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MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent.

A.M. No. 2430; August 30, 1990


CORTES
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1
(1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
FACTS:
1.

This is a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.

2.

It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina
Zerna.

3.

In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over
several lots included in Zernas estate.

4.

The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.

5.

It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE
VILLEGAS.

6.

When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONGs estate. MANANQUIL
alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS
should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zernas estate before the contracts were renewed,
VILLEGAS being counsel of that estates administrator.

ISSUE: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate courts approval regarding the lease.
RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1
(1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the
probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to
notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent subject to disciplinary
sanction for having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978
of renewals of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through
the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned in that article.

The disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on public policy considerations which disallow the
transactions entered into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised
by these individuals over the properties or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika
Publishing Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9, 1986, 142 SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164, RTC Fourth Judicial Region, Pasig,
G.R. No. 72306, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 351].
Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the
prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to
lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through
the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose
Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his
client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a
warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of
the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Villegas.
SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati
City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
G.R. No. 163707; September 15, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO
DOCTRINE: Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property[16] which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having
been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there
is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.[17]
FACTS:
1.

The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents
Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of
Makati City.

2.

Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his
father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion
to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

3.

Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the
decedent from any and all liabilities.

4.

The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly
constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to
the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards.

RULING: No, As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly
evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of
financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim.[15] Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot
be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents
or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property[16] which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights
as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.[17]

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove
their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his
co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

DISPOSTIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim, petitioners, vs. PEDRO
CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33281; March 31, 1930
MALCOLM
DOCTRINE: The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an
asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in
accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained
as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.
FACTS:
1.

A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and has ordered the confinement
of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director
of Health.

2.

Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a
grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health.

3.

Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an
insane asylum.

4.

Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE: WON a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the same to leave the asylum without the
opinion of the Director of Health.
RULING: No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together in
such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other.
The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum
pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance
with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to
whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without costs.