INDONESIA DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

for Peace and Security in West Africa

INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENT
Defense Diplomacy

Written by :

DIAN MAY FITRI

120140106010

DEFENSE DIPLOMACY DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF DEFENSE STRATEGY
2015
Introduction

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975

originally as a regional organization to essentially promote the economic integration of the
fifteen Member States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has
been gradually transformed, under the pressure of political events, into an organization also
responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crisis which were
undermining peace and security within the community space. The 1990 decade saw
ECOWAS, spurred by its most powerful member country by far, Nigeria, intervene beyond
the conventional diplomatic field by sending thousands of soldiers to try to restore peace in
Liberia, then in Sierra Leone and more modestly in Guinea Bissau. The assessment of these
military interventions decided by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the
highest decision making body of ECOWAS and implemented by the Executive Secretariat
has been the subject of many studies and has generated intense debates for twenty year after
the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, the peacekeeping force of
the organization. What seems undeniable is that ECOWAS indeed faced enormous difficulties
in achieving its objectives of restoring peace where it intervened but its military and
diplomatic engagement contributed immensely to the international effort which finally helped
in ending conflicts that devastated the Mano River Basin region between 1990 and 2003.
ECOWAS interventions in the 1990s were, first and foremost, geared towards ending
civil wars involving one or several armed rebel groups and the government of legally
recognized Member State. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government was going to the
rescue of one of its members facing armed rebellion. The aim was indeed to defend the
legality embodied by a sitting president and government and not necessarily to defend the
political standards adopted by the community like the respect of specific democratic
principles or human rights. When Nigeria decided that ECOMOG should intervene in Liberia
a few months after Charles Taylors rebel movement attacked the government of Samuel Doe,
neither the victim of the attack nor the Nigerian government could be described as models of
democracy and respect for human rights. The decade of 1990s was also marked by
democratic transitions on the African continent in general and West Africa in particular, with
varied fortunes depending on the country. ECOWAS logically could not represents values and
defend political principles that were barely beginning to be officially accepted by Heads of
State and Government of Member States of the Organization (Yabi, 2010).
It is the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security adopted in December 1999 and complemented by the
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in December 2002,
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which established a clear link between the objective of conflict prevention and resolution and
the will to develop strong political principles like the communitys objection to any accession
to power through unconstitutional means and the possibility to intervene in case of serious
and massive violation of human rights. These are to a large extent the same general principles
that were stated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) adopted in July 2001. The
AU and ECOWAS mechanisms which are meant to help them maintain peace and security at
the continental and regional level. The study reviews actions taken by ECOWAS under its
Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and
Security in two fragile countries of the region, namely the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the
Republic of Guinea. Yabi (2010) mentioned that the former experienced an armed conflict
between 1998 and 1999 and played host to ECOMOG troops for a very brief period before
the end of the war. Guinea Bissau continued to show signs of political instability and violence
over a period of ten years after this intervention, despite the presence a United Nations Peace
Building Support Office (UNOGBIS) and sustained attention from ECOWAS.
The study will examine the role of ECOWAS on how did ECOWAS attempt to help
some fragile areas like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cte dIvoire to reduce the
risk of a resurgence of armed conflicts and to come out of a vicious circle of political
instability, lack of economic and social progress and criminalization of the State? This study
will respond to this question by, in the first instance, describing the historical context which
accounts for the structural political fragility of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cte
dIvoire and, secondly, drawing a parallel between political events covering ECOWAS
initiatives and reactions. Francis (2006) added that the history of the Republic of Guinea is no
less turbulent than that of its neighbour, though it is basically different in many respects.
Having attained independence about fifteen years before Guinea Bissau, it had been
ruled by only two presidents during its fifty years of existence. The slow end of the second
regime due to the deteriorating health of President Lansana Cont, the embodiment of the
regime has been since 2003 a source of grave concern for ECOWAS insofar as it was also
raising the issue of succession crisis in context marked by weak institutions and serious
economic and social difficulties facing the people. This writing also provides the main
outlines of the historical context within which the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea
Bissau and Cte dIvoire evolved, then it shows the stands and actions taken by ECOWAS.

Description

ECOWAS: Peacekeeping and Conflict Stabilization Interventions in A Bad

Neighbourhood
It was the bloody civil war in Liberia in 1989 that forced ECOWAS leaders to face the
fact that they could no longer run away from the reality of developing a regional mechanism
for peace, security and conflict management. The civil war in Liberia resulted in devastating
regional consequences in terms of massive influx of refugees into neighbouring countries,
large scale displacement of the internal population, gross violations of human rights, mass
killings and widespread destruction of property. The bloody and violent civil war created a
humanitarian disaster that directly threatened regional peace and security. The civil war was
led by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), against the
brutal dictatorship of President Samuel Doe. Charles Taylors insurgency was supported by
other West African states such as Cte dIvoire and Burkina Faso, and by Colonel Gaddaffi of
Libya. The outbreak of the Liberian civil war did not attract immediate intervention by the
international community, despite the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The US, which had
a special relationship with Liberia, was, during this period, preoccupied with the United
Nations-backed international coalition in the Gulf war against Saddam Husseins Iraq. The
United Nations (UN) was also over-burdened with its new post-Cold War responsibilities for
the maintenance of international peace and security. It was this perception of international
neglect of Africa that created the opportunity for the sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, to
assume political and military leadership in the management and resolution of the Liberian
conflict.
Liberia: ECOMOG I
In an attempt to resolve the Liberian civil war, the ECOWAS summit in Banjul, The
Gambia, established the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) on the
recommendation of the Nigerian military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, as a
regional mechanism to settle disputes and conflict situations within the Community and
to look into inter-state dispute and conflicts which have a disruptive effect on normal life
within the member states and on the smooth functioning of the Community (Nwachukwu in
Francis, 2008). This ad hoc committee was mandated with the responsibility to mediate the
resolution of the Liberian conflict. The beleaguered Liberian president, Samuel Doe,
requested ECOWAS to send an intervention peacekeeping force into Liberia to forestall the
increasing violence and tension and to ensure peaceful transitional environment (Francis,
2001:436).
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It was the decision of the ECOWAS Authority at an extra-session of the Community

in August 1990 to accept the request of the embattled Liberian president that led to the formal
establishment of ECOMOG. It is important to note that the mandate of ECOMOG was
framed in the spirit of traditional peacekeeping or First Generation peacekeeping, whereby a
peacekeeping force is deployed as a neutral inter-positionary force between two opposing
national armies or warring factions, acting as a confidence building mechanism to prevent
relapse into further conflict.
Sierra Leone: ECOMOG II
It did not take long for the spill over effect of the Liberian Civil War to be manifest in
neighbouring Sierra Leone, when the Corporal Foday Sankoh-led Revolutionary United Front
led a war against the All Peoples Congress (APC) party government under the leadership of
President Joseph Momoh. For a variety of reasons, the RUF rebellion was directly supported
by Charles Taylors NPFL, and covertly by other West Africa states such as Burkina Faso and
Cte dIvoire, and Gaddaffis Libya. The Sankoh-Taylor axis was based on the understanding
that the success of the Liberian civil war would be used as a staging post for the overthrow of
the APC regime in Sierra Leone through rebel insurgence and that strategic mineral resources
such as diamonds would be used to finance the war. Therefore, in 1990 Charles Taylor
opposed the use of the territory of Sierra Leone to facilitate the military operations of
ECOMOG in Liberia. Francis (2006) stated that Taylor perceived this as a major obstacle in
his bid to secure the presidency in Liberia, and therefore threatened to attack Sierra Leone.
Guinea Bissau: ECOMOG III
The outbreak of the civil war in Guinea Bissau in 1998 dragged ECOMOG into
another regional peacekeeping and conflict management adventure. Yabi (2010) in the
analysis said this civil war threatened the national security of the immediate neighbouring
states, i.e. Senegal and Guinea, as well as regional peace and security, further reinforcing the
impression of a bad neighbourhood. Both Guinea and Senegal were already hosting
thousands of refugees from the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and could not
contemplate the consequences of yet another massive influx of refugees from Bissau.
Cte dIvoire: ECOMOG IV
The bad neighbourhood dynamics and the spill over of civil conflicts in West Africa
became evident in Cte dIvoire, long described as the oasis of peace and prosperity in a
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region troubled by armed conflicts and political instability. In December 1999, a military
coup was led by the army chief, General Robert Guei, against President Bedie. General Guei,
after a period of rule, organised democratic elections and his attempt to rig the result of the
elections in his favour led to a peoples revolution that forced him out of power. Laurent
Gbagbo of the Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) was declared winner of the October 2000
general elections. There were recurrent political clashes and instability between Guei and
Gbagbos supporters, which eventually led to a military mutiny in September 2002 and the
outbreak of a civil war. The country became divided in two, the pro-government south
controlled by government forces and supporters, and the North-West controlled by three rebel
factions including the main group, Movement Patriotique de Cte dIvoire (MPCI), Ivorian
Popular Movement for the Far West (MPIGO, comprising largely the Western Yacouba ethnic
group) and the so-called New Forces Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP).

Summary
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have demonstrated a real
political will to rely on the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cte dIvoire, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security adopted in December, 1999 and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and
Good Governance adopted in December, 2001 to positively influence political and security
developments. The ECOWAS Commission is clearly committed to play its part by
dispatching fact-finding and election observer missions, by appointing special representatives
and mediators as well as initiating the establishment of international contact groups. The
Commission has also defended the new values upheld by the regional organisation through
firm public condemnation of human rights violations perpetrated by the armed forces in both
countries in the last few years.
The will to act and defend the principles of constitutional convergence that the
organisation has adopted is, however, not enough to make a decisive contribution to the quest
for lasting peace and security in especially difficult situations. The interest that ECOWAS has
shown in Guinea Bissau was reflected in different initiatives which made it possible to
temporarily calm-down tensions without dealing with the root causes of structural instability
and political violence in the country. The recurrent crises in this country are the signs of a
laborious and erratic process of building a State that would be legitimate as well as capable of
guaranteeing the security of its citizens and leaders.
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Conflict prevention implies carrying out successfully farreaching reforms in the

security sector, putting a stop to the involvement of military leaders in crime, reform of the
public administration and improvement of economic management in order to restore
credibility in a particularly deprived State. The will and declarations of intention of
ECOWAS can only have a decisive impact to the extent that they are accompanied by a
significant and immediate investment in terms of human and financial resources. In Guinea,
the organisation has been the driving force of the international community following the
takeover of power by the military junta in December, 2008. The stand adopted by the
Community combined firmness on principles, political realism and international mobilisation
to formulate requirements for a short transition leading to the transfer of power to elected
civilian political leaders. When the military leaders begun to renege on their initial
commitments, the reaction of the international contact group, led by ECOWAS and the
African Union, helped to marginalise the juntas most hostile wing and alienate the military
from the exercise of power.
Regionalism and globalism hav both in the processes of developing international
organizations and institution for governance (Karns and Mingst, 2004). Managing complex
situations with very limited human and financial resources for ECOWAS implies setting
priorities, clearly identifying what it can achieve in the short, medium and long term and map
out differentiated strategies taking into account the most imminent threats to peace and
security in each of the countries within its community space. The external partners of
ECOWAS must, for their part, ensure that the assistance that they offer does not lead to a
proliferation of disparate initiatives that might weaken strategic thinking within the
organisation and cause a significant gap between ambitious action plans and the
Commissions capacity to implement them. The various forms of support to ECOWAS
institutions to enable it fully play its role as guardian of principles of democratic governance
and respect for human rights in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cte dIvoire,
which it is already doing very well is crucial. However, there is no alternative to
strengthening national institutions entrusted with the preservation of peace and security and
accountability of the political authorities of each Member State through the collective action
of their citizens.

References
Adapted from Yabi, Gilles Olakounl. (2010). The Role of ECOWAS in Managing
Political Crisis and Conflict The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Abuja: FriedrichEbert-Stiftung.
Francis, D. (2001). The Politics of economic regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS.
Aldershot, Ashgate.
Francis, D. (2006). Linking Peace Security and Developmental Regionalism:
Regional Economic and Security Integration in Africa. Journal of Peacebuilding &
Development.
Francis, D. (2008). Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: The Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa. London: University
of Bradford.
Karnst, Margareth P. and Mingst, Karen A. (2004). International Organizations The
Politics and Process of Global Governance. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.