Rawls

From the beginning I have stressed that justice as fairness applies to the basic structure of society. It is a conception for ranking social forms viewed
as closed systems. Some decision concerning these background arrangements is fundamental and cannot be avoided. In fact, the cumulative effect of
social and economic legislation is to specify the basic structure. Moreover, the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to
have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic system is not only an
institutional device for satisfying existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants in the future. How men work together now to
satisfy their present desires affects the desires they will have later on, the kind of persons they will be. These matters are, of course, perfectly obvious
and have always been recognized. They were stressed by economists as different as Marshall and Marx. 2 Since economic arrangements have these
effects, and indeed must do so, the choice of these institutions involves some view of human good and of the design of institutions to realize it. This
choice must, therefore, be made on moral and political as well as on economic grounds. Considerations of efficiency are but one basis of decision and
often relatively minor at that. Of course, this decision may not be openly faced; it may be made by default. We often acquiesce without thinking in
the moral and political conception implicit in the status quo, or leave things to be settled by how contending social and economic forces happen to
work themselves out. But political economy must investigate this problem even if the conclusion reached is that it is best left to the course of events
to decide.
Oncetheprinciplesofjusticearederived,however,thecontractdoctrinedoesestablishcertainlimitsontheconceptionofthegood.Theselimits
followfromthepriorityofjusticeoverefficiencyandthepriorityoflibertyoversocialandeconomicadvantages(assumingthatserialorderobtains).
ForasIremarkedearlier(6),theseprioritiesmeanthatdesiresforthingsthatareinherentlyunjust,orthatcannotbesatisfiedexceptbytheviolation
ofjustarrangements,havenoweight.Thereisnovalueinfulfillingthesewantsandthesocialsystemshoulddiscouragethem.Further,onemusttake
intoaccounttheproblemofstability.Ajustsystemmustgenerateitsownsupport.Thismeansthatitmustbearrangedsoastobringaboutinits
membersthecorrespondingsenseofjustice,aneffectivedesiretoactinaccordancewithitsrulesforreasonsofjustice.Thustherequirementof
stabilityandthecriterionofdiscouragingdesiresthatconflictwiththeprinciplesofjusticeputfurtherconstraintsoninstitutions.Theymustbenot
onlyjustbutframedsoastoencouragethevirtueofjusticeinthosewhotakepartinthem.Inthissense,theprinciplesofjusticedefineapartialideal
ofthepersonwhichsocialandeconomicarrangementsmustrespect.Finally,astheargumentforembeddingidealsintoourworkingprincipleshas
broughtout,certaininstitutionsarerequiredbythetwoprinciples.Theydefineanidealbasicstructure,ortheoutlinesofone,towardwhichthe
courseofreformshouldevolve.
Theupshotoftheseconsiderationsisthatjusticeasfairnessisnotatthemercy,sotospeak,ofexistingwantsandinterests.It
setsupanArchimedeanpointforassessingthesocialsystemwithoutinvokingaprioriconsiderations.Thelongrangeaimofsocietyissettled
initsmainlinesirrespectiveoftheparticulardesiresandneedsofitspresentmembers.Andanidealconceptionof
justiceisdefinedsinceinstitutionsaretofosterthevirtueofjusticeandtodiscouragedesiresandaspirationsincompatiblewithit.Ofcourse,the
paceofchangeandtheparticularreformscalledforatanygiventimedependuponcurrentconditions.Buttheconceptionofjustice,thegeneralform

ofajustsocietyandtheidealofthepersonconsistentwithitarenotsimilarlydependent.Thereisnoplaceforthequestionwhether

mensdesirestoplaytheroleofsuperiororinferiormightnotbesogreatthatautocraticinstitutions
shouldbeaccepted,orwhethermensperceptionofthereligiouspracticesofothersmightnotbeso
upsettingthatlibertyofconscienceshouldnotbeallowed.Wehavenooccasiontoaskwhetherunderreasonablyfavorable

conditionstheeconomicgainsoftechnocraticbutauthoritarianinstitutionsmightbesogreatastojustifythesacrificeofbasicfreedoms.Ofcourse,
theseremarksassumethatthegeneralassumptionsonwhichtheprinciplesofjusticewerechosenarecorrect.Butiftheyare,thissortofquestionis
alreadydecidedbytheseprinciples.Certaininstitutionalformsareembeddedwithintheconceptionofjustice.Thisviewshareswithperfectionism
thefeatureofsettingupanidealofthepersonthatconstrainsthepursuitofexistingdesires.Inthisrespectjusticeasfairnessandperfectionismare
bothopposedtoutilitarianism.
Nowitmayappearthatsinceutilitarianismmakesnodistinctionsbetweenthequalityofdesiresandallsatisfactionshavesomevalue,ithasno
criteriaforchoosingbetweensystemsofdesires,oridealsoftheperson.Fromatheoreticalpointofviewanyway,thisisincorrect.Theutilitarian
canalwayssaythatgivensocialconditionsandmensinterestsastheyare,andtakingintoaccounthowtheywilldevelopunderthisorthat
alternativeinstitutionalarrangement,encouragingonepatternofwantsratherthananotherislikelytoleadtoagreaternetbalance(ortoahigher
average)ofsatisfaction.Onthisbasistheutilitarianselectsbetweenidealsoftheperson.Someattitudesanddesires,beinglesscompatiblewith
fruitfulsocialcooperation,tendtoreducethetotal(ortheaverage)happiness.Roughlyspeaking,themoralvirtuesarethosedispositionsand
effectivedesiresthatcangenerallybereliedupontopromotethegreatestsumofwellbeing.Thus,itwouldbeamistaketoclaimthattheprincipleof
utilityprovidesnogroundsforchoosingamongidealsoftheperson,howeverdifficultitmaybetoapplytheprincipleinpractice.Nevertheless,the
choicedoesdependuponexistingdesiresandpresentsocialcircumstancesandtheirnaturalcontinuationsintothefuture.Theseinitialconditions
mayheavilyinfluencetheconceptionofhumangoodthatshouldbeencouraged.Thecontrastisthatbothjusticeasfairnessandperfectionism
establishindependentlyanidealconceptionofthepersonandofthebasicstructuresothatnotonlyaresomedesiresandinclinationsnecessarily
discouragedbuttheeffectoftheinitialcircumstanceswilleventuallydisappear.Withutilitarianismwecannotbesurewhatwillhappen.Sincethere

isnoidealembeddedinitsfirstprinciple,theplacewestartfrommayalwaysinfluencethepathwearetofollow.

Variousfeaturesofpublicgoodsderivefromthesetwocharacteristics.Firstofall,thereisthefreeriderproblem.Wherethepublicislargeand
includesmanyindividuals,thereisatemptationforeachpersontotrytoavoiddoinghisshare.Thisisbecausewhateveronemandoeshisactionwill
notsignificantlyaffecttheamountproduced.Heregardsthecollectiveactionofothersasalreadygivenonewayortheother.Ifthepublicgoodis
producedhisenjoymentofitisnotdecreasedbyhisnotmakingacontribution.Ifitisnotproducedhisactionwouldnothavechangedthesituation
anyway.Acitizenreceivesthesameprotectionfromforeigninvasionregardlessofwhetherhehaspaidhistaxes.Thereforeinthepolarcasetrade
andvoluntaryagreementscannotbeexpectedtodevelop.Itfollowsthatarrangingforandfinancingpublicgoodsmustbetakenoverbythestateand
somebindingrulerequiringpaymentmustbeenforced.Evenifallcitizenswerewillingtopaytheirshare,theywouldpresumablydosoonlywhen
theyareassuredthatotherswillpaytheirsaswell.Thusoncecitizenshaveagreedtoactcollectivelyandnotasisolatedindividualstakingtheactions
oftheothersasgiven,thereisstillthetaskoftyingdowntheagreement.Thesenseofjusticeleadsustopromotejustschemesandtodooursharein
themwhenwebelievethatothers,orsufficientlymanyofthem,willdotheirs.Butinnormalcircumstancesareasonableassuranceinthisregard
canonlybegivenifthereisabindingruleeffectivelyenforced.Assumingthatthepublicgoodistoeveryonesadvantage,andonethatallwould
agreetoarrangefor,theuseofcoercionisperfectlyrationalfromeachmanspointofview.Manyofthetraditionalactivitiesofgovernment,insofar
astheycanbejustified,canbeaccountedforinthisway.Theneedfortheenforcementofrulesbythestatewillstillexistevenwheneveryoneis
movedbythesamesenseofjustice.Thecharacteristicfeaturesofessentialpublicgoodsnecessitatecollectiveagreements,andfirmassurancemust
begiventoallthattheywillbehonored.Anotheraspectofthepublicgoodssituationisthatofexternality.Whengoodsarepublicandindivisible,
theirproductionwillcausebenefitsandlossestootherswhichmaynotbetakenintoaccountbythosewhoarrangeforthesegoodsorwhodecideto
producethem.Thusinthepolarcase,ifbutapartofthecitizenrypaystaxestocovertheexpenditureonpublicgoods,thewholesocietyisstill
affectedbytheitemsprovided.Yetthosewhoagreetotheseleviesmaynotconsidertheseeffects,andsotheamountofpublicexpenditureis
presumablydifferentfromwhatitwouldbeifallbenefitsandlosseshadbeenconsidered.Theeverydaycasesarethosewheretheindivisibilityis
partialandthepublicissmaller.Someonewhohashimselfinoculatedagainstacontagiousdiseasehelpsothersaswellashimself;andwhileitmay
notpayhimtoobtainthisprotection,itmaybeworthittothelocalcommunitywhenalladvantagesaretalliedup.And,ofcourse,therearethe
strikingcasesofpublicharms,aswhenindustriessullyanderodethenaturalenvironment.Thesecostsarenotnormallyreckonedwithbythemarket,
sothatthecommoditiesproducedaresoldatmuchlessthantheirmarginalsocialcosts.Thereisadivergencebetweenprivateandsocialaccounting
thatthemarketfailstoregister.Oneessentialtaskoflawandgovernmentistoinstitutethenecessarycorrections.