Einfhrung die Metaphysik

Proseminar, WS 2014/15
Adrin Abshagen Castro
Essay 2:
Unter welchen Bedingungen findet mereologische Komposition statt?

When it comes to mereological composition there are three ways of approaching to this
problem, but each of these views include different ways of getting closer to the problem.
Mereology is a methaphysical theory of part and whole. This theory has been presented
under different points of view by Lesniewski, Tarski and Goodman; each of them have
presented formal systems, definitions axioms and proofs of theorems.

First of all I will explain briefly what consists the mereological composition and then
under the premises of the metaphysical view I have embraced I will give an explanation
of how does this occur and I will also explain why I did choose that mereological view.

If we take for example two atoms of oxygen which each of one are in one different
corner of the universe and two atoms of oxygen that are very near; we would conclude
that while the atoms that stand each one on one corner of the universe dont conform
together an object, the oxygen atoms that are very near do conform together an object
specifically an O2 molecule. But since Im embracing the unrestricted composition (UC)
theory due to its simple and elegant nature, I will claim that the two atoms that stand in
different corners of the universe conform a further object.
So when question over which rule or condition determines when compositions occurs
and when does not occur is formulated as the following: When does a pair of objects
satisfy the predicate x is a proper part of y? This question is known as the Special

Composition Question. We will respond: always.

In order to give some cohesion to the argumentation that will follow, firstly we will
have to explain some basic notions of mereology.
First of all we have to know that a proper part of something must be smaller and distinct
than the whole. Secondly we need to know that overlapping occurs when any things
have some parts in common, while disjoint things are just the opposite. And finally we
will say that something is a sum when every member of a thing A is also a part of x, and
very part of the thing x overlaps some member of the thing A.

As we saw at the beginning of this paper, one of the philosophers who presented
mereology was Tarski, and since we are following the UC view which is still very
accepted in the philosophical community, our view will also rely on the axioms that
were formulated by this pioneer. The first axiom refers to the transitivity principle
referred to the relation is part of. The second one concern to the existence and
singularity of sums, where non-empty set has a unique sum.
Some philosophers as Markosian have argumentated against this second axiom,
accusing UC of being a non-innocent metaphysical theory. This objection will take
strength with the accusal of UC being a 4-D theory, which we will answer soon.

Before we answer the main objections against UC, we will show the benefits of
maintaining this position and through objections we will disdain with an elimination
argument the moderate compositional theory and the nihilist one.

Firstly we maintain that UC has the advantage of giving a solution to the explosion of
reality problem. This problem asks if composed objects like computers or stars are

something beyond the matter which is composed of. Does an object become a new
entity when we gave a form to it? So we are lead into the problem which maintains that
there are infinite entities inhering in any parcel of matter.
But this doesnt look like a real problem for UC because since we embrace classic
mereology we also embrace the uniqueness axiom which states that if x and y have all
the same parts then they are the really one and the same object.

Another objection that is very similar to the last one accuses UC to embrace 4-D, theory
which has the need of postulating that two different objects can share the same matter,
space and exists at the same time. The adversaries of UC theory claim that UC needs to
postulate two different objects, the mereology variable, which is composed of different
parts during different times and the mereology constant which is always compose of the
same parts. Because for example the same particles that form me, before I came to birth
they still existed scattered all around the world and since UC claims that those particles
constitute an object on both temporal times we have to postulate the mereological
variable and constant.
But we can avoid this problem that would affect the uniqueness axiom by saying that
like I am a mereologically variable object that, at each moment of its existence, shares
a temporal part with a mereologically constant object.

UC represents also a smooth solution to the problem of arbitrariness and indeterminacy

that afflicts the restrictive mereology theories when it comes to answer the Special
Composition Question.. This question was made out by van Inwagen and says: When do
a number of objects form a whole?
Three answers are possible: always which is going to be ours, never which is

maintained by the nihilists and sometimes but now always which is given by the
moderate views that hold a restricted compositional theory.

Nihilism claims that there are no composed objects, there are only mereological
simples. There are no clouds or example, but just atoms that are arranged cloud-wise, so
there is some kind of nominal existence of composite objects. In order to solve this
problem nihilists use a technic which implies paraphrasing ordinary sentences that seem
to be true but that are false according to the nihilists, and they transform them into
sentences that are true in the nihilists mind.
But this nihilist view has a big problem:
If we accept the Leibnizs maxim that claims: if there are nominal existents, there must
be real existents , this means that we have to postulate at least one kind of minimal
particle that cannot be further divided. But then when we see a person that is
consciousness, we only n say that there are some simples arranged consciousnesswise.
But this last phrase is very problematic because we will need to account for the
apparent fact that there is a single subject of that consciousness, which is the same
subject that will be having a similar thought later on.
Nihilism also faces another problem: what if there are no mereological atoms and all is
just gunk? Atomless gunk is what Lewis called the belief that the matter is infinitely
divisible, ad infinitum. So if this belief is true nihilism does not only reject composite
objects but any kind of them.

On the other side we have the restricted compositional theory or moderate view. This is
also divided in different views depending on which are the principles of the restriction.
The principle would stand like this: the xs compose something iff the xs stands to one

another in relation R.
We will only show the deficiency of the most famous restricted theories, the ones that
imply one of the next conditions: contact & cohesion and brutal composition.

The contact principle states that objects that compose something must be exactly occupy
some continuous region of space. But this view has a lot problems as ruling out many
common sense objects and ruling in objects that common sense would deny its statue of
object as two persons who got paralyzed while handshaking.
But if the participant tries to save this principle restriction applying some matter of
degree then this principle must also face a problem of rising of arbitrariness or
vagueness. There would be objectionable arbitrariness if some minute degree of
cohesiveness makes the difference between forming a new object or not. And vagueness
would rise if it is not determinate at which point along some continuum of cohesiveness
a new whole comes to being.
Then if we apply the Siders Sorites argument which claims that either composition
always takes place or it never occurs, we find that we are left between two possibilities:
nihilism and UC. Since we have already shown that nihilism does not work, we must
stick on UC.

Lastly we need to face the two last options that may be taken instead of the UC: the van
Inwagens position and the brute composition maintained by Markosian.

Van Ingwagen claims that only live things are composal , so there is something that the
xs compose iff the activity of the xs constitutes a life.
But this conception implies also a big vagueness problem because there are some

entities which are between life and non-life, or there are even some cells which
compose a further object which could survive out of that system.
Finally we reach the last view called Brutal Composition which is able to sidestep the
objections made to the previous moderate views. This theory claims that composition
must be restricted in order to eliminate strange object compositions. But while they
maintain this need of restriction they say that some objects compose wholes and other
does not, without saying why. There is maybe no further reason for the fact that those xs
compose something, it is just a primitive fact. So Brutal Composition aswers that there
is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to SCQ.
There are some tangible problems that rise against this conception:
The first one has to do with the implausibility of this theory. Most of the philosophers
will not accept that SCQ should remain without any answer since it is a very important
one. But the BC followers will say that all the likely ansers has turned up nothing that
seems to work.
Another big objection is the one done by Sider. Since there is the possibility that two or
more objects compose a further object and at the same time there is also the possibility
that those two or more objects don not compose a further one, then Sider asks us to
imagine a serie where the beginning is started with the objects which compose a further
one and the end is finished by those which do not. He tell us that in the middle of those
two cases there must be groups of objects that do compose and do not compose which
connect the two original cases. So since in one of the corner of the serie there is
composition and in the other corner there is no composition, then there must be
somewhere in the series where there will be a pair of adjacent cases such that in one
case composition occurs and in the other case does not occur. Thus, there are going to
be two cases that are near-duplicate which one of them compose an further object and

the other does not. And this conclusion is quite implausible. There is an abrupt cut-off.
And this view also is against commonsense, because people think that there is really an
answer to the question under which condition objects are conformed.

So as a conclusion ( la escribir maana, sern dos o tres lneas)