is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The
complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of
the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.
Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for
having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The parties do
not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI from their office and
kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which
was the agency tasked to administer Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the
agreement
with
GABI
and
order
the
organization's
ejectment.The question now is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of private respondents. We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority
on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not
be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private
respondentswereallowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of
accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may
validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be
ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a
vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the
metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those
that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2,
Section
3
of
the
Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform
civilian
functions
of
the
government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under
the
Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of
the
joint
visibility
patrols.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of
the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another
co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the
law
and
the
Constitution.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling
the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and
the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional
provision
on
civilian
supremacy
over
the
military.
The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether
it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's
powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed
out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . .
a
factual
showing
of
perceptible
harm."
Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on
these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is
not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law
enforcement. We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the
Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is
required
in
the
interest
of
public
safety.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed
forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The
implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of
the
power
to
call
as
compared
to
the
two
other
powers.
We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment
of
the
Marines.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They
have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The
exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was
often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January
15, 1987. On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez. Alvarez was
only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting. Tension mounted the next day. The
farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the
employees from going inside their offices.
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's
group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands . On their march to Malacanang,
they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod
(KPML). Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending. Government antiriot forces assembled at Mendiola. The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at
around 4:30 pm. From CM Recto, they preceded toward the police lines. No dialogue took
place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo). 39 were
wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of
marchers. Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries. The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident
on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit. The police and military were armed with handguns
prohibited by law. The security men assigned to protect the government units were in
civilian attire (prohibited by law). There was unnecessary firing by the police and military.
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law. It is not clear who started the
firing. The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd;
the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve
only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are
not tantamount to a waiver by the State
No
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging
their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they
fired at the crowd instead
reversible
error
by
the
respondent
Judge
found.
Petitions
dismissed.
Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution
the
motor
vehicles
of
the
DA.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued
without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt
from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have
divested
itself
of
its
sovereign
immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract
relates
to
the
exercise
of
its
sovereign
functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact,
performed
any
act
proprietary
in
character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to
the Commission on Audit.