Opinion Lead

February 7, 2015
Updated: February 7, 2015 00:33 IST

Indias tango with the great powers

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Srinath Raghavan
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TOPICS

diplomacy
India-China
international relations
summit

Geopolitical and economic factors and the re-energised

relationship between the U.S. and India are the drivers of
change in the trilateral relationship between India, Russia
and China. The cumulative impact of these two trends points
to a new, emerging configuration of the triangular
relationship
The latest trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of India,
Russia and China was held on shifting strategic sands. It would be no
exaggeration to say that the triangular relationship between these
countries is entering a new phase one that differs significantly from
the past. Indias ability to navigate this unfolding terrain will not only

impinge on its relationships with Russia and China, but also on its wider,
international objectives and choices.
The drivers of change in this trilateral relationship are primarily
geopolitical and economic. The civil war in Ukraine shows no sign of
abating, nor indeed does Russias involvement in the conflict. The
resurgence of the fighting in eastern Ukraine has left the peace talks in
tatters. And Russian support for the rebels has ensured that the
Ukrainian forces cannot gain the upper hand. Indeed, the Ukrainians
have suffered heavily in the recent fighting. This has led to a chorus of
calls in the West to arm the Ukrainian forces. Although U.S. President
Barack Obama has demurred against this, several influential voices
including Mr. Obamas nominee for Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter
have come out in favour of providing heavy weapons to Ukraine.
Any such move will lead Russian President Vladimir Putin to dig in his
heels still deeper. Russia already faces a raft of economic sanctions
imposed by the European Union (EU) and the U.S. The Russian
economy is apparently wilting under the one-two punch of these
sanctions and the free-fall in oil prices. The projected slowdown in
growth, the depleting foreign exchange reserves, the rising inflation, the
downgrading of Russias credit rating to junk status: all point to a
serious economic crunch. The economic sanctions have already led

Russia to tilt closer towards China. The talk of providing weapons to

Ukraine or imposing further sanctions will accentuate this shift.
The second driver of change is the re-energised relationship between the
U.S. and India. The U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision put out during Mr.
Obamas visit not only singles out the South China Sea dispute but also
commits India and the U.S. to work together with other democracies in
the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The wisdom of issuing such a
statement is debatable. Are we staking our credibility before creating
capabilities? Does it needlessly restrict our room for diplomatic
manoeuvre in the event of a crisis in the South China Sea? New Delhi
insists that a strategic embrace of the U.S. need not limit its relations
with China. While this may be true in some generic sense, we should not
forget that every move on the chessboard of international politics will
invite countermoves. We do not yet live in a world that is free of
consequences.
India-Russia

relationship

The cumulative impact of these two trends points to a new, emerging

configuration of the triangular relationship between India, Russia and
China. Going forward, Russia-China ties might become the strongest
side of the triangle. From Indias standpoint, this is historically
unprecedented. New Delhis strategic ties with Moscow first took shape

in the late 1950s. The backcloth to the blossoming of this relationship

was provided by Indias deteriorating relationship with China owing to
the disputed boundary. At the same time, ideological and strategic ties
between Moscow and Beijing were coming apart. Although the Russians
played an ambivalent role during the war of 1962, Indo-Soviet ties,
especially in defence, continued to tighten.
The clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces in 1969 led Moscow to
propose a treaty of friendship with India. The treaty was eventually
consummated at the height of the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. This crisis
also saw the American opening towards Maoist China, which
subsequently led to a strategic nexus aimed at the Soviet Union. While
New Delhi and Moscow were pulled together by their shared concerns
about Beijing, India found its choices being circumscribed in other areas
as well. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
India publicly supported the Russians, while the Americans and the
Chinese covertly assisted Pakistan and the Mujahideen against the Red
Army.
By the time the Cold War drew to an end, there was a rapprochement
between Russia and China. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led
India to look more towards the West. Yet, at no point, was there a
possibility of a Russia-China entente of the kind that is now
crystallising. Nor did the normalisation of the Russia-China relationship

outweigh

Indo-Russian ties. Most importantly, the developing

relationship between Moscow and Beijing did not impact on New

Delhis immediate interests.
All this appears to be changing. In June 2014, Russia announced the
lifting of its long-standing embargo on arms sales to Pakistan. In
November, Russia and Pakistan signed their first ever military
cooperation agreement. The Russians argue that if India can buy defence
equipment from the U.S., why couldnt they sell to Pakistan. The
problem for India, of course, is the strategic import of such moves by
Russia. Then again, we must realise that our growing proximity to the
U.S. reduces our leverage over Russia. As does Russias increasing tilt
towards China. As always, a bit of history can be useful.
Russia-China ties might become the strongest side of the
triangle.

From

Indias

standpoint,

this

is

historically

unprecedented.
Back in the 1960s, the Russians first mooted the idea of selling military
equipment to Pakistan. The Indian response was swift and sharp. In a
meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi bluntly said that nothing should be done from which it could be
inferred that the Soviet Union treated India at par with Pakistan. India,
she added, was especially worried with regard to Soviet help [to
Pakistan], as such help might neutralise what we have obtained from the

Soviet Union. Moscow promptly backed off. The Russians did so

because they needed Indian support in their own problems with China.
Moreover, India unlike Pakistan was not an American ally.
Security

architecture

The strategic picture now is rather different. Discussions in the recent

trilateral meeting underscored the complexities that will confront India.
The joint statement issued in Beijing makes the usual noises about the
desirability of a multipolar world. Yet, several points need to be
unpacked. The statement calls for a security architecture in Asia that
must be open, inclusive, indivisible and transparent. The use of
indivisible is interesting. This refers to the American pivot and
attempts at rallying its allies. By contrast, the India-U.S. statement
supports at least rhetorically the U.S.-led efforts. The Chinese and
Russians have clearly taken note.
Things would be easy for India if it confronted stark choices between the
U.S. and China. Consider the position taken by the three countries on
climate change. The statement hopes that in 2015, a legally-binding
instrument would be arrived at on the basis of equity, common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. This fits with
Indias negotiating position so far. But the fact is that the U.S. and China
have already agreed upon a plan that effectively carves out an

exceptional space for themselves and leaves little for countries like India
to work with. This is a nice example of the G2 solutions for which
India will have to watch out.
Another instance of this might be in international trade. The joint
statement affirms that the World Trade Organization (WTO) must
remain the preeminent global forum trade. This reflects their concern
about U.S. efforts to create new regional trading blocs in Europe and
Asia. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negotiated by the
Obama administration aims to bring into force a very different kind of
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in Asia-Pacific, which will bring on to
the trade agenda a new set of norms and standards. The Chinese have
been explicitly kept out of it by the Americans in the hope that China
will eventually have to come to terms with this trade agenda. Indeed, as
the TPP negotiations near completion, the Chinese have informally
conveyed to the U.S. their desire to get on board. As in climate change, a
U.S.-China convergence on this issue will hurt Indian interests.
Then again, there are issues where the three countries interests seem
closely aligned and in opposition to the U.S. They have agreed to
support a U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolution prohibiting
intervention and forced regime change. This cuts against the idea of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was introduced by the western

powers through the UNGA and sought to be built up as a norm

governing interventions.
Indias relations with the great powers, then, are entering a period of
unprecedented complexity. There are no pat solutions or simple tradeoffs. And every move we make will be consequential.
(Srinath Raghavan is Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New
Delhi.)
Keywords:

India-China-Russia

bilateral

relations, trilateral

meeting, Sushma Swaraj, Sushma Swaraj China visit, India-China

bilateral

relations, India-Russia

bilateral

realtions, Sino-India

relations, UN General Assembly, Responsibility to Protect