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A SubsidyBut for What?

A Madisonian Perspective on Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
-------Jesse M. Crosson
University of Michigan Political Science 701/495
Dr. Arlene Saxonhouse
12/16/2013

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In a 2006 paper entitled Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, Richard Hall and Alan
Deardorff develop a novel theory about the way in which lobbyists operate in the US Congress.
As suggested by the title, Hall/Deardorff argue that, rather than current models of persuasion
and exchange, lobbying works as a subsidy for those congressional offices that share a
particular interests policy position(s) . And while seemingly more benign than artful persuasion
or outright vote-buying by seasoned lobbyists, the process in actuality compromises the equality
of representation without compromising individual representatives.1 Sadly, they say, as particular
interests possess unequal capacities for subsidy, certain issues and positions receive greater
priority, and the equality principle suffers as a result. But despite the centrality of the equality
principle in Hall/Deardorffs normative analysis, many of Americas most famous political
theorists have, while maintaining a deep concern about interest groups, rejected the equality
principle as the fundamental aim of self governance. Perhaps most notably, James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay argue in The Federalist Papers that the fundamental aim of
representative government lies not in reflecting the fleeting heats and ferments of the people,
but in promoting the public goodsecurity and prosperityfor members of society.
Such a fundamental difference in basic normative assumptions, of course, suggests an
altogether differentand heretofore unexploredperspective on the implications of lobbying as
legislative subsidy. How might Madison view Hall/Deardorffs findings? How, if at all, might a
shift in focus from the equality principle to the public good alter ones conclusions about
such lobbying? This paper examines these questions in light of Madisons discussion of faction in
Federalist No. 10 and concludes that, while lobbying as subsidy may bode well for certain
readings of Federalist No. 10, the notions of confirmation bias and political particularism likely
render it a danger to Madisons proposed safeguards against faction.
FEDERALIST 10 MADISONS TEMPLATE FOR COMBATTING FACTION

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As noted above, this paper will address lobbying as legislative subsidy in view of perhaps
the most famous discussion of organized interests in the Federalist, Madisons discussion of
faction in Federalist No. 10. According to Madison, a faction is defined as a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.2 Note here, as highlighted above, that
Madisons introduction of faction does not revolve around representation, per se. Rather,
factions cause danger to a community insofar as they infringe on rights or, more commonly, the
interest of the community on the whole. Regardless of factions source of danger, however,
Madison famously attributes the violence of faction to the very nature of humankind. Writes
Madison, the latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every
where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil
society. For this reason, he writes, The friend of popular governments [] will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is
attached, provides a proper cure for [the violence of faction].3 Himself a friend of popular
government and a Framer of the Constitution, Madison develops just such a plan Federalist No.
10 and argues that the Constitution provides an opportunity to put the plan into action.
Broadly speaking, Madison suggests two basic remedies for factionalism, both inherent to
truly republican government: the enlightened statesman4 and extending the sphere. Of the
former, Madison writes, the effect [of republicanism] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.5 Unlike pure democracy, which
subjects society to the most dangerous intrigues of a majority faction, republicanismthat is,
representative, popular governmentprovides a mechanism for refining the views of the

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public. That mechanismchosen citizens whose patriotism and love of justice preclude
temporary or partial considerationsserves as republicanisms first line of defense against
factions, preventing factious measures from becoming law or further fermenting in the public
sphere.6
But while enlightened statesmen may arise to fight faction, not all representatives will so
diligently serve the public interest. As Madison warns, men of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the
suffrages and then betray the interests of the people.7 How can a republic prevent such an
occurrence? Fortunately, Madison replies, republics ability to govern large polities provides a
solution to this problem. According to Madison, the advantages of a large republic are two-fold.
First, large republics prevent the election of the sort of corrupt leader mentioned above. Says
Madison, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than
in the small republic, it will be more difficult to for unworthy candidates to practice with success
the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried.8 But besides the coordination issues
caused by an extensive, well-populated republic, large republics protect against faction in a
second, vital way: through the diversification of interests. That is to say, as republics grow in size,
so too does the number and diversity of the interests of the citizenry. Extend the sphere,
Madison says, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens.9
Thus Madison offers two basic solutions for the problem of factions subverting the public
good: the guidance of enlightened statesmen and the inherent complexity of an extensive
republic. The Constitution, Madison thought, provided both of these benefits, and if the American
states wished to tame the violence of faction, they would do well to ratify the new Constitution.

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The actual effectiveness of Madisons plan, of course, remains a complex empirical question not
addressed in this paper. But, as noted above, Madisons normative goal of protecting the public
good through the anti-faction solutions he proposes provides an alternative framework from
which to evaluate Hall/Deardorffs findings in Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy. How might the
Hall/Deardorffs conception of lobbying alter the effectiveness of the enlightened statesman
and/or the extensive republic? This paper will proceed by examining the implications of lobbying
as legislative subsidy for each of Madisons proposed solutions for faction.
THE ENLIGHTENED STATESMAN: SUBSIDIZING WISDOM OR VEILING BIAS?
As noted above, Madisons first solution for faction comes through the wisdom of
enlightened statesman. Thus, a central concern emanating from lobbying as legislative subsidy
for Madison lies in the extent to which such subsidies increase or decrease a statesmans
enlightenment. To address this concern, a bit more detail about the system of legislative subsidy
will provide needed clarity. According to Hall/Deardorff, lobbying as legislative subsidy
capitalizes on one major challenge with which legislators must cope daily: limited resources.
Indeed, despite the exponential growth in the number and complexity of federal laws in the past
few decades, legislators must cope with strict limitations in congressional staff, budget, and even
time (particularly given their need to frequently visit their home district). Consequently, while
legislators may espouse strong convictions on any number of issues or policy initiatives, they
may dedicate resources to only a handful of them. Sensing this scarcity of resources, lobbyists
capitalize on the situation by providing the very resourcespolitical information, policy research,
and occasionally, moneythat preclude legislators from pursuing a given issue. Lobbyists do not
contribute such resources blindly, however. Rather, they subsidize the views of those legislators
with which they most agree. That is, if a given legislator would in fact pursue a desired policy if
only he/she possessed greater resources, lobbyists will provide a matching grant to the

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legislators staffin hopes that the legislator will fight for their common policy interest.
Regardless of how enlightened a particular legislator may be, every member of
Congress must cope with resource scarcity. Metaphysics being what they are, no legislator can be
in more than one place at a time; and as much as they may like to do so, they cannot add hours to
a day, either. Consequently, the challenge of resource scarcity threatens the potential effectiveness
of the enlightened legislator as a force against faction: how can she enact the policies she favors,
if she must pick and choose only a small subset of priorities? Moreover, if an enlightened
legislator can only pay full attention to a handful of issues, how can she fully monitor for the
violence of faction throughout the policy spectrum? Perhaps, at least in one sense, lobbying as
legislative subsidy offers way of escape for the enlightened statesman from the predicament of
resource scarcity.
As Hall/Deardorff remark in their paper, contemporary politicians often claim that
lobbyists are not agents of corruption; rather, they say, they help us do our job.10 For years,
reporters, pundits, and citizens have scoffed at this answer, Hall/Deardorff remark. But when
viewed in light of the intense constraint of resource scarcity, this response seems far more
plausible. For indeed, if lobbyists offer a matching grant of political information, policy analysis,
or merely legislative grunt workall without actually changing the views of the enlightened
legislatorthen lobbying simply works to subsidize enlightenment. Imagine Enlightened
Legislator A believes that America needs four basic policy reforms this legislative cycle: tariff
protections for nascent American industries, property tax reform for farmers and ranchers, purity
regulations for foreign cotton imports, and increased funding for garrisons on the frontier.11
Roughly speaking, A has prioritized the issues as follows: tariff protections, cotton regulations,
frontier garrisons, and property tax reform. But, A has determined that all of these issues
absolutely require action this cycle, lest the political window for one of them closes.

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Complicating things further, A anticipates she will face a strong electoral challenging following
this legislative cycle, so she plans to spend much of her time campaigning. Needless to say, A has
a problem: how can she address these four major policy reforms, while also defending her
congressional seatall with extreme limitations in staff and budget?
Luckily for A, the American Association of Cotton Growers offers her some help. They
have been watching her lately, they say, and they feel that her brilliant cotton-purity policy
initiative will solve the problems that unfair foreign competition has caused their farmers in
recent years. Their office, they tell her, is prepared to provide her with hundreds of person-hours
worth of research and political intelligence from the cotton industryand all A has to do is put
the information into action. Naturally, A is ecstatic: she may now push her brilliant cotton-purity
legislation without sacrificing precious hours on the campaign trail. The Cotton Growers may
have acted solely in their own self-interest in this scenario; but, in doing so, they actually
subsidized the brilliance and wisdom of Enlightened Legislator A and her policy initiative.
To this point, it would appear that lobbying as legislative subsidy, as a solution to the
problem of resource scarcity, enhances Madisons enlightened statesman solution for faction.
However, the conception of the enlightened statesman thus far has veiled an important
assumption about enlightenment: that it is a characteristic or state, and not a process. To be
sure, some legislators, upon taking office, enter Congress with a better understanding of public
affairs than others. But regardless of ones entry-level knowledge of public affairs, very few
legislators possess the requisite knowledge to attain enlightenment immediately upon entering
office. Though public affairs have grown immensely more technical and complex since the days
of the Founding, Madison himself seems to acknowledge the gradual nature of enlightenment
throughout the Federalist, particularly when arguing for the duration of federal officials terms.
When defending the biennial election of representatives in Federalist No. 53,12 for instance,

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Madison remarks, No man can be a competent legislator, who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to
legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information, [] [a]nother part
can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station.13 At least
according to this discussion of US representatives, Madison acknowledges that legislators will
not likely enter Congress as enlightened statesmen. Rather, he says, legislators will gain a
significant portion of their enlightenment on the job. Thus, Madison concludes, The period of
service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical
knowledge, requisite to the due performance of service.14
How does this view of enlightenment affect ones conclusion about lobbying as legislative
subsidy in the context of Madisons enlightened statesman? In the first place, assuming a
legislator does not enter Congress with full enlightenment, she may accept subsidies either not
fully understanding the implications of an issue/policy or not knowing about a particular point of
view at all. This is precisely the problem that Lawrence Lessig underscores in a recent book
entitled Republic, Lost. Speaking of his own lobbying experience, Lessig reflects, [t]he most
striking feature of those exchanges was not that members disagreed with me. It was that members
didnt understand that there was another side to the issue. They have never even heard it.15 Like
Hall/Deardorff, Lessig worries about incomplete or unequal exposure because it could (according
to Lessig, it in fact does) lead to incomplete and unequal representation of all Americans in
Congress. But incomplete exposure may prove no less dangerous to Madisons enlightened
legislator and her pursuit of the public good. Suppose for instance that Enlightened Statesman As
cotton-purity legislation, despite its near-perfect design carries with it one negative externality: it
will, over the next 5 years, skyrocket cotton prices for the average American consumer. Suppose
further that the cotton lobby understands this externality and, though cotton profits have remained

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at all-time highs of late, choose not to mention it to A. After all, should A find this out, she would
rescind her support for the legislation and explore other ways to address the cotton-purity issue
an action that would certainly not serve the interests of the cotton lobby. Thus, in the system of
lobbying as legislative subsidy, the public good suffers: even though Enlightened Statesman A
wishes to achieve cotton purity and protect consumers in the process, the incentive structure
inherent to legislative subsidy has prevented her from doing so. Of course, one need not accept
that A would in fact rescind her support for the legislation, in the face of the economic
information detailed above. Instead, suppose that her district includes a strong contingent of
consumer advocates and activistssupporters that pushed cotton-purity to the top of her priority
list in the first place. Supposing the legislation passes and prices skyrocket, one might expect that
the consumer advocates to grow angry and abandon Acausing her to lose reelection. Here
again, the public good suffers: the subsidy A receives has led hera great, enlightened American
leaderdirectly out of a job as a member of Congress.
Clearly, under certain circumstances and conceptions of enlightenment, Madisons
enlightened statesman loses his/her effectiveness at combating faction in a system of lobbying as
legislative subsidy. But there is yet another factor inherent to politics and public affairs that could
also endanger the enlightened statesman: confirmation bias. Indeed, no matter ones level of
enlightenment, great satisfaction attends the confirmation of ones ideas and opinions
particularly in an arena as competitive as the political arena. Perhaps then, even when confronted
with information that contradicts an enlightened statesmans position on a particular issue, he/she
will refuse to update his/her beliefs. Instead, citing the influx of subsidy for his/her original
position, the enlightened statesman may hold fast to his/her original convictionseven if, in
actuality, those views do not represent the true public good. Here again, lobbying as legislative
subsidy lessens the effectiveness of the enlightened statesman at fighting factionthis time by

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confirming the overwhelmed legislators inherent biases.
In the end, while one may not find confirmation bias a realistic threat to a truly
enlightened statesman, the threat of incomplete informationparticularly under a process
conception of enlightenmentundoubtedly harms the effectiveness of an enlightened statesman
to protect society against the violence of faction. Thus, under the Madisons conception of
faction, lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact present problems for society. And depending
on how enlightened a legislator may be when he/she enters office, that negative effect may
prove more or less deleterious to the public good.
EXTENDING THE SPHERE: INTEREST DIVERSIFICATION OR A DESCENT INTO
PARTICULARISM?
While lobbying as legislative subsidy may serve as a threat to the enlightened statesman,
Madison suggests a second solution to the violence of faction: extending the sphere. The
premise of extending the sphere, as noted above, is simple: extensive republics not only render
the election of devious legislators more difficult, but they also diversify interests such that
maleficent coalitions may not form. But barring the unforeseen annexation of Canada, America is
not likely to expand significantly in the foreseeable future. How, then, could lobbying as
legislative subsidy affect this particular solution to injurious faction?
To arrive at an answer, one need first draw a distinction between two kinds of faction:
majority and minority factions. By definition, every faction works against the public interest. But,
according to Madison, majority factions or coalitions of factionsthat is, factions and coalitions
that may actually enact their dangerous agendaconstitute the largest threat to a republic. Says
Madison, [i]f a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views []. When a majority is included
in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling

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passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.16 Even though factions
may form coalitions on particular issues (in order to attain a majority), an extensive republic, by
diversifying interests, not only renders particular coalition blocs smaller and/or more specific, but
it also decreases the probability that these specific blocs will form stable and successful coalitions
with any frequency. In other words, extensive republics decrease the occurrence of majority
factions. Could lobbying as legislative subsidy somehow add to this process of diversification? In
a word, if one takes some level of lobbying as given, the answer to this question may be yes.
Consider the alternative models of lobbying, highlighted at the outset of this paper:
exchange and persuasion. Exchange theory, perhaps the most cynical view of lobbying,
involves the literal buying of votes, according to Hall/Deardorff. As they state in their paper, [i]n
political science and economics, the principal class of models assume that interest group agents
and legislators engage in mutually beneficial if implicit trades, typically campaign contributions
for votes.17 The other model Hall/Deardorff describe, that of persuasion, involves more
strategic information than money. Under this model, lobbyists take advantage of legislator
uncertainty about public opinion and reelection by providing private information about
constituency views and us[ing] it to persuade legislators that electoral self-interest lies in taking
group-friendly positions.18 Instead of vote-buying, lobbyists in the persuasion model attempt to
convince uncertain legislators that positions consistent with their particular interest will bode well
for that legislators reelection.
While Hall/Deardorff underscore a number of logical and empirical problems with these
theories, one particularly problematic theme runs through both models: the incredible difficulty a
lobbyist would face in achieving any results. As Hall/Deardorff point out, thousands of
lobbyists are paidquite lucrativelyeach year to represent the interests of all sorts of groups
across the country. Were lobbying success so difficult (and rare), would these groups bother

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paying so many full-time lobbyists? Consider the exchange model, for example. If members of
Congress were indeed selling votes, would not one expect quite a high price for such votes, given
the exorbitant price tag associated with modern US elections?19 Consider also the persuasion
model. Given Congresss far-reaching power and the complexity of modern politics, would not
one expect a members multiplicity of information cuessuch as the White House, his/her
political party, congressional leaders, local political leaders, etc.to drown out any marginal
effect a single lobby may have on a members vote choice?20
These challenges, Hall/Deardorff claim, severely limit the explanatory power of the
exchange and persuasion models of lobbyingsuggesting that another model may offer a better
explanation. That model, they believe, is lobbying as legislative subsidy. Rather than spending
large amounts of money vote-buying (with no enforcement mechanism, once the money is
already donated) or dedicating time and resources in a futile effort to persuade busy lawmakers,
lobbyists (as noted throughout this paper) can provide legislative subsidies to a members staff.
Legislative subsidy lowers the bar for influence in a number of ways. First, it is cheaper than
one might expect vote-buying to bein fact, while it implies paying the lobbyists, it implies no
monetary cost beyond that. Second, legislative subsidy implies no arduous persuasion. Instead,
lobbyists under the subsidy model only target legislators who already share their position.
Could this potential lowering of the lobbying bar have any effect on Madisons extendthe-sphere solution to faction? At least at first blush, when compared to the exchange and
persuasion models, lobbying as legislative subsidy benefits Madisons extend-the-sphere solution.
That is, if lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact imply a lower bar than the other models,
one may presume that a greater number and diversity of interests may lobby Congress at any
given time. If so, as Madison suggests, faction leaders will encounter increasing amounts of
difficulty in assembling consistent faction coalitions powerful enough to actually subvert the

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public good. Thus, if lobbying as legislative subsidy does in fact lower the lobbying bar, then it
has (in comparison to the other models) encouraged the very characteristics (numbers and
diversity) that allow the extensive republic to combat faction. If so, then perhaps it may, despite
its potentially negative implications for the enlightened statesman, in fact bode well for the public
good and Madisons solutions for faction.
This conclusion, of course, rests on ones assumption that lobbying is simply a reality of
popular government. In other words, this paper does not mean to suggest that lobbying as
legislative subsidy in itself is good for extending the sphere. Rather, if one presupposes that
lobbying will occur, this paper argues that lobbying as legislative subsidy may prove better for
the public good and extending the sphere than other models of lobbying. This assumption seems
reasonable in light of Federalist No. 10. After all, if faction is sewn into human nature, then is it
not reasonable to assume that those factions will inevitably attempt to exercise influence through
lobbying? Moreover, had Madison believed that factions would not attempt to lobby, would he
have classed them among the great dangers to republics and spent time devising
solutions/responses to that danger? Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that Madison
anticipated some level of lobbying of the federal government. If so, then perhaps lobbying as
legislative subsidy implies the most benign of possible mechanisms for interest-group influence.
Then again, perhaps it does not. In fact, perhaps Madisons extend-the-sphere solution is
itself mistaken in its underlying assumptions. Under Madisons extend-the-sphere solution,
Madison appears to conceptualize lobbyists as competitors, particularly for legislators time.
Indeed, regardless of how related or unrelated a particular group of factions may be, they
nonetheless compete against one another for the ear and effort of a given legislator. Under this
sort of system, extending the sphere (with its numbers and diversity) would undoubtedly prevent
domination by factions. For indeed, as a large group of individual interests competes for the

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attention of a particular legislator, their efforts are likely to cancel one another out. Moreover,
given the intense competition associated with such a common goal and large numbers,
collusion/cartelization would prove incredibly difficult: how would such diverse interests find
any common ground upon which to build a coalition, much less prevent cheating, even if they
could build a one?21
But suppose interests may affect Congress by another means besides winning in a vast
competition for attention. That is, instead of competing for attention with a wide range of
interests, is there another means of affecting legislators actions? In a word, yes: by rendering a
particular policy request as specific and esoteric as possible, lobbyists may shrink their field of
competition substantially. Imagine again the enlightened-but-embattled Legislator A. As noted
earlier, Legislator A wishes to pass cotton-purity legislation, as well as tariff reform, property-tax
reform, and increases in funding for frontier garrisons. Suppose Lobbyist B would like to gain a
competitive advantage for her clientsa group of enterprising Virginia farmers, the majority of
whom reside in Legislators As congressional districtby carving out some special property-tax
exemptions. Lobbyist B could achieve this goal by subsidizing major property tax reform for the
whole US. But, in doing so, she would compete for agenda space with the lobbyists supporting
each of As other causes: cotton purity, frontier safety, and tariff protectionism. Rather than
risking this level of competition, Lobbyist B could instead pursue a different strategy: submitting
pre-drafted, geographically specific legislation to As congressional office. The benefits of such a
strategy are two-fold. First, the geographic (and topical) specificity of the legislation shrinks the
field of competition. Rather than competing for agenda space with major interests, B will now
encounter significantly less agenda competition (or pushback to the bills actual substance), given
the legislations ultra-specificity. Second (and just as important), Bs specific legislation will
provide A an easy opportunity to please some rather important constituents back home

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increasing her already questionable reelection chances. Clearly, then, B would seem to have an
incentive to provide this sort of specific service to A. And indeed, outside this hypothetical world,
the trend toward this sort of particularism is well documented.22
How does this sort of strategy apply to lobbying as legislative subsidy? Simply put, under
Hall/Deardorffs model, Bs provision of specific legislation itself constitutes a subsidyand one
that may not fly in a less extensive republic. That is, while As staff may never have found the
time or resources to determine the sorts of policies that would please Bs clients, research the
current property tax code in the area, and draft effective legislation, Bs staff has done all of this
legislative grunt work for A. And given that A already wishes to pass some pro-farmer
property-tax legislation, B is merely subsidizing As preferences.
This all suggests an important potential danger for Madisons extend-the-sphere solution.
Suppose that B does not have the publics best interests at heart (shocking!); and while she
realizes that her legislation may harm other members of society, she still pushes it on A.
Assuming A goes along and passes the legislation, the public good shall sufferall because
lobbying as legislative subsidy provided a means for B to draft nearly irresistible legislation. In
this instance, whereas Madison anticipated that extensive republics would imply more issue
competition, such republics appear actually to incentivize the sort of particularism that, as in this
example, harmed the public good. How does such an incentive arise? As noted above, the intense
competition itself associated with agenda control in an extensive republic incentivized Bs descent
into particularism.23 Thus, perhaps even more so in an extensive republic than a non-extensive
one, lobbying as legislative subsidy encourages potentially deleterious, particularistic legislation.
Indeed, on the issue of competition and diversification, Madison appears to have overlooked the
fact that competition within issue areas matters just as much (if not more, in an extensive
republic) than competition between them.

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Legislative particularism begotten by legislative subsidy implies at least one additional
problem: if all lobbyists descend into particularism, the potential for collusion between interests
actually increases, not decreases as Madison seems to suggest. How could this be so? Primarily,
through the process of logrolling. The phenomenon of logrolling, though often defined in a
variety of different ways, implies a sort of reciprocity at its most basic level: if you support my
bill, Ill support yours. Traditionally, logrolling has become most often associated with
particularlistic legislation (often, pork-barrel projects)and for good reason: if a particular
legislator has absolutely no stake in a particular bills substance (and will therefore not be held
accountable for his actions either in favor or against it), then he/she stands only to gain by
supporting it. For, if one supports someone elses esoteric legislation in Congress, that member
will return the favor by supporting ones own esoteric legislation in the future. And so the pattern
continues. Rather than a coalition in the traditional sense (or the sense that Madison seems to
imply), then, particularism allows for a coalition of logrolling. Such coalitions are incredibly
stable because, by their nature, they defy electoral responsiveness. Consequently, insofar as
extensive republics encourage particularlistic legislative subsidies (as suggested above), they
actually encourage, rather than discourage, the creation of potentially factious coalitions.
CONCLUSIONS
This examination of lobbying as legislative subsidy has left Madisons Federalist-10
solutions in a strange and difficult predicament. Under certain sets of assumptions, lobbying as
legislative subsidy seems actually to enhance the mechanisms behind Madisons solutions. For
the enlightened statesman, lobbying as legislative subsidy may allow for a subsidization of
enlightened policies themselves. And for extensive republics, lobbying as legislative subsidy
seems to multiply the number and diversity of interests competing against one another,
strengthening the anti-faction effects of extending the sphere. Under another set of assumptions,

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however, lobbying as legislative subsidy seems to severely harm the effectiveness of Madisons
solutions: subsidies could result in an enhancement of confirmation bias and a rise in
particularism.
Where does this leave lobbying as legislative subsidy, with regard to Madisons discussion
of faction? Like many political phenomena, the goodness or badness of lobbying as
legislative subsidy for protecting against factions seems to depend on the particular scenario.
With regard to the enlightened statesman, the nature of lobbying subsidies seems to be a function
of a given legislators level of enlightenment before entering office. If in fact a legislator already
possesses a detailed, flawless agenda that will benefit the public before entering office, then
lobbying as legislative subsidy may help this legislator enact his/her agenda. However, insofar as
one conceives of enlightenment as an ongoing process and most legislators as on-the-job learners,
one is led to worry more or less about the confirmation-bias potentiality of legislative subsidy.
With regard to extending the sphere, the nature of lobbying subsidies is no less contingent on
particular circumstances. Indeed, insofar as lobbying as legislative subsidy multiplies the number
and diversity of interests in competition for legislators attention, one may find it beneficial to the
fight against faction. But, insofar as one expects such multiplication to devolve into particularism,
one may conclude that lobbying as subsidy actually encourages factious behavior.
In full view of decades of acquired knowledge about Congress, the outlook would appear
bleak for Federalist No. 10, if in fact Hall/Deardorffs model holds true. Indeed, each election
cycle, humorous stories arise about the difficulties of freshman members of Congress assimilating
into their new job. (Serving in Congress is rarely as easy as it looks!) Moreover, as Mayhew,
Fiorina, and countless other congressional scholars document, particularism has become the norm
in Congressand logrolling a common practice. If true, these facts certainly spell trouble for
Madisons solutions to faction, in light of lobbying as legislative subsidy. But perhaps even

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beyond this conclusion, another more far-reaching one arises. That is, whereas one must accept
the equality principle to accept Hall/Deardorffs conclusions about lobbying as legislative
subsidy, one need not accept this premise (albeit a common and popular one) any longer, in order
to worry about lobbying in America. Instead, even from a public good (or even, dare I say,
Burkean) perspective on representation, lobbying as legislative subsidy present serious challenges
for republican governance and the influence of interest groups

Notes:

Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," American Political Science Review 100, no. 1
(February 2006): 81.
2
Hamilton, Jay, Madison, The Federalist Papers, edited by George W. Carey and James McClennan, Indianapolis: The
Liberty Fund (2001): No. 10, 2.
3
Ibid, 7.
4
Insofar as the term statesman is used, it is meant only as a direct historical reference to Madisons original term and not
in any gendered sense.
5
Ibid, 16.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid, 18.
9
Ibid, 19.
10
Hall and Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," 81.
11
Perhaps these are the sorts of issues that interested legislators in Madisons day?
12
The norm at the time was annualnot biennial elections. Madison did not believe that annual elections gave legislators
enough time to settle in to their new job, and so he spent a sizeable amount of time in the Federalist explaining the
advantages of biennial election.
13
The Federalist Papers, No. 53, 5.
14
Ibid.
15
Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress--and a Plan to Stop It (New York: Twelve, 2011), 147.
16
The Federalist Papers, No. 10, 11.
17
Hall and Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," 70.
18
Ibid, 71.
19
In actuality, the increase in PAC spending associated with major votes in Congress is only about $130-180, according to a
study cited in Hall/Deardorffs paper. This fact, they say, would seem to point away from an exchange theory of lobbying,
for that this price, even the most impoverished reader of political science journals could afford to hire a lobbyist every
now and again.
20
Hall and Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 71.
21
This sort of coordination problem is commonly referred to the collective action problem, popularized by economist
Mancur Olson. This problem is particularly challenging for large groups (as Olson refers to them), which seems to accord
with Madisons underlying logic.
22
See, for example, David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)
23
Extensive republics also serve to hide particularistic actions. That is, the larger the republic, the less likely wasteful or
otherwise harmful particularistic actions will be detected.