FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMENA and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., respondents. FACTS: The DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communication planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT III), was intended to provide a mass transit system. Thereafter, Republic Act No. 6957 entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes," was signed by President Corazon C. Aquino. In accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6957 and to set the EDSA LRT III project underway, DOTC, on January 22, 1991 and March 14, 1991, issued Department Orders Nos. 91-494 and 91-496, respectively creating the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical Committee. EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC. Finding this proposal to be in compliance with the bid requirements, DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an "Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the terms of the BOT Law. According to the agreements, Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system. On April 22, 1992, the agreement was renegotiated. the parties entered into a Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer and Light Rail Transit System for EDSA. On May 6, 1992, DOTC, represented by Sec. Jesus Garcia, Sec. Prado and private respondent entered into a Supplemental Agreement to the April Revised Agreement so
as to clarify their responsibilities.
respective
rights
and
According to the agreements, the EDSA LRT III
will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000 passengers a day. The system will have its own power facility. It will also have 13 passenger stations and one depot in 16hectare government property at North Avenue. Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system. Target completion date is approximately 3 years from the implementation date of the contract. Upon full and partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on aj monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As agreed upon, private respondents capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only US $1.00. In their petition, petitioners argued that the agreement of April 22, 1992, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement of May 6, 1993, in so far as it grants EDSA LRT COPORTATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, violates the constitution, and hence, is unconstitutional. They contend that the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like private respondent. Petitioners argued that: the grant to Edsa Lrt Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation, the ownership Of Edsa LRT III, a public utility, violates the constitution and, hence, is unconstitutional.
The EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the
ownership and operation thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like private respondent; The respondent argued that: The nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private respondent. ISSUE: WON, respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public utility? HELD: EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. Is admittedly a foreign corporation duly incorporated and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. However, there is no dispute that once the EDSA LRT III is constructed, the private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for the latter to operate the system and pay rentals for the said use. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility in not their ownership but their use to serve the public. The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and the equipment used to serve the public. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. HOME INSURANCE VS. AMEARICAN STEAMSHIP (23 SCRA 24) Facts: The Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America shipped jute bags of Peruvian fishmeal through SS Crowborough, consigned to San Miguel Brewery, Inc. The cargo, which was insured by Home Insurance Company, arrived at the port of Manila and was discharged to the lighters of the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. When the same was delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to P 12, 033.85,
prompting the latter to pay against Luzon
Stevedoring Co. Because the others denied liability, Home Insurance paid San Miguel the insurance value loss. This cost was brought by the former to recover indemnity from Luzon Stevedoring and the ship owner. Luzon Stevedoring raised the defense that it deliver with due diligence in the same from the carrier. Mexican Steamship Agencies denied liability on the ground that the charter party referred to in the bills of lading, the charter, not the ship owner, was responsible for any loss or damage of the cargo. Furthermore, it claimed to have exercised due diligence in stowing the goods and as a mere forwarding agent, it was not responsible for losses or damages to the cargo. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party to owners non-liability was valid as to absolve the American Steamship from liability loss? Held: The Civil Code provision on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent is void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant is absolved from liability to plaintiff. Insurance Co. vs. Phil Ports Terminal 97 Phil 288 FACTS: The Insurance Company of North America filed a complaint against the Philippine Ports Terminals, Inc., alleging, among other things, that: the defendant Philippine Ports Terminals, Inc., was the contractor and operator of the arrastre service in the Port of Manila, and as such, was charged with the custody and care of all cargoes discharged at the government piers at Manila with the duty to deliver same to their respective owners upon presentation by the
latter of release papers from the agents or
owners of vessels and the Bureau of Custom. In September1949, the steamship "PRESIDENT VAN BUREN" discharged into the custody of the Philippine Ports Terminals, Inc., one case of machine knives consigned to the Central Saw Mill, but said merchandise was never delivered by the defendant to said consignee; that the defendant admits the non-delivery of the said merchandise to the consignee, Central Saw Mills, Inc. The court below dismissed the complaint. The defendant-appellee filed a motion for dismissal based on the provisions of Public Act No. 521 of the 74th U.S. Congress more commonly known as "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act". This Act was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by Commonwealth Act No. 65 which was approved and took effect on October 22, 1936. The pertinent provision of said "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act" regarding the time for bringing action reads as follows: In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered: Provided, That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. It is evident, however, that the defendant Philippine Ports Terminals, Inc., is not a carrier. Section 1 (a) and (d) of "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act" defines the terms "carrier" and "ship" as follows: The term "carrier" includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper. The term "ship" means any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea.
The defendant-appellee, Philippine Ports
Terminals, Inc., is neither a charterer nor a ship. Consequently the "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act" does not apply to it. However, the ordinary period of four years fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure will apply. The action in this case has been brought within that time. DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.