Anda di halaman 1dari 9

NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D.

VICTORIO, as Presiding
Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
DOCTRINES:
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended
to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion,
and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general
interest of the community.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient,
it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physicians testimony.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the
following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom
the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential,
and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."cralaw virtua1aw library
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1.
The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. The physician may be considered to be
acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure,
so long as the subject communicated is not stated."cralaw virtua1aw library
ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES THEREOF. One who claims this privilege must
prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION
GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES, NOT PRIVILEGED. There is authority to the effect
that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third
person destroys the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus
destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have
reached a contrary result."cralaw virtua1aw library

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. while it may be true that counsel for
the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado
and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the
petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of
the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial courts
advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the
testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions
of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner s Petition and
Memorandum, and in the private respondents Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were
interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege,
the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
2. Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for annulment of such marriage on the
ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before,
during and after the marriage and until the present."
3. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on
his own behalf.
4. He would also present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental
Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
5. Petitioners counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from
the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and
had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
6. The omnibus motion was DENIED.
7. Petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the
reception of Dr. Acampados testimony. The Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution denying due
course to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of
the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified."
ISSUE: Whether or not the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court was a
privileged communication.
HELD: NO, Supreme Court ruled that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication
because the information was not obtained from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity
and neither was the information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the
patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the
character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II
and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the
Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was
summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patients ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic)

the hypothetical question. Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to
cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give
testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while
attending to the patient.
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin.
Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be
implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and
the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each
instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information
given."
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the
end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient
for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to
the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is
to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone.
Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party.
Thirdly, except for the petitioners sweeping claim that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado brings
disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and
the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia which caused,
and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family,"
which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the formers "character" (or "reputation"). Dr.
Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment and
the treatment recommended therefor.
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said
subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings
that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an
answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial courts advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered
by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony
of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioners Petition and Memorandum, and in the private respondents
Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (12th Division) and
LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 132864 October 24, 2005
GARCIA, J.:
DOCTRINES: Hearsay Rule; What is; Hearsay evidence has been defined as "the evidence not of what
the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."; Any evidence is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person
not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule.
FACTS:
1. Philippine Free Press, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free
Press Magazine, one of the widely circulated political magazines in the Philippines. Due to its wide
circulation, the publication of the Free Press magazine enabled petitioner to attain considerable
prestige prior to the declaration of Martial Law as well as to achieve a high profit margin.
2. Sometime in 1963, petitioner purchased a parcel of land to construct an office building to house its
various machineries, equipment, office furniture and fixture.
3. During the 1965 presidential elections, petitioner supported the late President Diosdado Macapagal
against then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the election of the late President Ferdinand
Marcos in 1965 and prior to the imposition of Martial law on September 21, 1972, petitioner printed
numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of
the regime. The petitioner likewise ran a series of articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to
impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law.
4. In the evening of September 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building, forced out its
employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment. The soldier in charge of the military
contingent then informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr. that Martial Law had been declared and that they were
instructed by the late President Marcos to take over the building and to close the printing press.
5. Teodoro Locsin, Sr. was arrested and was brought to Camp Crame and was subsequently transferred
to the maximum security bloc at Fort Bonifacio.
6. Sometime in December, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed against him
and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions, to wit: (1) he remained
(sic) under city arrest; xxx (5) he was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say
or write anything critical of the Marcos administration.
7. Consequently, the publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased.
8. On separate occasions in 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers
from then President Marcos for the acquisition of the petitioner.
9. On October 23, 1973, the parties, petitioner, as vendor and private respondent, represented by
B/Gen. Menzi, as vendee, met and executed two (2) notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land,
building and the machineries of the petitioner.

10. Locsin, Sr. thereafter used the proceeds of the sale to pay the separation pay of petitioners
employees, buy out the shares of the minority stockholders as well as to settle all its obligations.
11. In 1987, petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against respondent Liwayway and the
PCGG before the Regional Trail Court on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of
purchase price. On motion of defendant PCGG, the complaint against it was dismissed.
12. In a decision, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint and granted private respondents
counterclaim.
13. In time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the appealed
decision of the trial court, the modification consisting of the deletion of the award of attorneys fees to
private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering as hearsay the testimonial evidence
which clearly established the threats made upon petitioner and that respondent Liwayway will be used as
the corporate vehicle for the forced acquisition of petitioner's properties.
HELD: NO, the petition lacks merit.
The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and
Teodoro Locsin, Jr., which, in gist, established the following facts: 1) the widely circulated Free Press
magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand against the
Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration, which closure eventually drove
petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders, Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2
months without charges and, together with his family, was threatened with execution; 3) Mr. Locsin, Sr.
was provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press and writing
anything critical of the Marcos administration; and 4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of
reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Per the Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances that petitioners property in question was sold
to private respondent, represented by Gen. Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied the squeeze on
Mr. Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the "Marcos cannot be denied" and "[you] have no choice but to sell"
line.
It was under the above-enumerated circumstances that the late Hans Menzi, allegedly acting on behalf of
the late President Marcos, made his offer to purchase the Free Press. It must be noted, however, that the
testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that "Marcos cannot be
denied" and that respondent was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is
hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself; the same can be
said of the offers to purchase made by Atty. Crispin Baizas and Secretary Guillermo de Vega who are also
both dead. It is clear from the provisions of Section 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
that any evidence is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a
party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine
the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed. And there can be no quibbling that
because death has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos subalterns, Messrs.
Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening statements allegedly made by
them for the late President.

Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a
live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the
other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in character.
The all too familiar rule is that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge". There can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify respecting what
President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there be,
precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the declarationagainst-interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can
conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in
offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own
interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act
for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

ARTHUR ZARATE, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY,
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 152263

July 3, 2009

PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINES: Rule 130, sec. 42; Res Gestae; Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which includes statements given as part of the res gestae. SEC. 42. Part
of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place, or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
FACTS:
1. At about 10:00 p.m. of April 1, 1994, Good Friday, Ernesto Guiritan, a homosexual and beautician,
was seated alone on a bench outside the Sta. Rita Church.
2. Arthur Zarate approached Guiritan and asked him for a cigarette. When Guiritan could not produce
one, Zarate immediately stabbed Guiritan with a switchblade knife and ran away.
3. Feeling pain and sensing that he was profusely bleeding, Guiritan walked a short distance and called
for help. Eduardo Remigoso and Mario Binasbas came to his aid. Guiritan asked them to bring him to
the hospital.
4. Guiritan was brought to the Gingoog District Hospital, where he was admitted at 12:40 a.m. of April 2,
1994. Dr. Ma. Ellen Santua and Dr. Joel Babanto attended to him.
5. In the morning of April 2, 1994, Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Orlando Alecha went to the hospital to
investigate and take the ante-mortem statement of Guiritan, who, at that time, was lying down and
feeling weak.
6. Petitioner Zarate put up the defense of alibi. He declared that he came to know Guiritan only in court.
7. In the Decision, the trial court did not find Zarate guilty of frustrated murder as charged, absent proof
of evident premeditation and/or treachery that was alleged in the Information. Instead, Zarate was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The trial court held that
Guiritans positive identification of Zarate as the person who stabbed him prevails over the denial and
alibi of Zarate.
8. Zarate appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts decision that the antemortem statement of Guiritan was part of the res gestae since the statement was taken after the
operation of Guiritan in the hospital, which operation affected his mental and physical condition.
Moreover, there were no witnesses presented to support the claim of Guiritan that petitioner stabbed him.
HELD: NO, the contention is without merit.

Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which
includes statements given as part of the res gestae. The pertinent provision reads:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. The foregoing circumstances reveal that the
statement was taken a few hours after the operation when he regained consciousness. His statements
were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the shocking event speaking
through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive the story. Thus, his statement is
admissible as part of the res gestae. Contrary to petitioners contention, the statement was signed by
Guiritan and its date was established by SPO1 Alecha.
Petitioner erred in stating that Guiritans statement, which was admitted as part of the res gestae, was the
sole basis for his conviction. Apart from the written statement, Guiritan, who survived the stabbing
incident, positively identified appellant in open court and testified that petitioner was the one who stabbed
him and that he knew petitioner even before the stabbing incident. Conviction of the accused may be had
on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.
The trial court correctly disregarded petitioners alibi and denial that he was the perpetrator of the crime.
For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed but must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime. In the case, petitioner failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
the crime scene.
It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper in the light of
the positive identification by complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who stabbed him.
It is also a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. If found positive and credible by the trial court, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, like
complainant Guiritan, is sufficient to support a conviction. Having observed the deportment of witnesses
during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility; hence, his
findings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have
altered the conviction of petitioner. This Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and agrees
with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Finally, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide instead of the
charge of frustrated murder, absent any proof of treachery or evident premeditation alleged in the
Information to qualify the crime to frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20710,
dated on September 28, 2001, which upheld the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 43, dated April 1, 1997, finding petitioner Arthur Zarate GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum term,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum term, and ordering Arthur Zarate to
indemnify private complainant Ernesto A. Guiritan the amount of P11,580.50 for medical and
hospitalization expenses, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

Anda mungkin juga menyukai