Multiple Definition

Author(s): I. A. Richards
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 34 (1933 - 1934), pp. 31-50
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544231 .
Accessed: 11/01/2015 21:26
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Aristotelian Society and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

at 55, RusseUSquare,London,
oftheAristotelian
Society
Meeting
W.C.l,onNovember
27th,1933,at 8 p.m.

II.-MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

By I. A. RICHARDS.
THE purposeof this paper is to invite discussionof a type of
analysiswhichhas, I believe,a numberof novel features. We
shallbe agreed,I hope,that a chieftask ofphilosophyis analysis
have
and thatthisis because the wordswe use in philosophizing
many meaningsnot the same for different.
users, and that,
further,
the very wordswe use in givingour analyses are apt
themselvesto have-being moreabstract,and beingused with
a more ambitious intentionof precision-more troublesome
ambiguitiesthan any others.
Everywordin everyphilosopher'sabstractvocabularyhas, I
take it, a numberof different
sensesto misleadhis readers(and,
alas, too often,himself). A remedyforthis would seem to be
to have morewords; and to put " one word, one sense; one
sense, one word" beforeus as a slogan. But, as we all know,
the new wordstend to take overthe ambiguitiesof the old, and
the result is only more words which need still more careful
watching.
Anotherremedy,and I hope a morehopefulone, would be
to have fewerwords,and it is as an experimentin vocabulary
thatwhatfollowshas beendrawnup. The advantage
restriction
of a minimumphilosophicword-list-foruse in analysiswouldbe that we shouldbe forcedto attendas closelyas possible
to the ambiguitiesof each word in it. A strictlyminimum
word-listwould be a measureof our powerto keep in mindthe
ranges of differentsenses which each word would, for our
philosophicalpurposes,carry.
E

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

32

T. A. RICHARDS.

The word-listI am using below is clearly very far from

beinga minimumlist-it is perhapsabouthalf-waytowardsone.
It is used hereas a step towardsa minimumword-listwhich
wouldlet me say anythingwhichanyphilosopherwould wishto
say in a way whichwouldhave a fairchanceofbeingunderstood
not onlyby trainedphilosophers
but by all reflective
personsincludingpersons(Chinese,for example) not of the European
linguisticand intellectualtradition. A furtherconditionwas
thatwhatwas writtenin it was to seemquitelikenormalEnglish.
It is in facttheword-list
ofBasic English,and as suchis governed
by many purposeswhich are not of philosophicinterest. Its
philosophicinterestis that it aims to be a language,a systemof
words,with whichany thoughtof any kind can be expressed
so as to be distinguishableby ordinaryuntrainedintelligence
fromany otherthoughtwithwhichit is likelyto be confounded
-a systemwithwhichany two thoughtswhichwe have a wish
to separatemay be separated.
This you will agreeis a grandioseaim and I do not pretend
that this word-list,as workedout at present,entirelyfulfilsit.
The wordsessentialto it are between two and threehundred.
A numberof them,and these the most important,have (as in
ordinaryEnglish) a varietyof senses. The problemis to find
ways of distinguishing
betweenthese senseswiththe aid of the
otherwordsin the list. Naturallyenoughthe factthat different
wordsoftenhave (in a given context)the same sense and the
same range of senses soon becomes very evident. It would
have been possibleto crossout a numberofwordson thisground,
but the effectwould have been to make my specimendiscourse
more monotonousthan seemed desirableat this stage. That
was one of the philosophically
irrelevantconsiderations
alluded
to above.
This list then is certainlyredundant. The doubt will
ratherbe, I think,whetherit is sufficient-whether
all philosophic

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

3:3

DEFINITION.

ideas are capable of being displayedin termsof the multiple

senses of so small a list of words,and whetherthese multiple
senses can be reciprocallycontrolledwithinthe systemwith
forphilosophicalpurposes. I do not want
refinement
sufficient
to put any limitsto the sensesofthe word" philosophical" here
that are narrowerthan thoseusuallyobserved. We mightfind,
however,that some kinds of philosophicalviews went into a
restrictedlanguage much more easily than others and this
of our opinions-whatever
confirmation
mightbe an interesting
these were-of certainphilosophicalaims and methods.
In steppingover into this limitedlanguage (fromnow on I
make use of no word not in mv word-listwithoutstraightaway givingan accountof its sense) threeotherways in which
such tests mightbe of interestmay be noted. They may give
us a way of learningmoreabout our use of wordsin everyday
talk, writingand reading: a way of teachingthose who are
startingserious reasoningto put questions about the senses
of theirwords; and a way of makinga,new sortof comparison
betweendifferent
views and of controllingthese comparisons
by puttingthemintoa system.
The opinionswhichcome now are put forwardnot only for
purposesof argumentbut forcomparisonwithotherstatements
of like viewsmade withan unlimitedword-list.

The best thingwill be to get agreement,if I am able, to a

generalquestion about divisionsbetweenthe senses of words.
This is the mostimportantpointof all. It is not hardto make
clear,but it is veryhard to keep in mind,and till we are able
to do this all the time troublesof every sort will get in our
way at everyturn. It is this:
When we take a wordand give it a sense,we are free; we
are able, forthe purposein hand,to give it any sensewhichfor
E:2

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

34

I. A. RICHARDS.

the purposein hand will be of use. The sense we give it first

may in fact not be of use, we mav not be able-keeping to
that sense-to say somethingwhichwe have a desireto say.
If so, then we have to make a new attempt; we go back and
sense to the word. But when we firstgive a
give a different
sense to a wordwe are not limitedin any way. We may give
any sense whichseems of value so long as thereis not serious
dangerof othermen takingit in othersenses; that is, if only
we are able to make clear whichsense we are givingit.
Wordshave not got-by naturaldesignas it were-senses of
which they are the owners. They are instrumentsby which
men give directionto thoughts,*nothingmore; thoughthe
conditionsunderwhichwe are able to make them do this are
limited. But-and herethe troublecomesin-when we give a
fixedsenseto a wordwe have at the same timemade it possible
to say somethingswithit, and not possibleto say otherthings,
which we will probablyhave a strongdesire to say later oni.
We are not able to see, at first,whatwe willbe able to say with
the wordso fixed,and what we will not be able to say withit.
We have to let the test of experiencegive us the answerto this
secret. A time may come and probably will come when we
have a strongdesire to say somethingwith the word which
the sense we have given to it will not let us say. Then we
may come to the decisionthat the firstsense we gave to the
word was not the rightone, that we made an errorin using
the wordso. But here we have to take greatcare. Thereare
two importantand very different
ways in which we may be
"
said to have made anierror" and in whichthe sense we gave
may be said to have been " not the rightsense
* And feelings,
and desiresand acts, inaddition. But herewe have
in view onlythe use of wordsforthe controlof thoughtsin the narrow
sensein whichthoughtsare separatefromotherprocessesin the mind
(See 1 2).

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

35

(1) The sense we gave may not have been the sense of most
make
use forthe purposein hand. In this way we frequently
errorsand the senses we give to words are frequentlynot the
rightones. We may make an errorin this way withoutever
makingany false statements.
(2) But thereis anotherway of makingerrors. When we
make a falsestatement,we are in error-but in a quite different
way. In takinga wordand givingit a sensewe are not in error
in this way-till, having given the word this sense, we make
some false statementwith the word. Till we do this we may
be unwisein our use ofthe wordbut we are not sayinganything
whichis not true.
The greatdanger,and the cause of mostof our troublewith
is that we do not keep these two ways of
wordsin arguments,
" makingerrors" clearlyseparatein our minds. When we see
that we are unable to say what it is necessaryfor us to say
withouta changein the sense of a word,the feelingmay come
stronglythat somehowin giving that sense to the word we
weremakinga false statement. It seems to us as if therewas
somethingwhichwas the true ownerof the word and that in
givinig
the wordto anotherthing(thatis, in givinganothersense
to the word) we were takingit away fromits true ownerand
fromwhat
falselymakingsome otherthingseemto be different
"
it is. Bishop Butler'ssayingthat Every thingis what it is
and not anotherthing,"or some thoughtto the same effect,
may come into our mind,and give us the feelingthat we have
done wrong. We have, by the effectof teachingand, it seems
possible,by birth,a strongimpulseto take words to be the
names of things-one thing,one name: one name,one thingand go on to the idea that,if we wereonlyable to see enough,
" (What is
the true answerto the question," What is ___?
Art, the Mind, Existence,Value, Science, Belief? etc.) would
becomeclearto us. But these 'questions' have no answers-

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

36

1. A. RICHARDS.

in the formin whichwe most frequentlyput them. Some of

themare not questionsat all; othersare questionswhichhave
to be put in theform" Whatis thisword ' ---'
beingusedfor
in this connection? " Puttingthemin the shortform" What
is ? " gives us a quite wrongidea of the sort of answer
whichis possible,and the firstgreatstep to a bettercontrolof
thoughtis to see whythisis so.
An examplemay make the positionclearer. We have, say,
the word " Poetry". There are a great numberof interesting
statementswe are able to make in connectionwith the word
" Poetry". We maysay that Poetryis a way of puttingwords
togetherso as to be the cause of a specialsortof effect; or that
it is a way of puttingwordstogetherwhichcomesfroma special
sortofact or eventorexperiencein themindof themanwhoputs
themtogether; or that it is a way of puttingwordstogetherin
verses-that is, such that (with the rightinstruments)tests
may be made whichmake clearthat some qualityof the sounds
or motionof the wordscomesback timeaftertimein a regular
way; or that it is a way of puttingwordstogetherin which
it seems that therewas a regularorder(rhythm)of sounds or
motionsin the writerof them; or that in a completereaction
to themsome regularorderof soundsor motionswill come into
the mind in connectionwith whichthey will take theirplaces
(these give two other senses to the word " verse"), or we
may say that Poetryis wordsput togetherin such a way that
when sense and feelingis given to themin readingthe motion
and sound seem to be in special agreementwith the sense.
We may go on fora longtimesayingthingsof thissortwith
the word " Poetry". We may say thatit is beautifuland high
thoughtsin delicateand rightlanguage,or that it is the coming
back intothe quiet mindofstrongfeeling,or thatit is an important amusement,or that it is a sort of teachingwhichis fullof
pleasure,or that it is the breathand higherbeingofknowledge,

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

37

or thatit is the look on the faceof science. (Some ofthemmay

seemstrange,but threeofthemare the opinionsofWordsworth,
the othersare fromShelley,Sir PhilipSidneyand T. S. Eliot.)
If we make a comparisonbetweenthesesayings,we will see
that the word" is " is not the same in all of them. In the first
group it will seem natural to put the sign_ in the place of
" is", in the secondthiswillnot seemso natural. This changeis
most important. To make use of a special word fromLogic,
the firstgroup are naturallytaken as definitions-thatis, as
attemptsto give an account of a senseof the word"Poetry ".
The second group are more naturallytaken as statementsthat is to say we take themas if theword " Poetry" had some
othersense given it beforeand as if we are now sayingsomethingabout the thingsof whichthe word (in this before-fixed
sense)is the name. It is clearthat onlythe secondgroup,taken
as statements,are able to be true or false. The firstgroup(as
definitions)
do no morethangivea senseto theword" Poetry";
they do not go on to say anythingabout the thingsof which
the word " Poetry" in this way becomesa name-and because
theydo not say anythingit is happilynot possibleforthemto be
wrong. But, in mostarguments,
mengivetheirchiefattentionnot to makingopen and public the senses which may be best
used-but to the attemptto say the rightthingabout a nothing
whoseformand qualitiesare changedwitheverystatementmade
about it. When a man says, withmuchweightupon the " is",
and
" he is probablygivingus a definition
that " Poetryis
thenit wouldbe betterif he did not becomeso heated.
A strangelighton all this-that it is strangeis the strangest
thingof all-comes withthoughton howthe sensesofour words
are givento us. " Poetry" forexample. We have knowledge
of it first,let us say, in connectionwithcertainverses. Which
of the qualitiesof the verses (so faras we may then see them
separately)do we firsttake as the sense of " Poetry" ? And

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

38

I. A. RICHARDS.

whichlater,whenthe othersortsof thingsnamed poetrycome

beforeus ? Is thereany needto be surprised
if,afteryearsofthis
sort of thing,we have no clear, fixedand completesense for
" Poetry" in our mind; ifthe best we do, whenwe make use of
the word,is to give withit a mass of mixed,brokensensesone
of whichwill seem the most importantat one time,anotherat
another(as actingdefinitions)
changingwiththe different
statementsin whichthe wordis used ? For purposesof amusement,
forattackingone another'sopinionsin a generalway,forstitching togetherslow minutesin company,such play withunnoted
sensesis ofvalue,withoutdoubt. But not forseriousdiscussion.

Let us take the most importantwords,in the theoryof the

comparisonofsensesand in the workoftakingstatementsto bits
for the purpose of comparison,and make lists of their chief
senses. We willgivenumbersto thesesenses,so thatwe mayput
a fingeron them,withouttrouble,whenin the processof discussion it becomesnecessaryto give themseparateattention. We
will be able to see-together and on one page-the chiefsenses
whichmay be cominginto use at this point in the discussion.
We willthensee not onlywhichtricksand twistswe willhave to
keepin mind,but-and thisis moreimportant-theotherpossible
theories.
The firstreactionof most readersto numbers(12. 112, 3*24
and so on) in pages put beforethemis normallyone offearmixed
with disgust. It is hoped, however,that here the great help
whichsuch numberinggivesin keepingdifferent
thingsseparate
willmakeyou morekindto them.
I give in my account only some of the reasonsformaking
the divisionswhere I do. This apparatus is a machine for
separatingthe sensesof otherwordswhenit is necessaryto do
so. The test of the value of our divisionsis the amountof help

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

39

theygive us. It is importantto keep in view thisfactthat we

are not here puttingon paper somethingwhichis givento us,
so muchas makinga machine--amachineforcontrolling
thought
whichwill let us do some thingsand keep us fromdoingother
things. It is a good machineif it is of use to us; any changes
whichwill make it of moreuse to us will make it better. They
are notable to be testedin any otherway thanthis.
On the otherhand,ifit is to be ofuse, it is necessaryto keep
some of the divisionsin the places in whichour mindsnormally
put them. The attemptto make a machinelike thisis, in fact,
a way (and the best way) to the discoveryof how our mindsdo
theirwork. But, as we will see, our mindsdo theirworkin a
numberof different
ways. They put the chiefdivisions,upon
which all the othersare dependent,in a numberof different
places fordifferent
purposes. So a numberofdifferent
machines,
different" philosophies,"different" logics," are possible and
necessary. Verylittleof the theoryof the connectionsbetween
thesepossiblemachineshas been workedout and the historyof
thoughtis still waitingforsuch a theory.
The mostimnortantwordsin thismachineare
Theoryof
Theoryof
Theoryof
Knowledqe.
Instrurments.
Connections.
Thought1
Property
Cause
Is
Effect
Thing2
Force
Fiction3
General
Fact 4
Law
Special
Knowledge5
Quality
Part
Relation
Belief6
System
Necessary
True7
Change
Possible
Same
Sense 8
Probable
Sort
Degree

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

40

I. A. RICHARDS.

With accountsof the chiefsensesof these key-wordsbefore

us on paperin clearlists,the worsttroublesof all discussionwill
in a shorttimebe seento givethebestchancesfornewdiscoveries.
They will no longerbe, as they are now, causes of unfertile
doubt and complexerrors. The lists we make herewill at first
not be completeand clear enoughto give us everysense which
is needed. But even lists which are not completewill let us
see much which we do not now naturallysee withoutthem.
Even a bad attemptwillbe muchbetterthan no attemptat all.
first-andlet us notbe troubled
We willtake thewordthought
if at firstwe seem not to be sayinganythingnew or important.
All men have knowledgeabout mostof thesethingsfromtheir
earlyyears,fromthe firststeps in theirlearning. We are only
puttingthisknowledgeintoorder.
Thought
1-1.

(In thewidestsense)any eventin themind.

In this sense all the historyof a mindis made up of thoughts;

but for most purposes we have to make divisions between
thoughtsand feelingsfor example, or betweenthoughtsand
desires. Feelings and desiresare equally events in the mind.
So take as a narrowersenseforthought:
themind.
before
1*2. An eventin themiindwhichputssomething
Some writerssay, or take as said, that the thingwhichis put,
bythought,beforethe mindis a picture,or that, if it is not a
picture,it is somethingwhichis like a picturein beinga copy
of somethingwhichis not beforethe mind (or in the mind) in
this sense. These thingswhich,on this theory,are before(in)
the mind are frequentlynamed images. For example, when
we have a thoughtof a tree,we will be said to have an image
(or picture)of a tree beforethe mind: and when we have a
thoughtofa noise,we have an image(a copy) ofthe noisebefore

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MU1JLTIPLE DEFINITION.

41

us, and so on. This theoryof imagesmay be wrong. A great

numberof personssay that theydo not ever have images,and
personswho sometimeshave images say that they are able to
have thoughtswithouthaving any images. Even those who
make use of imagesin theirthoughtsay that theirimagesare
sometimesnot at all like the thingstheyare havingthoughtsof.
So it is wise not to make our accountof thoughtsdependenton
any theoryof imagesbut to say that what is beforethe mind
in thoughtis in some way the thingwhichthe thoughtis about
and not onlysome pictureor othercopy of it in the mind. It
will be clear that, if we say this,the word beforeis not being
used in the same way in whichit is used when we say " this
book is beforemy eyes". We take beforehere in " beforethe
mind" in a special sense (not quite like any other use of it)
as the name of the relationwhichthoughtshave to the things
theyare thoughtsabout.
What is importantis that thoughts(in this sense, 1.2) put
the mind into a special connectionwith things. A thoughtis
of or aboutsome thingand so it may be true (7.1) or false.
A feelingor desireis not about somethingin thesameway (when
we are not, as we frequently
are, givingto the wordsfeelingor
desirea sense whichmakes themthe same as thoughtsin this
sense). It willbe notedthat we may equallysay that a thought
is of somethingor aboutit. In most places the two are not
different.We may, however,make themdifferent-aswe will
see in connectionwiththe word thing(2.2)-and this gives us
sometimesa feelingthat theyare different
in some way in other
places where,in fact,theirsenseis the same.
A divisionin thissenseofthoughtis of muchuse :121. A thought
may be of something
as true,as beingso; or
it may (1-22) be onlyof something,
withoutthequestion" Is the
so ornot? " comingup at all. In otherwordsa thought
something
may be, in addition,a belief(6.2 or 6 3), or it may be onlya

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

42

I. A. RICHARDS.

thought. When we are not deeply interested,or needingto

do anything,then our thoughtsare frequentlywithoutthis
addition. This divisionis importantwhenwe cometo questions
senses of true,
about the limitsof knowledge,and the different
belief,
fiction,
possibleand so on.
1X3. A divisionwhichis sometimesimportantcomes up with
thought
(and a greatnumberof other words). A thoughtmay
be an eventin thehistoryof a mind (1.2) or it may (1.5) be
a groupofgeneralproperties
whichthateventhas and otherevents
mayhave. For example,we say " Newton'sbest thoughtstook
place in Cambridge" and " Newton'sthoughtabout space was
changedby Einstein." In thesecondof thesewe are not saying
that Einsteindid anythingto the eventsin Newton'shistory.
We are sayingthat in place of thoughts(such as Newtonhad)
of one sortEinsteinmade use of thoughtsof anothersort.
In sense 1-2 a thoughtis one event with a fixedplace and
time; in sense1 *3 a thoughtis a generalproperty
whichthoughts
(1 *2) may have. If theyhave it, we say that theyare the same
thought,and by a fiction(3 2) we take themto be one thing
(2.4).
We may now go on fromthoughts
to things.
Thinng
2-1. The word with the most general sense possible. Wre
have to say " Everythingis a thing" because we have no more
generalword with whichto give an account of them. In this
sense,to say about anythingthat it is a thingis notto say anything about it. If it is then it is a thing. So thing,in this
sense, is almost without sense. It has less sense than any
other word. Like is, being and propertyit is an instrument
whichis ofuse onlyin puttingthe sensesofotherwordstogether.
Minds,events,processes,qualities,properties,
numbers,relations,
times,points,spaces, changes,rates of change,fictions,doubts,

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

43

smells,destructions-allthingswe have or make names forare, in thissense,things.

senseonlythosethings(2.1) are thingsabout
2 2. In a narrower
whichotherthingsare said. This senseis sometimesa littlehard
to see. The divisionis betweenwords used as names of substancesand wordsused as names of properties. But thesetwo
words substanceand propertyare almost as hard as thingto
senses. Our best way of getting
make clear in theirdifferent
the questionstraightwill be to give some examples. It is hard
onlybecauseit is so verysimple.
Whenwe say " grassis green" grassis the name of a thing
(in this sense) but greenis not. Grass here is a substance
we are sayingsomethingabout it. Greenhereis a propertya propertyof grass; it is somethingwe are sayingabout grass.
If we say " greenis pleasingto the eyes,"now greenhas become
a substance-we are sayingsomethingabout it. The division,
as I put it here,betweenthings(in this sense) and what are
not thingsis a questiononly of how we are using our words.
It is not a divisionin the things(2.1) we have thoughtsof,
but onlyin theorderin whichourthoughtsare put intolanguage.
but forsomequestions
For thisreasonit mayseemunimportant,
it is verynecessaryto be clear about it.
It is with this divisionthat a thoughtof somethingor a
thoughtaboutit may be made to seem different.A thought
may be of grass when nothingmore is said, but about grass
whenit is a thoughtthat grassis green.
In Logic the discussionof this question makes use Qf the
word abstract. An abstractthought(Latin " taken from") is
of a propertytakenfromthe substancewhichhas the property;
or of a substancetaken fromthe propertieswhichit has. It is
probablynot possibleto have a thoughtof a substancewithout
seemspossibleto have thoughts
any propertiesbut it frequently

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

44

1. A. RICHARDS.

of properties-forexample, green-without any thought of

any thingwhichis green. So we may get the idea that green
is somethingwhich may have existence by itself without
anythingwhichis green. But what we see is a greenspace.
Green,like otherproperties,only comes to us joined to other
things-not by itself-but we do not necessarilytake note-of
the otherthingsit is joined to.
2 3. A thingis a body. In this much narrowersense only

bodies are things,bodies being what we are able to see or to

have knowledgeof by touch,smell,hearing,or otherformsof
observationthroughthe senses (8.2). Earth, grass,bread,bits
of iron,and anythingwhichhas the same sort of existenceas
these,are thingsin thissense.
for sone time.
294. A thingis anythingwhichhas existence
Most bodies have existencefor some time and so are things
in this sense, in addition. But we take, as having existence
for some time,some thingswhichare not bodies-our minds,
forexample,nations,laughs,digestion,events,chainsof events,
acts and processes. The importantpoint is that thingsin this
sense keep the same (or seem to be the same) long enoughfor
us to go withthemin thoughtfromone conditionto another.
We are able to say of them that they are now this and then
that, now here,forexample,and thenthere,now red and then
green,now quick and thenslow. If, forexample,a mind does
not keep in some ways the same fromyear to year,it is not
possible to give a historyof it. Our tendencyto make up
histories,to give accounts whichseem to be about one thing
and its changes,and not only about the way in whichdifferent
eventscome one
thingstake one another'splaces, or different
after anotheris responsiblefor our wide use of this sense of
thing. The question" Is a mind one thing,in fact? " (in this
sense of thing)-that is to say, " Does it keep the same ? "

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

45

is possiblynot one to whichwe will ever be able to give an

answer. The question may only be about the way in which
our thoughtsmake an attemptto give orderto events. So a
thing (in this sense) may be only a trick of our thoughtsto
make theirworksimple. The question comes up very clearly
in connectionwith the new ideas in science. Is an electrona
thingin this sense, for example,or are the waves with which
men of science give an account of the motionof light? And
how about the points of which space has been said to be
made ? Or how about nationswhentheygo througha change
of organizationor government
? Or ideas when we have seen
that they are not wise but foolish? Are theythe same things
beforeand after?
With this we come to:

Fiction
3 1. A storynot put forwardas fact (4.1: See Belief).
3 2. A thought(1.2) used as if there was a thing (2.4) in
agreementwithit whenthereis in fact (4 2) no such thing.

Fact
4-1. Anythingwhichis so.
4 11. That whichmakesa thoughtfalsewhenit is false.
4*2. Anythingwhichis (has been,willbe).
4 *21. Anythingcomplexwhichis.
4 *22. Anythingwhichmay be.
4 *3. Our onlyway of puttinga thoughtto the test is by comparison with other thoughts,and by having other thoughts
about them. To get at facts we have to have thoughtsabout
them. This seemsright,but it may not be true of those facts
whichare our historiesas we go throughthem. These events
in our minds,some say, may be got at straightwithoutany
need forus to have thoughtsabout them. (Bergsonis a representativeof thissortof view.) But generallyit is truethat the

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

46

I. A. RICHARDS.

testof a thoughtis anotherthought.If thisis so, thenthe

' X ' true? "
" Is X a fact? " (4I 1) or" Is thestatement
question
with
ofa thought
becomesa questionnotabouttheagreement
with
of a numberofthoughts
a factbut aboutthe agreement
one another.
whichis in
Thisgivesus 4 3, a factis thatwhicha thought
(7 2) is of. And,ifwe
withtherestof truethoughts
agreement
take" whatthe thoughtis of" as changedhereintoa fiction,
true? " becomesequallya question
thequestion" Is a thought
withone anothernot about
of thoughts
aboutthe agreement
This view goes with
things.
of
with
the agreement thought
the view that all thingsare thoughts(whichhas the name
"Idealism" in thehistoryof thought).But thereis no need
has
to takethislastviewevenifwe takethefirstthatthought
to be testedby thought.The two maybe takenseparately,
to seemdependent
thoughtheyhavebeenmadebysomewriters
upononeanother.
witha generalthought.
4 44. Thatwhichis in agreement
Fromfact it is a natural step to:

Knowledge
5-001. Thatofwhichwehaveknowledge.
5 002. Those processes(thoughts1 2) by whichwe have
knowledge.
to something.
5' 1. A reaction
causesof our
5 101. That of whichwe have knowledge-the
reaction.
in us bywhichwehaveknowledge.
5 102. Thoseprocesses
to it.
takenwithout
farther
reaction
5 11. Ourreaction
to thisreaction.
5-12. Ourreaction
5 13. Reactionwithoutanyeventsbetweenit and thecauses
of it.
of a mind,a
5-2. An eventin the mind,partof the history
bitofexperience.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

47

MULTIPLE DEFINITION.

5 3. A special relationbetweenthe mind (or some event in

the mind)and things.
5 *5. WVhat
is said by an authoritynot able to makeerrors.
This puts the questionsof beliefand truebeforeus:Belief
6 *1. A thoughttakento be truewithoutbeingtested.
6 11. A thoughttakento be truewhichis not able to be tested.
6 2. A thoughtwe take as a guidein ouracts or feelings.
6'21. A feeling,desire,impulse,tendencyin the mind as a
guidein our acts or feelings.
6 3. A thoughtwe are certainis true.
6 4. A specialfeelingwhichis the cause of our beingcertain.
True
7 001. A statementis truewhenthe thoughtusingit is true..
7-1. A thoughtis truewhenit is in agreementwithwhat it is
about.
7-2. ...
in agreementwithall otherthoughtsin comparison
withwhichit may be taken.
7 21. ...
in comparisonwithwhichit is possibleto take it.
7 22. . . in comparisonwithwhichit is wise to take it.
7-3. A thought(feeling,desire,etc. . . .) which we have a
needto take as a guidein ouracts is frequently
said to be true.
7-4. A thoughtwhich comes with a feelinglike the feelings
whichcome withtrue (7*1, 7.2) thoughtsis frequently
said to
be true.
And now we come to the senses of sense Sense
8 1. A general propertyof a thoughtby which what the
thoughtis about is fixed.
8 2. Seeing, hearing, touching, smelling,tasting-the five
senses-and any otherway of gettingknowledgewhichis like
them.
F

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

48

1. A. RICHARDS.

8 3. A use of sensewhichis nearerto the one we are makinoJ

is that in whichpersonswhoare wiseare said to havesense,that
is, to have goodsense.
Goodsenseis, at least in part,a powerto keep our thoughts,
thesensesofourwords,in therightplaces. So thereis a connection betweenthe controlof the sensesof wordsand good sense.
One who is not able to keep the sensesof his wordsin orderis
said to be "out of his senses". In thissense, who among us
is in them?
The readermay be waitingto put a questionwhichhas been
in his mind fromthe start. What is this Agreement
on which
almost everythingin this apparatus of divisionsseems to be
dependent? It came at the start in the account given of our
purpose; it came again in the senses of thought,
fiction,fact,
knowledge,
true,sense, and in the senses of of and about. It
comes,but not so openly,in the chiefsenses of cause and law.
It is at the back of any discussionof change,same,property,
general,necessary,
possibleand probable. No otherword seems
so important,
but no special discussionof it has been attempted
till now in thesepages.
- We have seen,withtrue,withsense,withfact,
withknowledge;
and we would see again withproperty,
generaland sortthat the
samequestionsmaybe put again and againin different
words. A
way,a form,a sort,a group,a property
areall ways(sorts,forms,
groups,properties)
ofthings; and a thingmaybe a law,and a law
again a way. The words with which discussiongoes on are
more in number-thoughevery word has its group of senses
-than the sensestheyare used to put in order. And at more
than one place the troubleand dangerto thoughtwhichcome
fromour way of taking an answeredquestion as a new one
might have been pointed out. Is this question " What is
Agreement? " only the other questions "What is a sort? "'
" What is a way of being the same ? "

"What is a general

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

.MULTIPLE

DEFINITION.

49

property?" "How are thoughtstrue? " " What is kinowledge? " and "What is a cause ? " put in anotherform? As
questions-as formsof words to which,when senses for them
have been fixed,answersmay be given-these are, or may be
made, clearly different.But the fact (4 2) about which we
put themseemsto be one fact-a verycomplexfact,of whicha
numberof views,of parts of it, may be taken. The part which
may not be clear-for whicha separateaccountof the sensesof
Agreement
mightbe a help-is coveredby senses of the words
general,propertyand cause. It is possible, and not hard, to
give a list of them by using these words. But then someone
mightsay " Ah ! you are sayingwhat Agreementis by using
cause and general,and you said what cause and generalare by
usingAgreement!You are movingin a circleand youraccount
of thesethingsis onlya trick! " If, on the otherhand, I took
some new words,say X and Y, withwhichto givean account
oftheAgreement
whichhas beenusedin talkingaboutknowledge,
then someone would say, " Ah! he has given no accountof
X and Y, the sensesupon which everythingin his systemis
dependent; so it is not completeand has no base!" These
twoprotestswouldequallybe signsthatthepurposeofthesepages
has not been rightlytaken. As was said at the start, this
apparatus of senses is to be tested by the help it gives us in
puttingour thoughtsin order,in lettingus say what we have
a need to say and keepingus fromsayingotherthingswhichwill
getinthewayofourpurposes. If it is a help,thathelpis itsbase.
What the purposesare forwhichthe machinemay be a help
is only made clear by the range of its uses. We are able to
give an account of a purposeonly by sayingin detail what it
is a purposeto do. A purpose,in this sense, is not something
different
fromthe way in whichit may be workedout.
What is importantis to see that the sensesof wordsmay be
taken in groups,and that if the formof one group of senses

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

50

I. A. RICHARDS.

becomesclear to us, the formof othergroupsof senses,which

wvemaynot everhave put in connectionwiththem,maybecome
clear at the same time. This gives us new chances for the
controlof our thoughtand for taking over the knowledgewe
have ofone fieldintootherfields. As Coleridgesaid, " thatonly
is learining
whichcomes again as power." And to see how any
senseis in relationto any otheris to get a sortof learningwhich
comesagain as power.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Sun, 11 Jan 2015 21:26:24 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions