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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiffs Linda Andreini, Edward J. Andreini, and Mario Andreini, individually and as
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successors-in-interest to Edward A. Andreini, deceased, by and through their counsel, and for
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1.
This action arises from the acts and omissions of the defendants agency, the
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United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base. The Air Forces
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acts and omissions resulted in the death of plaintiffs decedent, Edward A. Andreini. Plaintiffs
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bring this action against defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims
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Act, (28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq.), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983).
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COMPLAINT
2.
The Air Force promoted and produced an open house and air show at Travis Air
Force Base, called Thunder Over Solano, on May 3, 2014 through May 4, 2014. To attract
civilian stunt pilots to perform at its air show, the Air Force represented to prospective
performers that it would ensure their safety by, among other things, providing effective,
appropriate, and reasonable aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) services in the event a pilot
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to air show accidents required the Air Force to pre-position its ARFF equipment and personnel
in front of the shows crowd line and near show centerthe spot where an accident is most
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likely to occur during an air show. Further, regulations and orders required the Air Force to pre-
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position additional ARFF teams around the airfield such that a team could reach a crash on any
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operational runway, regardless of its location, within three minutes of the accident.
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The Air Force failed to comply with the requirements set forth above and thus
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failed to provide a timely or effective ARFF response at the Thunder Over Solano air show.
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For example, instead of pre-positioning teams to allow them immediate access to show center,
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the Air Force positioned the ARFF teams either behind the crowd line or, alternatively, more
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than one mile away from show center. Further, the Air Force failed to position ARFF teams so
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as to ensure a team could reach performers anywhere on the runway within three minutes of a
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crash. Indeed, ARFF teams were not even able to reach crashes at show center within that time
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frame.
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On May 4, 2014, while performing at the Thunder Over Solano air show,
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Edward Andreini impacted the runway during an inverted ribbon-cut maneuver. The aircraft
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slid upside down on the runway and came to a stop. Mr. Andreini broadcast over his aircraft
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radio that he was uninjured but was trapped in the wreckage and needed immediate rescue. The
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aircraft caught on fire. The Air Force ARFF dispatcher ordered ARFF trucks to respond
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immediately, and the show announcer ordered all non-ARFF personnel to refrain from
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rendering aid and to instead let the [ARFF teams] do their job. But the ARFF teams did not
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do their job. As the crowd, other performers, crew members, and various Air Force personnel
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COMPLAINT
watched and waited for an ARFF team to arrive, Mr. Andreini struggled, alone, to extricate
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Due to the Air Forces failure to comply with the applicable regulations,
directives, standards, and orders, no ARFF team arrived in time to effectively respond to Mr.
Andreinis mishap. Indeed, by the time the first ARFF truck arrived, nearly 5 minutes had
elapsed. By then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini needlessly died of extensive thermal injuries.
Had the Air Force provided effective and reasonably prompt firefighting and rescue service as
equipment would have reached Mr. Andreini within three minutes and Mr. Andreini would not
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have perished.
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THE PARTIES
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heir, and the successor-in-interest to his estate. Linda Andreini is a resident of Half Moon Bay
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estate. Edward J. Andreini and Mario Andreini are residents of Half Moon Bay in San Mateo
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County, California.
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9.
Defendant United States of America, through its agency, the United States Air
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Force, 60th Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base is located in Fairfield, California.
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Defendant United States of America, including its directors, officers, operators, administrators,
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employees, agents, and staff at the United States Air Force Base, 60th Air Mobility Wing are
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administrators, employees, agents and staff were employed by and/or acting on behalf of
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defendant.
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This action is brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671
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et seq. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) which
states that this Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
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This action also raises federal questions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983.
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This Court is the proper venue because plaintiffs reside in this district. An action
against the United States may be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiffs reside.
28 U.S.C. 1402(b).
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On or about July 16, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted an administrative claim for the
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claim set forth below to the United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air
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Force Base. As of the date of the filing of this complaint, plaintiffs have not received a final
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disposition of the claim. It has been more than six months after the claim was submitted to the
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Air Force. Under 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), the failure of the Air Force to make a final disposition is
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deemed a final denial of the claim. Thus, plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative
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remedies.
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The Air Force began planning for the Travis AFB Open House Thunder Over
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Solano, in November 2013. As part of its preparation, the Air Force sent Lt. Col. Eric Weber
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and another representative to the International Council of Air Shows (ICAS) annual tradeshow
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in Las Vegas.
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Lt. Col. Weber returned from the ICAS tradeshow with a manual entitled Air
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Shows 101: Air/Ground Operations Training. The manual addressed the importance of pre-
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positioning ARFF equipment, stating that [t]he primary purpose of your ARFF personnel and
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equipment is to rapidly and effectively respond to an aircraft emergency at your air show, to
keep your performers and public safe. . . . This requires your ARFF team to be properly
added.)
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The Air Shows 101 manual further advised that [t] hose [ARFF responders]
assigned to support flight operations and respond to incidents in front of the crowd line should
have unrestricted access to the aerobatic box. (The aerobatic box is the area within which
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Consistent with the guidance set forth in the Air Shows 101 manual, the Air
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Forces own directives require that it pre-position its emergency vehicles so as not to be
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trapped behind the crowd control lines. (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-1004, Conducting Air
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Similarly, the Air Forces Thunderbirds manual requires the Air Force to
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position ARFF personnel within the aerobatic box and outside the crowd line so that rescuers
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have immediate access to the show line. The 60th Air Mobility Wing specifically agreed to
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comply with that directive with regard to Mr. Andreinis performance when it scheduled the
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Thunderbirds (the Air Force aerial demonstration team) to perform later in the day. (DD Form
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Air Force directives make plain that proper pre-positioning of ARFF equipment
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and personnel is critical for a timely response to any aircraft rescue and firefighting emergency.
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For example, the Department of Defense incorporates within its own regulations, instructions,
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and directives the codes and standards advanced by the National Fire Protection Association
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(NFPA), a trade association that promulgates standards and codes for firefighting and rescue
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response. See Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.06, Fire and Emergency
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Services (F&ES) Program (December 21, 2006.) Those standards provide that [t]he response
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time of the first responding ARFF vehicle to reach any point on the operational runway and
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begin agent application shall be within 3 minutes of the time of the alarm. (National Fire
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Protection Association. (2014) NFPA 403: Standards for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting
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COMPLAINT
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ARFF must reach any aircraft in three minutes or less after impact because:
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and fire control can be achieved within this time frame. [] Any
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NPFA 402: Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting Operations, 6.1.1-6.1.2.
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The Coalition for Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety states that [w]hatever
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the role of ARFF personnel at an aviation accident, there is ample evidence to verify that they
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must arrive at the accident scene in less than three minutes if they are to save lives. (Surviving
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the Crash: The Need to Improve Lifesaving Measures at Our Nations Airports, Coalition for
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Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety (1999), 15, emphasis added.) There is nearly universal
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In fact, even if the 3-minute response is sufficient for standard operations, it may
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be insufficient for an air show that involves aerobatic flying. The International Council of Air
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Shows states:
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Show Layout Plans may (and usually do) require ARFF Equipment
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box.
Air Shows 101, supra, at 3. Thus, to meet the minimum 3-minute requirement, the Air Force
must pre-position it resources for an air show. Fire stations should be located to allow rapid
direct access to operational runway(s) so that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the
vehicles can be utilized to enable them to reach any point on the runway(s). NFPA 402,
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The Air Force requested Edward A. Andreini, a Hall of Fame aerobatic pilot
with over 60 years of flying experience, to perform a routine, including an inverted ribbon cut
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maneuver, at the Thunder Over Solano Open House and Airshow at Travis AFB on May 3
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and May 4, 2014. The Air Force agreed to provide for the benefit of Andreini and other
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During the Air Forces pre-show safety briefing, one performer raised concerns
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about the ARFF trucks proximity to show center. The Air Force assured the performers that
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the emergency response team had everything managed, and that if a response was needed it
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would be swift as the Air Force would position fast response vehicles nearby. The Air Force
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told performers that in the event of an emergency, they should not seek to render aid to a fellow
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performer: Dont do it yourself; let the [Travis] fire department do their job.
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During the briefing, performers also raised their concerns about an incident at an
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air show at Barksdale Air Force Base. In that case, the ARFF response to an aircraft fire was
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delayed because ARFF personnel were not wearing their protective gear during the airshow and
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thus were not ready to respond immediately upon receiving an alarm. As a result, while the
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ARFF personnel got dressed, a performer felt he had no alternative but toand did
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extinguish the fire himself. On behalf of the performers, the civilian Air Boss specifically
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asked the representative of the Travis AFB fire and rescue team whether such would be an
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issue at this air show. The Travis AFB representative assured the Air Boss and the performers
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that the Air Force had nearly 60 trained people who were prepared for any situation that may
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come up at the air show and that the mistakes made at Barksdale would not be repeated.
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COMPLAINT
28.
On Sunday, May 4, 2014, Edward Andreini was piloting his Boeing E75
Stearman at the air show. Per the Air Forces request, Andreini was to perform a ribbon-cut
maneuver, which required the pilot to invert the plane, fly low over the runway and use the
aircrafts tail to cut a ribbon stretched between two poles located on the runway at show center.
As it approached the ribbon at low altitude, for reasons unknown, Mr. Andreinis aircraft
descended several feet and impacted the runway. The aircraft slid inverted on the runway and
came to a stop near show center. Approximately 10 seconds passed from time of impact to
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The engine on the plane was still running and Mr. Andreini broadcast over the
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aircraft radio, I am okay but I cant get out. Mr. Andreini shut down the engine and the white
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Shortly after coming to rest, Mr. Andreini called over the radio, Im on fire
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get me out! One of Mr. Andreinis crew members called for fire and rescue on his handheld
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radio. Mr. Andreini yelled from his aircraft, I cant get out.I cant get out! Mr. Andreinis
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crewmember again called for fire and rescue, Get out here now! The emergency dispatcher
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ordered ARFF trucks to roll immediately. Black smoke started to rise from the aircraft as a
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small fire started under the engine cowling. At this point, approximately 30 seconds had
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Crucial seconds and minutes passed. The air show announcer warned all to stay
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back, not render aid, and let the [emergency responders] do their job. Approximately two
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minutes after impact, an airport maintenance crew member driving his pick-up truck
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disregarded the warning and slowly approached Mr. Andreinis aircraft. As he approached, the
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maintenance crew member could see that Mr. Andreini was still trapped in his cockpit and
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The crew member took a small fire extinguisher out of the bed of the truck. One
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of Mr. Andreinis own crew members grabbed the small fire extinguisher from the maintenance
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crew member and, with no ARFF trucks in sight, attempted to put the fire out himself. His
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efforts had little effect. Approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds had passed since the moment
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COMPLAINT
33.
Finally, approximately 4 minutes and 30 seconds after the aircraft impacted the
runway, the first fire fighting vehicle, the P-245, arrived at the aircraft. This vehicle,
however, did not meet the applicable extinguishing agent standards and was thus considered to
be one of the extra trucks, not a qualifying ARFF vehicle. Because the truck did not have the
appropriate extinguishing agent on board, it too had little or no effect on the fire.
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The next vehicle, CRASH-10 (also referred to as the P-23), arrived more
than 35 seconds laterabout 5 minutes and 5 seconds after the impact. CRASH-10 had the
appropriate extinguishing agent on board. But by then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini was dead.
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The coroners autopsy report showed that the crash had caused Mr. Andreini no blunt force
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trauma. Otherwise uninjured, the cause of Mr. Andreinis death was extensive thermal injuries.
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Despite the Air Forces knowledge that it was to pre-position its ARFF trucks so
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that they would arrive at the scene of a crash anywhere on the field within three minutes or less,
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no ARFF equipment or personnel arrived at show center until well after that window had
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closed.
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extinguishing agent requirements and, in any event, did not arrive until more than 4 minutes
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and 30 seconds after impact. The second arriving ARFF vehicle arrived 35 seconds later, in
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violation of DoDI 6055.06 which requires that, regardless of how long it takes the first ARFF
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vehicle to reach the crash site, additional units must arrive in intervals not exceeding 30
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seconds.
The first vehicle, the P-245, was not suitable as it did not meet the Air Forces own
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The Air Force was required to pre-position its ARFF vehicles so that they have
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immediate access to the runways. It failed to comply with that requirement. Instead, it
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positioned the closest ARFF station from which trucks could respond to show center 1.3 miles
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away. There was a closer fire stationthe primary crash response unitbut the Air Force
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had improperly positioned that station behind the crowd line and thus, the ARFF teams route
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to the runway was blocked by spectators, rendering the station of no use to the performers.
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Furthermore, the Air Force improperly imposed on the ARFF vehicles various
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COMPLAINT
and conflicting speed limits which essentially assured that, given their distances from show
center, a timely and effective response to show center would be virtually impossible. For
example, though some of the ARFF vehicles are capable of speeds in excess 65 mph, Travis
imposed on all responding vehicles using the taxiways a speed limit of 25 mph. This is in
conflict with the NFPAs standard, adopted by the Air Force, that ARFF vehicles be placed so
that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the vehicles can be utilized. NPFA 402,
supra, at 6.1.4.
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38.
Further reasons ARFF personnel failed to respond to the accident at show center
in a timely fashion were that (1) the Air Forces ARFF personnel were not ready to go and
(2) communications were muddled, confused, and delayed.
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Even when your ARFF team is positioned perfectly, if they are not
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crowd line must realize that they are continuously ready to roll
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from the moment they report in position until they return to the
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firehouse at the end of the show. This means that they are suited
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Unfortunately, ARFF crew members were not in a state of readiness, and were
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not in their protective gear. Instead, they were across the field taking pictures of aircraft.
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Further, only one crew member at the fire station had the necessary equipment to communicate
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by radio, and there was no PA system at the fire station to simultaneously and effectively alert
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all the ARFF crew members of the need to respond. Thus, after the alarm was sounded, the sole
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crew member with a radio had to find and gather together the other picture-taking crew
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COMPLAINT
members before they could respond to Mr. Andreinis emergency. Even then, according to one
Air Force witness, [d]ue to . . . the standby posture of the [ARFF] personnel there were several
minutes of apparent inactivity as crews dressed in their bunkers and rolled their vehicles to the
scene.
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foregoing paragraphs.
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The Air Force, acting by and through its various departments, agencies and/or
divisions, was responsible for providing aircraft rescue and firefighting services for the Travis
Air Force Base at the Open House on May 4, 2014.
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At all relevant times mentioned above, all of the individuals responsible for the
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planning of the open house, including but not limited to the positioning, staffing, and
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supervision of aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicles and crew members, and all of the
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individuals were responsible for responding to the aircraft fire which caused Mr. Andreinis
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The Air Force had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid
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injury to Mr. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to
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otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.
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The Air Force breached its duty of care to Mr. Andreini and acted with
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deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or
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with an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same
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situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others, through, inter alia, the following acts and
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emergencies;
manner; and
e. Failing to respond to the aircraft fire within 3 minutes as required by the NFPA,
regulations; and
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negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, and/or other
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wrongful acts and/or omissions of the Air Force, Edward A. Andreini suffered massive
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non-pecuniary losses, including without limitation, grief, loss of society, loss of support,
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services, care, comfort, affection, moral support, solace, and other losses for which recovery is
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foregoing paragraphs.
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As a result of the acts set forth herein, plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini were
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subjected to deprivation of rights by the Air Force, which rights include, but are not limited to,
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privileges and immunities secured to plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini by the Constitution and
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laws of the United States. By reason of such acts, the Air Force has violated the constitutional
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rights and liberty interests of plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini, which are protected under,
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among other things, the 14th Amendments prohibition against depriving a person of life and
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50.
At all relevant times, the Air Force and the individuals responsible for aircraft
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rescue and firefighting were acting under the color of law and of statutes, or ordinances,
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At all relevant times, the Air Force was responsible for, inter alia, emergency
rescue services for Travis AFB and required to provide such services in the event of an aircraft
incident.
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At all relevant times mentioned above, the Air Force owed Edward A. Andreini
and plaintiffs a duty to, inter alia, exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid injury to
Edward A. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to
otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.
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53.
The Air Force breached its duty of care to Edward A. Andreini and plaintiffs
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and acted recklessly and/or with callous or deliberate indifference to known and obvious
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dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or with an extreme departure from what a
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reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to
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others, through, inter alia, the following acts and omissions, which are set forth in greater detail
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above:
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regulations; and
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54.
At all times herein mentioned, the Air Force knew, or should have known of the
obvious dangers, was deliberately indifferent to them, ignored them, and failed to provide
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The conduct of the Air Force was so egregious and outrageous and contrary to
the right to life implicit in ordered liberty and common decency so as to shock the conscious of
the community.
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Edward A. Andreini was deprived of the necessary rescue, medical intervention, care and
treatment, was essentially abandoned in the aircraft fire, and suffered serious injuries and death,
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and as a result of the injury, pain, and suffering Edward A. Andreini suffered prior to his death,
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plaintiffs claim damages for loss of life and pain and suffering prior to Edward A. Andreinis
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including, without limitation, grief, loss of support, services, care, comfort, affection, moral
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support, solace and other losses for which recovery is authorized under applicable law.
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expenses for funeral, burial, attorneys fees and seek recovery for all damages authorized by
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the Complaint;
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trial;
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E. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted,
DANKO MEREDITH
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By:
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