The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics.

By
Marc Trachtenberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), ix + 317 pp.
$27.95 paper.

The Cold War and After is a collection of nine essays, all published previously, most
in the last decade and with one appearing in English for the first time. The book has
three sections: the first on theory discusses Marc Trachtenbergs views on realism and
then as related to the international order, the second includes five historical essays
that examine particular events during the Cold War, while the third addresses policy
matters relating to preventive war and the invasion of Iraq. The structure reflects the
authors purpose of showing by and through examples his belief that writing
meaningful historical work on international relations requires linking conceptual
frameworks with empirical approaches. The book primarily focuses on U.S.Europe
relations and makes a most useful complement to Trachtenbergs earlier outstanding
work on the American security policies concerning Europe, A Constructed Peace:
The Making of the European Settlement, 19451963.
The declared conceptual framework through which Trachtenberg analyses
international relations policy development is that of realism with its stress on relative
power. He considers that good policy arises when policymakers are properly
cognizant of power politics and are not diverted by other considerations. If major
conflicts have developed, it was not because realist principles have shaped policy, but
rather because very different sorts of impulses have come to govern the behavior of
great states (43). This view places him firmly in the steadily growing neo-classical
realist school that holds that to be successful state policies should reflect the structural
characteristics of the international system while minimizing the impact of domestic or

ideational factors. Many others, especially in Europe, would disagree and place more
weight on factors other than relative power. Trachtenbergs fine examination of his
chosen five historical examples mostly supports his contention, but in being so
constrained to a very specific context may also suggest that his realist conceptual
framework is suitable only in some circumstances, not necessarily all. If meaningful
history requires the application of a conceptual framework, is realism the only
appropriate oneor indeed the best?
Trachtenbergs astute study of American relations with France in the years
196974 is one that casts doubt on realism always being the best conceptual
framework. In a detailed analysis that draws deeply on American and French sources,
he analyses the main issues that led to the energetic American initiative to re-engage
with France to falter and eventually fail. In this sharply asymmetric relationship,
realism would suggest that in due course American wishes should have prevailed and
yet this was not so. Trachtenberg forensically addresses the disagreements but seems
ultimately perplexed. This sentiment is mirrored in the books final chapter on the
20022003 political crisis in the Western Alliance caused by the invasion of Iraq. In
both cases he laments that great opportunities were missed by the United States and
Europe not being able to talk seriously about major issues with each other. In the Iraq
case he observes that: The issues were discussed at much too superficial a level; the
core issues were not argued out, with the result that in the end no real meeting of the
minds was possible. But that does not mean that we cannot do better in the future
(311).
In the final section of the book Trachtenberg focuses on the contentious issue
of preventive war. He most usefully places the controversial policy of the George W.
Bush presidency amongst historical examples where preventive war was also

considered. There is though a difference that Trachtenberg seems to gloss over:

President Bush actually implemented a preventive war policy, whereas other U.S.
presidents simply considered such an alternative in developing their policy. In the
examples discussed, the 2003 Iraq invasion thus stands alone and as such is of
questionable similarity to other examples such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and
the 199394 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Trachtenbergs focus in analysing
historical examples in his distinctive manner sometimes overlooks that good policy
development is just the starting point of a complex process of addressing deeply
troublesome matters. The value of any policy can really only be judged after
implementation.
Raising such questions though reveals the real strengths of this book. Firstly,
in his masterful examination of the development of particular international relations
policies Trachtenberg reminds us that good policies do not just happen, but are the
result of careful and intelligent thought. Secondly, in discussing in such a
comprehensive manner his well-developed approach to writing about international
political history Trachtenberg does a great service to students while providing
professors with an excellent teaching text. The Cold War and After is a useful and
insightful book on several levels.

Peter Layton, University of New South Wales, Australia