UNIT 8: GLOBALISATION & FINANCIAL INSTABILITY

8.1.LearningOutcomes
This unit aims to help you develop an understanding of:

Different forms of financial crisis

Major crisis that took place since 1980

Causes of financial crisis

Consequences of financial crisis

8.2.Overview
In the previous unit, we described the conditions of increasing financial
integration in the world economy within a historical context. We argued that the
process of financial globalisation has been facilitated by ICT and the
deregulation of financial markets since the 1970s. As a result, the degree of
integration has been much deeper and wider since the 1990s in comparison to
any other phase in the history.
On the other hand, the frequency of financial crises was lower before
financial globalization. Since the 1980s, the number of financial disturbances
increased significantly. Unlike the crisis prior to the 1980s, those in the last
several decades had pronounced contagion effects which led to the spread of
instability from the country of origin to other countries. Stiglitz (1999), for
example, indicates that around 80-100 countries had a financial crisis since the
mid-1970s. Aggregate figures often cloak some interesting details. The findings
of Bordo et al. (2001) suggest that the overall financial instability has been more
recurrent from the 1970s onward in comparison to any other period in the
history. But this overall picture heavily reflects the circumstances in the
developing countries. If we focus on the financial markets in the developed
countries alone, the frequency of crisis has actually declined significantly since
the 1970s.
These trends raise important questions. Why has the recurrence of crisis
been higher since the 1970s? Has increased integration and capital mobility had

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a role to play in financial instability patterns worldwide? Why are developing

countries more prone to crisis? Are there any differences between the triggers
of financial crisis that took place before and after the financial globalisation?
What are the consequences of financial instability?
We aim to shed some light on these questions in the forthcoming sections in
this unit.

8.3.Thetypesoffinancialcrises
In general, there are three main ways in which financial crises manifest
themselves. These are banking crisis, currency crisis and balance of payments
crisis. More often they are inter-linked, one leading to another form of crisis. A
crisis may start as a banking crisis and turn into a balance of payments crisis
later. Or it may start as a currency crisis and turn into a banking crisis.
Banking crisis often result in an increase in non-performing loans, liquidity
shortages and weakens the capital base of banks. The causes of banking crisis
are various. But most important is the role of the cyclical economic conditions. In
a booming economy, investors are usually optimistic and the lending capacity of
banks is greater. In good times, some banks relax their lending rules to take
advantage of improved business opportunities. Others may follow the suit to
retain their market share. Excessive risk taking by banks and borrowers will
create a lending spree and a bubble in financial markets which cannot be
maintained forever. Eventually, the interest rates will have to rise. If an economic
slump sets in with increasing unemployment, reduced profits and household
incomes, those with excess borrowing will find it difficult to meet their
obligations. Some firms will start to borrow short term in order to finance their
long term debt. This type of maturity mismatch in the management of debt and
its financing is called ponzi financing and it is one of the clear signs of turmoil in
the financial markets. Defaults on borrowing will start to rise with banks
accumulating an increasing proportion of their assets in the form of nonperforming loans. Ability of banks to extend lending will be reduced and a credit
crunch will hit the economy.
For banks to maintain their role as financial intermediaries without major
disruptions, prudent risk management practices are necessary. This often has
two dimensions. The first is the supervision of banks by an independent financial
regulator that can maintain an oversight on the sector as a whole. Financial
regulators may impose restrictions on banks lending by imposing reserve,
liquidity and capital adequacy requirements. They also oblige banks to publish
their accounts (e.g. balance sheets, annual reports of activities) periodically and
make these available to the general public. This aims to improve the

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transparency of their transactions, discipline banks through market pressure and

reveal their exposures to various markets.
Second, the banks themselves have to enhance their risk management
capacity and adopt prudent lending practices. They have to keep their accounts
and their customers profile in check. For example, they can keep an eye on
maturity match by using the ratio of short to long term debt. They can also
monitor their exposure to various markets and rebalance their activities.
Excessive exposure by banks to foreign exchange markets, for example, can be
rather risky in countries where exchange rates fluctuate erratically and large
devaluations occur due to low foreign exchange reserves and speculative
attacks on local currency. Another example is the excessive exposure to subprime markets in lending which generated substantial turmoil in the US and to a
lesser extent in the UK since the Summer of 2007.
Balance of payments crisis often reflects unsustainable deficit on the
current account or the capital account. The oil price hikes in the early 1970s, for
example, significantly deteriorated the balance of payment accounts of the nonoil producing developing countries. Because oil is a major energy source for all
industries with low elasticity of demand, governments and the private sector
were faced with two undesirable choices. They either had to cut down the
demand for oil or they could use the easy loans offered by overseas banks that
re-cycled the petro-dollars of the oil producing economies and maintain their oil
imports. The first option had the potential to increase the capacity
underutilisation in the economy with dreadful consequences of low growth and
high unemployment. The second option meant that these countries had to bear
large current account deficits financed by capital account surpluses created
through capital inflows, i.e. external borrowing. Developing countries that opted
for the second alternative accumulated current account deficits which later
worsened when their exports also started to decline as a result of the recession
in their trading partners, especially in Europe and North America. Therefore, a
large number of developing countries went through the 1970s and 1980s with
increasing debt burden and sizable imbalances on their external accounts.
Moreover, capital outflows in sizeable amounts can turn the balance on the
capital account to deficits (e.g. debt repayments) and can be destabilising. But
capital inflows can also create instability if they finance current spending, debt or
speculative investment as repayment of these financial flows can be difficult in
the future. Foreign inflows used for productive investment such as FDI often do
not have such negative side-effects.
Balance of payments crisis is likely to lead to a currency crisis. This is
because heavy indebtedness often leads to reduction in foreign currency
reserves and a large drop in the value of domestic currency which worsens the
size of the debt stock in terms of local currency. Lowering of countrys credit

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rating by international credit rating agencies may trigger a capital flight and limit
countrys access to international financial markets. Therefore, it is essential for
countries that are prone to currency crisis to keep an eye on three ratios:
i) The ratio of foreign currency reserves to external debt, especially short
term debt
ii) The ratio of foreign currency reserves to current account deficits
iii) The ratio of the interest rate on external debt to the rate of return on
domestic investment

8.5.Majorcrisissince1980s
Latin American Crises in the 1980s was caused by increasing external
indebtedness accompanied by financial deregulation. It started with Mexican
moratorium (announcement to discontinue debt payments) in 1982. By 1983
another 15 countries in Latin America and 11 elsewhere declared their inability
to meet their obligations.
Mexico encountered another major crisis in 1994 when capital inflows
stopped after some political turmoil. The government tried to finance its current
account deficits by issuing bonds called tesobonos which were payable in pesos
indexed to US$. Despite this, reserves were still low and capital inflows were
limited. Hence, government could not defend the exchange rate by allowing
minor depreciation. Eventually it let the exchange rate to float and suffer a
substantial depreciation in the value of domestic currency. This inflated the
redemption value of the tesobonos as they were linked to the US$and hence the
external indebtedness. The fears about a possible moratorium twelve years after
the first one in 1982 led the US Treasury and the IMF to design a US$50 billion
bailout package for the redemption of tesobonos.
The 1997 Asian Crisis started with a run on Thai Baht and large capital
outflows followed by a sizable devaluation in July 2007. Soon the currency crisis
spread into Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and eventually South
Korea. This is often explained as the contagion effects of the initial trigger
caused by the crisis in Thailand. Most of these economies saw their asset and
property prices tumbling down during the crisis and found themselves unable to
finance their increasing external debt.
The 1998 Russian Crisis was fuelled by a growing budget deficit which was
being financed by external borrowing. This strategy worked for a while with
restrictions which sterilised the country against sudden capital outflows. In
1997, public sector borrowing requirement increased further as a result of a

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decline in government revenues and increase in its interest payments, which

amounted to half of its revenues. The government raised the return on its short
term securities (mainly treasury bills) which were in the range of 25-35 per cent
and lowered the restrictions on capital outflows. These measures appealed
international investors who were looking for new destinations for investment in
the aftermath of the Asian crisis. While external indebtedness increased as a
result of rising short term capital inflows to Russia, a new development opened
another hole, this time in its current account: Oil prices and prices of non-ferrous
metals, two important export items in Russia, declined in the international
markets. Growing current account deficits led international investors, who had
not recovered from the shock of Asian crisis, to withdraw their funds from
Russia. The rise of Central Banks interest rates to 150 per cent did not stop the
capital flight. Before long, new borrowing opportunities had dried-up in the
international markets. Ultimately, the government defaulted on redeeming its
securities. The commercial banks were also heavily exposed to foreign
exchange markets. Some of them defaulted on their debt servicing. Eventually,
the government announced a 90- day moratorium in August 1998 and accepted
a rescue package from the IMF to facilitate recovery.
In 1999, a crisis hit Brazil. At the heart of the crisis was governments
strategy to stabilise the economy. The strategy was introduced in 1994 and
called as the Real Plan. It involved a reduction on the reliance of domestic
monetary expansion and increase in external capital inflows under a managed
exchange rate system. Low interest rates in the international markets in the
1990s encouraged many developing economies to borrow from overseas. Brazil
attracted large capital inflows, mainly short term, after 1994. Capital inflows are
often accompanied by appreciation of local currency which raised the current
account deficits. The external debt accumulated and public sector foreign debt
alone amounted to 30 per cent of GDP. By November 1998, capital inflows were
reversed and reserves started to decline dramatically. In January 1999, the
government had to let the Real to float which resulted in 50 per cent devaluation.
A severe deflation set in as domestic interest rates were raised to evade further
depreciation in the value of currency.
The 2001 Argentine Crisis was caused by high external debt and
maintenance of an overvalued currency under a fixed exchange rate regime
which the country had adopted to cure hyperinflation of the 1980s. The
overvaluation of peso rendered domestic goods and services uncompetitive in
international markets and led to a fall in exports. Increasing current account
deficits made it difficult for the country to service its debt. The government
financed its external debt by borrowing from international markets. Total external
debt was around 50 per cent of GDP. The IMF requested cuts in public spending
in order to improve fiscal and current account balance. Although the government
reduced spending it could not lower it to the levels required by the IMF because
unemployment and recession were growing. In 2001, IMF suspended $1.3

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billion approved loan to Argentina on the grounds that the government was not
following the agreed economic policies. Eventually, it became clear that the
Argentine debt was unsustainable. Foreign loans dried. The government
undertook emergency measures and restricted withdrawals from bank accounts.
No policy measure could save the country and eventually government was
forced to float the peso and allow a large devaluation which worsened the debt
crisis and prolonged the recession for a long time.

8.4.Whyhavecrisesbeenmorefrequentsince1980
The financial crises over the last two decades occurred under different
circumstances and manifested themselves in different ways. Nevertheless, there
were some common elements shared by many countries in crisis.

financial liberalisation, especially, capital account liberalisation

pegged exchange rate regimes

increasing indebtedness, often reflected by fiscal deficits and/or balance

of payments deficits, which eventually rendered pegged exchange rate
regimes un-sustainability

Financial liberalisation or deregulation has been promoted for improving

competition in financial markets and enhancing efficiency of financial institutions
as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Despite differences in the
composition of policies across the countries, frequently they combined
deregulation of domestic financial markets with liberalisation of international
financial transactions (capital account). In the past, all banks were publicly
owned in some countries while in others public sector had a predominant
presence in the financial sector. Encouraging entry of the private banks into the
financial markets and/or privatising existing public sector banks has been part of
the financial sector reforms. In the past, lending and deposit rates were
administered by either central banks or other government agencies at low levels
to provide incentives for investment. Deregulation programmes often relaxed or
removed the administrative controls on interest rates and allowed them to be
increasingly determined by market forces. Restrictions on international capital
flows have also been moderated.
Many observers view that the instability in the capital flows to the developing
world in the 1980s and 1990s were associated with financial liberalisation
especially with capital account liberalisation (Stiglitz 1999, Prasad et al, 2003).
Why should this be the case?

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Find out more

about moral
hazard

The literature on financial liberalisation provides us with a number answers.

Firstly, there may be institutional problems or lack of institutional adjustment in
the process of opening financial markets. Most importantly, intensive
competition in the financial sector after deregulation may lead to imprudent
lending and deposit taking practices. Indeed, over-borrowing and excessive
lending without prudence, which is a form of moral hazard, has been considered
as one of the most crucial factors leading to financial crisis in Asia in 1997. This
resulted in high default rates, increasing non-performing loans and deterioration
of banks balance sheets and in some cases total bankruptcy of financial
institutions.
Many countries opened up their financial markets but failed to complement
these reforms with necessary institutional reforms. The lessons from the Asian
(1990s) and Latin American (1980s) crises are that financial liberalisation
requires a strong institutional apparatus with appropriate supervisory and
regulatory systems to oversee the risk exposure of financial institutions in
different markets and to set standards (such as capital adequacy requirements)
for limits on excessive risk taking. Legislative structures are necessary for
guidance and legal requirements for enforcement of rules and regulations.
Secondly, a particular inconsistency after liberalisation has played an
important role in triggering financial crises. This was the use of pegged
exchange rate regimes together with flexible interest rates on domestic assets.
As argued by Obstfeld (1998) financial integration has limited the policy
autonomy of governments in achieving their objectives in that they cannot
possibly maintain control over two or more of the following elements: Capital
account, monetary policy, exchange rate. If they want to maintain a grip on
exchange rate then they will lose their autonomy over the capital account and
the monetary policy. If they want to retain their power over the monetary policy
then they have to release their grip on exchange rates and capital account.
Obstfeld called this inconsistent trinity or a trillemma.
A country with an open capital account may choose to use monetary policy
either to encourage domestic investment through low interest rates or to attract
foreign capital flows through high interest rates as in Figure 9.1 below.
Alternatively it may pursue a neutral monetary policy with no controls over
interest rates. The country may also prefer to use a fixed or pegged exchange
rate regime to achieve stability, which is a worthy objective for any government.
This is when the country would encounter the trilemma. If the monetary policy
requires low interest rates, then the country will face capital outflows which
would depreciate the value of domestic currency. The central bank will have to
sell foreign currencies in exchange for local currency in the domestic market to
defend the fixed exchange rate. But this will lower the level of foreign exchange
reserves. If reserves are close to some critical level below which government
can no longer defend the exchange rate there may be a run on the domestic

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currency. This is likely if there is a speculator attack, i.e. when speculators start
to buy foreign exchange in massive amounts, expecting that the government will
have to abandon the peg and allow the domestic currency to depreciate. The
result would be a surge in external debt stock as borrowers have to give up
more local currency to repay their debt in foreign currencies. Speculators will
gain as a result of foreign exchange appreciation.
Figure 8.1. The Trilemma: An example
Monetary Policy with
Open Capital Account

Low R for High Domestic Investment

FX fixed

CB defends
FX Rate.
Sells FX.
Reserves
run down.
Unsustainable.
Speculative
attacks

FX floating

Capital
Outflow but
stronger X with
Depreciation,
Capital
Inflow but
low X with
Appreciation

High R for high capital inflows

FX fixed

CB defends
FX Rate
Buys FX.
Builds up
Reserves.
Costly
Speculative
Attacks

FX floating

Initially, high
Capital Inflow &
Low X with
Appreciation,
This tendency is
reversed later

A pegged exchange rate policy is also unsustainable with administered and

high interest rates aiming to attract foreign investment. Capital inflows will put
pressure on domestic currency to appreciate. To defend the peg, central bank
will have to withdraw foreign exchange from the market by buying foreign
currencies in exchange for local currency. However, this strategy creates two
problems. One is the opportunity cost of building up more reserves than
necessary. That is what the country could earn if the reserves were invested.
Another, it insulates foreign investors from market risks, which are transferred to
the residents and governments of the host country. Foreign investors do not only
benefit from high interest rates but are also protected against a decline in the
value of their money because of the fixed exchange rate which is defended at
the cost of public resources.
The suggestion of the two scenarios we explained above is that with capital
mobility and increased financial integration under open capital account, a
government can either keep its control over monetary or exchange rate regime
but not both.

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In fact, the Asian crisis gave signs that perhaps governments can have
control neither over monetary nor exchange rate policy under an open capital
account regime that intensifies the links of the individual economies with the rest
of the world. Many Asian economies deregulated their capital accounts in the
1990s and lifted controls on domestic interest rates. Competition in the financial
sector to attract savings raised the domestic interest rates. On the other hand,
interest rates were rather low in the US, Europe and Japan during the 1990s.
Asian financial institutions exploited the
opportunity offered by the interest rate
Note that short term flows (e.g.
foreign debt) is more volatile. Equity
differentials and borrowed from lower rates
investment is useful for raising
abroad and lent from higher rates in the
capital at lower cost but in times of
domestic economy. Because exchange
financial turmoil the mass sale of
rates were pegged they faced little
such assets can dramatically lower
exchange rate risk. This encouraged
share prices, and hence the net
worth of companies. FDI, on the
capital inflows mostly in the form of
other hand, is less volatile.
portfolio investment (i.e. equity investment
or short term debt). Over-investment
inflated the asset prices. Bankruptcy of few
heavily indebted players in the market (a bank or a real estate trader) created a
panic in financial markets and reversed the flow of capital. Herd behavior of
investors intensified capital outflows. The central banks could not defend the
pegged the exchange rates and eventually left their currencies to float with
substantial devaluation. Malaysia was the only country which was able to
contain the damage by imposing restrictions on capital outflows.

Herd behaviour is usually defined as investors mimicking each others actions, sometimes
ignoring socially valuable information. Rationalisations of herding include learning from
others and incentive structures for fund managers. Herding due to learning from others
can occur when actions are observable but information is partly private. In such situations
it may be optimal to rely exclusively on others actions. If the abilities of fund managers are
known to investors, investors may choose to compensate managers based on relative
performance. This, in turn, provides an incentive for managers to mimic the actions of their
peers: fund managers do not tend to deviate too strongly from benchmark indices. A
related behaviour of investors is given by momentum trading strategies prescribing
buying assets whose prices have been rising selling those whose prices have been falling.
Such behaviour can also be destabilising. (Extract from Prasad et al. 2003, p. 27)

In sum, before financial globalization financial crises were seen as an

outcome of the crisis in the real economy. These fundamentalist perspectives
relied on the following causes to explain most financial crises:
Unsustainable credit extension and excessive risk taking during the booming
periods (Private/Public Debt & Non-performing loans)

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 Excessive current or capital account imbalances which gave rise to currency

crises.
In the current era of financial globalization, however, crises do not always arise
because of the problems in the fundamentals. In most Asian economies, for
example, deficits on the current and capital accounts as well as on governments
budget were sustainable before 1997. Researchers highlight other issues which
do not fit into the framework described above. These include:
Financial deregulation and institutional problems (e.g. moral hazard and
regulatory weaknesses)
Policy inconsistencies: e.g. the trillemma
Speculative attacks
Hot capital flows and herd behaviour in financial markets
Contagion

8.6.TheConsequencesofFinancialCrisis
Major financial crises do not only affect financial markets. Every single
macroeconomic indicator is likely to be upset by a major financial upheaval,
including growth, unemployment, price levels, and governments finances. The
World Bank, for example, estimated the cost of crisis in terms of economic
contraction (negative growth) and unemployment in some countries. In all cases,
except for Dominican Republic, drop in growth rates have been sizeable,
especially so in Argentina, Uruguay, Indonesia and Thailand. Unemployment
effects were also significant.

Source: World Bank, cited in Leijonhufvud (2007, p. 1822)

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Read the news extract below and identify the measures and the cost of
measures that Indonesian government used during 1997-98 to manage the
negative impacts of the financial crisis.

ASIAN CRISIS IN THE NEWS: INDONESIA

BBC NEWS April 4, 1998, 15:55 GMT, UK : Indonesia has closed seven banks
and placed seven others under formal supervision because of their massive
liquidity problems...The government ordered the largest state bank to guarantee
the deposits of those closed down Of more than 200 banks in the country, most
are believed to be in serious trouble due to bad loans and the collapse of the
rupiah. Foreign banks have stopped offering credit to Indonesian banks, which
means even those companies still trading can no longer receive funding to
continue day-to-day businessMore banks will have to be liquidated before the
banking sector is restored to health; until then there can be no economic
recoveryMeanwhile, the Central Bank is continuing to pour millions of dollars
into the remaining banks to keep them afloat but it is not clear for how much longer
it can afford to do soIndonesia is in its third week of negotiations with the IMF in
a bid to resume a $40bn rescue programme. The IMF suspended it because it said
Jakarta was reluctant to introduce reforms already agreed. ..All deposit accounts
with the closed banks will be transferred to the state-owned Bank Nasional
Indonesia. Trading in shares of institutions placed under supervision will be
suspended.
ASIA TIMES, 10 June 1999, Jakarta: Indonesia is suffering the world's worst
banking crisis since the 1970s, when measured on a fiscal cost-to-gross GDP
basis, and may take up to a decade to fully recover. Standard & Poor's estimates
that Indonesia's crisis will consume an up-front fiscal cost, defined as funds
provided by the government to initially recapitalise or pay out creditors or
distressed banks, equivalent to $87 billion or 82 percent of GDPThe Indonesian
government's estimate of the up-front fiscal cost is $7O billion, or Indonesian
rupiah (Rp) 570 trillion. This consists of Rp352 trillion in bank recapitalisation
injection and Rp218 trillion of reimbursements to the central bank.

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RECAP
R
1. Therre has be
een increa
ased finan
ncial instab
bility since
e 1980
espe
ecially in the
e developin
ng world
2. Bank
king, Balan
nce of Paym
ments and Currency
C
c
crises
are th
he main
ways
s in which financial
f
crises manife
est themselvves
3. Befo
ore financia
al globalisa
ation funda
amentals (d
debt and deficits)
expla
ained mostt crises reassonably we
ell.
4. Afte
er financial globalisatio
on debt an
nd deficits are still important.
How
wever a nu
umber of other
o
facto
ors are em
merging as crucial
reas
sons for financial crisiis, including, institutio
onal problems, the
trilem
mma, hot capital
c
flow
ws, herd be
ehaviour, speculative
s
attacks
and contagion.
5. Fina
ancial insta
ability can have serio
ous negativve macroecconomic
impa
acts such as
a higher un
nemployme
ent, econom
mic contracttion and
fisca
al cost.

KeyW
Wordsand
dConceptts
Balance
e of paymentts crises
Contagion effects..................
Currenccy crisis ....................
Fundam
mentalist persspectives
Inconsisstent trinity ...............
Moral ha
azard .......................
Ponzi fin
nancing......................
speculator attack .................
The trile
emma

Bankin
ng crisis
Credit crunch
c
Foreign currency reserves
r
Herd behavior
b
Maturitty mismatch
h
Morato
orium
Speculative attackss
Sub-prrime marketss

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StudyQuestionsforUnit8
1. In economic theory major financial crisis with some impact on the whole
economy are classified according their causes and explained on the basis of
economic models. The literature in this area identifies three different crisis
models: First, second and third generation models. Find out more about
these models by carrying out a search on these in GOOGLE.
2. Identify the shortcomings
Leijonhufvud (2007).

of

various

risk

measures

discussed

by

3. Search for news, for example in Financial Times, on the housing crisis of
2007 in the US. What factors are highlighted as the causes of this crisis?
4. What are the factors that may cause unsustainable government deficits?
5. What are the factors that may cause unsustainable deficits in the current or
capital accounts of the balance of payments?

CourseworkforUnit8
Presentation Task: Study the financial crisis of 1994 in Mexico. Describe how
the crisis manifested itself and discuss its causes.
Short Essay Topic: Analyse the ways in which globalization has contributed to
increased financial instability.

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ReferencesandReadingList
Bordo, M et al (2001). Financial Crises: Lessons
from the Last 120 Years. Economic Policy, 35,
pp. 53-75
Grabel, I (2003) Averting crisis? Assessing
measures to manage financial integration in
emerging economies Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 27, pp. 317-336
Leijonhufvud, C. (2007) Financial Globalisation and Emerging Markets
Volatility, The World Economy, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01077.x
Mishkin, F S (2007) Is Financial Globalisation Beneficial? Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, pp. 259-294
Prasad et al. (2003) Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries:
Some Empirical Evidence, IMF Occasional Paper, No 220
Stiglitz J (1999) Reforming the global economic architecture: lessons from
recent crises The Journal of Finance, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 1508-1522

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