Subject:
RIS 500
Risikoanalyse og -styring
RIS 500
TIME: 9.00-13.00
AID: No printed or written means are allowed. Basic calculator allowed: Hewlett Packard HP30S,
Casio FX-82, Texas Instruments TI-30, Citizen SR-270X
The exam consists of: 10 problems, in English and Norwegian, list of words in English and
Norwegian, 7 pages including this.
1. Show a reliability block diagram with the following minimal cut sets: {1,4}, {4,5},
{1,2,3} and {2,3,4}. Assume the success probabilities for the five components are all
0.01. Compute the unreliability of the system. Specify assumptions you need to make
in order to do the calculations.
Consider the event tree in this figure:
Y= number of fatalities
(shown at the right side of the figure, linked
to the various scenarios)
A: leakage
B: ignition
C: explosion
X: number of leakages.
Assume P(B|A) = 0.002, P(C|A,B) = 0.20
Compute P(Y=1|A) and explain what this probability expresses in this case.
All meaningful answers given score.
Figures 6.8 in RA book with 1,4 instead of 1,5 first.
Assuming component unreliabilities equal to 0.01:
System unreliability is 0.01 x 0.01 + 0.01 x 0.01 + 0.01 x 0.01 x 0.01 + 0.01 x 0.01 x
0.01 = 2 x 10-4
Assuming minimal cut sets 15 45 234 123
Figure 6.8
Assuming component unreliabilities equal to 0.01: as above.
If component reliabilities are 0.01:
System unreliability (1- 0.01 x 0.01) x [1- 0.01 x ( 1- 0.99 x 0.99)]
(1- p1 p4)[1- p5 (1-q2 q3)] = 0.9997
2. Define the risk metric FAR. On an offshore installation a total FAR equal to 6 has
been calculated. Then the manning is changed, and the FAR is reduced to 4. Explain
how this can be the case. Is this total FAR value a suitable metric for measuring
individual risk? Explain.
FAR= Expected number of fatalities per 100 million exposed hours. It is computed as
[Expected number of fatalities / number of exposed hours] x 108
Hence if the manning is changed the number of exposed hours can change and the
FAR value. Not a good metric for individual risk as the FAR value and the risk could
be different for different persons/groups, and this is not reflected. A more suitable
metric is the IR defined by the probability that a specific person shall be killed in a
period of one year.
3. Explain the interpretation of a frequentist probability Pf(A) and a knowledge-based
(subjective) probability P(A) of an event A. Let B be the event that a leakage occurs
during a week in a process plant. A person states that he predicts B to occur 3 times in
a 10 weeks period. Give two possible interpretations of this expression, by reference to
frequentist probabilities and knowledge-based (subjective) probabilities.
Pf(A): The fraction of times A occurs in the long run if the experiment could be
repeated infinitely under similar conditions.
P(A): the assessors uncertainty/degree of belief of A to occur, meaning that if P(A) =
0.6 (say), the assessor compares the uncertainty (or degree of belief, likelihood) of A to
occur with drawing a red ball out of an urn containing 10 balls and 6 are red.
Two interpretations: the person estimate Pf(A) to be 3/10
The persons knowledge based probability is 3/10.
4. What is the basic idea of the FMEA method? A key column in an FMEA form is the
judgment of probability for the failure event to occur. A person suggests to add a new
type of column to reflect the strength of knowledge that this probability is based on.
Argue why this is a good idea, and outline what type of issues that could be used to
determine what is strong (weak) strength of knowledge in this context.
The system is divided into components/units, and each of them is studied with respect
to failure modes, impacts on other components and system, and probability is assigned
for these events. One failure is considered at the time.
The probabilities could be based on more or less strong background knowledge but
this is not reflected in the existing columns the strength of the knowledge is also an
important aspects of the risk description. If the background knowledge is poor this
should be highlighted as the probability judgment has less power in the decision
making process.
See RS book pp 138-139 (Method 1)
5. Explain the ALARP principle. Discuss to which extent the principle supports
Protection or Development.
The ALARP principle says that risk should be reduced to a level that is As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). A risk reducing measure should be implemented unless it
can be demonstrated that the costs are grossly disproportionate relative to the gains obtained
(the burden of proof is reversed).
Thus if there is a safety measure that can improve safety, it shall be implemented as a
rule, unless you can demonstrate that the cost are in gross disproportion to the benefits
gained. This means that Protection is highlighted. On the other hand, if cost benefit
analysis is used to verify ALARP which is often seen in practice, Development is
supported as this analysis is based on expected values.
6. Define a black swan either according to Taleb or Aven (specify whose definition is
given). Define the three type of black swans defined in the curriculum (a), b) and c);
give one illustrating example for each of them.
Look at the following two statements. Which of them can be used to argue why it is
important to confront black swans (no reasoning is needed)
i)
The risk analysts may have overlooked the possible occurrence of some events
which have the potential to cause severe damage
ii)
The risk analysts may have ignored events as having negligible probability on
the basis of a poor knowledge
Taleb:
I.
II.
III.
Outlier as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past
can convincingly point to its possibility.
Extreme impact.
In spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.
7. How is knowledge defined in the curriculum. Argue why justified true beliefs is not
adequate as a definition of knowledge in this context, according to the curriculum.
Justified beliefs. True is the problem, who decides what is true.
Refer to the die example used: I have a die and argue that the frequentist probability is 1/6
based on symmetry arguments, I have some knowledge, but who can say that the truth is
1/6.
8. Explain the five principles of the collective mindfulness concept using the work and
performance of a student (for example a student on a master programme) as an
example.
Listen to the streaming on this topic.
http://mediasite.uis.no/Mediasite/Catalog/catalogs/ris500
9. A robust system is able to deal with stressors, the stability is not lost. What is Talebs
argument for saying that we need to see beyond robustness when obtaining top
performance. He introduces the concept of antifragility. What is the idea of this
concept? Explain how risk and uncertainties can be linked to this concept.
We need not only stressors to regain stability but we need to love stressors (variation,
uncertainty, randomness, risk) to some extent to become better and better improving.
Idea: To obtain top results and avoid disasters, you must to some extent love
some level of stress, randomness, variation, uncertainties and risk
The same as in physical training, to become good over time, we need some
stressors.
The more antifragile the higher probability and risk related to positive performance
and the lower probability and risk related to negative performance (such as
accidents).
To measure the degree of antifragility, risk needs to be described (key elements are:
consequences of various stressors related to both positive and negative performance,
uncertainty judgments, background knowledge).
10. Variation is commonly represented using probability models. Explain using a Poisson
model how variation in the occurrences of events per day is linked to frequentist
probabilities. Explain the meaning of model uncertainty in relation to this Poisson
model. Hint: consider the difference D between the Poisson frequentist probabilities
f(x) = Pf (X= x) and the true fractions g(x) of days with x number of events occurring.
Se p flgende to utsagn. Hvilke av dem kan brukes til argumentere for hvorfor det er viktig
mte svarte svaner (ingen argumentasjon er her ndvendig)
i) Risikoanalytikerne kan ha oversett mulig hendelser som har et potensial til forrsake
alvorlig skade
ii) Risikoanalytikerne kan ha ignorert hendelser gitt dem neglisjerbar sannsynlighet - med
grunnlag i svak kunnskap.
7. Hvordan blir kunnskap definert i pensum? Argumenter med basis i pensum hvorfor
"justified true beliefs" ikke er egnet som en definisjon p kunnskap i denne sammenheng.
8. Forklar de fem prinsippene for collective mindfulness-begrepet ved hjelp av et student
eksempel for eksempel en student p et masterprogram.
9. Et robust system er i stand til hndtere stressr, stabiliteten tapes ikke. Hva er Talebs
argument for si at vi trenger se utover robusthet for opp topp-resultater. Han
introduserer begrepet antifragility. Hva er ideen med dette begrepet? Forklar hvordan risiko
og usikkerhet kan knyttes til begrepet.
10. Variasjon representeres ofte ve hjelp av sannsynlighetsmodeller. Forklar ved hjelp av en
Poisson-modell hvordan variasjon i forekomsten av hendelser per dag er knyttet til
frekvenssannsynligheter. Forklar hva som menes med "modellusikkerhet" i forhold til denne
Poisson-modellen. Vink: vurdere forskjellen D mellom Poisson frekvenssannsynlighetene f(x)
= Pf (X = x) og den sanne andelen g(x) av dager med x antall hendelser.
Norsk
Aleatorisk
Fastsette/sette/bestemme en sannsynlighet
Gren-hendelser (i et hendelsestre)
rsaksanalye
Forsiktighetsprinsippet
Sjanse
grovrisikoanalyse
Konfidensintervall
Konsekvensanalyse
Kost-nytteanalyse
Kostnads-effektivitsanalyse
Troverdighetsintervall
Beslutningstaking
Diskonteringsrate
Beredskap
Epistemisk
Estimere (ansl)
hendelsestre
Forventet nverdi
Forventet nytteteori
Forventet verdi
Ekspertvurdering
omkomne
Feiltre
Frekvens
Urimelig misforhold
deleggelse, forringelse, svekkelse
Fortolkning
Initierende hendelse
Kunnskapsbasert
Lekkasje
Ledelsesgjennomgang og vurdering
Minimal kuttmengde
Neglesjerbar risiko
Observerbar strrelse
A posteriori fordeling
Fre-var-prinsippet
Predikere
Prediktiv fordeling
Prediksjonsintervall
English
Prior distribution
Probability
Quantile
Random
Relative frequency
Risk acceptance
Risk acceptance criteria
Risk analysis
Risk assessment
Risk aversion
Risk evaluation
Risk management
Risk matrix
Risk tolerability limits
Risk treatment
Scientific uncertainties
Sensitivity analysis
Severity
Uncertainty
Value-at-risk (VaR)
Variance
Vulnerability
Norsk
A priori fordeling
Sannsynlighet
Kvantil
Tilfeldig
Relativ frekvens
Risikoaksept
Risikoakseptkriterier
Risikoanalyse
Risikovurdering
Risikoaversjon
Risikoevaluering
Risikostyring
Risikomatrise
Grenser for tolererbar risiko
Risikohndtering
Vitenskapelig usikkerhet
Sensitivitets-/flsomhetsanalyse
Alvorlighet
Usikkerhet
"Value at risk" (VaR)
Varians
Srbarhet