G.R. No.

133706
Francisco Estolas vs. Adolfo Mabalot

Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban, J.)

May 7, 2002

FACTS:
Adolfo Mabalot was awarded with an agricultural land by virtue of PD 27. Corresponding
Certificate of Land Transfer was issued on November 11, 1973. In May 1978, he needed money
for medical treatment and passed the land to Francisco Estolas in exchange of P5,800 and P200
worth of rice. According to Mabalot, the transfer was only a verbal mortgage but Estolas treated
the same as sale. Department of Agrarian Reform then issued a Transfer Certificate Title in favor
of Estolas. In 1988, Mabalot tried to redeem the land from petitioner but was unsuccessful. DAR
Regional Office decided in favor of the petitioner contending that there was abandonment on the
part of the respondent. DAR Central Office, however, reversed its regional offices decision.
Estolas appealed but Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent, contending that the transfer
of land to petitioner is void and there was no abandonment by respondent since failure on the
redemption was due to a higher redemption price set by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the transfer of the agricultural land valid?
LAW:
Presidential Decree 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the
Land Reform Program of the government shall not be transferable except to the grantees heirs
by hereditary succession or back to the government by other legal means.
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
and cited that there is no room for interpretation in the provision of PD 27 regarding transfer of
agricultural land. It affirmed, as well, CAs decision on the non-abandonment of the subject land
by the respondent.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The award of agricultural land by virtue of PD
27 is based on the premise that farmers must be given opportunities to achieve a dignified
existence and to make them more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens. To protect
that interest, the law provides that transfer of title shall only be made if such would constitute
either transfer to the awardees heirs or to the government. This would ensure that these small
farmers will not be deceived or enticed to sell the property in consideration of urgent financial
needs. Such provision of the law accorded the farmers or grantees the protection they need from
abusive lenders or creditors.
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 109568

Roland Sigre vs.
Court of Appeals & Lilia Gonzales

Supreme Court 1st Division (Austria-Martinez, J.)

August 8, 2002

FACTS:
Lilia Gonzales, in her capacity as a co-administratrix of the estate of Matias Yusay, filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus, seeking to prohibit Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
from accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBP to turnover to Gonzales the
rentals previously remitted by Sigre. Sigre was a tenant of Gonzales in an irrigated rice land in
Iloilo. He remitted rental payments to Gonzales until the issuance of memorandum circular no. 6
series of 1978 by the Department of Agrarian Reform, which set the guidelines in the rental
payments by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of PD No. 27. Pursuant to the
issuance, Sigre stopped paying Gonzales and remitted the rentals to LBP instead. Gonzales
questioned the validity of the circular and the constitutionality of PD 27. The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Gonzales and ordered LBP to return the rentals to the respondent and Sigre to
revert direct payment to Gonzales. Rolando Sigre, who substituted Ernesto, filed consolidated
petitions for review alleging that erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Is the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 invalid? Is PD No. 27 unconstitutional?
LAW:
PD No. 27 decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them
the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor.
PD No. 816 provides that rentals are to be paid to the landowner by agricultural lessee until after
the valuation of the property shall have been determined.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rolando Sigre and granted his consolidated petitions. The
Court ruled that DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not in conflict with PD 816, which states
that tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of
the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and DAR. The circular only
supplements such Presidential Decree by mandating that tenant-farmer pays rental to LBP after
the value has been determined. Moreover, the Court reiterated that there is no question on the
constitutionality of PD 27, providing for the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of soil
and transferring to them the ownership of the land they till.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. DAR Memorandum Circular and PD 816 are not
in conflict with each other, rather, they complement each other. With the promulgation of DAR
circular, the petitioner is now obliged to remit rental payments to Land Bank of the Philippines
since the value of the property has been ascertained. The respondents contention is without merit
as the constitutionality of PD 27 has long been settled.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 128557

Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals and Jose Pascual

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)

December 29, 1999

FACTS:
An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after the refusal of Land Bank of the
Philippines to pay private respondent pursuant to the final decision rendered by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered to pay Php 1.9M plus interest as just
compensation to Jose Pascual. The computation was based on the increased value of the
Government Support Price, which was Php 300 per cavan of palay and Php 250 per cavan of
corn. The petitioner refused to pay the respondent alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and that it acted beyond its authority. It also asserted that the writ of mandamus could
not be issued, as there are other remedies available in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE:
Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9M plus 6% interest per annum as
just compensation to Jose Pascual?
LAW:
EO 228 provides that the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by PD 27 shall be based on the
average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in
accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuance
of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production shall be multiplied by 2.5,
the product shall be multiplied by Php 35, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos
of palay on October 21, 1972, or Php 31, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos
of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn
land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation
to the landowner.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting the compensation of Php
1.9M but it deleted the 6% interest per annum, as it is no longer applicable. Administrative Order
No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners for unearned interests is no longer
applicable since the PARAD already increased the GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan of
palay and from Php 31 to Php 250 per cavan of corn.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court to modify the decision of the Court of Appeals. I
believe that imposing 6% interest per annum on top of the Php 1.9M value of the lands is
unconscionable. It goes beyond the just compensation required by law to be given to
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

landowners. By PARADs decision to increase the basis of land valuation, the landowner has
already been justly compensated. The need for imposing the interest is uncalled for.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 132048

Hon. Antonio Nuesa and Restituto Rivera vs.
Court of Appeals, DARAB and Jose Verdillo

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Quisumbing, J.)

March 6, 2002

FACTS:
An award over two (2) parcels of agricultural land was granted by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in favor of Jose Verdillo. He then filed an application with the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to purchase the lots after twenty-one years. Restituto River, who
was in possession of and cultivating the land for the time being, filed a letter of protest against
Verdillo. He also filed an application to purchase the land. After investigation, Antonio Nuesa,
the Regional Director of DAR, ordered the cancellation of the grant to Verdillo. A petition was
consequently filed by Verdillo with the Provincial Adjudication Board for the annulment of the
said decision.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition of Verdillo on the ground of improper
remedy but the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator denied it and the DAR Appellate Adjudication
affirmed the same. Hence, petitioners submit this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Does the Court of Appeals act in grave abuse of discretion when it sustained DARABs decision?
LAW:
RA 6657 and other relevant laws and issuances provide that the Department of Agrarian Reform
is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program.
RULING:
The Court ruled that DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their
legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and
respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded the lots in question. It emphasized the
importance of observing jurisdictional limits set by enabling laws for the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. DARABs decision is unjustified, as it should not, in the first place,
take cognizance of the case. Hence, Court of Appeals decision was reversed and DAR Regional
Directors order granting the land in favor of Restituto Rivera was reinstated.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court, not only on the basis of jurisdictional authority,
but also based on the principle of equity. Restituto Rivera has been in possession of the land and
he has also been cultivating the same. It is only equitable that he be awarded with the agricultural
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

land. Jose Verdillo, who was originally granted with the award of land, did not act upon it until
after the lapse of twenty-one years. He did not object nor initiated an action to stop Rivera from
possessing and cultivating the land. Hence, it can be inferred that he was estopped from filing an
action to recover the land by way of the grant. As Rivera cultivates the agricultural land for quite
some time now, it is pursuant to the objectives of agrarian reform that he reaps the fruits of his
labor.

G.R. No. 139285

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr., J.)

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs.

December 21, 2007
Secretary of Agrarian Reform & DAR Regional
Director (Region V)
FACTS:
The Archbishop of Caceres owned several parcels of land planted with rice, corn and coconut
trees. He filed petitions for exemption from Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 of
these lands with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office in Naga City. Two petitions were
however denied by the Regional Director of Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioner
contended that such lands were donations and he held the property only in trust capacity. He
argued that the donations had stipulations prohibiting him to sell, exchange, lease, transfer,
encumber or mortgage the subject lands, from which he concluded that he was the landowner
as contemplated by the PD 27 and RA 6657. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Are the subject lands exempt from Operation Land Transfer under PD 27?
LAW:
RA 6657 provides for an exclusive list of exemptions as follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
a) Lands actually, directly, exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
b) Private lands actually, directly, exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that said prawn farms
and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program. In cases where the
fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be
necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall
apply.
c) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds
and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and convents
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
(As amended by RA 7881)
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in holding that subject lands are not
exempt from the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27 and RA 6657. Supreme Court held that the
Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the Filipino faithful as the lands in question
clearly do not fall under any of the exemptions enumerated by the law. The law is clear on the
exemptions granted and there is no room for interpretation. According to the decision in this
case, the Archbishop, as a religious leader, can just take solace in the fact that his lands are going
to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them to the fullest.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court that the land in question should not be exempt
from the OLT of PD 27. The ultimate goal of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is to
accord land to the landless who can utilize such to its fullest. With the nobility of this law, it is
only proper that exemptions be strictly construed. Only exclusions contemplated by law should
be allowed to ensure that its purpose would not be defeated. Moreover, I find the contention of
the Archbishop rather unbecoming of a religious leader. He, among anybody else, should have
understood the reason behind the Operation Land Transfer of CARL. By filing the petitions for
exemptions, it was as if he wanted to deprive the landless the lands that should be awarded to
them.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 154654

Josephine Taguinod & Vic Aguila vs.
Court of Appeals, Antonino Samaniego, et al.

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Velasco Jr., J.)

September 14, 2007

FACTS:
Salud Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots based on homestead patents. Said lots
were transferred to Vic Aguila, who was then a minor, and to Josephine Taguinod. Both lots were
held under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 with 12 tenants or farmerbeneficiaries identified. Salud Aguila, on behalf of Vic Aguila, filed an application for retention
over the said land. And when Vic Aguila reached the age of majority, he filed a letter-protest for
exclusion or exemption from OLT. Taguinod filed the same letter-protest seeking for exclusion
and exemption from OLT. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended
the approval of applications of Salud and Taguinod to the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) for retention of the lots in question. PARO did grant the application, which led
the beneficiaries to file a counter-protest.
The issue was then elevated to the Regional Director of DAR, who ruled that the application for
retention be granted to the petitioners of not more than seven (7) hectares of land. Lots in excess
of 7 hectares must be placed under the control of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners filed
motions for reconsideration.
Taguinod filed an appeal with the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
contending that she was the rightful owner of the disputed land after redeeming the property
from Salud Aguila, her adoptive mother, when such land was subjected to a mortgage. The
Secretary affirmed the decision of the DAR Regional Director and denied the petitioners appeal.
The Secretary also found that Salud Aguila was disqualified to retain 7 hectares of land.
With this decision, the petitioners interposed appeal before the Office of the President. The
Office of the President ruled in favor of the petitioners. It anchored its ruling on the fact that the
land in question was derived from a homestead patent. As such, these lands are exempt from the
coverage of PD 27.
The respondents, then, filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of
the Office of the President and reinstated the decision of the Secretary of DAR. CA agreed with
the Office of the President that the rights of the homesteaders are superior to those of tenants
invoking agrarian reform laws. However, petitioners failed to establish the identities of the
original homestead patentees and that they are direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees.
ISSUE:
Are the lots previously covered by homestead patents outside the ambit of PD 27?

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 6 provides that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who
still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to SC, it is a settled
rule that homestead grantees rights are superior to those of tenants invoking rights under the
agrarian reform law. However, in this case, the petitioners failed to prove the identities of the
original homestead grantees and establish that they were indeed direct compulsory heirs of the
grantees to avail of the exemption. As exclusions from the coverage of PD 27 must be strictly
construed, failure on the part of the petitioners to prove that they are covered by the exemptions
provided for by law extinguishes their rights to avail of the same. Premised on the said grounds,
the petitioners are disqualified to avail of the right of retention over the land as they are not small
landowners and the lands in dispute are subject to the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Since petitioners failed to prove that they hold
superior rights over the subject land, they are not entitled to the exemptions accorded by the law.
Granting them with the right of retention over the said land would defeat the very purpose of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Promotion of social justice is the paramount
consideration of the program; hence, it is a deviation from this core purpose if retention will be
granted to the petitioners who still own several parcels of land aside from the lots in question. It
is more in accordance with law that qualified farmer-beneficiaries will be granted parcels of land,
which they can till and fully utilize to improve their living.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 164195

Supreme Court 3rd Division (Chico-Nazario., J.)
Apo Fruits Corp & Hijo Plantation vs.
December 19, 2007
Court of Appeals & Land Bank of the Phils.
FACTS:
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Incorporated were owners of 5 parcels of land in
Davao. These companies voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the Department of Agriculture
pursuant to RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The parties were not able to
come into agreement as to the price of the lands in question. Thus, the petitioners brought the
matter to before the DAR Adjudication Board to determine just compensation. Pending the
determination of the just compensation, the government deposited P26M and P45M to Apo
Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also registered said lands in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines and distributed the same to farmers under CARP.
Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on the valuation of land and
determination of just compensation. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of
just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao, which rendered decision in favor of
AFC and HPI. RTC ruled that the purchase price of the land should be higher than what was
initially offered by DAR, considering the permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands.
Department of Agrarian Reform appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Was the price set forth by the Department of Agrarian Reform within the ambit of just
compensation as contemplated by the law?
LAW:
RA 6657, Sec. 57 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC) shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.
Sec. 17 of the same Act provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors
shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that just compensation was not accorded to the petitioners, AFC and
HPI. DARABs failure to determine just compensation for a span of three years was prejudicial
to the landowners. DAR was not able to justify why a lower purchase price was offered for the
said lots. The Court ruled that to allow the taking of landowners properties and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. According
to the decision, just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount of
be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Although the welfare of the less privileged
farmers is the main consideration of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, payment of just
compensation to landowners should not be taken for granted. While the government reserves its
right to uphold the law and protect small farmers, it should not also oppress the landowners and
deprive them of just compensation in exchange of their properties. With the facts presented in the
case, it can be concluded that the landowners have given the government, especially DAR, ample
time to determine just compensation. But the latters failure to determine and award such
compensation prejudiced their rights as property owners. It is only just and proper to award
P1.38B to the petitioners.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 122363

Victor Valencia vs. Court of Appeals

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)

April 29, 2003

FACTS:
Victor Valencia, a government retiree, owned two parcels of land, which he leased out to Glicerio
Henson for ten (10) years. Henson constituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on
the property during his lease. Valencia then leased the same land to Fr. Andres Flores for five
years after the expiration of the first lease contract. Fr. Flores also designated several people as
workers, including Crescenciano and Marciano. The petitioner acquired said parcels of land
through a homestead grant by the government.
After the expiration of the contract between Valencia and Flores, the petitioner demanded the
workers to vacate the said land. However, the workers refused and continued cultivating the land.
They applied for Certificates of Land Transfer under the Operation Land Transfer Program of PD
27, instead. The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the applications and CLTs were issued
to the respondents.
Valencia then filed actions for recovery of possession over the subject land on the ground that the
tenants and the government unjustly withheld these lands from him. He also contested the
existence of the tenancy relationship between him and the tenant-beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Were the subject lands wrongfully taken from the petitioner?
LAW:
RA 3844, Sec. 6 states that a Civil Law Lessee is not automatically authorized to employ a tenant
without the consent of the landowner.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The subject lands were unlawfully taken from Valencia
when the Department of Agriculture issued Certificates of Land Transfer to the respondents
(tenants). First, the lands in question were acquired by the petitioner through a homestead grant,
which is excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Second, the tenant-beneficiaries were not really
tenants of the landowner. The lessee, Fr. Flores, was the one who hired the workers to cultivate
the land. Such designation of workers was beyond the scope of authority of a Civil Law Lessee
and was made without the consent of the landowner. The security of tenure guaranteed by the
laws may only be invoked by tenants de jure, and not by those who are not true and lawful
tenants. The Court also emphasized that while it is true that in case of reasonable doubt, the it has
to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion, it is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

or reject the rich simply because they are rich. Justice must always be served for the poor and the
rich alike according to the mandate of the law.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. I strongly agree with Justice Bellosillo that
decisions of the Court should not favor the poor just because they are poor. Although the agrarian
reform program is especially implemented to promote social justice and provide opportunity for
the farmers to own the lands they till and decently provide a living for their families, the Court
has to maintain its independence and must decide always according to the mandate of the law. In
this case, the landowner was unlawfully deprived of his property. The parcels of land were taken
away from him pursuant to PD 27. However, according to the same law, the subject property is
exempt from the Operation Land Transfer Program as it was acquired through a homestead title.
Moreover, the tenant-beneficiaries did not qualify as right beneficiaries of the program because
they are not lawful tenants of the landowner. They were designated to cultivate the land without
the tacit consent of Valencia. With all these facts, I believe that while it is not beneficial to the
respondents, the decision was fair enough to enable the real owner to recover possession of his
property.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 78742

Association of Small Landowners in the Phils.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Supreme Court En Banc (Cruz, J.)

July 14, 1989

FACTS:
The case at bar is a consolidation of four cases harping on the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 27, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioners
in this case question the unreasonable taking of their land without just compensation. The lands
were taken from the petitioners before the payment of just compensation. The landowners also
raised the issue that the mode of payment of compensation for the lands subjected to the agrarian
reform program was unfair and prejudicial to them.
ISSUE:
Are the executive orders 228 and 229 in violation of the constitutional provision that no property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation?
LAW:
RA 6657, Section 16 provides for the procedure on the acquisition of private lands. Included in
this section is the payment of just compensation. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall send
notice to the landowners for the acquisition of land and offer to pay corresponding value of the
land. If the landowner accepts the offer of DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall pay the
owner the purchase price of the land within 30 days after the delivery of the deed of transfer in
favor of the government. Otherwise, the DAR shall conduct an administrative summary
proceeding to determine the value of the land. Upon payment of the purchase price to the
landowner, or in case the offer was rejected, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The lands will then be
distributed to the beneficiaries. Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter
to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It found no basis to
render the executive orders unconstitutional. As regard the just compensation in question, the
court ruled that the case does not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Neither does it involve exercise of ordinary expropriation. The expropriation involved
pertains to vast areas of land amounting to a hundreds of billion pesos. Hence, just compensation
in cases like this need not be paid fully in money.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The agrarian reform program involves a massive
transfer of landownership from private individuals and corporations to the government, and as
such, a large sum of money is needed to pay for just compensation. Hence, it is not to be
expected that all land subject to the implementation of the agrarian reform program will be paid
at once and in full before they shall be taken away by the State. It will be detrimental to the
economy and would affect other government projects if all landowners will be paid with just
compensation at the same time for the full amount. While the government is mandated to pay for
just compensation whenever it takes away private property, it should also ensure that such taking
would not affect other projects of the government intended for other stakeholders.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 119398

Supreme Court 3rd Division (Panganiban, J.)
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs.
July 2, 1999
Court of Appeals, PCSO & Fernando Carrascoso, Jr.
FACTS:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was an owner of several racehorses. He entered in the sweepstakes races
on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. He sent letters of demand to private respondents for
the collection of prizes and other fees due him. The respondents however responded consistently
that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was withholding the demanded
prizes. When petitioner filed an action for collection before the Regional Trial Court, the PCGG
advised private respondents that it is no longer objecting to the remittance of the prize winnings.
Petitioner, however, refused to accept payment of prizes.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the prize
winnings with interest. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court on
holding that the respondents are in bad faith. CA is of the opinion that the respondents were just
carrying out the instructions of the PCGG.
ISSUE:
Was the withholding of the petitioners winnings in violation of his property rights without due
process of law? Did the respondents act in bad faith when it withheld the remittance of
winnings?
LAW:
Civil Code Article 32 provides that it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or
bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones
duties.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing
that right.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The respondents did not act in
bad faith when they withheld the prize winnings of the petitioner upon the instructions of the
PCGG. Hence, the moral and exemplary damages should not be awarded. However, the Court
agreed with the petitioner and the trial court that the petitioners constitutional right has been
violated. Although the PCSO and private respondent only acted upon the instructions of the
PCGG, they could have also sought legal basis for the order issued by the latter. A little exercise
of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. Hence, Cojuangco was unlawfully deprived of his
property. Nominal damage, amounting to Php 50,000 was then awarded to the petitioner.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in holding the respondents liable for nominal
damages and for the payment of the prize winnings. Despite the existence of an order issued by
the PCGG, the respondents are still liable for damages for failure to exercise prudence in
inquiring into the legality and applicability of the withholding order. Even if the petitioner has
properties subject to examination of the PCGG, the property in question is not part of the
sequestration proceedings.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 118712

Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, Pedro Yap, et. Al.

Supreme Court 3rd Division (Francisco, J.)

July 5, 1996

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed after the petition for review on certiorari was denied.
The petitioners contend that contrary to the Courts conclusion, the opening of the trust accounts
in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of the RA 6657.
The respondents, on the other hand, argue that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal
of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the
final valuation of their properties.
In this case, the private respondents parcels of land were subjected to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. The landowners did not accept the offer made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, hence, they demanded for reassessment of land valuation. Pending the
determination of the final valuation, the petitioners opened trust accounts as a mode of deposit
pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6657.
ISSUE:
Was the opening of trust account for the rejecting landowners compliant to the mandate of RA
6657?
LAW:
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides that Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response form the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines
RULING:
The Court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The Supreme
Court ruled that the provision of RA 6657 as to the procedure for acquisition of private lands is
clear and unambiguous. Hence, including the opening of trust accounts within the ambit of
Section 16 (e) is tantamount to expanded construction. The Court also ruled that to allow the
taking of the landowners properties and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by
withholding the payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it
will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the
property and return it to the owners when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure,
is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is prejudicial and oppressive for the
landowners to be deprived of just compensation especially when their properties have already
been taken away from them. The Constitution guarantees that when a private property is to be
taken from an individual or corporation, just compensation must be given. In this case, the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines were not compliant with the
mandate of the law regarding payment of just compensation to the landowners.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. L-61293

Domingo Maddumba & Anita Maddumba
vs. GSIS

Supreme Court 2nd Division (Regalado, J.)

February 15, 1990

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus, compelling respondent GSIS to accept payment of LBP bonds
at their face value for a pre-existing obligation.
Government Service Insurance System conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed
properties. Domingo and Anita Maddumba participated in the bidding and gave a managers
check and cash as proposal bond. Upon receipt of notice of award, the petitioner offered to pay
the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at face value. Such bonds were issued to him as payment
for his Riceland acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. GSIS, however, rejected the
offer. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment and all future
installments. When the second installment became due, the petitioner sent a letter to GSIS Board
of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his LBP bonds.
He invoked the provision of Section 85 of RA 3844, as amended by PD No. 251. GSIS however,
denied the petitioners request. GSIS would only accept the LBP bonds if they be discounted
because acceptance at face value would impair the actuarial solvency of GSIS. Hence, petitioner
filed an action for mandamus.
ISSUE:
Can GSIS be compelled to accept payment of LBP bonds?
LAW:
Sec. 85 of RA 3844 provides that The bonds issued by the Bank may be used by the holder
thereof and shall be accepted for any of the following: xxx Payment for the purchase of shares of
stocks or assets of government-owned and controlled corporations. Upon offer by the
bondholders, the corporation owned and controlled by the Government shall, through its Board
of Directors, negotiate with such bondholder with respect to the price and other terms and
conditions of the sale. In case there are various bondholders making the offer, the one willing to
purchase under terms and conditions most favorable to the corporation shall be preferred. If no
price is acceptable to the corporation, the same shall be determined by the Committee of
Appraisers composed of three members, one to be appointed by the corporation, another by the
bondholder making the highest or only offer, and the third by the members so chosen. The
expense of appraisal shall be borne equally by the corporation and the successful purchaser.
Should the government offer for sale to public any or all shares of stocks or assets of any of the
government-owned or controlled corporations, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land
Bank shall be preferred, provided that the various bids be equal in every respect in the medium
of payment.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in favor the petitioners. GSIS is ordered to
accept payment of LBP bonds at face value. It not disputed that under Sec. 85 of RA 3844, GSIS
is compelled to accept LBP bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets, and in fact, the
bidder who offers to pay in LBP bonds is entitled to preference. Moreover, such provision
cushions the impact of dispossession. Acceptance of LBP bonds, instead of money, entails a
bigger sacrifice on the part of the landowners when they departed with their property pursuant to
the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, discounting the LBP bonds for
acceptance as payment, thereby reducing their effective value, imposes additional burden on the
landowners part.
OPINION:
I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. GSIS, as a government owned and controlled
corporation, must accept the payment of LBP bonds as payment for the purchase price of the
asset sold. The bonds were issued by the government and it would seem peculiar if the GSIS
rejects these bonds, being an instrumentality of the government, as well. To dishonor such bonds
would impair the integrity of the debt instruments issued by the government. Discounting of the
bonds gave the landowner double burden: first, when his property was taken away from him and
compelled to receive LBP bonds as payment of just compensation and second, when such bonds
would be accepted and used in a diminished value.

Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

G.R. No. 86889

Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Supreme Court En Banc (Paras, J.)

December 4, 1990

FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. Along with others in
the same business, Luz Farms stand to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some
provisions of RA 6657 and its implementing guidelines. The petition prayed for the declaration
of the aforesaid laws and guidelines unconstitutional. Luz Farms contend that the term
agriculture as used by the law, did not mean to include livestock, poultry and swine.
ISSUE:
Are the aforementioned provisions of CARL unconstitutional?
LAW:
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657 insofar as the inclusion of
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage NULL and VOID. During the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it can be concluded that the framers of
the law did not intend to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program.
OPINION:
I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Constitution only includes agriculture as
subject of the agrarian reform program. The intention of the legislators in drafting the law was to
provide farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till and receive just share of its
fruits. To include livestock, poultry and swine within the ambit of the agrarian reform program,
is giving expanded interpretation of the law, which is in itself, clear and unambiguous. The
decision of the Court to render the provision null and void is in accordance with the mandate of
the Constitution. No one must be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Kristie Xyla R. Amaro

CEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)

Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation