Vedanta Sutra and the Vedanta

Subhash C. Sharma
Introduction
Based on the observations and experiences (including the supernatural) of humans during
early civilization, the accumulated knowledge was compiled as the Veda which considers the
ultimate reality, or the Absolute, as Brahman (or God), souls and the world (or material
Universe). Over time, different philosophical systems developed so that these aspects of reality
could be better understood and combined, at least conceptually. Thus the analysis of the
world was carried out using the Vaisesika and the Nyaya philosophies with the former looking
at the things in minute detail whereas the latter taking a much broader view of things.
Similarly, the Samkhya and the Yoga systems deal, respectively, with the theoretical study
and the practical aspects involving the field of experience. The Mimamsa, on the other hand,
consists of the Vedanta (Uttara Mimamsa) and the Purva Mimamsa which relate,
respectively, to God and the acts of service (sacrifice).
In the Vedanta, emphasis is on Lord and not on the lordship. In other words, the Absolute or
the Reality is investigated by considering Brahman first and the creation (souls and the
world) follows next (and even as attributable to Brahman). The term "Vedanta" means
literally "the end of the Veda," or the doctrines set forth in the closing chapters of the Vedas,
which are the Upanisads. The views of the Upanisads also constitute "the final aim of the
Veda," or the essence of the Vedas. The Vedanta Sutra (or the doctrine of Vedanta) is called
Brahm Sutra, because it is an exposition of the doctrine of Brahm (or Brahman), and also
Sariraka Sutra, because it deals with the embodiment of the unconditioned self. While in the
Purva Mimamsa (or Karma Mimamsa) Jaimini investigates the duties (dharma) enjoined by
the Veda, together with the rewards attached thereto, in the Uttara Mimamsa Badarayana
describes the philosophico-theological views of the Upanisads. Together, the two form a
systematic investigation of the whole Veda. The Upanisads are but a series of glances at truth
from various points of view, and not an attempt to think out the great questions consecutively.
Badarayana (around 400 B.C.), through his sutra (which could be under development for a
long time even before Badarayana compiled it finally), attempts to systematize this wisdom of
the Upanisads in a consistent whole. His work is not so much systematic philosophy as
theological interpretation. It investigates the Upanisads teachings about God, the world, the
soul in its conditions of wandering and of deliverance; removes apparent contradictions in the
doctrines; and binds them systematically together. In five hundred and fifty-five sutras
(aphorisms), which consist mostly of two or three words each, the whole system is developed.
The sutras are unintelligible in themselves, and leave everything to the interpreter. Thus,
according to the traditions of a particular time or personal theisms of the commentators -chief among them, Samkara, Bhaskara, Madhva, Ramanuja, Yadavaprakasa, Kesava,
Nilakantha, Baladeva, Vallabha, and Vijnanabhiksu -- the resulting views or the
commentaries on the Vedanta Sutra can vary vastly. The Sutra is one of those rare books
where each, in accordance with his merits, finds his reward.
Thus even when Badarayana formulated his Sutra, there were differences of opinion in
interpreting the Upanisads on such central topics as the characteristics of the released soul
and the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Asmarthya holds the bhedabheda view of
the relation of the soul to Brahman, that it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely nondifferent from it. Audolomi is of opinion that the soul is altogether different from Brahman
up to the time of final release, when it becomes merged in it, and Kasakrtsna thinks that the

soul is absolutely identical with Brahman, which, in some way or other, presents itself as the
individual soul. The later interpreters accept one or more of these views. This indicates that
the Upanisads were subjects of considerable discussion throughout and Badarayan's view of
the Vedanta seems to be the outcome of a very prominent school of thought, though other
schools of considerable repute also flourished.
Metaphysical Views
The Vedanta Sutra has four chapters. The first deals with the theory of Brahman as the
central reality. This includes an account of the nature of Brahman, its relation to the world
and the individual soul. The second (avirodha) meets the objections brought against this view
and criticizes rival theories. It also gives an account of the nature of the dependence of the
world on God and the gradual evolution from and reabsorption into him. In the latter part
there are interesting psychological discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes, its
relation to God, body and its own deeds. The third discusses the ways and means (sadhana) of
attaining Braham-vidya or Braham-jnana (divine knowledge). There is in it an account of
rebirth and minor psychological and theological discussions, together with many exegetical
components. The fourth deals with the fruits (phala) of Braham-vidya. It also describes in
some detail the theory of the departure of soul after death along the two paths of the gods and
the fathers and the nature of the release from which there is no return. Each chapter has four
parts (padas), and the sutras in each part fall into certain groups called adhikaranas. Some
textual differences in the readings adopted by the different commentators are found, though
they are not all of great importance.
For Badarayana the Veda is eternal and the sastra (scriptural knowledge) is the great
authority. He declares openly that there is no possibility of discovering metaphysical truth by
means of tarka or reflection. He admits that there are two sources of knowledge, sruti and
smrti, and calls them pratyksam (perception) and anumanam (inference) possibly because the
latter, as Samkara suggests, requires a basic knowledge (pramanyam), and the former not.
The revealed sruti, which is self-evident, is called pratyksam. By sruti Badarayana
understands the Upanisads, and by smrti he means the Mahabharata (including the
Bhagavadgita, because of its being a part of the Mahabharata) and the Manusmrti (code of
Manu). Note, as one of the Upanisads, the Gita is also part of sruti. As relating to the knowledge
in general, inference rests on the perception, so is smrti dependent on sruti. Badarayana
admits of no other pramanas (evidence). He makes a distinction between two spheres of
existence, the thinkable, which is the region of prakrti (nature, body), with the elements,
mind, intellect and egoity and the unthinkable, which is Brahman. In the latter, sastras are
the only guide. Any reasoning that does not conform to the Veda is useless for Badarayana.
Reasoning proceeds from characteristic marks. But of Brahman one cannot say that this or
that characterizes it to the exclusion of other attributes. Reasoning, therefore, is subordinate
to intuition, which can be obtained by devotion and meditation.
According to the Vedanta Sutra, the purusa and prakrti of the Samkhya are not independent
substances, but modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true infinites is not possible.
The one infinite substance, Brahman, is identified with the highest reality set forth in the
Upanisads. In the first chapter, there is a discussion of the several descriptions of Brahman
given in the Upanisads. He is the origin, support and end of the world, the efficient and the
material cause of the universe. He creates without implements. A psychological proof of the
reality of Brahman is offered on the evidence of dreamless sleep. Brahman is not to be
confused with the unintelligent pradhana (Mahat or the first cause), or the individual soul. He
is possessed of all dharmas, and is the inner law and guide. He has the qualities of purity,

truth of purpose, omniscience, omnipotence, etc. His cosmic aspects are also brought out. He
is the cosmic light, the golden person in the Sun, the cosmic space or akasa, and the cosmic
breath or air or prana. He is also the light in the soul. He is to be contemplated as residing in
the heart of man, and humans are allowed to look upon the omnipresent god as occupying a
limited space. The ultimate ground of things is a single supreme spirit that is the source of
everything and an adequate object of unqualified adoration and worship.
As the Gita considers unintelligent things and intelligent souls as the lower and the higher
manifestations of one reality, the Sutra -- overcoming any ambiguity in the Upanisad view of
creation -- admits Brahman, itself uncreated and eternal, as the cause of the whole universe.
Every material element is created by Brahman. If, through the activity of the primary
elements, the evolution of the world takes place, even then it is Brahman that confers the
power through the exercise of which the evolution takes place. As it is said, Brahman, after
creating the elements, enters them; and it is Brahman dwelling in the elements that effects the
production of other things.
Brahman thus is the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the world. In the
Sutra the nature of the relation between the cause and the effect, Brahman and the world, is
discussed. The identity of cause and effect is brought out by two illustrations. Just as a piece
of cloth, when rolled up, does not show its nature properly, but shows its nature fully when
spread out, though the same piece of cloth is present in two cases, so cause and effect are the
same though their qualities differ. Just as, when breath is held up, the individual is not able to
perform any action, though he continues to live, and, when the breath is let loose, he is able to
move the limbs, the breath remaining the same throughout, similarly cause and effect produce
different actions, though they really are the same. Brahman and the world are not different
(ananya), even as the clay pot is not different from clay. While the commentators agree that
the cause is not different from the effect, the nature of identity of Brahman and the world is
differently explained by them. To Badarayana, ananya does not mean absence of difference or
change. For the explanation of this change Samkara postulates avidya. The world exists only
for those who are under the influence of avidya, even as the imagined serpent exists only for
the man who has the wrong view of the rope. The other commentators hold to the theory of
parinama or transformation, i.e. finite things are real as determinations of Brahman and not
as the rope as a snake. The statement that Brahman is the material cause of the world
suggests that the world is a modification of the substance of Brahman. The world is not an
illusion or a dream-like structure, but a real, positive something which has its origination,
existence and absorption in Brahman. Badarayana believes that the power of creation belongs
to the pure, stainless Brahman, even as heat belongs to fire. Brahman for its own sport
develops itself into the world without undergoing the least change and without ceasing to be
itself. According to Ramanuja and others, such real creation is possible because Brahman has
wonderful powers -- to turn the impossible into possible -- by which even the inconceivable
might be achieved. Samkara on the other hand believes that the ultimate reality is Brahman,
the indeterminate spirit, and argues that the world of knower, known and knowledge is
somehow in Brahman.
Badarayana says that the soul is jna, which Samkara interpretes as intelligence, while
Ramanuja takes it as an intelligent knower. Vallabha agrees with Samkara, while Kesava
thinks that the soul is both intelligence and knower. The individual soul is an agent (karta).
Birth and death refer to the body and not the soul, which has no beginning. It is eternal. The
jivatman (soul in the body) is considered as anu or atomic in character. Ramanuja, Madhava,
et al., share this view. Samkara is of the opinion that the soul is all-pervading or vibhu, though
it is considered to be atomic in the worldly condition or in the body it occupies. Badarayana

holds that Brahman is in the individual soul, though the nature of Brahman is not touched by
the character of the soul. As the jiva (embodied soul) and Brahman are different as the light
of the sun and the sun, and as when the light is covered by clouds the sun is not affected, even
so, when the jiva is subject to pain, Brahman is not. The embodied self acts and enjoys,
acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure and pain, while the highest self has
opposite nature and is free from all evil. The statements "that are though" and "this atman is
Brahman" attempts to show that the two, Brahman and atman, God and man, are in reality
one. If Brahman were the cause of everything, it must be the cause of the individual soul as
well. The absolute divine essence is present in all its manifestations. Every individual shares in
the spirit of God. It is not clear, from Badarayana's account, in what exact manner the
individual is related to Brahman, as a part (amsa) or reflection (abhasa) of the universal self.
Badarayana points out that Asmarathya, Audulomi and Kasakrtsna take up different
positions with regard to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Asmarathya thinks
that the soul is a part of Brahman, even in a spatial sense. Audolomi holds that, in deep sleep,
the soul is temporarily in union with Brahman. Kasakrtsna, whose view Samkara upholds,
believes that Brahman exists, whole and undivided, in the form of the individual soul, and
Badarayana simply mentions these different opinions, but does not say which view he
supports. The passage that the jiva is a part (amsa) of the highest reality is taken by Samkara
(of Advaita) to mean "a part as it were" (amsa iva). Since Brahman, who is not composed of
parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense, Bhaskara and Vallabha assert that the jiva is a
part of the Lord because there is difference as well as identity between them. Ramanuja,
Nimbarka, Baladeva and Srikantha think that the jiva is a real part of Brahman, even as the
light issuing from a luminous object like the fire or the sun is a part of that object. The view
that the jiva is both different and not different from the supreme, even as a serpent is both
different and not different from its folds is refuted. Ramanuja, however, takes the sutra as
dealing with the relation of Brahman to matter, and disputes the view that matter is only a
different posture of Brahman and not different from it, even as the folds of the serpent are
only a different position of and not different from the serpent. Ramanuja contends that both
jiva and matter are parts of Brahman. Kesava argues that matter is both different from and
one with Brahman, even as the serpent and its hood are different and also not different when
the serpent is viewed as whole. Matter is identical with Brahman inasmuch as its very
existence depends on Brahman, and it is different from Brahman since it has name and form.
The jiva is also different and not different from Brahman, and the difference is certainly real.
There is strong support for the view that Badarayana looks upon the difference between
Brahman and the individual soul as ultimate, i.e. something which persists even when the soul
is released. The jiva, though minute in size, pervades the whole body even as a little sandal
ointment refreshes the whole body.
Ethics
The world is due to the will (samkalpa) of God. It is his lila, or play. It does not, however,
mean that he created sin and suffering for his joy or, as some might say, that there may be
inferior creatures who will praise and glorify him for his eternal greatness. A God all blissful,
who delights in the suffering of creatures, is no God at all. The diversity (or diverse
conditions) is determined by the karma (actions) of the individuals. God is limited by the
necessity of taking into account the previous actions of humans. The unequal distribution of
happiness is the expression of the moral order of which God's will is the embodiment. So
Brahman is neither partial nor pitiless, and has not the delightful freedom and
irresponsibility.

In the third chapter of the Sutra it is pointed out how ethical discipline can secure for the
individual a body fit for the acquirement of absolute knowledge or Braham-jnana. The
salvation is possible for everyone, whether through acts or the grace of God. To this end, the
rules of the Veda (sruti) are helpful. Badarayana indicates in the Sutra that active service and
renunciation of the world get equal support from the scriptures, and finds himself inclined
towards the combining of the spirit of renunciation with strenuous life. Action done out of
ignorance, but not all action, impedes the rise of spiritual perception or jnana. Whatever
freedom is there after attaining release, on earth, even in the jivanmukta (liberated life)
condition, action is enjoined. Following the Upanisads, the Sutra allows secondary worships
(involving the lesser devas) which may grant blessings to the devotees, though even these are
governed by the supreme. The reality is beyond and not contained in the pratikas, or symbols,
which are permitted as an aid (in prayer etc.) to the inapt man. The supreme is avyakta or
unmanifested, though he is seen in the state of samradhana. The highest kind of religion is the
possession of God-vision. The ultimate end of the individual is the attainment of the self.
Badarayana believes in jivanmukti or liberation in life. Knowledge of Brahman puts an end to
the karmas which have not begun to operate, though the body lasts until the karmas which
have started to operate (arabdha) are exhausted.
In the fourth chapter, there is an account of how the individual soul reaches Brahman
through the Devayana, whence there is no return. The characteristics of the released soul also
are described. According to Audolomi, its chief feature is thought. Jaimini maintains that it
has a number of exalted qualities, and Badarayana declares himself in favor of a combination
of these two views. After mentioning the almost infinite power and knowledge which will come
to the liberated soul on attaining moksa, the author remarks that none, however, will get the
power of creating, ruling and dissolving the universe, since that belongs to God alone.
Badarayana affirms a monistic view of the world. He does not admit polytheism or a plurality
of independent and equally ultimate reals or unoriginate souls or a dualism between God and
the Evil One. He accepts the two views of Brahman as the indeterminate intelligence
(nirvisesa cinmatra) held by Badri, Kasakrtsna and Audolomi, and determinate personal
Lord (saviseka) held by Asmarathya and Jaimini.
------------------------------------Compiled from: The Bhagavadgita; and Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, by S. Radhakrishnan, ISBN
019563821-4, pp. 430-444.
by: Dr. Subhash C. Sharma
Email: lamberdar@yahoo.com
Date: June 27, 2004