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G.R.No.L4221

TodayisFriday,March06,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L4221August30,1952
MARCELOD.MONTENEGRO,petitionerappellant,
vs.
GEN.MARIANOCASTAEDA,andCOLONELEULOGIOBALAO,respondentsappellees.
FelixbertoM.SerranoandHonorioIlaganforappellant.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralPompeyoDiazandSolicitorFelixV.Makasiarforappellees.
BENGZON,J.:
ThepurposeofthisappealfromtheCourtofFirstInstanceofQuezonCityistotestthevalidityofProclamation
No.210suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.
Afewmonthsagothesameproclamationcameupfordiscussioninconnectionwiththerequestforbailofsome
prisoners charged with rebellion.1 The divided opinion of this Court did not squarely pass on the validity of the
proclamationbut,assumingitwasobligatory,bothsidesproceedstodetermineitseffectupontherightofwhich
prisonerstogoonbail.
Thisdecisionwillnowconsiderthepointsdebatedregardingtheaforesaidresidentialorder.
Thefactsarefewandsimple:Aboutfiveo'clockinthemorningofOctober18,1950,MaximinoMontenegrowas
arrested with others at the Samanillo Bldg. Manila, by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion,
insurrectionorsedition.Sofarastherecorddiscloses,heisstillunderarrestinthecustodybyrespondents.On
October 22, 1950, The President issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. On October 21, 1950, Maximino's father, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas
corpusseekingthereleaseofhisson.
Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority to go
furtherinthematter,invokingtheabovementionedproclamation.
Petitioner replied that such proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not apply to his son, who had been
arrested before its promulgation. Heeding the suspension order, the court of first instance denied the release
prayedfor.Hencethisappeal,foundedmainlyonthepetitioner'spropositions:.
(a) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law and
unlawfullyincludesseditionwhichundertheConstitutionisnotagroundforsuspension"
(b)Supposingtheproclamationisvalid,noprimafacie.
(c) "There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof," the only situations
permittingdiscontinuanceofthewritofhabeascorpusshowingwasmadethatthepetitioner'ssonwasincluded
withinthetermsthereof.
ProclamationNo.210readspartlyasfollows:
WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection and
rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and in pursuance thereof, have
createdastateoflawlessnessanddisorderaffectingpublicsafetyandthesecurityofthestate
WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection, and rebellion consisting of armed raids, sorties, and
ambushesandthewantonactsofmurder,rape,spoilage,looting,arson,planneddestructionofpublicand
privatebuildings,andattacksagainstpoliceandconstabularydetachments,aswellasagainstcivilianlives
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andpropertiesasreportedbytheCommandingGeneraloftheArmedForces,haveseriouslyendangered
andstillcontinuetoendangerthepublicsafety
WHEREAS,theseactsofsedition,insurrectionandrebellionhavebeenperpetratedbyvariousgroupswell
organized for concerted actions and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic
weapons,byreasonwhereofthereisactualdangerofrebellionwhichmayextendthroughoutthecountry
Whereas, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and the presently
underdetentions,andstrongandconvincingevidencehasbeenfoundintheirpossessiontoshowthatthey
areengagedintherebellious,seditiousandotherwisesubversiveactsasabovesetforthand
Whereas, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure the peace and
securityofthepopulationandtomaintaintheauthorityofthegovernment
NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
uponmebyarticleVII,section10,paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doherebysuspendtheprivilegeofthe
writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter
similarly detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and or on the occasion thereof, or
incidentthereto,orinconnectiontherewith.
A.Itisfirstarguedthattheproclamationisinvalidbecauseit"partakes"ofabillofattainderoranex post facto
law, and violates the constitutional percept that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. The
argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. U.S. vs. Gen. El., 80 Fed. Supp. 989 De
Passvs.Bidwell,24Fed.,615.2Abillofattainderisalegislativeactwhichinflictspunishmentwithoutjudicialtrial.
(16C.J.S.p.902U.S.vs.Lovett(1946)328U.S.303).Anyway,if,aswefind,thestayofthewritwasorderedin
accordancewiththepowersexpresslyvestedinthePresidentbytheConstitution,suchordermustbedeemedan
exceptiontothegeneralprohibitionagainstexpostfactolawsandbillsofattaindersupposingthereisaconflict
betweentheprohibitionandthesuspension.
Ontheotherhandthereisnodoubtitwaserroneoustoincludethoseaccusedofseditionamongthepersonsas
towhomsuspensionofthewritisdecreed.UndertheConstitutiontheonlygroundsforsuspensionoftheprivilege
ofthewritare"invasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof."Obviously,however,theinclusionof
seditiondoesnotinvalidatetheentireproclamationanditisimmaterialinthiscase,inasmuchasthepetitioner's
descendantisconfinedinjailnotonlyforsedition,butforthegraveroffenseofrebellionandinsurrection.Without
doingviolencetothepresidentialdirective,butinobediencetothesupremelawoftheland,theword"sedition"in
ProclamationNo.210shouldbedeemedamistakeorsurplusagethatdoesnottaintthedecreeasawhole.
B. In his second proposition appellant insists there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent
dangerthereof."Thereare"headmits"intermittentsortiesandlightningattacksbyorganizedbandsindifferent
places" but, he argues, "such sorties are occasional, localized and transitory. And the proclamation speaks no
more than of overt of insurrection and rebellion, not of cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
dangerthereof."OnthissubjectitisnotedthatthePresidentconcludedfromthefactsrecitedintheproclamation,
and the other connected therewith, that "there is actual danger rebellion which may extend throughout the
country." Such official declaration implying much more than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the
suspensionofthewrit.
Tothepetitioner'sunpracticedeyetherepeatedencountersbetweendissidentelementsandmilitarytroopsmay
seem sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation's security, analyzed the extent and
patternofsuchviolentclashesandarrivedattheconclusionthattheyarewarpandwoofofageneralschemeto
overthrowhisgovernmentvietarmis,byforceandarms.
And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court thru,
Marshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalinBarcelonvs.Baker(5Phil.,87,pp.98and100)theauthority
todecidewhenevertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringthesuspensionbelongstothePresidentand"hisdecision
isfinalandconclusive"uponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.
Indeed as Justice Johnston said in that decision, whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled
thruitscivilandmilitarybranchestoobtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfromeveryquarterandcornerof
the nation, the judicial department, with its very limited machinery can not be in better position to ascertain or
evaluatetheconditionsprevailingintheArchipelago.
ButevensupposingthePresident'sappraisalofthesituationismerelyprimafacie,weseethatpetitionerinthis
litigation has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the
ExecutiveandLegislativeDepartmentsofourGovernment.
C. The petitioner's last contention is that the respondents failed to establish that this son is included within the
termsoftheproclamation.
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On this topic, respondents' return officially informed the court that Maximino had been arrested and was under
custodyforcomplicityinthecommissionofactsofrebellion,insurrectionandseditionagainsttheRepublicofthe
Philippines.Nothavingtraversedthatallegationintime,petitionermustbedeemedtohaveconcededit.
...Intheabsenceofadenial,orappropriatepleadingavoidingtheireffect,avermentoffactsinthereturn
will be taken as true and conclusive, regardless of the allegations contained in the petition and the only
questionfordeterminationiswhetherornotthefactsstatedinthereturn,asamatteroflaw,authorizesthe
restraintunderinvestigation.(39C.J.S.,664655.)
D.Aninterestingissueisposedbyamicicuriae.TheBillofRightsprohibitssuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit
of habeas corpus except when the public safety requires it, in cases of (1) invasion (2) insurrection or (3)
rebellion.
ArticleVIISection10authorizesthePresidenttosuspendtheprivilege,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit,incasesof
(1)invasion(2)insurrectionor(3)rebellionor(4)imminentdangerthereof.
"Imminent danger," is no cause for suspension under the Bill of Rights. It is under Article VII. To complicate
matters,duringthedebatesoftheConstitutionalConventionontheBillofRights,particularlythesuspensionof
the writ, the Convention voted down an amendment adding a fourth cause of suspension: imminent danger of
invasion,insurrectionofrebellion.
ProfessorAruegoamemberoftheConvention,describestheincidentasfollows:
Duringthedebatesonthefirstdraft,DelegateFranciscoproposedasanamendmentinserting,asafourth
cause for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus imminent danger of the three causes included
herein.Whensubmittedtoavoteforthefirsttime,theamendmentwascarried.
After this motion for a reconsideration of the amendment was approved, Delegate Orense spoke against
theamendmentallegingthatitwouldbedangeroustomakeimminentdangeragroundforthesuspension
ofthewritofhabeascorpus.Inpart,hesaid:
"Gentlemen, this phrase is too ambigous, and in the hands of a President who believes himself more or
lessadictator,itisextremelydangerous,itwouldbeaswordwithwhichhewouldbeheadus.".
Indefenseoftheamendment,DelegateFranciscopointedoutthatitwasintendedtomakethispartofthe
billofrightsconformtothatpartofthedraftgivingthePresidentthepowertosuspendthewritofhabeas
corpusalsointhecaseofanimminentdangerofinvasionorrebellion.WhenaskedbyDelegateRafolsif
the phrase, imminent danger, might not be struck out from this corresponding provisions under the
executivepowerinstead,DelegateFranciscoanswered:
"Outright,itispossibletoeliminatethephrase,imminentdangerthereof,inthepageIhavementioned.But
I say, going to the essence of referring exclusively to the necessity of including the words, of imminent
dangerofoneortheother,Iwishtosaythefollowing:thatitshouldnotbenecessarythatthereexistsa
rebellion, insurrection or invasion in order that habeascorpus may be suspended. It should be sufficient
that there exists not a danger but an imminent danger, and the word, imminent, should be maintained.
Whenthereexistsanimminentdanger,theStaterequiresforitsprotectionandforthatofallthecitizens
thesuspensionofhabeascorpus."
Whenputtovoteforthesecondtime,theamendmentwasdefeatedwith72votesagainstand56votesin
favorofthesame.(IAruego'sFramingofthePhilippineConstitution,pp.180181)
NeverthelesswhenthePresident'sspecificpowersunderArticleVII,weretakenuptherewasnoobjectiontohis
authority to suspend in case of "imminent danger". (At least we are not informed of any debate thereon.) Now
then,whatistheeffectoftheseemingdiscrepancy?
Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as limiting Legislative powers only not
executivemeasuresundersectionVII?HasarticleVII(sec.10) pro tanto modified the bill of rights in the same
mannerthatasubsequentsectionofastatuemodifiesapreviousone?
The difference between the two constitutional provisions would seem to be: whereas the bill of rights impliedly
denies suspension in case of imminent dangers of invasion etc., article VII sec. 10 expressly authorizes the
Presidenttosuspendwhenthereisimminentdangerofinvasionetc.
The following statements in a footnote in Cooley's Constitutional limitations (8th Ed.) p. 129, appear to be
persuasive:
It is a general rule in the construction of writings, that, a general intent appearing, it shall control the
particular intent but this rule must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent
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plainlyexpressedinonepartofaconstitution,thoughapparentlyopposedtoageneralintentdeducedfrom
otherparts.WarrenV.Shuman,5Tex.441.InQuickV.WhitewaterTownship,7Ind.570,itwassaidthatif
twoprovisionsofawrittenconstitutionsareirreconcilablyrepugnant,thatwhichislastinorderoftimeand
inlocalpositionistobepreferred.InGulf,C.&S.F.Ry.Co.v.Rambolt,67tex.654,4S.W.356,thisrule
was recognized as a last resort, but if the last provision is more comprehensive and specific, it was held
thatitshouldbegiveneffectonthatground.
AndinHoagvs.WashingtonOregonCorp.(1915)147Pac.Rep.,756atp.763itwassaid:
Itisafamiliarruleofconstructionthat,wheretwoprovisionsofawrittenConstitutionarerepugnanttoeach
other, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred. Quick v. White Water
Township,7Ind.,570G.,C.&S.F.Ry.Co.v.Rambolt,67Tex.654,4S.W.356.So,evenassumingthe
twoclausesdiscussarerepugnant,thelattermustprevail.
Wherefore in the light of this precedents, the constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of
imminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionunderarticleVIImaynotcorrectlybeplacedindoubt.
E.Thepetitionerinsistedinthecourtbelowthatthesuspensionshouldnotapplytohisson,becausethelatter
hadbeenarrestedandhadfiledthepetitionbeforetheExecutiveproclamation.Onthisphaseofthecontroversy,
it is our opinion that the order of suspension affects the power of the court's and operates immediately on all
petitionsthereinpendingatthetimeofitspromulgation.
AproclamationofthePresidentsuspendingthewritofhabeascorpuswasheldvalidandefficientinlawto
suspend all proceedings pending upon habeascorpus, which was issued and served prior to the date of
theproclamation.MatterofDunn,D.C.N.Y.1863,25How.Prac.467,8Fed.Cas.4,171.
F.Premisesconsidered,thedecisionofthecourtaquorefusingtoreleasetheprisonerisaffirmed,withoutcosts.
Paras,C.J.,Pablo,Padilla,Montemayor,BautistaAngeloandLabrador,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1 Hernandez vs. Montesa, G.R. No. L4964, Nava vs. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L4855, Angeles vs. Abaya,

G.R.No.L5102,October,1951,(90Phil.172).
2Cf.Caldervs.Bull,3DallU.S.386,1LawEd.648.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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