A Thesis On Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems

Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems
using Analytical and Equivalent Approaches
A thesis Submitted to the College of
Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Fulfhent of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Electrical Engineering
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon
Wei Zhang
Fa11 1998
O Copyright Wei Zhang, 1998. AU rights reserved.
If
National Library
of Canada
Bibliothque nationale
du Canada
Acquisitions and
Bibliographie Services
Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques
395 Wellington Street

Ottawa ON K1A O N 4
395. nie Wellington

Ottawa ON KI A ON4
Canada
Canada
Your IW Vorre relermce
Our hie Noire reMrence
The author has granted a nonexclusive licence allowing the

National Library of Canada to
reproduce, loan, distribute or sell
copies of this thesis in microform,
paper or electronic formats.
L'auteur a accord une licence non

exclusive permettant la
Bibliothque nationale du Canada de
reproduire, prter, distribuer ou
vendre des copies de cette thse sous
la forme de microfiche/f%n, de
reproduction sur papier ou sur format
lectronique.
The author retains ownership of the

copyright in uiis thesis. Neither the
thesis nor substantial extracts kom it
may be printed or otherwise
reproduced without the author's
permission.
L'auteur conserve la proprit du

droit d'auteur qui protge cette thse.
Ni la thse ni des extraits substantiels
de celle-ci ne doivent tre imprims
ou autrement reproduits sans son
autorisation.
UNLVERSITY OF SASlKATCIB[EWAN
College of Graduate Studies and Research

SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfibent
of the requirements for the

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILQSOPBY
Wei Zhang
Department of Electrical Engineering

S u m e r 1999
Examining Cornmittee:
Dr. P. Browne
W ~ d I W & ~ e a nDesignate,
' s
Chair
CoUege of Graduate Studies and Research
Dr. T.S, Sidhu
Chair of Advisory Conmittee, Department of

Electrical Engineering
Dr. R. Billinton
SupeMsor, Department of Electrical Engineering
Dr. N. Chowdhwy
Dr. P. Pramanick
Departrnent of Electrical Engineering
Dr. M. Hosain
Department of Civil Engineering
Extemal Examiner:
Dr, R.W. Menzies

Head of the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of Manitoba
15 Gillson Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
R3T 5V6
EtELIABILWY EVALUATION OF BULK POWER SYSTEMS

USING ANALYTICAL AND EQWALENT APPROACHlES
Electric power systems throughout the world are undergokg considerable changes
due to the converging forces of deregdation, technologicd revolution and evolving

customer expectations. Quantitative reliability evaluation plays an important role in the
development, design and operation o f composite generation and transmission or buk
power systems. This thesis presents research conducted on the development and
examination of concepts, techniques and pertinent factors in the reliability evaluation of
composite power systems using direct analytical and equivalent analyticat approaches.
A major dificulty in composite system reliability evduation using analytical
methods is the long computation times required to investigate the extremely large number
of possible system outage events in an actual composite system. O d y the credible system
states are usually investigated. The credible system states are those that rnake significant
contributions to the reliability indices and are d l y detennined by considering outages
up to a certain level. The computation t h e increases rapidly with increase in system size
and the defined outage level. The obtained adequacy indices can ofien be inaccunite due
to limited depth of analysis.
Computation times can be significantly reduced when the unchanging portion of a
systern can be replaced by a reduced equivalent reliability model. Equivalents can prove
very usefl in the evaluation of large systems where sensitivity studies are to be
performed on a portion of the systern or when the systern is to be intercomected to a

M e r system, which is to be snidied in detail. Reliability equivalent concepts also have
many other applications in composite system evaluation.
This thesis illustrates the mathematical foundations, evaluation procedures, pertinent
factors, reliability indices and cornputer pro gram design concepts associated with
composite system evaluation using the analytical approacb The thesis presents three
advanced algorithms which effectively improve the accuracy of the reliability indices
without considerably increasing the requixed computation time. The three advanced
algorithms are illustrateci using numerical examples and are applied to the evaluation of
two reliability test systems. The thesis provides a complete description of adequacy
equivalent concepts and their applications in composite system evaluation. System
studies on two reliability test systems and inte'K0~eCtedforms of the two reliability test
systems using the equivalent techniques are provided. The concepts of reliability
costhenefit analysis and the utilkation in this area of the equivalent techniques and the
new algorithm for annual adequacy indices are presented in tl& thesis.
Born in Weihai, China
B-Eng., Electncal Engineering, Chongqing University, China

M.Eng., Electncal Engineering, Chongqing University, China
M. Sc.,
Elecrical Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Canada
R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Algorithm for filure eequency and duration

assessment of composite power systerns", IEE Proc.-Gener. Tronsm. Distrib., vol.
145, no. 2, March 1998, pp. 117-122.
W. Zhang and R. Billinton, "AppIication of an adequacy equivalent method in bulk
power system reliability evaluation", IEEE Tram. Power Systems, VOL 13, no. 2, May
1998, pp. 66 1-666.
R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Enhanced adequacy equivalent for composite power

system reliability evaluation", IEE Proc. -Gener. Transm. Distrh,
vol. 143, no. 5,
September 1996, pp. 420-426.
R. Billinton and W. Zhang, 'State extension for adequacy evaiuation of composite
power systems", acceptedfor publication in EZechic Power Systems Research.
R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Equivalents in adequacy evaluation of power systems",

PMAPS Conference, Vancouver, Canada, 1997.
R. Biliinton and W. Zhang, "An adequacy quivalent approach for composite power
system reliability evaluation", IEEE FK?XCANEXProceedings, Canada, 1995.
R. Billinton, P. Wang and W. Zhang, "Reliability assessment of power systems by a
network equivalent approach", IEEE W E S C mProceedings, Canada, 1997.
W. Zhang, An Adequacy Equiwlent Approach for Reliability Evaluation of
Composite Power Systems, MSc. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1995.
Permission to Use
The author has agreed that the Library, University of Saskatchewan, may make this
thesis f?eely available for inspection. Moreover, the author has agreed that permission for
extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Professor
who supervised this work recorded herein, or, in his absence, by the Head of the
Department or the Dean of the CoUege in which the thesis work was done. It is
understood that due recognition will be given to the author of this thesis and to the
University of Saskatchewan in any use of the material in this thesis. Copying or

publication or any other use of the thesis for inancial gain without approval by the
University of Saskatchewan and the author's \ m e n permission is prohibitecl.
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in
whole or in part should be addressed to:
The Head
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Canada S7N 5A9
Abstract
Electric power systems throughout the world are undergoing considerable changes
due to the converging forces of deregulation, technological revolution and evolving
customer expectations. Quantitative reliability evaluation plays an important role in the
development, design and operation of composite generation and transmission or bulk
power systems. This thesis presents research conducted on the development and
examination of concepts, techniques and pertinent factors in the reliability evaluation of
composite power systems using direct analytical and equivalent analytical approaches.
A major difficulty in composite system reliability evaiuation using analytical methods
is the long computation times required to investigate the extrernely large number of
possible system outage events in an actual composite system. Only the credible system
states are usually investigated. The credible systero states are those that make signiscant
contriibutions to the reliabsty indices and are usually determined by considering outages
up to a certain level. The computation time increases rapidly with increase i systm size
and the defmed outage level- The obtained adequacy indices can &en be inaccurate due
to limited depth of analysis.
Computation times c m be significantly reduced when the unchanging portion of a
system can be replaced by a reduced equivalent reliabiiity model. Equivalents can prove
very useful in the evaluation of large systems where sensitivity studies are to be
performed on a portion of the system or when the system is to be intercomected to a
M e r system, which is to be studied in detail. Reliability equivalent concepts &O have
many Other applications in composite system evaluation.
This thesis illustrates the mathematical foundations, evduation procedures, pertinent

fctors, reiiability indices and compter program design concepts associated with
composite system evaluation using the analyticd approach. The thesis presents three
advanced dgo~thmswhich effectively hprove the accuracy of the reliability indices
without considerably increasing the required computation tirne. The three advanced
algorithms are illustrated using numerical examples and are applied to the evaluation of
two reliability test systems. The thesis provides a complete description of adequacy
equivalent concepts and their applications in composite systern evaluation. System
studies on two reliability test systems and intercomected forms of the two reliability test
systems using the equivalent techniques are provided. The concepts of reliability
cotlbenefit analysis and the utilization in this area of the equivdent techniques and the
new algorithm for annual adequacy indices are presented in this thesis.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to express sincere thanks and appreciation to his supervisor
Prof Roy Bi1l.inton for his guidance, discussion, criticism and encouragement throughout
the course of this work. His assistance in the preparation of this thesis is phankflly
achowledged. It has been a w o n d e f i opportunity and expenence to work under hi

supervision.
Financial assistance provided by Prof Roy Billinton in the form o f research support
eom the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada is
gratefully acknowledged.
The author takes the opportunity to thank his d e , Yaling, bis daughters, Haijing
and Haili, his relatives and his fiends for the^ moral support, encouragement and love.
Table of Contents
Page
Permission to use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acbowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Symbols and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 Introduction
!.1
:-2
..3
.. 4
.. 5
..6
..............................
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basics of Reliability Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basics of Adequacy Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deregulation Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Basic Concepts and Evaluation Techniques . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . .
StateSpace Technique . . . .
Basic Procedure and Concepts
Network Solution Techniques
Rernedial Actions . . . . . .
Load Curtailment Policies . .
Load Modeis . . . . . . . . .
Basic Adequacy Indices . . . .
Cornputer Programmhg . . .
-S
3 Advanced Algorithm
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
.......................
55
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Algorithm for FF & FD Evduation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Numenc Example and Non-coherence Effect . . . . . . . . . . . .
State Extension Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Numeric Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Algorithm for Annual Adequacy Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NumericalExample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55
56
62
67
76
79
85
88
Summary
...............................
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two Test Systems: the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . .
Improved FF & FD Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State Extension Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annual Adequacy Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...............................
90
90
94
100
114
124
5 Concepts and Methods of Adequacy Equivalents . . .
127
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Summary
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BasicConcepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent Roundhg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Network Solutions for Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utilization of Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Common-cause Failure Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Station Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary
...............................
6 Applications of Equivalent Techniques

6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
127
128
136
143
146
148
153
156
159
164
..........
166
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect o f Network Solution Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of Equivdent Rounding Increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of High Level Outages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calculation of Annual Adequacy Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
166
167
179
190
197
6.6
6.7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
Effect of the Station Originated Events .
...............
...............................
203
217
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Customer Damage Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expected Customer Damage Costs (ECOST) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annualized and Annual ECOST for the RBTS and the EEE-RTS .
ECOST for the Two-area RBTS and the IEEE Two-area RTS
Using the Equivalent Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
219
220
221
231
233
Summary
8 Summary and Conclusions
242
248
...................
250
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
259
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
266
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Data of the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Data of the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collection of Reliability Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
266
268
273
List of Tables
Table 2- 1.
Table 3.l .
Table 3.2 .
Table 3.3.
Table 3.4.
Table 3.5 .
Table 3.6 .
Table 3.7 .
Table 3.8.
Table 3.9.
Table 3.1 0 .
Table 3.11Table 3.1 2Table 3.13.
Table 4.1.
Table 4.2.
Table 5.1.
Table 5.2 .
Table 5.3.
Table 5.4.
Table 5.5.
Table 5.6.
Table 5.7.
Table 5.8.
Table 5.9.
Table 5.1 0.
Table 5.1 1.
Table 5-12.
Table 5.13.
Table 5.14Table 5.15.
Table 5.16,
Table 5-17.
Table 5.18.
Seven step load data for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Basicstateindicesforthetwo-componentsystem . . . . . . . . .
Failure fiquencies using the dif5erent equations . . . . . . . . .
Essentialparametersforthethree-componentsystem . . . . . . .
Basic parameters for the three-component system . . . . . . . . .
Basic parameters for the three-cornponent system, when enumerating
system states up to level 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boundary level subtree parameters for the five-component system .
S2+ and Sg+ parameters. assuming S2 and S3 are the investigated
system Mure states for the three-component systern . . . . . . . .
FEbndFFwithoutapplyingthestateextensiontechnique . . . . .
FP and FF when applying the state extension algorithm . . . . .
Effect of the state extension technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annualized adequacy indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
h n u a l adequacy indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cornparison of the adequacy indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General uiformation of the four given studied cases . . . . . . . .
A seven-step load mode1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essential state parameters for the two-component system . . . . .
A three-state equivalmt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essentid parameters for the IA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mode1 1equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Including outage level information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mode1 II equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mode1 III equivdent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mode1 N quivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent mode1 1before rounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rounding process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent mode1 1afier roundmg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The RBTS quivalent using d.c. load flow . . . . . . . . . . . .
The reduced RBTS equivdent using d.c. load flow . . . . . . . .
The reduced RBTS quivalent using nekvork flow . . . . . . . . .
.......
The rounded RBTS equivalent using d.c . load flow
The rounded RBTS equivalent ushg network low . . . . . . . .
Adequacy d y s i s of the system in Fig. 5.13 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essential parameters for the mode1 in Fig. 5.16(a) . . . . . . . . .
47
58
63
66
70
72
73
75
77
78
79
86
87
87
107
116
135
135
139
139
140
141
142
143
144
144
145
149
150
151
152
152
156
158
Table 5.19.
Table 5.20.
Table 5.2 1.
Table 6.1.
Table 6.2.
Table 6.3,
Table 6.4.
Table 6.5.
Table 6.6Table 6.7.
Table 6.8.
Table 6.9.
Table 6.10.
Table 7.1.
Table 7.2.
Table 7.3.
Table 7.4.
Table 7.5.
Table 7.6.
Table 7.7.
Table 7.8.
Table 7.9.
Table 7.1 0.
Table 7.1 1.
Table 7.12.
Table A- l .
Table A-2 .
Table A-3 .
Table A 4.
Table B-1.
Table B-2.
Table 8 - 3 .
Table B-4.
Table B-5 .
Table B-6 .
EquivalentforthemodelinFig.5.16(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essential parameters for the mode1 in Fig.5.16(b) . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent for the mode1 in Fig. 5.16(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data on the three tie lines in the IEEE two-area RTS
X and B/2
are in p.u . with a base power equal to 100 MVA) . . . . . . . . .
Cornparison of the required cpu times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparison of the required CPU times for the two-area RBTS . .
Comparison of the required CPU times for the IEEE two-area RTS
Equivalent generator reliability data for the RBTS . . . . . . . . .
EquivalenttransmissionIinereliabiltydatafortheEU3TS . . . . .
Equivalent load feeder reliability data for the RBTS . . . . . . . .
Equivalent generator reliability data for the IEEE.RTS . . . . . . .
Equivalent transmission line reliability data for the IEEE-RTS . . .
Equivalent load feeder reliability data for the EEE-RTS . . . . . .
Sector CDF expressed in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Assumed load compositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CCDF in (%/kW)for the test systerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Load factors of the seven sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector peak load docation for the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector peak load percentages for the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector energy consumption percktages for the RBTS . . . . . . .
CCDF for the RBTS load buses in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector peak load allocation for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector peak load percentages for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . .
Sector energy consumption percentages for the IEEE-RTS . . . .
CCDF for the IEEE-RTS load buses in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . . . .
Bus data ( in p.u.) for the RBTS . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lnedata(inp.u.) fortheRBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generator data for the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tenninal station equipment data for the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . .
Bus data ( in p.u.) for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Line data ( in pu.) for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generator data for the EEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weekly peak load in percent of annual peak . . . . . . . . . . . .
D d y peak load in percent of weekly peak . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hourly peak load in percent of daily peak . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
158
159
159
173
194
20 1
202
205
205
205
210
2 11
211
222
223
223
225
226
226
226
227
228
228
229
229
266
266
267
267
268
269
270
271
271
272
List of Figures
Subdivision of power system reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic fiinction zones and hierarchical levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two fimdamentdy diffrent approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generation evaluation mode1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic generation modeling approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Investment. damage and tota1 cost as a function of system reliability
Unbundled structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A single component two-state state space diagram . . . . . . . . .
A single component three-date state space diagram . . . . . . . . .
A two-component system state space diagram . . . . . . . . . . .
State space diagrams including common cause filures . . . . . . .
Basic amlytical procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State enurneration of the three-component system . . . . . . . . . .
State space diagram of a po wer system with n independent components
Equivalent conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The EEE-RTS hourly load duration curve . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A seven step load model based on the IEEE-RTS load duration curve
A tweive-intemal Ioad model based on the IEEE-RTSchronological
hourlyloadvariation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 2.12. Computa programming strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.1- State space diagram for the two-component systern . . . . . . . . .
Fig.3.2. Simple netwurk configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.3. State enumeration for the three-component system (non-CO
herence) .
Fig. 3.4. State space of the three-component system . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.5. System States of the five-component system . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.6. A radial configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.7. Simple network co&guration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3.8. Assumed hourly load duration curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4.1. Single h e diagram of the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4.2. Single h e diagram of the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4.3. Failure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses at the 185 MW load level
Fig.4.4. Failure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses at the 148 MW load level
Fig. 4.5. Failure fiequencies at bus 2 for different load levels in the RBTS . .
Fig. 4.6. Failure fkequencies at bus 6 for ciiffirent load levels in the RBTS . .
Fig. 4.7. Failure fkequencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4.8. Failure fkquencies at bus 2 for different load levels in the IEEE-RTS
Fig. 1.1.
Fig. 1.2.
Fig. 1.3.
Fig. 1.4.
Fig. 1.5.
Fig. 1.6.
Fig. 1.7.
Fig.2.1.
Fig. 2.2,
Fig.2.3.
Fig.2.4.
Fig. 2.5.
Fig- 2.6.
Fig.2.7.
Fig. 2.8.
Fig. 2.9.
Fig.2.10.
Fig.2.1 1 .
3
5
5
7
7
12
14
21
21
22
23
27
29
30
35
46
47
48
52
58
62
65
69
73
84
85
86
92
93
95
96
97
97
98
99
Fig. 4.9.
Fig. 4.10.
Fig. 4.1 1.
Fig 4.12.
Fig. 4-13.
Fig. 4- 14.
FIg. 4.15.
Fig. 4.16.
Fig. 4.17.
Fig. 4.18.
Fig. 4.1 9.
Fig. 4.20.
Fig. 4.2 1.
Fig. 4.22.
Fig. 4.23.
Fig. 4.24.
Fig. 4.25.
Fig. 4.26.
Fig. 4.27.
Fig. 4.28.
Fig. 4.29.
Fig. 4.30.
Fig. 4.3 1.
Fig. 4.32.
Fig. 4.33.
Fig. 4.34.
Fig. 4.35.
Fig. 4.36.
Fig. 4.37.
Fig. 4.38.
Failure fiequencies at bus 15 for different load levels in the IEEE-RTS

Failme probabilities at the RBTS load buses (Case 1) . . . . . . . .
Failure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses (Case 1) . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS at various load levels
(Casel) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fdure fiequencies for the overall RBTS at various load Ievels
(Casel) . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabiIities at the RBTS load buses (Case 2) . . . . . . . .
Fdure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses (Case 2) . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS at various load Levels
(Case2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fkquencies for the overall RBTS at various load
Levels (Case 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failwe probabilities at the IEEE-RTS load buses (Casel) . . . . . .
Fdure eequencies at the IEEE-RTS toad buses (Casel). . . . . . .
Faure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load levels
(Case 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fiequencies for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load levels
(Casel) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities at the IEEE-RTSload buses (Case 2) . . . . . .
Fadure f?equencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses (Casez) . . . . . .
Failme probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load
Ievels (Case 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fkequencies for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load
levels (Case 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failme probabilities for the overd IEEE-RTS for the four cases . .
Failure nequemies for the overall IEEE-RTS for the four cases . - .
Failure probabilities at the RBTS load buses using the three methods
Failure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses uskg the three methods .
Expected load curtailed at the RBTS load buses using the three
methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expected energy not supplied at the RBTS load buses using the
three methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS ushg the three methods. .
Failure fiequemies for the overd RBTS using the three methods . .
Expected load curtailed for the overall RBTS using the three methods
Expected energy not supplied for the overall RBTS using the three
methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabdities at the IEEE-RTS load buses using the three
methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fiequencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses using the three
methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expected load curtded at the IEEE-RTS load buses using the
three methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4.40.
Fig. 4.4 1.
Fig. 4.42.
Fig. 4.43.
Fig. 5.1.
Fig. 5.2.
Fig. 5.3.
Fig. 5.4.
Fig. 5.5.
Fig. 5.6.
Fig. 5.7.
Fig. 5.8.
Fig. 5.9.
Fig. 5.10.
Fig. 5.1 1.
Fig. 5.12.
Fig. 5.13.
Fig. 5.14 .
Fig. 5.15.
Fig. 5.16.
Fig. 5.17.
Fig. 5.18 .
Fig. 5.19.
Fig. 5.20.
Fig. 6.1.
Fig. 6.2.
Fig. 6.3.
Fig. 6.4.
Fig. 6.5.
Fig. 6.6.
Fig. 6.7.
Fig. 6.8.
Fig. 6.9.
Expected energy not supplied at IEEE-RTS the load buses using

the three methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS using the three methods
Failure fiequencies for the overd IEEE-RTS using the three methods
Expected load curtded for the overall IEEE-RTS using the
three methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expected energy not supplied for the overall IEEE-RTS using
the three rnethods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple series system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple pardel system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Single component %th no spare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent two-state model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Single component with one spare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State space diagram for the two-component system . . . . . . . . .
A power network divided into two areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A network represented by two interconnected areas . . . . . . . . .
A network represented by two-IAand one AI . . . . . . . . . . .
A simple equivalent exarnple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RBTS equivalent state probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RBTS equivalent state fiequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Topo10gical equivalent representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Topological equivalent representation for the example system . . . .
Two common-cause failure models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
niree-state component mode1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EqUvalent of a single bus configuration statioa . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent of a ring configuration station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent of a 1112 breaker configuration station . . . . . . . . . .
Symbolic interconnected two-area RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fiequencies for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the two-area
RBTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS using
the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure fiequencies for the overd AI in the two-area RBTS using
the two LA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expected load curtaiied for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS
Expected energy not supplied for the overall AI in the two-area
RBTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xii
Fig. 6.10. Symbolic IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fig. 6.1 1. Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.12. Faure fiequemies for the AI load buses in the for the IEEE
two-area RTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.13. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the IEEE
two-area RTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.14. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the IEEE
two-qea RTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.15. Failwe probabilities for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area
RTS using the two IA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.16. Failure fkequencies for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area
RTSusingthetwoIAequivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.1 7. Expected load curtailed for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area
RTS using the two IA equivdents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.18. Expected energy not supplied for the overall AI in the IEEE
two-area RTS using the two LA equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.19. Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using difEerent rounding increments for the IA quivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.20. Failure fiequencies for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using dBerent rounding increments for the lA equivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.2 1. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using dBerent rounding increments for the IA equivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.22. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the two-area
RBTS using dEerent rounding increments for the IA equivalent . . .
Fig. 6.23. Failure probabilities for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS
using diCerent rounding increments for the IA equivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.24. Failme fiequencies for the overd AI in the two-area RBTS
using dXerent rounding increments for the IA equivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.25. Expected load curtailed for the overd AI in the two-area RBTS
using dinerent rounding increments for the equivalent LA . . . . . .
Fig. 6.26. Expected energy not supplied for the overall A I in the two-area
B T S usjng different rounding increments for the IA equivalent. . .
Fig. 6.27. Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using diffrent rounding increments for the IA equivalent . . .
Fig. 6.28. Failure fiequencies for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using diffrent rounding increments for the IA equivalent. . . .
Fig. 6.29. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using dserent rounding increments for the IA equivalent. . . .
Fig. 6.30. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the IEEE two
-area RTS using different rounding mcrenients for the IA equivalent
Fig. 6.3 1. Fdure probabilities for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS
using different rounding iacrements for the LA quivalent . . . . . .
Fig. 6.32. Failure fkquencies for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS
using different rounding increments for the IA quivalent . . . . . .
173
174
175
176
176
1 77
177
178
178
180
18 1
182
182
183
183
184
184
185
186
187
187
188
188
Fig. 6.33. Expected load curtailed for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area
RTS using different rounding increments for the IA quivalent. . . .
Fig. 6.34. Expected energy not supplied for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area
RTS using different rounding incrments for the IA quivalent. . . .
Fig. 6.35. Failure probabilities for the overd AI in the IEEE two-area RTS
at diffrent load levek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.36. Failure fkquencies for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS
at diffrent load levek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
two-area RTS at the system peak load level . . . . . . . . . . . . .
............
two-area RTS at the system peak load level
Fig. 6.39. Effects of high level generator outages on the expected load
curtailed index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.40. Effects of hi& level generator outages on the expected energy
not supplied index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.41. Effects of hi& level transmission h e outages on the failure
probability index
..........................
Fig. 6.42. Effects of high level transmission line outages on the failure
fiequency index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.43. Annual f'ailure probabilities for the AI load buses in the two-area
RBTS using the two methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.44. Annual failure fiequencies for the AI load buses in the two-area
RBTS using the two methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.45. Annual expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the
two-area RBTS using the two rnethods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.46. Annual expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses
in the two-area RBTS using the two methods . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.47. Annual expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the
IEEE two-area RTS using the two methods . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.48. Annual expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in
the IEEE two-area RTS using the two methods . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.49. Failure probabilities for the RBTS load buses at the peak load
level in the three cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.50. Failure fiequencies for the RBTS load buses at the peak load
level in the three cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.51. Expected load curtailed for the RBTS load buses at the peak
load level in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.52. Expected energy not upplied for the RBTS load buses at the
peak Ioad level in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.53. Failure probabities for the overd RBTS at difEerent load levels
in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.54. Faure fiequemies for the overall RBTS at diffrent load levels
in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xiv
Fig. 6.55. Expected load curtailed for the overall RBTS at different load
levels in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.56. Expected energy not supplied for the overall RBTS at different
load levels in the tbree cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.57. Failure probabilities for the IEEE-RTS load buses at the peak load
level m the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.58. Failure fiequencies for the IEEE-RTS load buses at the peak load
level in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.59. Expected load curtailed for the IEEE-RTSload buses at the peak
load level in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.60. Expected energy not supplied for the IEEE-RTS load buses at
the peak load level in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.62. Failure probabilities for the IEEE-RTS toad buses at the load
level of 2565 MW in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.62. Expected energy not supplied for the IEEE-RTS load buses at the
load Ievel of 2565 MW in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Failure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS at different load
Fig. 6.64. Failure frequencies for the overall IEEE-RTS at different load
Fig. 6.65. Expected load curtailed for the overd IEEE-RTS at different
load levels in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 6.66. Expected energy not supplied for the overall IEEE-RTS at
different load levels in the three cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.1. Sector customer damage functions in (%/kW) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.2. The composite custorner damage function in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.3. CCDF for the RBTS load buses in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.4. CCDF for the EEE-RTS load buses in ($/kW) . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.5. Expected customer damage costs for the RBTS load buses at
variable load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.6. Expected customer darnage costs for the overall RBTS at various
load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.7. Intempted energy assessment rate for the RBTS load buses at
variable load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.8. Intempted energy assessment rate for the overall RBTS at various
load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.9. Distribution of the annual expected custorner damage cost in the
RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.10. Annual intempted energy assessment rate for the overall RBTS
andattheloadbuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.1 1. Expected customer damage costs for the IEEE-RTS load buses
at variable load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.12. Expected customer damage costs for the overall EEE-RTS
at various load Ievels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209
209
212
212
213
213
214
214
215
215
216
216
222
224
227
230
234
235
235
236
236
237
238
238
Fig. 7.13. lntemrpted energy assessment rate for the IEEE-RTS load buses
at variable load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.1 4. Interrupted energy assessment rate for the overall IEEE-RTS at
various load levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.1 5. Disfibution of the annual expected customer damage cost in the
IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.1 6. Annual i n t m p t ed energy assessrnent rate for the o v e r d IEEE-RTS
and at the load buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.17. Disfibution of the m u a l expected customer damage cost in the
IEEE-RTS considering 5Gt3L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.18. h u a i intemipted energy assessment rate for the o v e r d IEEE-RTS
and at the load buses considering 5Gf-31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.19. Distnbution of the annualized expected customer damage costs in the
AI for the two-area RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.20. Distribution of the annual expected customer damage costs in the AI
for the two-area RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.2 1. Aonualized intempted energy assessment rates for the overall AI
and at the AI load buses for the two-area RBTS . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.22. Annualized interrupted energy assessment rates for the overall AI
and at the AI load buses for the two-area RBTS . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7-23. Distnbution of the a~ualizedexpected customer damage costs in
the AI for the IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.24. Distribution of the annual expected customer damage costs in the A
I
for the IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.25. Annualized intempted energy assessment rates for the overall AI
and at the AI load buses for the IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 7.26. Annual interrupted energy assessment rates for the overd AI and
at the AI load buses for the IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . . . .
xvi
List of S p b o l s and Abbreviations

Markov state transition rate
Average M u r e rate
Average repair rate
Average installation rate
Average repair tirne
Set of in-service components
Set of out-of-service components
Set of system normal states
Set of systern failure states
Link fiom bus i to bus j

Flow on link (i, j)
Flow f?on source to si&
Availability of component i
Unavailability of component i
Psi
Probability of system state si
%i
Frequency of system state si
dsi
Duration of system state si
a.c.
Altemating Current
AI
Area of Interest
CCDF
Composite Customer Damage Function
CDF
Customer Damage Function
xvii
CEA
Cana&m Electrkity Association
COMREL
Camposite System Reliability Evaluation Program.
d-c.
Direct Current
ECOST
Expected Customer Damage Cost
EENS
Expected Energy Nat Suppfied
FF&FD
F d ~ Frequency
e
and Failure DUrati~n
ELC
Expected Load Cuaailed
FP
Failure Probabm
HLVC
Hourly Load Variation *e
HL1
Hierarchical LevelI
HL 11
Hierarchical Level 11
HLrn
Hierarhical Level
IA
Intercomectd Ares
IEAR
Inten-upt ed Energy Assessrnent Rate
IEEE
Institute of ~lectricdand Electronic Engineers, Inc.
ISO
Independent S y t a Operator
LDC
Load Duration Qrve
occ./y
Occurrences per year
RBTS
RTS
Roy Billinton Test System

Reliability Test System
1
Introduction
1.
Introduction
The primary objective of an electnc power system is to supply its custorners with
high quality reliable electric energy at the lowest possible cost. Reliability is basically a
quality characteristic. It is however a specific quality characteristic, which is difEerent
fiom the ordinary quality attriiutes such as the voltage and fkequency of electricity which
can be instantly measured using particular devices in detenninistic terms. Reliability is

probabilistic in nature and can only be measured in a probabilistic format. This suggests
that reliability measurernent c m only be done over a long time and reliability assurance is
more complex than that of vokage or fiequency. Reliability engineering is concerned
with the measurement and the prediction of reliability and has become a recognized
profession.
The reliability of electnc supply is directly associated with the quality of life in
modem society. The importance of supplying highly reiiable electric energy cannot be
overstated and is constantly growing. Reliability is, however, not fkee. Reliability and
economic constraints will always codlict with each other and lead to dScult managerid
decisions. Reliability evaluation provides the Opportunity to quantitatively evaluate the
reliability of the system and c m be used to provide valuable input to the decision making
process [ l-31.
The conventional approach to creating a satisfactory degree of reliability for many
decades was achieved through empirical methods and policies. The aiteria and
techniques that form the basis for these empincal methods and policies were all
deteTmiI3istically based, and many of them are stiU in use today. The basic weakness of
..
these d e t e r d c criteria is that they do not respond to or reflect the probabilistic or

stochastic nature of system behavior, customer demands and component fdures.
DeterminiStic techniques also cannot respond systematically to many of the parameters
which actudy Innuence system reliability, especidy in modern electric power systems
which are large and extremely complicated.
The need for ngorous and quantitative reliability analysis has become increasingly
more evident and urgent, as electric utility deregulation forces the electric power supply
industry into market cornpetition. In recent years, the formal concepts and methods of
reliability theory have been applied to almost every aspect of power system planning and
operation. Reliability evaluation can provide effective infiormation in regard to the
identification of system weaknesses, cornparison of alternative system designs, and the
justification of new facilties [4-81.
The basics of power system reliability evaluation are desmbed in the following two
sections. This is then followed by a bnef description of the impacts of ebctnc utility
deregulation in t erms of power system reliability evaluation activities. The research
objectives and the outline of the thesis are provided in the last two sections o f this
chapter.
1.2
Basics of Reliability Studies

Reliability is, in a general sense, a measure of the ability of an item or a systern to
perform its intended f'unction. In a mission onentated sense, reliabity is dehed as the
ability of the item to perfonn a required function under certain conditions for a stated
period of tirne. In the case of an electnc power systern, reliability is usually defined in a
quite different way. A power systern is designed to perform its function not for a lirnited
short p&od but for a relatively long t h e . A power system c m have faimes at dinerent
points in the system at certain thes, but these faiures c m always be repaired, and the
system can be constantly developed in order to satisfL the changing demands and to
improve the performance of its fiuiction. It is therefore important for a power system to
recognize and control the various possible systern fdures and to minmiize the fdure
effects that the customer experiences. One dennition of systern reliability is simply the
control of fdures [l]. The rneasurement of power system reliability includes the
unavailability, the expected faiure fiequency and duration, and the expected magnitude
of adverse effects on consumer service.
System reliabilxty evduation is based on reliability data for the items which rnake up
the system. The collection of systern cornponent reliability data is therefore a

fundamental task in system reliability evaluation. Many electric power utilities have
traditionally recorded the performance of power system components. These recordings
are the primary sources of the component reliability data required for the purpose of
conducting power system reliability evaluation. The data collection systems established
and managed by the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) are extrernely valuable
repositories of power system equipment and system data, and sources of data definitions
and methodologies, which are briefly desmied in Appendix C of the thesis. Although the
reliability data provided by the CEA may not be directly applicable in other countries, the
data collection systerns of the CEA provide a very usefl example of how to collect
reliability data in electric power systerns [9- 121.
Reliability as applied to a power system is divided into the two general categories of
system adequacy and system security. This division is shown in Fig. 1.1. System
adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient generation, transmission and distribution
System Reliability
Fig. 1.1. Subdivision of power system relisbility
facilities within the system to satisfy the customer load demnd. Adequacy evaluation is
therefore associated with system steady state conditions. System security, on the other
hand, relates to the ability of the system to cope with disturbances and is consequently
associated with transient system conditions. System adequacy is usually associated with
system planning for both long and short terms, but is also very important in system
operation. S ystem security is ccncemed with both system planning and operation [2,6].
System adequacy precedes system security. Satisfactory system security cannot be
obtained without acceptable systern adequacy. Comprehensive probabilistic techniques
for reliability evaluation in the adequacy domain have been developed and are coiitinually
developing [2,13- 161. The need for the application of adequacy evaluation techniques in
efectric power industries is growing. The ability to assess security is relatively iimited at
the presmt tirne compared with adequacy evaluation, due to the complexities associated
with the required modeling. Effective work on security assessrnent has been done and
efforts are contiming. It is worth noting that many adequacy evaluation techniques are
now being used in the security domain to evaluate security based reliability or to
establish risk based security limits instead of using traditional deterministic security Limits
in system operation. In these cases, risk is defined as the product of probability and
consequence [17-251. This thesis is concemed with system adequacy evaluation.
Electnc power systems are generally categorized into the three segments or
functiond zones of generation, transmission and distniution. This division is an
appropriate one as most utilities are either divided into these zones for the purpose of
organization, planning, operation and analysis or are solely responsible for one of these
functions. The three fwictional zones can be combined to give three hierarchical levels,
as shown in Fig. 1.2. Hierarchical Lxvel 1(HL 1) is concemed only with the generation
facilities. Hierarchical Level II (Ea II) includes both generation and transmission
facilities and HL III uicludes aU three functional zones. System adequacy analysis is
usually conducted in each of the three functional zones or in the three hierarchical levels
~6~71.
Fig. 1.2. Bs i c fiinction zones and hierarchical levels

HL 1 analysis using probability rnethods is the oldest and most extensively
developed area. Considerable effort has been applied over the last two decades [14-161
to develop acceptable techniques and criteria for HL II analysis, which is also designated
as composite power system or bulk power system evaluation HL III studies are not
usually done directly due to the enormity of the problem in a practical system and instead
the dstri'bution hctional zone is analyzed as an independent entity.
There are two basicdy and conceptually different methodo logies, the analytical
approach and the Monte Car10 simulation approach, used in power system reliability
evaluation [2,26]. This is shown in Fig. 1.3. The analytical approach represents the
system by a mathematical model and evaluates the reliability indices fkom this model
Basic Approaches
Fig. 1-3. Two fiindamentally different approaches

5
using analytical solutions. The Monte Car10 simulation approach, however, esthates the
reliability indices by simulating the achial process and random behavior of the system and
treats the problem as a series of real experiments [26-291.
There are merts and demerits in both approaches. Monte Car10 simulation usually
requires much longer computation times than analytical methods and it provides
approximate estimates of the reliability indices. The analytical approach, however,

requires relatively less computation t h e and c m be used to provide accurate reliability
indices. The analytical approach is n o d y selected given suitable methods are available
for specsc problems. In theory, the simulation approach can include any system effect or
system process which may have to be approximated in an andyticd method. The
simulation approach c m also provide probability distributions that analytical methods
cannot. Both analyticd and simulation approaches are undergohg continuous M e r
development and being used in specific applications. This thesis is devoted to the
development and extension of the analytical approach to power systern adequacy
evaluation.
1.3
Basics of Adequacy Evaluation

The basics of adequacy evaluation at the three hierarchical levels are provided in this
section. This includes the general concepts and the basic adequacy indices at the three
levefs. The concepts of reliabilty cost/worth assessment are ais0 uirroduced in this
sectionHL 1 Evaluation
HL 1 assessment, more commonly known as generating capacity adequacy

evaluation, is concemed with assessing the generating capacity that must be Istalled in
order to meet the system load with an acceptable degree of risk. The HL I system
evaluation mode1 is shown in Fig. 1.4. The major concm in HL 1evaluation is the total
generation required to satisfy the total system demand and to have sufncient capacity to
perform corrective and preventive maintenance on the generation facilities. The
@+dLoad
Generation
Fig. 1.4. Generation evaluation model
transmission systern and its ability to move the generated energy to the consumer load
points are not considered in an HL 1evaluation.
The basic modeling approach is shown in Fig. 1.5. The generation model and the
load model are convolved to form probabilistic risk or adequacy indices. The basic
generation model is a capacity outage probability table which contains the capacity
outage States of the generating system together with the probability, fkquency and
duration of each state. The load model can either be the daily peak load variation c w e
(DPLVC), which includes the peak loads of each day, or the load duration c w e (LDC),
which represents the hourly variation of the load.
HL 1 adequacy evaluation is widely applied in electnc power utilities, especidy in

North Amerka. The evaluation of the generating capacity risk level provides effective
input in the planning decision makmg process and in the expansion of installed generating
capacity to mset fiiture load growth. Research is still active in this area with regard to
technique extensions, modifications, new algonthms and their applications in a changing
system environment. The basic adequacy indices [2] include Loss Of Load Expectation
(LOLE), Loss Of Energy Expectation (LOEE), and Expected Failure Frequency and
Duration (FF&FD). They are d e h e d as follows:
Convoive
Mode1
Mode1
Indices
Fig. 1.S. Basic generation modeling approach
LOLE
--
Expected number of days (or hours) per year in which available

capacity is less than the daily peak load (or hourly load).
LOEE
--
Expected energy not supptied by the generation system due to the

load demand exceeding the available generating capacity.
FF&FD
--
Expected fiequency of capacity shortage events in a year and

expected duration of a shortage event.
The LOLE is the most Widely used probabilistic critenon in generation planning
because of its simplicity. It indicates the expected number of days or hours in which a
load loss or a deficiency will occur. It does not indicate, however, the severity of the
deficiency, the eequency or the duration of loss of load.
The LOEE is an appealing index as it meanires the seventy of deficiencies rather
than just the number of time units and therefore the impact of energy shortfalls as well as
their likelhood is evaluated. As it is an energy based index, it also reflects the basic fact
that a power systern is an energy supply syst&n. This index therefore is well suited for
use in situations in which alternative energy sources are being considered. The expected
energy not supplied is sometimes divided by the total energy demand. This gives a
normalized index which can be used to compare the adequacy of systerns that dSer
considerably in size.
The FF&FD approach identifies the expected frequency of encountering a deficiency

and the expected duration of a deficiency. It contains additional physical characteristics
which make it sensitive to the generating system parameters and therefore provides more
information to a power system plmer. FF&FD indices have been used extensively in
network studies. They have not, however, been usai very widely in generating system
adequacy analysis.
HL II Evaluation
Adequacy analysis at HL II is uusually termed as composite power systern or bulk
power system evduation. The term composite refers to the consideration of both
generation and oansmission system contingencies, including the modehg of the
operating policies necessary in order to dispatch generating units, assesment of power

flows on the transmission system, alleviation of network violations, and load shedding if
required. The basic modeling approach for HL II is the same as that for HL 1 shown in
Fig. 1.5, except that the generation model is replaced by a composite generation and
transmission system model. Adequacy andysis at HL II is much more complicated than
that at HL 1, as the composite system is much more complex than a single generation
systern and the system loads and generators a-re
C O M ~ C at
~ ~buses
distriiuted
throughout the systern. Considerable effort has been expended during the last two
decades in developing techniques and criteria for HL II shidies [2,16-251. The many
complications in HL II analysis include large required computation times, network
solution techniques, generation redispatch, overload alleviation, load curtailment policies
and the consideration of independent, dependent, cornmon-cause and station-associated
outages. Many of these aspects have not yet been M l y resolved and there is no
universally accepted method of analysis.

One major dfficulty in adequacy evaluation at HL II is the long computation times
required to solve the large number of system outage events or system states. For a
system with n components, the total number of system states is 2", when a two-date
model of each component is used. This is a v q large number for a normal power system
with several hundred components. The large number of system states in a composite
system &plies that a very large size sample of system states is required to obtain an
acceptable standard deviation for the adequacy index estimates when using Monte Car10
simulation. In the andytical approach, only credible events are norrndy investigated,
where a credible outage is dehed as an outage event that has s i w c a n t contribution to

the adequacy indices. Credibility is u s d y determined by considering outages up to a
certain contingency level defined in terms of the nurnber of simultaneous outages.
There are two sets of adequacy indices which can be used in composite system
evaluation. They are indices at the system load points and indices for the overall system
[ 2 ] .These indices are complementary, not alternatives. The overd system indices give
an assessment of ovaall system adequacy, while the load point indices indicate the
performance at the individual load buses and provide input values to the next hierarchical
level. The basic adequacy indices for both the overall system and the individual load
points in HL II assessment include the fouowing:
Failure probability
Expected failure fiequency
Expected failure duration
Expected load curtailed
Expected energy not supplied

The following adequacy indices are used in an overd system assessment of a
composite power system.
Bulk power supply disturbances

Bulk power interruption index
Buk power supply average MW curtailment

Bulk power energy curtailment index (or severity index)
Modifed bulk power energy curtailment index
Application of HL II adequacy evaluation is not as extensive as that of HL I
analysis, as rnany conceptual, modeling and computational difficulties are still unsolved.
The interest or need for applying HL II adequacy evaluation techniques is increasing and
urgent. This is due to electric utility deregdation and the resulting market cornpetition
forces. Adequacy evaluation of a composite generation and transmission srjtem can
provide realistic and comprehensive information with regard to the identification of

system weaknesses, cornparison of alternative system designs and the justification of new
expansion plans [ 3 W ] .
HL 111 Evaluation
HL III includes all three functional zones, staaing at the generating points and
tenniDating at the individual consumer load points. It is not usual or practical to conduct
adequacy evaluation directly on actual HL III systems due to their large size and
complexity. Instead, the distrr'bution functional zone is n o d y analyzed as a separate
entity. An adequacy analysis of the distribution functional zone provides valuable
evaluation on the strength of the distribution system. HL III indices c m be evaluated by

usEg the HL
II load-point indices as input values to the distribution fnctional zone
being studied. The objective of an HL III study is to obtain suitable adequacy indices at
the actud consumer load points.
Distribution systems are comparatively simple networks, and therefore their

reliability evaluation is not always as complex a task as that of generation and
transmission systems. The analflical methods for distn'bution systems are highly
developed 121. The usual techniques are bas& on the minmial-cut-set method or on
Mure-modes analysis in conjunction with sets of analytical equations which account for
all the realistic faiure and restoration processes. The actud application of these
techniques, however, is not extensive. This is rnainfy because of the lack of appropriate
data and the fact that distribution outages have very localized eEects.
Analysis of customer fdure statistics shows that a major part of the service
interruptions experienced by an individual customer is due to faiures in the distribution

system, which clearly points out the need to irnprove the reliability of this area.
Distriution reliability applications are steadily inmeashg with the collection of better
data on component m u r e rates and custorner interruption costs. These applications

allow planners to incorporate reliability cost/worth concepts in system design and in the
cost justification of operation and maintenance policies. Advanced work is also being
conducted oi; the collection of cost of customer interruption data and the evaluation of
the effects of transmission systems on overall customer reliability.
The primary indices in HL III analysis are the expected frequency of failwe, the
average duration of filure and the annual unavailability (or outage time) of the load
points. In order to give a complete representation of the system behaviour and response,
additional indices are usudy required. The most commonly used additional indices at HL
III are as follows [2].
11
System average interruption fiequency index, SAFI
Systern average intmption duration index, SMDI
Customer average interruption fiequency index, CAIFI

4
Custorcer average intemption duration index, CAIDI
Average savice availability index, ASAI

Energy not supplied index, ENS
4
Average energy not supplied, AENS
Average customer curtaiIment index, ACCI
Cosrnenefit Assessrnent
Economics plays a major role in the application of reliabiIity concepts and the
attainment of an acceptable level of reliability- Reiiability is not fiee, but poor reliabity
of electric power supply usudy costs much more than good reliability. It is therefore
important to detemiine the optimal reliability level at which the reliability investment
achieves the best results in reducing the customer damage costs due to power supply
intemiptions. This optimal reliability level concept cm be lIustrated as shown in Fig. 1.6.
The reliability investment cost shown in Fig. 1.6 generdy increases as consumers
are provided with higher reliability. On the O ther hand, the consumer costs associated
Investment cost
System Reliability
Fig. 1.6. Investment, darnage and total cost as a function of system reliability
12
with power supply interruptions wiU decrease as the reliability increases. The total cost
to society will therefore be the sum of these two individual costs. This to ta1 cost exhibits
a mUiimu111,at which an optimum or target level of reliabilty is achieved.

One aspect of reliability costhenefit malysis is to develop techniques which can
appropriately evaluate the costs of the various system planning alternatives that are
associated with the dif3erent reliability levels. These planning alternatives include
diffkrent reinforcanent schemes and improvements in maintenance and operating
policies.
An important requirement in reliability cost/benefit andysis is the ability to
quantitatively evaluate the customer damage costs due to supply interruptions. It is

important to note that the customer damage costs due to supply intemiptions include
both direct and indirect components. The assessmect of the indirect costs is usually a
difncult task as many non-technical factors and the uncertainties are involved. There
have been many studies of interruption or outage costs [45-491- The commonly used
method is to derive a composite customer damage function (CCDF) fiom surveys to
individual customers and to calculate the expected total cost (ECOST) of power supply
interruptions to the customers. It is also important to note that the customer damage
costs vary with societal development and increasing reliance on electncity.
The market cornpetition due to utility deregulation at the present t h e has forced
many electric utilities to reconsider their strategies. Most have reexamined capital
investments, on the theory that there is no point investing fnds that may not be
recovered fiom customers within some reasonable time in the fture. Reliabity
costhenefit concepts and techniques are of great importance in this situation [50-551.
1.4
Deregulation Impacts
The electric power system industry has been traditiody organized and operated as
a regulated monopoly. Traditional electric power utilities own and operate all three
functional zones of the power system and therefore control all aspects of the system
planning, design and operation. The power system industry is now undergoing
considerable change throughout the world due to the forces of deregulation,
technological revo lution and evolving customer expectations [56-601.The intent of the
change or restnicturing is to push the electric power systern mdustry into competitive
markets in order to mprove cost effectiveness and to improve customer service and
satisfaction,
There are myriads of ways to restructure the power system supply industry. In the
new deregulated and competitive environment, the three functional mnes of a power
system will not be controlled by single verticdy integrated utilities, but will be controlled
independently by different entities. This is shown in Fig. 1.7. Despite the separation in
control for the three functional zones, an electric power system is a total energy system
in which generation and consurnption must rernain continuously and instantaneously in

balance. The GENCOs, TRANSCOs and DISCOs, while pursuing their own interests,
must work CO-operativelyto provide cost effective and a reliable high quaty electric
power supply. Great varieties exist concemuig faccilities ownership, systern operation and
system development in the three functional zones. While the details of restmcturing are
diffrent in different jurisdictions, there are common features in these restructuring
activities. A prominent common feature is to provide undiscriminated open access to
r-l
DISCOs
Fig. 1-7. Unbundled structure
essential transmission Gicilities. The comrnon features of deregulation in North Amena

are as follows:
0
Cornpetitive market for electric generation,
Independent System Operator (ISO) controls transmission,
No change in distriiution fianchises, and
Customer choices of electricity providers.
The deregulation of the power system industry will also change the environment
associated with system reliability evaluation activities. New reliability criteria and
analytical tools will be required, while some of the traditional criteria may no longer be
appropnate in the new environment. The traditional reliability criteria based on
deterministic considerations will become increasingly dScult to apply as the traditional
utility functions are unbundled. Quantitative probabilistic reliability evaluation techniques
should be extensively utlized in the new competitive environment and will become
important tools in many aspects of power system operation and development in order to
irnprove
CO st
effectiveness and competitiveness in the market. Conventional generation
expansion planning based on both determinitic criteria and probabilistic methods may
disappear or entirely change as the generating stations will be built when and where
investors decide and wiu be controlled by many diffrent participants. n i e various
l
,
however, still be
probabilistic reliability techniques in generating capacity evaluation d
ver-important, but will be used in a different way in the new restructurecl environment.
In the distribution functional zone, the existing aiteria and techniques for probabilistic
reliability evaluation will remain and be more actively utilized in the new environment.
Reliability evaluation applied strictly to the transmission fnctional zone may
decrease, while composite generation and transmission syst ern reliability evaluation will
increase in order to recognize the integration of the generation and transmission systems.
The ISO is a key element in the effective operation of an electric power system in the
new competitive environment. The primary fiction of the ISO is to ensure that the
composite or bulk electric power system is operating in both a safe and cost effective
mariner. Probabilistic reliability evaluation of composite power systems will play an

important role in the restnictured competitive environment of electnc power supply.
Research Objectives
1.5
This thesis is concemed with the adequacy evaluation of composite power systems
using analytical rnethods. A major dinicuky in the adequacy evaluation of composite

power systems using analytical methods is the long computation times required to
investigate the extrernely large number of possible system outage events in a practical
composite system. Only the credible system states are usually investigated, where the
credi'ble system states are those that have sigmficant contniution to the adequacy indices
and are u d y detennined by considering outages up to a certain level defined in ternis
of the number of sirnultaneous outages. The computation t h e inmeases rapidly with
increase in the system size and the d e h e d system outage levels. The adequacy indices
obtained can ofien be inaccurate or uncertain due to iimiting the investigated system
states.
Computation times can however be significantly reduced when the unchanging
portion of a system c m be replaced by a reduced equivalent model. These reduced
models can be designated as reliability or adequacy equivalents. They c m prove very
usefiil in the evaluation of large systems where sensitivity studies are to be performed on
a portion of the system or when the system is to be interconnected to a M e r system
which is to be studied in detail. These situations arise quite Eequently Ki power system
applications. Adequacy equivalent concepts can also have many other applications in
adequacy evaluation of composite power systems.
The primary objective of the research was to investigate and develop techniques for
the adequacy evaluation of large composite power systems in order to provide improved
adequacy indices with feasible or acceptable reqired computation times. A major
activity in the research was the investigation of the applications of adequacy equivalent
concepts in composite system evaluation in order to achieve the primary research
objective. Previous research work on adequacy equivaent techniques has been mainly
conducted by the Power System Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan [6 1-
701. The research in this thesis is based on and extends the previous research work.
Specincally, the following fou. major research objectives have been studied and are
detailed in the thesis.
Investigate the possible techniques which cm improve the accuracy of the
adequacy indices, provide error estimation of the obtained indices, and reduce
the required computation times.
0
Develop the techniques and investigate the effects of using different solution
techniques in composite system adequacy evaluation using the quivalent
approach.
Investigate various applications of the equivaient concepts and their effects in
adequacy evaluation of large composite power systems.
* Investigate the techniques for reliability cost/benefit analysis and the pertinent
factors in the costhenefit analysis when the adequacy equivalent approach is
used.
1.6
Outline of this Thesis

This introductory chapter provides the philo sophy and basic concepts of reliability
evaluation in general and particularly for eiectric power systems. The concepts and the
indices in the adequacy evaluation of power systems at the three hierarchical levels
together with the general framework of reliability costhenefit assessment are bnefly
described. The impacts of power systern utility deregulation on reliability evaluation
activities and the research objectives of the thesis are also descriied in this chapter.
In Chapter 2, the fundamental concepts, techniques and the basic procedure of

adequacy evaluation in composite power systems are descriied in detail. Many of these
concepts are applicable to both the analytical approach and the Monte Carlo simulation
approach. Three advanced algorithms are developed and illustrated in Chapter 3. These
advanced algorithms can generally provide improved adequacy indices without
considerabIy increasing the required computation times and they can be effectively
utilized in the adequacy equivalent.techniques Uustrated in the thesis. System studies
using two reliabity test systerns designatecl as the Roy Billinton Test System W T S )
[7 11 and the IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) [72,73] are iuustrated in Chapter
4. These studies use the basic evaluation techniques and the advanced algonthms
developed in Chapters 2 and 3. The studies provide furdier insight into the concepts,
techniques, adequacy indices and the new advanced algorithms presented in Chapters 2
and 3.
Chapter 5 provides a complete description of the adequacy equivalent concepts,
techniques and applications. System studies on an interconneted two-area RBTS and an
interconnected two-area EEE-RTS using the adequacy quivalent techniques are
provided in Chapter 6. The effects of various fctors in the composite systern adequacy
evaluation using the equivalent techniques are investigated and iuustrated h Chapters 5
and 6 . The major use of the adequacy equivalent techniques is to establish an equivalent
for the unchanged portion of a composite system and to use this equivalent in composite
system analysis in which the required computation tirnes are effectively reduced. The
equivalent techniques cm also be used to represent common cause outages and station
originated events by equivalents and to effectively investigate the effects of these
complicated events. This application of equivalent techniques is also illustrated in
Chapters 5 and 6 .
Costhenefit analysis of composite power systems is becorning an essential factor in
the detemimation of the system reinforcement and expansion projects, particularly in the
e l e c ~ cutility dereplation and market cornpetition environment. The concepts and
techniques for
CO sthenefit
malysis of composite po wer systems, combined with the
equivalent techniques are descnbed in Chapter 7. System studies on both one and two
area RBTS and IEEE-RTS which consider the cost related indices in different situations
and investigate the effects of various factors on the variation of the indices when using
the equivalent techniques are also illustrated in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 provides the
surmnary and conclusions of this research.
Basic Concepts and Evaluation Techniques

2.1
Introduction
A primary objective in adequacy evaluation of composite generation and
transmission systems is to calculate a set of adequacy indices for the o v e r d system and
for the load points distnbuted throughout the system. These indices indicate the
composite system adequacy fiom different points of view. The indices provide important
numerical input in the identification of the system weaknesses, in the cornparison of
alternative system designs or reinforcement schemes and in the justification of new
expansion plans.
The requirement of large computation times is a c o r n o n problem in composite
power system adequacy evaluation when using either an analytical technique or a Monte
Car10 simulation approach. This is d
y because of the large size associated with a
practical composite system and the very large nurnber of possible systern states due to
component outages. An analytical approach usually requires less computation time than a
simulation approach and is able to provide accurate adequacy indices, when mitable
models and techniques are developed. The simulation approach however can be used to
provide approximate estimates of the adequacy indices and their standard deviations.
This chapter provides a description of the theoretical foundation, the basic concepts
and the practical evaluation techniques for composite generation and transmission system
adequacy evaluation using the andytical approach Many of these concepts are
&O
effective in the simulation approach as the difference between the analytical and
simulation approaches is mainly in the process of generating the sytern states, which is
one aspect of composite system assessment.
2.2
State Space Technique

The state space technique cm be generally used for a wide range of engineering
system reliability assessments. The technique is based on the mathematical theory of

Markov processes. A process that is govemed by probabilistic laws is usually referred to
as a stochastic process. A Markov process is a specinc stochastic process and is
characterized by a lack of memory, that is, a system state is independent of all past states
except the immediately preceding one. A Markov process is therefore a process in which
the fture random behaviour of a w
e
r
n only depends on where it is at the present, not
on where it has been in the past or how t arrived at its present position. A stochastic
process can also be designated as stationary or non-stationary. A stationary process is a
process in which the system random behaviour in a k e d time interval is the same at all
times in the past and fiiture regardless of the time being considered. The state space
technique is applied to stationary Markov processes.
The two features of lack of memory and being stationary c m be satisfied in those
systerns whose random behaviours can be desmbed by probability distn'butions that are
characterked by constant transition rates, such as Poisson and exponential distributions.
Power systems and many other engineering systems can often be descnbed as having
discrete system states with constant transition rates between them; their random
behaviours are therefore stationary Markov processes. The state space technique using
state space visualization and basic Markov solution concepts is generally applicable to a
wide range of electric power system reliability problems and other engineering systems
whose random behaviours can be descned by stationary Markov processes [3].
A power system state space diagram provides the discrete or identifiable states in
which the system and its components can reside, and the transition rates between the
states. The establishment of a system state space mode1 is the &st step in using the state
space technique. AU the relevant system states and the known transitions between the
states should be included in a specifc system reliability malysis. The state space diagram
of a single component system is shown in Fig. 2.1, Ui which the system can reside in
Fig. 2.1. A single component two-state state space diagram
either state 1 (the up or operating state) or state 2 (the down or faied state). The
transition rates between the two states are the component fidure rate h and repair rate p,
which are considerd to be constant values.
In some situations, a single component may be best represented by more than two
states. A unit in a nin-of-the-river hydro plant cm be a simple example of this situation,
in which the river flow rate detemines the unit output capacity. The unit is then
represented as a d t i - s t a t e unit in which the capacity states correspond to the river flow
rates. Fig. 2.2 shows the state space diagram of a single component represented by three
states.
For a two-cornponent system, there are four possible states in which the system can
exist, if component independence is assumed and each component is represented by a
two-state mode1 The state space diagram of the two-component system is s h o w in Fig.
Fig. 2.2. A single component three-state Gate space diagram
Fig. 2.3. A two-cornponent system state space diagram
2.3, in which hl, pl, h2 and p2 are the Mure and repair rates of components 1 and 2
respectively. It should be noted that there c m be many diffrent state space diagrams for
a two-component systern. Fig. 2.3 is one of the sirnplest. The state space rnay contain
more than four states when, for instance, each or both components are represented by
more than two states.
If the two components are not independent of each other, as is the situation of two
transmission h e s on a common tower, then the two components may fail at the same
time due to filure of the tower. This lcind of fiiilure is usudy refmed to as a common
cause or common mode M u r e . In Zn situation, states 1 and 4 in Fig. 2.3 should have
direct transitions to represent the possibility of common cause Mures and repairs. Fig.
2.4 shows two typical common cause fidure models. In Fig. 2.4 (a), the two components
on outage c m be repaired and returned to service separately or simultaneously (if pI2
>O). In Fig. 2.4 @), the two components out of service due to a common cause filure
are repaired and rehinied to seMce simultaneously.
The creation of a state space diagram translates a physical problem into a
mathematical model which requires engineeringjudgment and a thorough understanding
of the physical and logical operation of the system. The importance of engineering
I Down
2 UP
Ca)
5 1
1 Down
2 Dom
1 UP
2 Down
(b)
Fig. 2.4. State space diagams including common cause filures
judgernent and a thorough understanding of the systern physicai and logical operation
cannot be overemphasized in this phase of the problem solution. A state space diagram
indudes all the possible system states, the way in which these states comUI1icate and
the transition rate values. There are no basic restrictions on the number of states or the
type and number o f transitions that can be included.
Mer establishing an appropriate state space diagram for the system under
consideration, a corresponding m i t i o n rate matrix (or stochastic transition rate matmc)
can be obtaled. A set of mathematical equations for the system state probabities can be
developed. The general transition rate matrix [a],
for a state space diagram with n states,
is defineci as follows.
where
qj = Transition rate fiom state i to state j, with i ;tj
qi= Ca,is the total depamire rate fiom state i

j ~ i
The set of mathematical equations for the system state probabilities is
where
psi(t) is the probability of the system state si at t h e t, with i= 1, 2, ...,n
[a] is the transition rate matrix.

Equation (2.2) provides the time dependent system date probabilities when an initial
condition is given. Power system adequacy evaluation is, however, n o d y concemed
with the limiting or steady state probabilities of the system states and the eequencies of
encountering the states. The steady state probabilities are constant values, whose
derivatives with respect to time are zero. Equation (2.2) therefore has the following form
when the steady state probabilities of the system states are calculated.
where
psi is the steady state probability of the srjtem state si, with i=l, 2, ..., n.
The caiculation of system steady state probabilities usually requires that the system
be ergodic, that is, there is no absorbing state or every state has at least one possible
leaving transition. If the system is not ergodic, then once an absorbing state is
encountered, the system stays in that state forever. The frequency of encountering a
systern state is defned as,
where
Gi
is the fiequency of encountering state si,
qi is the total departme rate fiom state si.

The stochastic transition rate matrix for the state space diagram shown in Fig. 2.1
can be written using Equation (2.1) as foiIows.
The steady state probability equations can be writen using Equation (2.3) as:
Psi +Pr2
=1
The eequencies of encountering the two states c m be smiply obtained using

Equation (2.4) and are:
Equation (2.5) gives the two state probabilities, or more commonly the availability
and unavailability, of a single component system when it is represented by a two state

model. This equation is widely used in the adequacy analysis of power sn;t-.
Similarly, the stochastic transition rate matrix for the state space diagram shown in
Fig. 2.3 is
The equations for the four state probabilities are therefore:
The above equations can be solved using any linear equation solution technique
such as Gauss Elimination, or by using direct analytical methods. The state probabilities
are as follows:
where
pi = k/(i/(hi+pi)
and qi = &/(&+p-i), i=1,2, are the availability and unavailability
of component i respectively, as dehed in Equation (2.5).
Equation (2.6) shows that the state probabilities can be obtained directly fiom the
single component system availability and unavdablity. This is due to the assumption
that the components are independait in this example. This is consistent with basic
probability theory and can apply to a system with any number of components given that
the components are independent. If the independent condition is aot satisfied, such as
common cause outage situations, Equation (2.3) should be used.
The fkequencies of encounterhg the four states can be simply calculated using
Equation (2.4) and are
2.3
Basic Procedure and Concepts

The basic procedure for composite system adequacy evaluation c:an be generally
classined into the three steps of system state (or outage state) enurneration, system state
analysis and formation of adequacy indices as illustrated in Fig. 2.5. Adequacy indices
are obtained after ail the d e h e d system outage states have been analyzed [2,34,6 11.
Analysis
Adequacy Indices
Formation
MoreZ
States+ ( z q
l Y e s
Fig. 2.5. Basic analytical procedure
System state enumeration
The number of possible system states ni a practical composite power system can be
extremely large. Equation (2.3) camiot be used directly in the analysis. Component
independence is normally assumed in adequacy evaluation of composite systems. This
simplifies the initial problems of state space establishment and enables the system state
probabilities to be calculated in the simple f o m given in Equation (2.6). Dependent
events such as cornmon cause and station originated faiures [74-761are usually analyzed
separately using Equation (2.3) and incorporated into the independent cornponent system
mode1 if required.
The following equations. asniming component independence, can be used to

calculate the system state probabrlities and the system state repair and fdure rates
where
U is the set of &service components in state si,
D is the set of out-ofkenrice components in state si,

p, and hk are the availability and fdure rate of cornponent k respectively,
q, and
are the unavailablity and repair rate of component m respectively,
psi and Asi are designated as the system state repair and M u r e rates respectively.
The system state fiequency and duration indices are dependent upon the state
probability and the state repair and M u r e rates. They are obtained as follows,
A three-component system is used in Fig. 2.6 to illustrate system outage state
enmeration in the analytical approach to composite power system adequacy evaluation.

Each component of the example system is represented by a two-state model, i.e., the
component can be either in the normal state or the fidure state. The total number of
systern states, assuming component independence, is therefore 23 = 8. Fig. 2.6 is not a
complete state space diagram as it does not explicitly include all the transitions. It
contains, however, all the mfonnation required for adequacy analysis.
The system states in Fig. 2.6 are enumerated in a fonn of a tree graph. State 1 (S l)
is the root of the tree, which is the state with all components in service. This state is in
outage level O, as there are no failed components in this state. States 2, 6 and 8, i-e. S2,
S6 and Sg are the children of S1, and are in outage level 1, as there is exacay one
component out of service in each of these system states. The nurnber shown in each link
indicates the down or faied component. In level2, there are states S3, S5 and S7. State
S, is in level3.
The enumeration of the system outage states can be width-first or depth-kst.

Width-first enumeration determines all the system states in level 1 beginning f5om the
?
Fig. 2.6. State enurnerationofthe three-component system
state in level O, then d the system states in level 2, level 3 and so on. Depth-first
enumeration determines the system states f h m up to down and fom the left to the nght
side. The sequence of the system states shown in Fig. 2.6 is the result of depth-nrst
enumeration. Both the two enumeration approaches have found their own particular
appIications, dthough there is no diffaence between the two approaches in many
applications. The depth-frst enumeration approach is preferred when the calculation
results of a M e r system state are used as the initial values for the calculation of its
children systern states in order to d u c e the required computation time. The width-ht
enumeration method is preferred when the wall between the system nomial states and the
system Mure states needs to be recognized in order to obtain an improved caiculation of

the fdure fiequency and duration indices [77]or when the condition of a system state
needs to be determined not only by the performance of itselfbut also by the performance
of its children system states. These concepts are amplined in the f o l l o v ~ gdiscussions.
In a general situation of a system with n independent components in which each

component is represented by a two-state model, the state space diagram takes the f o m
shown in Fig. 2.7. The total number of system states in the diagram is 2'.
Fig. 2.7. State space diagram of a power system with n independent components
System state analpis
The system state enurneration becomes relatively simple in the adequacy evaluation
of a composite power systern in which the components are assumed to be independent.
The major dBculty is that the number of po ssible systern states can be extrmely large in
3
practical composite power system. It is therefore not feasible or even possible to
analyze or investigate all the system states in a composite system adequacy analysis. In
practice, only signincant or credible system states are investigated. The credibi1iry rnay
vary in accordance with the requirement of a spec5c system adequacy analysis, and the
available computing facilities and techniques.
The most direct way of selecting system states is to simply speciQ the system state
levels up to certain values, such as considering those system states with levek less than
or equal to four. The system state probabilities generally decrease as the state level
increases. It is therefore reasonable to curtail the credble systern state list by not
considering the high Ievel events which normally have lower and negligible probabilities
of existence. The minimum state level selection approach can be applied together with
further neglecting those system states which have a probability of occurrence less than a
certain minimum value, such as less than 1O-*.
There are many other techniques for systern state selection and ranking. The basic
idea is to select and rank the systern states using a fast approximate method and then
investigate the ranked outage contingencies in detail using a more complicated but more
accurate method [35,36]. The investigation of the ranked system states starts with the
most severe one and proceeds by analyzhg progressively less severe system states until
the state that does not cause any system problems are encountered. The purpose of
system state ranking is also to reduce the required computation times, as only the systern
states that cause systern problems are investigated in detail using the system state ranking
technique.
Credible systern state selection may depend on the intent behind a system adequacy
evaluation. The precision requHements can be different fkom one study to another. In the
case of cornparhg alternative system planning schemes, for instance, the credible system
state list can be relatively short as in this situation only relative accuracy is required.
It is important to have a clear understanding of what causes a system problern and
what is the problern in a systern adequacy evaluation. Generally, a composite power

system is considerd to have problems or be M e d if the service zt the load buses is
intemipted or the quality of supply becornes unacceptable. Such a condition arises if any
of the foIlowing events occur [8]:

1. there is not enough generation avdable in the system to meet the load demand,
2. the continuity of supply to a load point is intemipted,
3. transmission lines are overloaded, and

4. bus voltages are outside tolerance.
A system problem due to any of the above conditions does not generdy mean a
collape of the entire power systern. It could occur, however, by an overload condition
developing into a sequence of cascading events and tinally resultuig in a break-up of the
systern. This situation fdls into the domain of security assessment. In most cases,
however, the system problems or failures are corrected by remedial actions, such a s
switching, generation rescheduling or load shedding. The system outage states that cause
load shedding and voltage violation after taking all the appropnate corrective actions
contribute to the adequacy indices.
The network solution techniques used for the systern state investigation are the
power system steady-date analysis tools of network fiow and a.c.1d.c. load flow
methods. The network flow and d.c. load fiow approaches do not include the criterion of
bus voltage violations but are relatively fst. The a.c. load flow approach provides
compfete information on system performance including voltage violations and associated

reactive power adjustment. The a.c. load fiow method, however, requires large
computation times. The network iow method requires the smallest computation times
but provides the least accurate evaluation of the system performance. The d.c. load flow
-
approach provides satisfactorily accurate adequacy indices with acceptable computation
times, and is widely used in composite system adequacy evahiation when the effect of
voltage violatioris is not included in the anaiysis.
The network solution techniques, the remedial actions, the load curtailment po licies
and the load representations in the systern state analysis are essential fktors in forming
and explaining the adequacy indices of a composite power system. They can take a wide
range of Werent forms, which is descnibed in detail Iater.
Ad-uacy indices formation
Load curtailment is a major concem in the adequacy analysis of each systern state.
Voltage violations can be included in the system state analysis if the a.c. load flow
technique is us&. Mer each system state analysis, the possible load curtailments or
voltage violations at the system load buses or for the whole system are obtained, and the
contributions of the system state to the various adequacy indices c m be calculated and
recorded. When all the d e k e d system States have been examineci, the final adequacy
indices at each load bus and for the whole system are created. A complete description of
the basic-adequacyindices is given in Section 2.8.
2.4
Network Solution Techniques

Network flow and load flow are conceptually dinerent approaches for power
network steady-state analysis. The network flow approach was developed for solving the
maximum flow problem in the discipline of network flows. The maximum flow problem
is stated as what is the maximum flow that c m be sent fiom a source node to a s i .node
without exceeding the capacity of any arc in a capacitated network. The network flow
approach can be used in an electric power system to find the maximum electric power,
which can be supplied from the generating stations (source) to the load centers (sink)
w nsidering the capacity restrictions of the source generators and the transmission lines.
The network flow approach provides approxirnate solutions for electric power network
problems as the electric power fiows are not simple flows which are restncted only to the
system component capacities. Electric power flows follow both KirchhoEs cunent and
voltage Iaws. The network flow approach provides fast and often good approximate
solutions for many power network problems.
In using the network flow approach, if the obtained maximum available capacity at a
load bus is greater than or equal to the load dernand at that bus, then the system does not
have any problems at this bus. I$ however, the maximum available capacity at a load bus
is less than the load demand, then load curtailment is necessary. This load curtailment
thus contributes to the adequac*~
indices.
The load flow approach has been extensively studied and applied in electric pow-er
systems. A.c. load flow techniques provide complete information on system steady-state
performance when constant system loads and specifk generation schedules are applied to
a specific system state. There are various a.c. load flow techniques available for power
system steady-state analysis. The fst decoupleci a.c. load flow technique is usually used
in the adequacy evaluation of composite power systems due to its relafively low
computation t h e . When only a system active power balance is concemed, the fast
decoupled a.c. load fiow technique can be reduced to becorning a d-c. load flow
technique. This d.c. load flow technique is widely used in composite system adequacy
analysis in which the effect of the system reactive power and voltage violations is not
included. A description of the basic network flow concepts, the ft decoupled a.c. load
flow technique and the d.c. Ioad flow technique is given in the followingNetwork flow technique
A given power network G cm be expressed as G=[B;L], where B represents a set of
buses (or nodes) and L represents a set of links (or arcs). A link (i, j)
L is directed
fiom bus i to bus j and is designated with a maximum load carrying capacity Cij.
Consider a simple situation that a network contains only one source (generation) bus s
and one sink (load) bus t. Assume T is a load flow f?om s to t and xij is a flow on link (i,
j). The rnaximum flow problem of the network can be expressed mathematically as
follows.
subject to
xij 4 Cij
for all (i.,

J') E L
The above constraints state that the net flow out of the bus s is z, the net flow out of
bus t is -z, whereas the net flow out of any intermediate bus is zero and that the flow in a
link is restricted by the maximm permissible capacity. The maximum flow problem is to
find the maximum load flow f?om the generation center to the load center subject to the
above two constraints.

A practical power network usually contains more than one source (generation) bus
and more than one sink (load) bus. The problem remains that of a single source bus and a
single sink bus by creating an imaginary super source bus and an imaginary super sink
bus. The super source bus is connected to all the real source buses with links where the
maximum capacity of each link is equal to the corresponding maximum power supply of
the source bus. The maximum power supply of the super source bus is the sum of the
maximum supplies of all the real source buses. The super load bus comects all the real
load buses with links where the maximum capacity of each link is equal to the
corresponding maximum load.
The links or transmission lines in a practical power network are usually undirected
(bi-directional) instead of directed (midirectional). This problem can be solved by
considering an undirected Luik as two equivalent directed hes, as illustrateci in Fig. 2.8.
Fig. 2.8. Equivalent conversion
The solution of the maximum network flow problem is based on the Ford-Fulkerson
pRnciple 178-801. The two processes used to obtan the solution of a Ilzaximurn flow
problem are as follows.
Process 1: L a b e h ~routine: This is used to find a flow augmenting path f?om the
source bus to the sik bus. Starting f?om the source bus, a bus j can be labeled if a
positive flow can be sent fiom s to j. In general, fkom any bus i bus j can be labeled, if
one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. The link connecting the buses i and j is a fonvard link and the flow in link (Q) is
less than its capacity;
2. The link connecting i and j is a backward link,and the flow in link (j,i) is greater
than zero.
This labehg routine is continued until the sink bus is labeled, resulting in a flow
augmenting path.
Process II: Max. fiow algorithm The flow augmenting path is retraced with the help
of the labels on the buses and the maximal flow 6 that can be sent in the path is
computed. The fIow on all the forward links in the path is increased by F and the flow on
all the backward
links in the path is decreased by 6. The procedure is repeated by finding
another flow augmenting path eom s to t using the labeling routine. The algorithm
terminates when no flow augmentmg path c a . be found, at which t h e the maximal flow
possible fkom s to t is obtained.
A.c. load flow techniaue
The fast decoupled load flow technique is widely used for the systern state analysis
in adequacy evaluation of composite power systems. The fst decoupled load flow
formula can be derived nom the polar form of the Newton-Raphson expression by
considering two practical simpliiications [81,821.
Assume that a power network has m PQ (real and reactive powers) buses, n PV
(real power and voltage) buses and one dack bus. The total bus number for the system is
therefore m+ntl. The polar form power mismatch equation is as foilows:
M i = Pi- Pig=Vi
C V j ( G u ~ ~ 6 g + B i j ~ i -Pig=O
~6ij)
&ail buses
(i E dl PQ and PV buses)
AQi=Qi-Qk=Vi
~Vj(Gu~i~6ij-Bij~~~6ij)-Qig=0
j ~ a l buses
l
(i E dl PQ buses)
where
Pi and Qi are the calcdated real and reactive power injections at bus i,
Pig and Qi,are the given real and reactive power injections at bus i,
Vi or Vjis the voltage magnitude of bus i or j respectively,
Gij and Bij are the real and imaginary parts of the (ij) element in bus adminance
matn'x respectively, and
6, = 4 - 6j is the difference between the voltage phase angles at buses i and j.

The iterative Newton-Rphson method is a general approach for solving non-linear
equations such as Equation (2.9). The Newton-Raphson equation for (2.9) is as follows.
where
[AP] is a column matrix of the real power mismatches APi for the PQ and PV buses,
[AQ] is a column ma& of the reactive power mismatches AQi for the PQ buses,
[A&] iS a column matrk of voltage phase angle corrections
for the PQ and PV
buses,
[ A V N j is a column ma&
of voltage magnitude corrections divided by the
magnitudes AViNi for the P Q buses, and

[Ja], [Jb], [Jc] and [Jd] are submatrices of Jacobian matrix.
In a practical electnc power shjtem, the reactance of a tninsmission line is usually

much larger than the resistance. Thus the variation in real power is m a d y Bected by the
bus voltage angles and the variation in reactive power is mainly aEcted by the bus
voltage magnitudes. The Jacobian subrnatrices [Jb] and [Jc] are therefore quite small and
may be neglected. M e r this simpIifcation, Equation (2.10) is decoupled into two

equations as shown below.
Where
[Ja], = aA.Pi/aGj= Vi Vj . ( Gij sin tiij - Bij cos tiij ), while i # j
The coefficient matrices [Ja] and [Jd] are stiU variables in the iterative process at thk
stage. The second simplification is based on the fact that the following relations are valid
in a practical power system,
cos 5ij 1, Gij sin Gij Bij

;j=
and Qi Vi2 . BE .
Considering the above approximations, the elements of the Jacobian matrix can be
M e r simpiifed as:
- [JdIij = -Vi - V-J - B-- for the PV buses.
[JaI = -Vi V-J B.for the PQ and PV buses,

1.l'
tJ'
The final decoupled equations for the voltage magnitude and angle corrections can
now be written as:
where
[V.A6]
is the mlumn matrix of Vi-A& for all the PQ and PV buses,
[MN]
is the column matrix of APiNifor all the PQ and PV buses,
[AQW
is the column matrix of AQiNi for the P Q buses,
pl
is the miaglary part of the bus admittance rnatrix, i.e., the matrix of [Bij]
for all the PQ and PV buses, which is a constant matrix, and
P"1
is the imaginary part of the bus admittance matrix for the PQ buses and is
therefore a subset of Bq.
The
elements Bij cm be simpIy calculated using the following equation,
where
k represents the ground or a bus that is directly connected with bus i,
bij is the susceptance of the transmission h e s between buses i and j.
Equation (2.12) indicates that the matrices [B1and [B'q contain the network
susceptance and are reaL, sparse and constant. They need be trimgdated only once at the
beginning of the iterative process, which is the reason that the fast decoupled technique
provides the fast solutions.
It is worth noting that the simplifications for obtainmg the fst decoupled equations
are concerned only with the algorithm. The convergence condition for a solution does
not change. The solution precision is therefore maintained while using the fast decoupled
load flow method.
The power mismatches [AP] and [AQI are first calculated based on given initial bus
voltage magnitudes and phase angles using Equation (2.9). The A6 and AV values can
then be calculated ushg Equation (2.11). The voltage magnitudes at the PQ buses and
the phase angles at both the PQ and PV buses are then mocMed as follows,
The power mismatches [AP]and [AQ] are calculated at these new values of the bus
voltage magnitudes and phase angles using Equation (2.9). Further modifiecl voltage
magnitudes and phase angles can be obtained ushg Equation (2.1 1) again. The process is
repeated and the h a l solution attained when the power mismatches are less than a
speded tolerance.
D.c. load flow technique
The d.c. load low technique is acnidy a subset of the h t decoupled a.c. load flow
technique. The d-c. load flow technique is only concerned with the system real power
balance and the bus voltage magnitudes are assumed to be constant at 1 PX.. From
Equation (2.9), the real power mismatch equation, when the bus voltage magnitudes are
constant at 1 p.u., is written as follows:
*=Pi-Pig=
~ ( G ~ C O S ~ ~ ~ + B =
~ O~ S ~ ~ ~ , ) - P ~ ~
jEall buses
(i E all buses except the slack bus)
From Equation (2.1 1), the equation for the phase angle corrections is simply:
[B'I [A61 = [NI

where p']is dehed by Equation (2.12).
The real power mismatches CAP] are f i t calculated based on @en initial phase
angles using Equation (2.13). The A6 values c m then be calculated using Equation
(2.14). The phase angles are modified as follows,
[61n,
=1~1,1,
+CA61
The power mismatches [AP]are calculated at these new values of the phase angles
using Equation (2.13). Further modified angles can be obtained using Equation (2.14)
40
again. The process is repeated and the final solution attahed when the real power
mismatches are less than a specified tolerance.
2.5
Remedial Actions
M e n a power system is in the level O state, m which ali components are in service,
the generators are scheduled to meet the systern loads and transmission line losses in
accordance with the system balance equations given in Equation (2.9). This system state
is usually taken as a base.
AU other system States arise h m the base state due to various
component failures. Remedial or corrective actions are n o d y taken in practice in

response to the system component faiures.
In the case of generating unit fidures, the rernaining units in the system are
rescheduled to meet the generation deficiency due to the removal of the failed generating
units. If the capacity reserve at a bus that has generating units on outage is larger or
equal to the removed capacity at this bus, then this reserve can compensate for the
generating capacity problem at this bus. If not, generating capacity reserves at other
buses are required to compensate for the loss. There are rnany variations in how the
system generation reserve c m be used to meet the loss of n o d y scheduled generating
capacity due to unit failures. An ofien used policy, which is also applied in this thesis, is
that i f a bus reserve is greater or equd to the g e n d o n loss at the bus, then the reserve
at that bus is only applied, and if a bus reserve is l a s than the required generation, the
reserves at all other generation buses will be applied proportionally to meet the
requirement. Load curtailment wiU occur, ho wever, if the tota1 system generation is less
than the total system load. The concepts of load curtailment policies are desmbed in
Section 2.6.
Generating capacity can &O be lost due to transmission line outages in which one
or more generation buses are isolated. In this case, system amlysis is conducted on the
modined s y s t e a The generation reserves in the remahhg system are applied
proportionally to relieve the system generation deficiency. The isolated buses are treated
separately. Adequacy indices for the isolated load buses are calculated depending upon
the available generation and the ioad c o ~ e c t e dat each of these buses. If transmission
luie outages split a system into several parts, the adequacy of each subsystem is
evaluated. For the purpose of simplicity3an approxmiate method s used in the evaluation
of each subsystem in the case of a split network. In this approach, if the total generation
is greater or equd to the total load in a subsystem, there will be no load curtainent at
a&
otherwise, load curtailment will occur proportionally at all the load buses in the
subsystem.
Transmission line overloads can happen due to both generating unit and
transmission line outages. They can be alleviated by both generation rescheduling and
load shedding at appropriate buses. The total generating capacity in any generation bus
should not be larger than the total carrying capacity of the transmission lines connected
to the bus. Generally, generation at the sending end of an overloaded transmission lie
should decrease, while generation at buses with small relative voltage angles should
increase. A heuristic approach, based on rhe basic concept, can be applied to adjust
generation in order to alleviate transmission Iine overloads. Load shedding can be
conducted at the receiving end of the overload transmission line or at some other desired
locations. The load curtailment policy for alleviating transmission h e overloads used in
this thesis is desmied in Section 2.6.
Non-convergence may occur in system state operation analysis using a load flow
t ethnique, as the system States include extremely varied network topologies. Generation
rescheduling can be sometimes quite effective to d u c e the nimiber of non-convergent
cases. Ln those situations in which the load flow non-convergence cannot be remedied,
approximate techniques such as the network flow method can usually be used. Voltage
violations in a.c. load flow analysis are corrected heuristically by injecting reactive power
at the violated buses [64].
There are many complexities associated with incorporahg rernedial actions in the
system state analysis. The considered remedial action policies can be very different f?om
one electric power utizity to another and may lead to dBerent adequacy indices. It is
therefore very important to clearly understand what remedial actions and Ioad
curtailment policies are applied in the process of ystem state analysis, when considering
the obtained adequacy indices.
2.6
Load Curtailment Policies

Load curtailment resdts fi-om a system outage state in which the Ioad demand can
not be satisfied. Load curtailment policies consider both the location and the amount of a
load that must be curtailed in a system capacity deficiency situation. There are two main
factors associated with a load curtailment philosophy. The frst consideration is that the
importance of each bus load can be different. The second consideration is that the area of
load curtailment can possibly be varieci. In the fkst consideration, a usually used
approach in composite systen: adequacy d y s k is to classiS. the load at each bus into
two types, Le., Finn Load and Cwtailable Load. In this representation, the curtailable
load is relative less important than the rm load and is therefore curtailed frst when
necessary. This load representation is used in this thesis. Other classifications of an
eIectric load however exist and c m also be used.
In the second consideration, load curtaihent areas can be d e h e d by the concept of

load curtailment passes [64]. Load curtailment pass O covers those fded buses, which
include any bus whose filed generation capacity is greater than its reserve, or a bus that
loses input power flows due to a directly connected generation bus being isolated, or a
bus that is on the receiving end of an overloaded transmission line. Load curtailment p a s
1 covers a i l the above filed buses and a l l those buses that are one line away and
receiving power fiom the fded buses. Load curtailment pass 2 includes all the pass 1
buses and all those buses that are one line away and receiving power fiom the pass 1
buses. Similarly, load curtailment pass 3 contains al1.the pass 2 buses and all those buses
that are one line away and receiving power fkom pass 2 buses. Laad curtailment pass 3
can cover an extensive area in many composite power systems. In this thesis, if the pass
3 area is still not large enough for the required load curtailment, all the load buses that
receive power fiom the p a s 3 buses are used.
A load curtailment philosophy which restricts the load curtailment area as close to
the Mure locations a s possible and at the same time takes into account the relative
importance of each bus load can be and is applied in this thesis. In applying this load
curtailment phosophy, the specific load curtailment pass is dehed in the composite
system adequacy evaluation. If load curtailment pass 1, for instance, is deked for a
specSc system adequacy evaluation, the Ioad clrrtailment philosophy is as follows.
If the curtailable loads at pass O buses are large enough for a required load
curtailment, the loads at these buses are curtailed proportionally. Otherwise go
to step 2.
If the curtailable loads at p a s 1 buses are large enough for the rquired load
curtailment, the loads at these buses are curtailed proportionally. Othenvise go
to step 3.
If the curtailable loads at pass 1 buses and the fkm loads at p a s O are large
enough for the required load curtailment, all the curtailable loads at pass 1 buses
are curtailed and the fimi loads at pass O buses are curtailed proportionally. In
regard to the generation bus bloads, however, only the part which is larger
than the total bus generation should be curtailed. therwise go to step 4.
If the curtailable loads at pass 1 buses and the firm loads at pass 1 are large
enough for the required load c u r t h e n t , all the curtailable loads at pass 1 buses
are curtailed and the firm loads at pass 1 buses are curtded proportionally. In
the case of a generation bus &m load, only the part which is larger than the total
bus generation is curtailed. Otherwise go to step 5
Ifboth the curtailable and finn loads at pass 1 buses are not large enough for the
required load curtaihent, the curtailable loads at p a s 2 buses and the nmi loads
at pass 1 buses are included in the curtdment. If this is still not enough, both the
curtaiiable and finn loads at pass 2 buses wl be included for the curtaiiment.
This process will continue until the load curtailment area is large enough for the
rquired load curtai'hnent.
It is obvious in the @en
load curtailment philosophy that a load curtailment may
involve a larger area but less fkm load if the dehe load curtsilment pass inmeases.
There are many other possible Ioad curtailrnent policies. For example, it is possible to
curtail some less important loads which are far away fiom a generation center instead of
curtailing the loads close to the generation center in case of a system capacity deficiency
due to generating mit outages. Electric utilities may have their speciiic load curtdment
policies. It is worth noting that the load curtament poiicy used in a composite systan
adequacy evaluation can be a significant fctor in caiculating the load point adequacy
indices.
2.7
Load ModeIs
The simplest load model is to represent a load at a single fixed level over a given
perod. In many adequacy evaluations of composite power systems, the system loads are
assumed to be constant over a period of one year at the m u a l peak value. The adequacy
indices obtained using this constant load model are usualty refmed to as annualized
adequacy indices [2], as they do not take into account the achial load variations.
Annilalized indices c m be obtained with relatively little computational effort and they
c m be e E d v e in system adeqiiacy cornparisons of composite system reinforcement and
expansion scherne alternatives.

A practical power system load may be expressed more accurately by a multi-level
load model for a one year period. The adequacy indices based on this multi-level load
mode1 are referred to as annual adequacy indices. The adequacy indices can be fkst
obtained at the different constant load levels and the annual values can then be obtained
by weighting the indices in accordance with the load level probabilties. If the values of
an index, for instance, are xi, x2, ...,X, at the load levels 11, 12, ... , 1, respectively and
the occurrence probabilities of these load levels are pl, pz,
..., Pn
respectively, the
annual value of the index can then be dculated as follows,
The most accurate multi-level power system load model is the annual hourly load
variation c w e in which 8760 levels represent the annual hourly peaks. When the actual
chronological houriy load variation is soaed in descending order, it is usually referred to
as hourly load duration curve (LDC). The IEEE-RTS load model, for an example, is
given by the weekly peak load in percent of annual peak, the daily peak load in percent
of weekly peak and the hourly peak load in percent of d d y peak. These data are shown
in Tables B-4, B-5,and B-6 in Appenduc B. A winter peaking system is adopted by
taking week 1 as the first week in January and Monday as the &st day of the year. Since
the mode1 provides only 364 daily peak loads in a year, it is assumed that the daily and
hourly peak loads on 31 December are the same as those on 1 January. The actual
chronological hourly load variation in one year can be cdculated kom the given data.
The LDC can then be created after the chronological hourly load variation is sorted in
descending order. The IEEE-RTS LDC is s h o w in Fig. 2.9 using 100 hourly load
points.
IEEE-RTS load duration curve
Fig. 2.9. The IEEE-RTShourly load duration c w e
The LDC is not normally used directly in a composite system adequacy evaluation
due to the extrerneIy large required cornputation t;mes. Instead, the LDC is usually
approximately represented by load rnodels which possess fewer steps. This approach is
inustrated in Fig. 2.10, in which a smipEed seven-step load model based on the IEEE-
RTS load duration curve is shown. The seven-step load model data considering an
m u a l peak of 2850 MW for the IEEE-RTSare shown in Table 2.1.

A correlation problem ofhm arises in wing the LDC or its simpifed stepped load
rnodels in composite system adequacy evaluation, as the loads at different load buses c m
Vary in different patterns. The Ioad at bus one staying at a specinc load level for
instance, does not mean that ail the other bus loads shodd be at the same level at the
Fig. 2.10. A seven-step load model bas& on the IEEE-RTSload duration c w e
Table 2.1. Seven-step load data for the IEEE-RTS
Load (MW)
Probaliilty
htion(Hr)
same time. An assimiption is therefore usually made in practice that the load changes
sunultaneously at alI load points. This assumption simplifies the calculation of the annual
adequacy indices for composite power systerns and is reasonable in a ystern containing
customers with similar consumption patterns.
Another possible load representation is to use the actual chronological hourly ioad
variation cuve W C ) . This load model does not su&
the same correlation problem
between the loads at differit load buses as does the load duration curve. In the
chonological HLVC, the bus loads at each hour have the same occurrence probability.
The chronological HLVC is not n o d y used directly as extremely large computation
times are required for systern state analysis. The mode1 can, however, be approxmiately
represented or simpEed based on a restricted number of tirne intervals. A chronological
monthly peak load model, for instance, has only 12 load levels. The chronological
weekly peak load model has 52 load levels.
Fig. 2.1 1 shows the IEEE-RTS chronological hourly load variation curve and the 12
monthly peak load representation. The occurrence probability for each monthly load is
1/12. The curve shown in Fig. 2.1 1 is drawn using 120 load points obtained f k m the
actual 8760 houriy load points in an evenly spaced bmmer. Some hourly peaks are
A twelve-level Ioad model based on the IEEE-RTS HLVC
The month
Fig. 2.1 1. A twelve-interval load model based on the IEEE-RTS

chronological hourly load variation
therefore missed. Fig. 2.1 1 is shown o d y for the purpose of UUSfration. It is obvious that
many other approximations of the chronological Ioads can be developed. Fig. 2.1 1 shows
one of the many representations. For instance, the perod load levels may be the mean
values of the period hourly loads, imtead of the period peak loads. This mean value
representation is however not recommended, as the loads above the mean values are
often crucial in th&
contri'bution to the adequacy indices. The time partitionhg may be
based on seasonai variations or by analysis of the specifc load variation patterns in a

studied area. The choice of the load representations as weii as the number of the time
periods depends upon the intention behind a speciflc composite system adequacy
analysis, the system size and the available computing facilities.
2.8
Basic Adequacy Indices

As stated previously, adequacy indices based on a single load level model over a
period of one year are designated as annualized values. A power system load can be
represented more accurately when a year is divded into small periods and the load is
assumed to be constant in each period. Adequacy indices can be easily obtained for each
period using the constant load modeL The actual annual adequacy indices can then be
obtained by weighting the period values with the occurrence probabilities of the period
load levels. Adequacy indices associated with specined constant load models form the
basis of composite system adequacy analysis. The adequacy indices provided in this
section are d e h e d in the form of annualized values. Annual adequacy indices can be
obtained using the given definitions and an appropriate multi-level load model.
There are two sets of adequacy indices used in composite system adequacy analysis.
These are the overall system indices and the individual bus (Ioad point) indices [2,37,3 81.
The system indices provide an assesment of overall system adequacy while the load
point indices indicate the adequacy of each individual load bus and provide input values
to the next hierarchical level. It is worth noting that the two sets of adequacy indices do
not replace each other but actually cornplment each other. The following indices are
referred to as the basic indices. Average and maximum values can be obtained fiom the
basic indices and are not included here. Defitions of the average and maximum
adequacy indices can be found m reference [2].
In the definition of the following adequacy indices, the term 'Yaiure" can have a
wide range of meanings. It c m indicate, for exampie, load curtailments, voltage
violations, network splits, bus isolations, various unstable conditions or economicd

penalties. Adequacy &dices for all these aspects can be developed and calculated
separately to reflect the systern performance f?om a particular point of view. The
definitions of the basic adequacy indices are as follows.
Basic indices for both load points and overall m e r n
1. Failure Probability (FP)
2. Expected Number of Failwes (ENF)
3. Failure Frequency (FF)
-(
fsi
FF =
si&
kquency of encounters
among faiiure States
4. Failue Duration (FD)
5. Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS)

EENS =
C psi
L ,si -8760 W y e a r
si&
6 . Expected Power Not Supplied (EPNS)
7. Expected Load Curtailed (ELC)

ELC =
Cf,
W e a r
L,,i
si~F
where
F is the set of system fidure states, either for a speci6c Ioad bus (giving load
point indices) or for the overd system (giving overail system indices),
psi and i are the probability and fiequency of the system state si and are d e k e d
in Equations (2.7) and (2.8) respectively, and
LOsiis the load curtailed at a specific bus or for overd system in system state si.
Basic indices for the overall system
The following indices, which provide a &her overall assesment of the system
adequacy, are obtauied by aggregating the basic load point indices. Let k represent the
load bus number and L, the total system load. The o v e r d system adequacy indices can
be formulated as follows.
1. Bulk Power Curtailment Index (BPCI)
BPCI = x E L C k / L ,
WMW-Year
2. Buk Power Average MW Curtailrnent/disturbance(BPAC)
ELC
BPAC =
k
1 FFk
MW/disturbance
3. Bulk Power Energy Curtailment Index or Severity Index (BPECI or SI)
4. Modified Bulk Power Curtailment Index (MF3PCI)
2.9
Computer Progrsamming
The cornputer program structure for adequacy analysis of a composite power
system can be divided into two major parts, the system state enumeration and indices
formation segment ( part 1), and the system state analysis segment (part II), as shown in
Fig. 2.12. The communications between the two parts are simple and clear. The
information sent fiom part 1 to part II is the identification of a system state. The
information sent back from part II to part 1 is the adequacy condition (any load
curtailment or voltage violations?) of the system state.
Enurneration
-C)
More States
Part 1
Fig. 2.12. Computer programming strategy
A system state can be simply identifid using an integer level and a one dimension
array linka. The IeveZ Uidicates the outage level hat the systern date belongs to and the
Zinkfl contains the serid numbers of the system state outage components. The state
enurneration activity is therefore to create IeveZ and h k n in a specifc way, usually

wdth-&st or depth-fist as stated in Section 2.3. The system state probability, fkequency
and duration are calculated using Equations (2.7) and (2.8). The formation of the
adequacy indices can be relative simple using the definitions given in Section 2.8, when
the operation conditions of al1 the system states are appropriately represented and
cdculated.
The system state analysis can be a major activity in the adequacy evaluation of a
composite system It is programmeci independently as part II. The objective of this
segment of the computer program is to find out if there are any 10ad point fdures in a
given systern state and what are the degrees of severity. The most d e n used system
Mure aiteria are the load curtailments at the system load buses. One basic task in a part
II computer program is to estabiish the constant matrices [BI]and [B"]required to solve

the load flow equations using the fkst decoupied load flow technique described in
Section 2.4. p 1is a subset of [Bq.
The [Bq matrix is first established for the base system state (the Ievel O system
state). It must be modifed for each other systern state in which traLlSIlljSsion lines on
outage exist. The establishment and the modification of the LBy are conducted using
Equation (2.12) given in Section 2.4. The [Bq matrix reflects the actual systw state
physical structure. The situations of bus isolation and network spIitting can be identined
e o m the [BI] marix. In the situation of bus isolation, an isolated bus is the bus whose
correspondhg element (a diagonal element) -in [Bq is zero. In other words, a zero
diagonal element of
indicates the associated bus is an isolated bus. In the split
network situation, the identification can be a little more complex than that for bus
isolation. The identification of a split network can be achieved soiely using the [Bq
matrix, due to the fct that ody non-zero elements except those in the diagonal in the
p']indicate connection between two related buses.
A digital computer program, named COMREL-C, has been constmcted in C
language based on the given concepts. The program has a weli designed smcture
possessing the characteristics of concisenes, readability and extendibifity. The depth of
the analysis in terrns of outage levels can be specined by the user. The system s a t e
andysis segment @art II) can be used not only in an andyticd approach but also in a
Monte Car10 simulation structure.
This chapter descriies and illustrates the basic concepts and evaluation techniques
associated with using the amlytical approach for adequacy evaluation of composite
generation and transmission systems. The chapter fkst desmies the state space
technique, which is the theoretical foundation of system reliability assessrnent using the
analytical approach. Following the description of the state space technique, the chapter
illustrates the basic procedure of composite system adequacy evduation and descnbes
the concepts associated with the implementation of the procedure. The equations
required when using the analytical approach are formulated in this chapter.
Network solution techniques, remedial actions, load curtailment policies and load
models are the major pertinent factors associated with composite power system
adequacy evaluation. The chapter therefore provides a description of the basic network
solution techniques, i-e. the network flow, the fast decoupled a.c. load flow and the d.c.
load flow methods, and a detailed description of the rernedial actions, the load
curtailment philosophies and the load models applied in this thesis. The defitions of the
basic adequacy indices and some main points in designing a digital computer program for
composite system adequacy analysis are provided. Three advanced algorithms will be
presented in the next chapter, which effectively improve the accuracy of the obtained
adequacy indices without considerably hcreasing the required computation thne.
Advanced Algsrithms
3.1
Introduction
The total nwnber of possible system outage events in a practical composite
generation and transmission system c m be extremely large, as stated in Chapter 2. It is

therefore not feasible to attempt to investigate all the possible system outage states or
events in order to obtain the exact adequacy indices in these cases. It is, however,
possible to develop advanced techniques which c m provide acceptable adequacy
assessrnent of a composite system with the lowest required computation tirne. This is an
important consideration. Error limit estimation of the calculated adequacy indices c m be
an integral part of the adequacy evaluation process, as the exact values of the adequacy
indices may not be feasbly obtained. The matter of error limit estimation of the adequacy
indices has not been extensively considered in the past. Some advanced algorifhms have
been developed to provide improved cdculation of the Eequency and duration indices,
and to curtail the large required computation times by sorting the system contingency
states and by sorting the system generating units. The technique of sorting the generating
units recognizes the fact that each identical generator at the same bus has exactly the
same impact on the system adequacy.
This chapter presents three advanced algorithms which are aime0 at providing more
accurate adequacy indices without considerably increasing the required cornputational
effort. Error limit estimates of the calculated adequacy indices are
&O
provided in the
algorithms. The Grst algorithm is for the cdculation of the faiure fkequency and duration
(FF&FD) indices, which are norrnally dficult to accurately obtain. A state extension
technique is presented in this chapter, which provides a much miproved evaluation of the
basic M u r e probability, fiequency and duration indices without considerably increasng

the required computation times. An algorithm for the evaluation of annual adequacy
indices is also presented, which provides acceptable annual adequacy indices with a much
decreased requirement in computation time.
The algorithms are illustrated using simple network configurations. Numencal

examples ushg the developed algorithms are provided following each illustration. These
numerical examples provide some insight into the basic concepts and the effects of the
new algorithms. Applications of the algonthms to two test systems are provided in
Chapter 4, which d ow M e r observation of the effects of the developed algorithms.
3.2
Algorithm for FF&FD Evaluation

Failure frequency and duration (FF&FD) are important load point and systern
adequacy indices in composite generation and'transmission system analysis. These two

indices indicate the expected ikquency and duration of load supply interruption. A range
of techniques exists for cdculating these indices. Several papas have been published in
the past few years that focus on developing more accurate algorithms for the assessrnent
of the FF&FD indices, and considerable progress has been made [77,83-853. This section
presents an algorithm for calculating the FF&FD indices of a composite power system
[86]. The algorithm is efficient in implementation and provides more accurate
assessments of the FF&FD indices compareci with previous approaches. The algorithm
also provides estirnates of the FF&FD with exact and controllable m o r limits. The
concepts can be used not only in the analytical evaluation approach but also in the nonsequentid Monte CarIo simulation approach.
The f'ailure duration (FD) index can be obtained using Equation (2.18). This index is
totally dependent on the M u r e probability and fiequency indices. There is no problem
with the filure probability evaluation using Equation (2.15). The FF&FD problem is
therefore focused on the evaluation of the fidure fiequency (FI?) index. An accurate
calcdation of the FF index can be obtained using Equation (2.17). The fiequency of
encounters among system M u r e states required in Equation (2.1 7) is difficult to obtain.

A convenient solution of the FF is to simply ignore the diflncult part in the equation [2].
The FF index is then the same as the index of the expected number of fures given in
Equation (2.16). This simplification is traditionally used and is generally acceptable, as
the ignored part is usually small in many cases. The simplined equation for the FF is
written as follows,
Another simple and effective formula for the FF calculation was presented in [83],
which provides an irnproved assessrnent of the FF index without increasing the
computational burden. This formula is as follows,
Equation (3.2) is not a new formula as this is the equation used to recursively
calculate a cumulative fiequency index in generating capacity (HL 1) studies [2,87,8 81.
The effectiveness of this equation can be illustrated by application to a simple twocornponent system for which the state space diagram is shown in Fig. 2.3 and is
rearranged as shown in Fig. 3.1. The probability, fiequency, repair and failure rates of
each systern state can be obtained using Equation (2.7) and (2.8) and are shown in Table
3.1, i
n which pi and qi, i=1,2, are the nomial and faiure probabilities of component i
respectively. The FF index, assuming that states 3 and 4 are failure states, can be
calculated using the data contained in Table 3.1 and Equation (3.2) as
Level O -S
Level 1 3
Levei 2 -4
Fig. 3.1. State space diagram for the two-component system
Table 3.1. Basic state indices for the two-component system

System state
Probability
1
2
Pl - P2
3
4
Frequency Repair rate Failure rate

O
51
hl+h2
91 "P2
%2
111
h2
- q2
b
k
112
PI+P~
Pl
91-e
A1
The value of (pS3+ ps4)-p2 is the exact FF, which c m be determined by inspection.
The term @,4*g1- ps3.hl) appearing in the FF calculation is equal to zero, as the
transition fkequencies beween any two adjacent c o ~ e c t e dsystem states are identical in
both directions when component independence exists [89].This equality can be proved
as follows,
This two-component system is small and all the outagr states c m be easily
investigated. Equation (3.2) therefore provides the exact estimate of the FF index. In a
practical composite power system, the nmber of possible system outage states c m be
extremely large and only some of them, the credible contingencies, are investigated. The
high level outage states, with small iodivdual state probabilities, are ignored.
If it is assumed that state S4 in Fig. 3.1 is not investigated, the estimated failure
fiequency, using Equation (3.2), will be
This value is obviously smaller than the exact value (pS3+ps4)-p2.

If the second terrn
of Equation (3.2) is ignored, then the faiure fkequency becomes
This value is stiU d e r than the exact value @s3+ps4).p2,but is better than
pa-(p2-Xi). Using the deduction for tbis simple exarnple, an improved algorithm can be
fonned as follows,
where
Fi is the set of investigated system fdure states excluding the states in the boundary
outage level,
F2 is the set of investigated system failure states in the boundary outage level and
F1 + F2 = F is the set of aU investigated system failure states.

F d w e fiequency is concemed with the transitions between the Mure states and the
normal states of a composite system. A normal state is one in which no violation or load
curtailrnent exists. The fkquency associated with transiting fiom the Mure states to the
normal states is equal to the fkequency of transiting f?om the nonnal states to the fidure
states. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are fomed f?om the point of view of transiting fiom the
filure states to the no&
states. A similar, but more accurate algorithm can be
established fiom the point of view of transiting fiom the nonnal states to the M u r e
states. This algorithm is expressed as,
where N is the set of system no&
states.
Applyuig Equation (3.4) to the two-component system in the situation in which the
state S4 is not investigated, the M u r e fiequency is
This value of @ s l + p s &i~

s the exact failure fiequency and is equd to (pS3+ps4)-p2,
due to the balance transition rule stated earlier. This simple two-component system
example shows that Equation (3.4) provides the exact value of the FF index even when
not all the system states are investigated. This,however, is not tme in all situations. The
uninvestigated state S4 in the simple two-component system is a fdure state. This is the
reason that Equation (3.4) provides the exact value of the FF index when state S4 is not
investigated.
Generally, Equation (3.4) can provide the exact value of FF index if all the
uninvestigated system states are in fidure states. This is possible b many situations
especiaily for overd system adequacy evaluation, when the outage Ievel of the
investigated system stares is a high value. In situations in which the uninvestigated
system states contai. normal states, Equation (3.4) provides an upper bound of the FF
index. This upper bound is ofien tight as the normal states are imially only a small
percentage of the uninvestigated high level system stata in a practical. composite system
adequacy evaluation. Equation (3.4) can be considered to provide a tight upper bound of
the FF index in general for ail situations. The uninvestigated hi& level system states are
not known exactly regarding whether they are normal or M u r e states. The concept of a
tight upper bound on the FF index is clearly Uustrated by the numerical example
provided in Section 3-3.
The exact FF index lies between the values provided by Equations (3.3) and (3.4).
The difference between these two values can be large or small, and depends on how
close the total probability of the kvestigated system states is to unity. A reasonable
estimate of the FF index is to take the average of the two values provided by Equations
(3.3) and (3.4) and aitach it with an error M t . An expression for the difference is
deduced as foIlows,
where
N1 is the set of investigated systern normal states excluding the states in the
boundary outage Ievel,
N2 is the set of investigated systern nomial states in the boundary outage level, and
N = N1 + N2 is the set of alI investigated system normal states.
The algorithm that combines Equations (3-3) and (3.4) can then be expressed as:
Equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) improve the Mure fkquency estimate, without
greatly uicreased computational effort. Equation (3.2) was fkst presented for composite
system assessrnent in [83]. Equation (3.3) is an improvement
Equation (3.2).
Equation (3.4) is a new formulation. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are new, which provide
an estirnate of the FF index together with its associated error limit [86]. A numerical
exarnple is given in the following section to firrther illustrate the concepts and equations
provided in this section.
3.3
Numerical Example and Non-coherence Effect
Equations (3.1) -- (3.6) for the FF index are applied to the simple systern shown in
Fig. 3 -2. This systern is used in [2] to austrate the basic state enurneration technique for
the adequacy evaluation of composite power systems. The transmission h e s are

assumed to have no capacity constraints and the systern states up to level 2 are
investigated in this anaIysis. The calculation of the M u r e frequencies using the different
aigorithms is shown in Table 3.2.
Fig. 3.2. Simple network configuration
Table 3.2. Failure fkquencies using the different equations

Elm.
out
Equation
(3-2)
Equatioa
(3.3)
O
G1
G1,Gl
G1,GZ
G1,Ll
G1,U
G1,W
G2
G2,GZ
G2,L 1
G2,U
G2,L3
L1
L1,L2
LIU
L2
L2,L3
W
O
0.09337702
0.50294652
O
O
O
3,42768626
0.23262652,
0.3 7465287
0.4687 1944
0.28327047
O
0.03 113110
0.02096832
O
0.02622380
O
'
'
C
O
0.10386882
0.56854824
O
O
O
3.42768626
0.27060636
0.37959552
0.474485'76
0.28821303
O
0.03 131700
0.021 12912
O
0.0264 1140
O
Table 3.2 shows that the frlure fiequency obtained using Equation (3.1) is much
larger than the values obtained using the other three equations. The values obtained
using Equations (3-2), (3 -3) and (3 -4) are very close in this simple example, in which the
value obtained using Equation (3.4) is however the largest and the value obtained using
Equation (3.2) is the smallest. The contn'bution to the FF index fiom each of the
investigated system states, except the frst one, is negative or zero, when using Equation
(3-4). This is shown in the last column of Table 3.2. Generally, the system state repair
rate psi kcreases and the state faiure rate hsidecreases, when the system transits f?om a
current state to a higher level state. As the contribution to the FF index fiom any of the
level 2 system states is negative or zero, the contri'bution to this index f?om any of the
uninvestigated higher level systern states will be dennitely negative or zero in the
algonthm of Equation (3.4). This indicates that the FF index obtained using Equation
(3.4) is a true upper bound. Equations (3.2) and (3-3) both provide a lower bound fidure
fiequency, as the contribution to th index f?om any of the uninvestigated hlgher level
system states will be positive when using these two equations. Equation (3.3) clearly
provides a better lower bound of the FF index compared with Equation (3.2).
Applying Equations (3.5) and (3.6) to the given example, the Mure fkequency and
error E t estimate are
The above r e d t can be v&ed
by calculating the average and the difference of the
faiure frequencies obtained using Equations (3-3) and (3.4) given in Table 3.2.
Non-coherence effect
A system is referred to as coherent when the following two conditions are satisfid:
if a working component fiiils, the system performance never becomes better, and
convmely, if a failed component is repaired, the system performance never becomes
worse. Otherwise, the systern is non-coherent. R e f h g to the tree graph given in Fig.
2.6, a coherent system indicates that if a system state is a Mure state, its corresponding
descendant system states will all be failure states, or conversely, if a systern state is a
normal state, its ancestor states will never be a fdure state.
In other words, a coherent system assumes that the transitions from system normal
states to f d w e states can only occur in a downward direction, that is, fiom the lower
outage level to the next higher outage level. For a non-coherent system, transitions fiom
normal states to failure states may occur in an upward direction, that is, fiom a higher
outage level to a lower outage level. There are no transitions between states on the same
outage level, when component independence is assumed.
Most practicd power systems are coherent. The problem of system non-coherence
however does exist in some actual composite power systems, although the effect is often
srnall [31,84]. The equations presented in Section 3.2 are only accurate for coherent
systems. This section presents an approach which c m include the non-coherent fctor
when required.
A three-component system is used to illustrate the concepts associated with the
approach for considering the non-coherent fctor. The state enurneration diagram of the
three-component system is shown in Fig. 2.6 and is redrawn in the form shown in Fig.
3.3, in which a speclified system date fdure pattern is assumed. This specified system
date faiIure pattern includes a non-coherent factor. The system bas eight states in total.
It is therefore not difficult to exhaustively investigate ail the system states. The
probabilities, repair and failure rates of the eight system states can be cdculated using
Equations (2.7) and are shown in Table 3.3.
This systern is non-coherent, as the level2 state S5 is a normal state and it'is a child
of a failure state S2 in level 1 as shown in Fig. 3.3. The exact f'ailue fkquency c m be
obtained, by inspection, as follows,
Level O
-..
Level 1
Level2
-4
N o d State
Level3*
O Failure
State
Fig. 3.3. State mumeration for the three-component

system (non-coherence)
Table 3.3. Essential parameters for the three-component systern

System state
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Probability psi Repair rate &i

O
Failure rate h,
Pl
Plf CL2
Plf p2+k3
PifP3
CL2
Pzf Cr3
CL3
Using Equation (3.4), the fdure fkequency is
The sarne faiure fkequency can be obtained for this example using Equation (3.2) or
(3.3) as al1 the systern states have been investigated. The balance transition rule between
two swem states is used in the dculation. In cornparison with the exact FF, the value
obtained by Equation (3.4) has an extra term, -2-pss-p3ywhich is negative and two times
the fkequency of the system non-coherent fiictor. Equations (3.3), (3-4) and (3-5)c m all
be improved to compensate for this error and include the effect of system nonfor instance,is
cuherence. The improved algorithm based on Equation (33,
FF =
psi (Asi -psi)skN
zPsi
-ksi
/ 2 2 -non-coherent factor
skN2
(3-7)
The non-cuherent factor in Equation (3.7) is the fkequency due to systern noncoherence, that is, the total fiequency arising firom transitions fiom failure states to
nonnal states in the downward direction. The calcdation of the non-coherent factor
involves the storage and examination of the normal or m u r e information of the

investigated system states [77]. The separate treatment of the non-coherence effect has
the benefit that it cm be done without niining the smpli&y and perfection of the original
dgorithms. The expression of the maximum error lEnit given in Equation (3.6) does not
change.
3.4
State Extension Technique

As the total number of possible systern states can be extremely large for practical
composite generation and transmission systems, only credible system states, which are
usually given as up to a certain outage level are investigated in practical calculations.
Although the probabilities of the ignored high outage level system states are individually
very small, the total value can be sigdicant as the number of these high level system
states is ofien very large. Investigation of excessively hi& level system states may not be
feasible due to the greatly increased computation time requirement. The uncertainty due
to the uninvestigated system states is a major concem in composite power system
adequacy evaluation.
This section presents a state extension algonthm, which can egectively nclude the
effect of many high level system states without considerably increasing the computational
effort [go]. The accuracy of the obtained adequacy indices using the algorithrn can be
improved considerably with reasonable required computation times. The algonthm
applies to the basic M u r e probability, fiequency and duration indices for both the overd
system and the individual load points. The accuracy of the M u r e probability, fkequency
and duration indices is improved. The accuracy of the other extended adequacy indices is
also improved when using the state extension algorithrn Error limit estimates of the
Mure probability, fiequency and duration indices are included in the algorithm, which
recognizes the uncertainw of the caiculated adequacy indices. The concepts associated
with the state extension technique are developed and illustrated in this section using
simple networks. A numerical example is provided in the followig section to fiuther
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm
Component independence and system coherence are n o d y basic assumptions in
composite power systern adequacy evaluation. Cornponent independence implies that
cornponent failures and repairs are statistically independent. Dependent events such as
common-cause failures and station-originated fdures [74-761 are usually analyzed
separately and incorporated into the basic component independent system rnodel- System
coherence indicates that system performance could not be better if a working component
fa&, and not be worse i f a failed component is repaired. This is tme in most composite
systerns and is particularly tme with regard to high level outage events. System noncoherence c m be separately calculated and incorporated in the basic system mode1 as
stated In Section 3.3.
The M u r e probability and M u r e duration indices are evaluated using Equations

(2.15) and (2.18) respectively. The fdure fiequency index can be evaluated using
Equations (3.1)--(3 -5).Both Equations (3.1) and (3.2) cm be used in the state extension
technique. Equation (3.2) is used here to illustrate the technique. The equations for the
three indices used in deriving the state extension technique are as follows:
where F is the set of system failure states.

Equation (3.8) can provide the exact values of the failure probability, fiequency and
duration indices if all the possible system states are investigated. This is, however, not
the situation in practical composite system adequacy evaluation, where high level system
.
states, of which is an extremely large n d e r , must be ignored due to the infeasible
computation t h e . This has been stressed previously. The total probabfity of the ignored
high level system states can be signikant, although the individual probabilities of the
high level system states are very SIMI.I. The state extension technique includes the efect
of the many high level system states collectively with relatively small reguired
computation t h e .
A general three-component system is used to illustrate the technique. The state
space of the system is shown in Fig. 2.6 and Fig. 3.3. It is redrawn in the form shown in
Fig. 3.4, in which the symbol for the system states is s p e d c . The subscript digits of the
system state symbol imply the fded components in a systern state. Slz, for instance,
indicates the system state in which components 1 and 2 are in the faiure state. This
representation of the system states is usefiil to clearly illustrate the state extension
technique. The system date probabilities, repair and fidure rates obtained using Equatior.
(2.7) are shown in Table 3-3.These basic system state parameters are rewritten in Table
3.4 in order to consider the dament syrnbols used for representing the system states and
for convenient reference.
Level 1
Fig. 3-4. State space of the three-component system
69
Table 3.4. Basic parameters for the three-component system
Repair rate & Faure rate ksi
If it is assumed that ail the system states are enumerated and investigated, and that
S,, S2, SI2, Si3, S23 and Siz3 are the systern fdure states, the faiure probabiIity and
fiequency indices can be obtained using the data aven in Table 3.4 and Equation (3.8).
The cdculation is as follows, in which the balance transition rule between two directly
comected system states is applied.
F is the set o f system fdwe states,

psl+ = psi + psiz + psi 3 + psi= is the total probability of the S subtree, and
P s ~=
+ Ps2 + Ps23 is the tota1 probability of the S2 subtree.
If it is assumed that system states up to only level 1 are investigated, the systern
states SI and S2 are therefore the system Mure states. An accurate estmiate of the
fidure probability and kquency indices cannot be shply obtained using the data in
Table 3.4 and Equation (3.8) in this situation. The accurate values of the two indices for
this example systern can, however, be obtained using the state extension technique.
As S1 and S2 are the system M u r e states, th& descendants Slz, SI,, S,
and S123y
without individual investigation, are also fidure states due to system coherence. The S1
and S2 subtrees are wholIy in the M u r e state and the subtree probabilities are therefore
very important values as they include the effal of the uriinvestigated system states. The
state extension technique uses the information of the Mure subtrees instead of only the
root system state parameters to provide improved estimates of the adequacy indices. The
technique therefore incorporates the effect of the uninvestigated high Ievel system states
in a collective form,
Let Si, be designated as the state Si subtree. The probabilities, repair and Mure
rates of the investigated system states (up to level 1) and the two subtrees are given in
Table 3.S. The Si+ probability, as shown in Table 3.5, is ql ,which can be imaginai as or
equivdent to a systern state which contains only one component and the component is in
a fdure state. The cornespondhg system state repair and M u r e rates are therefore pl
and O respectively. The S2+ probability is pl*%, which is equivaient to a system state
which contains two components, in which the fkst component is in a nomial state and
the second is in a M u r e state. The correspondulg sys-
state repair and f'aifurerates are
therefore v2 and h l respectively, as shown in Table 3.5. Using the subtree parameters
given in Table 3.5 instead of the root system state data and Equation (3.8), the filure
probability and fkquency of the the-component system, when investigating the system
states only up to level 1, are as follows.
Table 3 -5. Basic parameters for the three-component system, when

enumerating systern states up to level 1
Systern state
P r o b a b w psi
Repar rate psi Fdure rate ksi

O
hl+h2+h3
S~
Pl - P2 - P3
91 - P2 ' P3
PI
hfh3
SI+
41
PI
S2
Pl
-q2'P3
hl+k,
%+
Pl
- q2
P2
hl
~3
PI
3'2-e
11-3
&+h2
The calculated FP and FF values are the same as those given previously when all the
system states were investigated. At this stage of discussing the state extension technique,
only up to level 1 system outage states are considered. It is clear that an effective method
to calculate a subtree probability and its associated repair and fiiure rates is essential in
order to develop an effective state extension algorithm. An effective way to calculate a
subtree probability and its associated repair and failure rates does exist. Generally, the
probability and its associated repair and fdure rates of a state Si subtree, Si+, can be
simply cdculated as follows.
where
U 1 is a subset of U. U is the set of in-senice components in system state si, defineci

for Equation (2.7). U1 contains the components whose series numbers are less than
the maximum failed component series number in the system state si. AU other
symbok are the same as those used for Equation (2.7).
The difference between Equations (3.9) and (2.7) is that Equation (3.9) uses the
subset U1 while Equation (2.7) uses the set U. Consider the application of Equation
(3.9) to a five-comportent system. The system state space is shown in Fig. 3.5, in which
the system states up to level 2 are assumed to be investigated. The boundary level
subtree probabilities and their associated repair and failure rates, which c m be calculated
using Equation (3.9), are the necessary parameters required to use the state extension
technique. The process and results of the calculation are shown in Table 3.6. The system
fdure probability, fiequency and duration adequacy indices can be more accurately
obtained by Equation (3-8)when utilinng the subtree parameters given in Table 3.6
instead of the related boundary level system state parameters.
Fig. 3.5. System states of a five-component system
Table 3.6. Boundary level subtree parameters

for the five-component system
System state
Rqair rate k1
Pl CL2
Pl + CL3
Pl + CL4
CL2 + P3
+
CL2 + p4
P3+k
Consider the three-component system exarnple shown in Fig. 3.4. Equations (3.9)
can be used to include aII the possible system Mure states when the system states up to
o d y level 1 are investigated and when SI and S2 are assumed to be the system fidure
states. This may not be true for other patterns of system Mure states. If, for example, S2
and S3, instead of Si and SZ,are assumed to be the system Mure states, Equation (3.9)
can only include the uninvestigated Mure state S B . In this situation all the
unuivestigated or higher than level 1 system states are fdure states, as they can corne
fiom not only the S and S2 systern states, which is explicitly shown in Fig. 3 -4, but also
the Sz and Sg systern states, which is not expricitly shown in Fig. 3.4, due to fllrther
component outages. If o d y S3 is assumed to be the system failure state, Equation (3.9)
wdi not include any effect of the uninvestigated system states and therefore not provide
any benefit. The uninvestigated system states SIS, SZ3 and SI= in this situation are
actually f'ailure states, as they c m come fiom S3 due to frther component outages,
although this is not explicitly shown in Fig. 3.4.

It is evident that the arrangement of the component sequence h a particular impacts
on the effect of Equation (3.9). The best mangernent of the component sequence is the
one that c m result in the system Mure states at the boundary level occurring on the left
side in the system state space diagram. Generally the component sequence arrangement
should be firom the most important or key component successively to the least important
one. The Mure of an important component more mely leads to a system failure state.
This approach of considering the best component sequence arrangement is simple in

concept and easy to understand. It c m be used for very small power system adequacy
evahation and for calculating the overd system adequacy Hidices. In large composite
power systems, the importance of each component carmot be easily recognized. In the
situation of evaluating the load point adequacy indices, each load point has its own
system Mure state pattern and consequently no one sequence of systern components c m
be the best for all the load points.
A generally rigorous approach to solve the component sequence problem is to deal
with it automatically in the computational process. This approach can be generdy used
for composite power system adequacy evaluation of both the overd system and the load
points. The general algorithm is fomulated as follows.
where
U2 is a subset of U 1. U 1 has been defined for Equation (3-9). The M e r condition

applied to being a U2 component is that the link of the component in the systern state
tree diagram, which is in the left side and is close to the component links of the
system state si, leads to a system failure state.

Equation (3.10) is dBerent iom Equation (3.9) only at the point of using the subset
U2 instead of the set U1. Both U1 and U2 are however subsets of U, the set of in-
service components in system state si. Applying Equation (3.10)to the three-component
system in the situation of investigating the system states up to level 1 and assuming S2
and S3 are the systern failure states, the S2+and S3+ probabities, repair and faiure rates
are obtained and s h o w in Table 3.7. The correctness of the values shown in Table 3.7
can be verified without difficulty as the system is s m d enough. Equation (3.10)
generally provides the best state extension for various systern fldure state patterns.
The caldation of the fdure probability, Eequency and duration adequacy indices
considering the system state extension technique is formulated in Equation (3.1 l),in
which p,,
,kj+
and hsj+are obtained using Equation (3.10) or (3.9).
Table 3-7. SZ+ and S3+parameters, assuming S2 and S1are the
fidure states for the three-component system
System date Probability pn Repair rate 14

S2+
s3+
P2 ' 3
PZ
P3
Faure rate A,
O
h2
F 1 is the set of investigated systern M u r e states excluding the states in the boundary
outage Ievel,
F2 is the set of investigated systern failure states in the boundary outage Ievei.
The state extension technique can effectively provide improved adequacy indices in
composite power systems, without the burden of individually investigating the large
number of hi& level system outage states. The technique, however, does not provide
exact values of the adequacy indices h practical composite systems, in which the
investigated system outage states may be very limited due to the very large required
wmputation times.
The technique provides tight lower bound adequacy indices, as the effect of the
uninvestigated high level system states may not be completely included, especially for
very large composite systerns. Error limit estimation can be established if the upper
bounds of the adequacy indices are obtained. The upper bound of the M u r e probability
is one minus the investigated system normal state probability. The upper b o d for the
fidure fiequency index c m be obtained uskg Equation (3.4). The error limit estimation
of the Mure probability, fiequency and duration c m then be simply conducted.
3.5
Numerical Example
The simple system shown in Fig. 3.2 is again used to illustrate the state extension
technique. The required data are shown in Fig. 3.2. Assume the system states up to level
2 are investigated and the transmission line curtaifment constraints are not considered in
the evaluation. The faiure probability and fiequency indices without app1yhg the state
extension technique are given in Table 3-8.
Table 3.8.
Elem.
FP and FF without applying the state extension technique
out
G1
G1,GI
Gl,G2
G1,Ll
Gl,L2
G1,L3
G2
G2,G2
G2,Ll
G2,U
G2,L3
L1
L 1,L2
Ll,L3
L2
LU3
L3
FP
Eq. (3.8)
FF
Eq.(3.8)
O
O
0.00052459
0.00364454
O
O
O
0.09020227
0.00237374
0.00032951
0.00041 188
0.0003089 1
O
0.00001430
0.0000 1072
O
0.0000 1340
O
O
O
0.09337702
0.50294652
O
O
O
3A2768626
0.23262652
0.37465287
0.4687 1944
0.28327047
O
0.03113 110
0.02096832
O
0.02622380
O
'
5.46160232
The total probability of the investigated system states is 0.99975952, a s shown in

Table 3.8. The Mure probabiiity (FP) and fiequency (FF) without considering the state
extension technique, obtained using Equation (3.8), are 0.097833 86 and 5-46160232
respectively. The upper bound of the FP can be s i q l y caiculated as 0.09783386310.99975952)=0.09807434. The upper bound of the FF is calculated using Equation (3.4)
and is shown in Table 3.8.
Table 3.9 shows the calculation of the FP and FF indices when applying the date
extension technique. Equation (3.9) is ued in this example for the calculation of the
subtree parameters due to its simplicity and for the purpose of better illustration. This
equation works weii for this simple one load point network. The state enmeration is in
the sequence of G2, L1, L2 and L3. The k t three states s h o w in Table 3.9 have the
same symbol '3+', as they all are related to state 3 shown in Table 3.8. This state 3 is
actually a combination of six original system states that have the same probability. When
Table 3.9. FP and FF when applying the state extension algorithm
Elements
State
- out
3+
3+
3+
4+
4-t
4+
4+
9+
1w
1l+
12+
14+
15+
17+
G1,Gl
GI,Gl
G1,Gl
G1,G2
Eq. (3.1 1)
0.0 1732800
Eq. (3.11)
0.00009025
G1,G2
G1,G2
G L $32
G2
G2,G2
G2,Ll
G2,L2
G2,L3
L1,L2
L1,U
L2,W
L
the subtree probabilities are applied, the six original system states are combined into the
irathree states shown in Table 3.9. The other system states in Table 3.9 can be simiiarly
explained.
The system FP increased to 0.09807277 fiom 0.09783386, and the systern FF

increased to 5.59533572 o c d y fkom 5.46160232 occ./y after using the state extension
technique, as shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. The error limit for the system FP is
M.00012024 occ./y before using the state extension technique and is reduced to
~ . 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9occ./y after using the state extension technique. The ratio of the two FP
error limits is 0.00012024/0.00000079
152. The error lunit for the system FF is
k W 6 8 5 3 5 occ./y before using the state extension technique and is reduced to
k.001668 occ./y after using the state extension technique. The ratio of the two FF error
limits is O,O68535/0.001668 = 41. The results indicate that the state extension technique
provides improved evaluation for both the Mure probability and fkquency indices and
therefore for the M u r e duration index. A cornparison of the fhal results without and by
considering the state extension technique is shown in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10. ERect of the state extension technique

Methods
No state extension
I
T
0.09783386
With state extension 0.09807277
3.6
FF ( o d y ) F D (hrs) FP upper bound FF upper bound

5-4616232 156.92
5.59533572
153.54
0.09807434
0.09807434
5.59867210
5.59867210
Algorithm for Annual Adequacy Indices

When the system load is assumed to be constant over the year, the calcuhted
adequacy indices are referred to as amualized indices. The actual annual adequacy
indices can be obtained by representing the systern Ioad by its hourly load duration m e
or hourly chronological load variation curve. These concepts are stated in Section 2.7.
The detailed hoiirly chronological load variation curve or the hourly load duration curve
is not directly used in the c a l d t i o n of annual adequacy indices for actud composite
power systems, as the required computation times can be extremely large. Annuai
adequacy indices of composite power systems have been obtained using smiplified multilevel load models b a s 4 on the hoirriy load variation curve.
A seven-step load model based on the hourly load duration cuve is illustrated in
Fig. 2.10. This seven-step load model strategy can be applied to all the bus loads of a
system based on the hourly load duraion curve for each of the bus loads respectively. A
basic assumption that the Ioad step changes simdtaneously at all the load buses is
n o d y applied when using the stepped load mode1 approach, which simplifies the
correlation between the load steps at diffrent load buses. A multi-interval load mode1
based on the hoinly chonological load variation c w e inalso be used and is illustrated
in Fig. 2.1 1. This multi-interval load model strategy can also be applied to all the bus
loads of a system based on the hourly chronologid load variation curve for each of the
bus loads respectively. In this approach, as the multi-interval load models are associated
with a specific t h e sequence, the correlation between the Ioad levels at m i r e n t load
buses is inherently recognized. The required computation times when using the stepped
and the multi-interval load models can, however, be very large when many Ioad steps or
state if the system at that state cannot satise the load demand (usually the annual peak
loads) connected at the systern load buses. The adequacy indices can be obtained at the
diffrent constant load levels which approxmiately represent the hourly load variation
curves over a year. The annual values of the adequacy indices can then be obtained by
weighting the indices in accordance with the load level probabilities. This is stated earlier
in Section 2.7. This process for the calculation of annual adequacy indices is very time
consuming, as a large nurnber of repeated load flow calculations is required. The number
of load levels applied in practice is l i . e d , which can greatly decrease the accuracy of
the calcdated mual adequacy indices.
Equation (3.12) is based on the load curtailment at each load bus when the bus
loads are constant. If the available capacities at the load buses are obtained, the hourly
load variation or duration c w e s of the loads can then be applied to directly obtain the
m u a l adequacy indices at the load buses and for the ovaall system. The basic FP,
EENS, FF and FD annual adequacy indices using the concept of available capacities can
be evaluated using the following equations.
where
S is the set of all investigated system states,
tsi is the total t h e @ours) in which the load is greater than the available
capacity at a specific load bus in system state si,
Lj is the hourly peak load in one year at the specinc load bus in system state si,
Csi is the available capacity at the spedc load bus in system state si, and
the 0 t h symbols are the same as before.
intervals are required to accurately represent the hourly load variation curves and to
obtain improved values of the annual adequacy indices.
A new approach is presented in this section, which can effectively incorporate the
actual hourly load variation or duration curves in calculating the annual adequacy indices
of bulk power systems. The technique c m be used with a single constant load level over
one year, or be used together with a stepped load model or multi-interval load model.
The basic concepts are iUustrated using a simple radial power system
The basic adequacy indices of M u r e probability (FP), expected energy not suppiied
(EENS), fiulure fiequency (FF) and the expected load curtailed (ELC) are used in this
section to illustrate the algorithm. These four indices are applied to both the load points
and the overd system. The dehitions of these four indices are given in Section 2.8. The
FP is calculated using Equation (2.13, the EENS is calculated using Equation (2.19) and
the ELC is calcuiated using Equation (2.21). The FF index cm be evaluated using one of
Equations (3.1)
-- (3 S).It cm also be evaluated using the average of Equations (3.1)
and (3.2), which is used in this section. The calculation of these four adequacy indices is
rewrtten as follows.
Fp=Zpsi
siEF
EENS =
Cpsi - Lesi -8760 M W y
skF
FF = z p s i Psi
occ./y
skF
ELC =
C fsi - Lesi
MW~Y
skF
where
F is the set of system M u r e states,

LCmsiis the load curtailment at a specific bus or for the overall system in the
system state si.
The adequacy indices obtained using Equation (3.12) are based on the constant load
level model used in the load flow calculations. A system state is recognized as a failme
Equation (3.13) is not totally new, as this approach is nonnally used in generating
capacity adequacy evaluation The equation is new regarding composite power system
adequacy evaluation. The avaiiable capacity can be directly obtained in generating
capacity adequacy analysis when only the total systern generating capacity and the total
system load are concemed and the effect of the transmission network is totally ignored.
Load curtailment is, however, the direct concern in composite system adequacy
evaluation, in which load flow analysis is used to determine the systern performance at
the various possible system states. This is po ssbly the major reason that Equation (3.1 2)
is norrnally used in composite system adequacy evaluation, while Equation (3.13) is

normally used in generating capacity adequacy evaluation.
At a specific load bus, the available capacity is the peak load minus the load
curtailment at this bus. The Ioad curtailment is calculated for the situation in which all
the bus loads are constant at their peak values. Equation (3.13), with the calculated load
bus available capacities, can then be used to provide the annual adequacy indices at the
load buses. The overall system annual adequacy indices of a composite system can be
obtained by considering the effect of all the load buses.
A correlation problem between the load buses exists in calculating the annual
adequacy indices using Equation (3.13). The available capacities at the various load
buses and the obtained load point annual adequacy indices depend on both the applied
load curtailment policies and the load Bow calculation condition that all the systern loads
are constant values. This dependency also exists in the calculation of the load point
ann11RtiZed indices as stated earlier. The dependency on the load flow dculation
condition does not cause any problem in the load point anmalized indices. It, however,
causes a correlation problem for the annual adequacy indices obtained using Equation
(3.13). This is because the hourly load variation curves at the load buses are directly
used in the calculation of the m u a l adequacy indices using Equation (3.13), while the
load flow calculation condition is that all the system loads are constant at their specified
values. This correlation problem is fhther analyzed in the following.
There c m be three possiole results after conducting Ioad flow analysis in a specifk
system state.
The available capacities at the load buses all meet their bus peak loads
respectively,
The available capacity at a specinc load bus does not meet its peak load due
to transmission capacity restrictions, and
The available capacity at a spedc load bus does not rneet its peak load due
to generating capacity deficiencies.
In the fst situation, the Wern capacity is adequate to meet aU the bus loads at
their peaks occurring in the same the. This situation therefore does not contribute
anything to the adequacy indices. In the second situation, the available capacity,
restrcted due to transmission system problems such as transmission Iine overload and
bus isolation, is independent of the other bus load levels. In the third situation, as the
system generating capacity cannot satisfy all the bus peak loads at the same t h e , some
bus available capacities ( n o d y the buses close to the outage locations) must be
reduced to values below their peak loads. The obtained bus available capacity in this
thu-d situation may be somewhat conservative, as it d o w s all the other bus available
capacities to be equal to their peak loads. The correlation problem occurs only in the
third situation, which makes the obtained w u a l adequacy indices upper bounds of the
exact values.
These concepts are illustrated using the simple radial configuration shown in Fig.
3.6. If all the components are in service, there will be no problem for the systern to
satisfy the three bus loads at their peaks at the same tirne. This is the given first situation.
If LI (or L2) is out of senice, the available capacities at buses 2 and 3 will be less than
their peaks due to the carrying capacity restriction of L2 (or L 1). These two available
capacities are dependent upon the applied load curtailment policy, but are independent
on the load level at bus 1. If L3 is out of senice, the available capacity at bus 3 will be
zero due to bus isolation, which is independent of the load levek at buses 1 and 2. These
Bus 1
Fig. 3.6. A radial configuration
are the examples of the second situation, in which the concemed correlation problem
does not ex&If G1 (or G2) is out of service, the system available capacity will not meet the bus
peak loads at the same time. Assume the load cintailment is resticted to buses 1 and 2
which are close to the failed generation bus 1. The avdable capacities at buses 1 and 2
are dependent on the applied load curtailment policy and the available capacity at bus 3,
which is qua1 to its peak load. This available capacity allocation guarantees that load
curtainent is only possible at buses 1 and 2, and not at bus 3. The actual load level at
bus 3 however may not be at its peak. In this situation, the available capacities at buses 1
and 2 wilI increase and the obtained annual risk indices at buses 1 and 2 will decrease.
The proposed approach can be regarded as providing slightly pessimistic values or
upper bounds of the annual adequacy indices. The required computation times can,
however, be greatly reduced using this approach as only load flow calculations at one
constant load level are required for the system state performance analysis. If the
technique is used at every load level in a multi-level load model the accuracy o f the
annual adequacy indices can be definitely improved without increasing the number of the
load levels. The burden of large required computation times to obtain satisfctory annual
adequacy indices can be reduced considerably using the presented algorithm Although
the concepts are illustrated using the four basic adequacy indices, they are effective for
all composite systern adequacy indices. The state extension technique presented in
Section 3.4 can be utiiized in this approach. A numerical example is provided in the
following section to illustrate the effect of the proposed new algorithm.
The simple systern s h o w in Fig. 3.2 and f k t used in (21, is used to illustrate the
presented technique for the calculation of afl~lualadequacy indices. A complete andysis
requires an actual load flow calculation to determine the iine Ioadings and the line loss
under each system state. It has been therefore assumed that the power factor associated
with fIow on a line is 0.95 and that an arbitrary line loss of 5 MW is added to the actuai
demand at the load bus [2]. The systern is redrawn in Fig. 3.7 considering the
transmission line capacity constraints and power loss. The calculation of the aanualized
adequacy indices using Equation (3.12) is shown in Table 3.1 1.
A straight line load characteristic fiom the 100% to the 40% points is used as the
load variation c w e for sirnplicity to calculate the annual adequacy indices using
Equation (3.13). The straight line load representation is shown in Fig. 3.8. Equation
(3.1 3) is modified as follows using the assumed straight line load variation curve.
EENS =
0.5 - (1 15-
- 8760169)
MWh/y
skF
FF =
Cpsi.ksi- (1 15 - cSi)/69
si~F
Fig. 3.7. Simple network con6guration
OCC./Y
Table 3.1 1. Annualized adequacy indices

Elem,
out
EENS
ELC
(MWh)
CMW)
G1
G1,GL
GI,G2
GI,Ll
G1,LZ
Gl,L3
G2
G2,GZ
G2,L 1
G2,L2
G2,L3
Ll
Ll,L2
L lJ.3
L2
L2,L3
A Ioad duration curve

.
Fig. 3.8. A s m e d hourly Ioad duration curve
In using Equation (3.14), the index contributions at a specinc system state are zero
if the available capacity C, at that state is greater than or equal to the peak load of 115
MW. The systern state available capacities are shown in Colum. 6 of Table 3.12. The
annual adequacy indices are calculated as shown in Table 3.12. The final annualized and
annual adequacy indices are gathered in Table 3.13 for convenient reference and
cornparison. Table 3.13 shows that the annual adequacy indices are much d e r than
the annualized indices. The m u a l adequacy indices are for both the single load point
and the overall system in this case.

Table 3.12. Annual adequacy indices
-
ELC
Elem.
out
G1
GI,Gl
G1,G2
G1,Ll
G1,U
Gl,L3
G2
G2,G2
G2,Ll
G2&2
G2,W
LI
L 1,L2
LI,W
L2
U,L3
L3
Table 3.13. Cornparison of the adequacy indices

Adequacy
indices
FP
Annualized
Annual
Ratio
0.10202341
0.01209436
8.4
EENS
(MWh)
73 11.127
819.293
8.9
F'F
(OCC-/Y)
14.465447
3.782761
3.8
ELC
O
Three advanced algorithrns have been developed and described in this chapter. The
algonthms are illustrated by application to simple networks and are fiirther illustrated
ushg numerical exarnples in the chapter. The presented algonthms effectively provide
improved assessrnent of composite system adequacy without considerably increasing the
required computational effort.

The frst algorithm is concerned with miproved calculation of the fidure fkequency
index, and therefore the fidure duration index. The diflculty involved in the Mure
fiequency calculation is the need to recognize the transitions between the system failure
states. Two equations are developed, which provide tight lower and upper bounds of the
M u r e fiequency index. The equation for the upper bound of the f d w e fkequency is
especialiy effective and accurate. The upper bound will becorne the exact faiure
fiequency if all possible system outage states are investigated or if all the uninvestigated
system outage states are faiure states. It can be expected that most of the uninvestigated
higher level system states are failure states in practical composite system adequacy
evaluation. An effective algorithm based on the equations for the tight bounds of the
fdure fiequency is W e r developed, which provides an estimate of the f d u r e

fiequency with an exact maximum mor limit. The error limit of the failure fiequency is a
fiuiction of the tota1 investigated state probability. Investigation of an extensive number
of system states leads to a decreased error limit, and therefore an improved faiure
eequency index. The total number of investigated system states is dependent on the
requirement or intention behind a speczc composite systern adequacy analysis. System
non-coherence effects, if required, cm be included separately in the given equations
without increasing the complexity.
The second algor i t h , designated as state extension, can effectively and efficiently
extend the knowledge of the investigated system states to include the effect of many
uninvestigated system states in a collective form, and can therefore provide improved
estimates of the adequacy indices for composite or buIk power systems. The accuracy
improvement, when using the state extension technique, applies to the basic fdure
probability, ftequency and duration indices for both the overd system and the individual
system load points. The accuracy of the other applicable indices is &O
improved. The
algorithm and the error limit estimation of the calculated adequacy indices effectively
decreases the uncertainty associated with the hct that a large number of high level
system states are ignored in practical composite system adequacy assessment.
The third alg~nthmis concerned with irnprovhg the evaluation of the annual
adequacy indices. Extended computation tirnes are usually required to calculate the
annual indices, in which variable load levels are considered. Traditional methods for
composite system adequacy evaluation focuses on the load curtarlments at a constant
load level, while the new algorithm focuses on the available capacities at a given constant
load level. This change makes it possible to incorporate actual load variation curves
directly in the composite systern adequacy analysis. The proposed new algonthm
egectively provides consistent tight upper bounds on the annual indices and rquues only
the load flow calculations at a single constant load level. The technique can also be used
together with a multi-level load mode1 to provide more accurate load point annual
adequacy indices. The required amputation b e s using the new algorithm are greatly
reduced compared with previous approaches.
Systern studies using the proposed techniques are presented in the next chapter, in
order to provide M e r insight into the concepts, the techniques and the actual adequacy
indices.
4
System Studies
4.1
Introduction
This chapter presents system studies on two test composite power systems using the
basic evaluation techniques presented in Chapters 2 and the advanced algoripresented in Chapters 3. The two test systems, the dbus RBTS [7 11 and the 24-bus
IEEE-RTS [72,73], vary in size and features and are bnefly described in this chapter.
The eEects of the three advanced algorithm presented in Chapter 3 are illustrated by
cornparing the adequacy indices obtained using the algonthms with those obtained by the
basic approach Wthout using the algorithms. The system studies provide insight into the
pertinent factors associated with the basic adequacy evaluation techniques, the effects of
the advanced algorithm and the variations in the adequacy indices.
4.2
Two Test Systems: the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS

The RBTS stands for the Roy Billinton Test System, which is a small 6-bus system
and was established for educational purposes in 1988. The IEEE-RTS stands for the
IEEE Reliability Test System, which is a 24-bus system and was fxst established by the
Reliability Test System Task Force of the Application of Probability Methods
Subcommittee in 1979. The two reliability test systerns are briefly descriied as follows.
The 6-Bus RBTS
This s m d test system was developed for educational purposes and has been used
extensively for research and teaching in the Power System Reliability Research Group.
The objective in designing this system for educational purposes was to make it
mffciently srnall to permit the conduct of a large number of reliability studies with low
solution tirne but sufficiently detailed to reflect the actual complexities involved in
practical reliabdity analpis. Students or researchers c m test, appreciate and cl-
variety of techniques, indices and pertinent factors using the small test system before
attempting wmputer development for reliability evaluation of large practical composite
power systems.
Fig. 4.1 shows the single line diagram of the 6 bus RBTS. The bus data, line data,
generator data and terminal station equipment data of this systern are given in Appendix
A. The load model used for the system is the same as that for the IEEE-RTS and is given
in Appendix B. The system has 2 generator buses, 4 load buses, 9 lines and 11
generating units. The voltage W t s for this system are assumed to be 1-05 and 0.97 p.u..
The total system load is 185 MW and the total generation is 240 MW. The minimum and
maximum generating unit sizes are 5 MW and 40 MW respectively.

The 24-bus EEE-RTS
The objective behind the development of this 24bus system was to provide a
reference network for test and cornparison of different methods in power systern
reliability shidies. The single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS is shown in Fig. 4.2. The
bus, h e , generator data of this system and the load model for the system are provided in
Appendk B. The terminal station equipment data are the same a s those for the RBTS
and are given in Appendix A. The system has 10 generator buses, 10 load buses, 4
intermediate buses, 33 transmission h e s and 5 transformers. The total number of
generating units is 32. The northern and southeni regions of the system are at diffrent
voltage levels. The northem region of the system is at 230 KV and the southeni part is at
138 K . . The northem region has a generation surplus while the southern region is
power deficient. The system peak load in the north is 1518 MW, in the south is 1332
MW and in total is 2850. The installecl capacity in the north is 2721 MW, in the south is
684 MW and in total is 3405 MW. The minimum and the maximum range of the
generating unit sizes are 12 MW and 400 MW respectively. The voltage limits for this
qstem are assumed to be 1.O5 and 0.95 p.u..
Fig. 4.1. Single line diagram ofthe RBTS
Bus
7"
S ynch.
Cond.
L22
Bus 14
NORTH
230 KV
--
uBus 12
Bus 24
Bus 13
1
SOUTH
138 KV
138
Fig. 4.2. Single h e diagram of the IEEE-RTS
93
Improved FF&FD Evaluation
4.3
Six equatiom (Equations (3.1) - (3.6)) are aven and developed in Section 3.2 for
the evaluation of the expected fiiure fiequency (FF) index. The expected faiure
duration (FD) index is totally dependent upon the FF and the M u r e probability index.
The six equations are rewritten as follows.
where
F= F l t F 2 is the set of aU system Mure states,

F1 is the set of all system failure States excluding those in the boundary outage level,
F2 is the set of system Mure states in the boundary outage level
N is the set of all system n o r d states, and

N2 is the set of system no&
states in the boundary outage level.
Equation (4.1) is actually the expected number of faines given in Equation (2.1 6),
which is traditionally used and is generdy acceptable for an approximate estimate of the
FF. Equation (4.2) is a simple formula for the FF calculation which provides an improved
assessrnent of the FF index and was fkst presented in [83]. Equation (4.3) is an
improvement on Equation (4.2). Equation (4.4) is new and provides a tight upper bound
of the FF index. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are new and provide an estimate of the FF
index together with its associated error limit [86].
Equations (4.1) - (4.4) are used for the FF caiculation of the RBTS and the IEEE-
RTS in this section. The effects of the four equations are illustratecl by cornparison and
analysis of the results provided. Equation (4.5) is actually the average o f Equations (3.3)
and (3.4). Equation (4.6) provides an estimate of the error b i t for the FF index. S ystem
states with up to four generating units on outage, up to three lines/transformers on

outage and up to three combined generating units and lines/transforrners on outage were
considered in the system tudies. A fast decoupled a s . load flow technique was used in
the performance analysis of the systern st ates.
Evduation of the RBTS

The total probability of the system states investigated for the RBTS is 0.999973,
which represents a comprehensive state space. The FF indices at the load buses at the
various load levels were calculated using Equations (4.1) - (4.4). The load point FF
indices when the system load level is constant-at the peak of 185 MW are shown in Fig.
4.3. The load point FF indices when the systein load level decreases by twenty percent to
148 MW are shown in Fig. 4.4.
1-- -
- - - - - - - - -
0Equation (4.1)
Equation (4.2)
E q u a t i o n (4.3)
E q u a t i o n (4.4)
&
Bus number
Fig. 4.3. Failure fkequencies at the RBTS load buses at the 185 MW load level
RBTS, load = 148 MW
1 OEquation (4.1)
1 HEquation (4.3)
mquation (4.2) - - - - Equation (4.4)
Bus number
Fig. 4.4. Failure fiequemies at the RBTS load buses at the 148 MW Ioad IeveI
Fig. 4.3 shows that Equation (4.1) clearly provides the highest estimate of the load
point FF at buses 2, 3, 4 and 6. The FF at bus 5 is the smallest. The difference in the FF
values at bus 5 obtained by the four equations is not obvious in Fig. 4.3. Equations (4.2)
- (4.4) provide basically simtiar and consistent values for the load bus FF. When the total
sample space probability is close to unity, Equations (4.2) - (4.4) tend to provide the
sarne accurate value of the FF index. The actual numbers show that the value provided
by Equation (4.3) is larger than the value provided by Equation (4.2) and smder than
the value provided by Equation (4.4) at each load bus. This indicates that Equation (4.3)
provides a better lower bound value than Equation (4.2), while Equation (4.4) provides a
tight upper bound of the FF index.
The load point FF values in Fig. 4.4 are reduced at ail the buses, except bus 6.
Equation (4. l), as s h o w in Fig 4.4, does not provide the highest estimate of the load
point FF. The fact that Equation (4.4) provides an upper bound of the FF index is clearly
shown in Fig. 4.4. It is usually not feasible in a large practical power network to
investigate the system space at a total probabilty as high as the one for this small test
system. The differences between the four equations in a large composite system
adequacy evaluation can be much larger than the situation shown in this example.
Fig. 4.5 shows the FF values at bus 2 for dairent load levels in the RBTS. When
the load level decreases, the FF values provided by Equations (4.1) - (4.3) reduce to
zero. Equation (4.4) provides a small constant value at very lower load levels as shown
in the Fig. 4.5. This is because not ail the system states have been investigated in the
ystem analysis. The small constant value corresponds to the effect of the uninvestigated
states. Fig. 4.6 shows the FF values at bus 6 for different load levels in the RBTS. Load
Cl Equation (4.1)
74
92.5
n----
ElEquation (4.2)
1295
III
148
1665
185
Load levels (MW)
Fig. 4.5. Failure fiequencies at bus 2 for different load levels in the RBTS
At bris 6 of the RBTS
Load leves (MW)
Fig. 4.6. Failure fiequencies at bus 6 for dBerent load levels in the RBTS
97
level variation does not rnaterally affect the FF index at this bus, as the main fdure
event at bus 6 is bus isolation due to fallure of line 9.
EvaIuation of the IEEE-RTS
The total probability of the investigated systern States for the IEEE-RTS is
0.985737, which is considerably d e r than the value for the RBTS. The FF values at
each load bus obtaked using the four different equations are shown in Fig. 4.7. Equation
(4.1) overestimates the FF at some buses, but not all buses. Equation (4.4) provides a
consistent upper bound value at each bus. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) both provide lower
bound values, in which the estimate provided by Equation (4.3) is clearly better than that
provided by Equation (4.2). The dSerence between the FF values provided by Equations
(4.3) and (4.4) is larger than that for the RBTS, as the system state investigation is not as
cornprehensive as that for the RBTS.

Fig. 4.8 shows the FF at bus 2 for seven different load levels for the IEEE-RTS. Fig.
4.9 shows the FF at bus 15 for the same load levels. The FF provided by Equations (4. l),
(4.2) and (4.3) decrease to zero as the load level decreases, as shown in both Fig. 4.8
and Fig. 4.9. The FF provided by Equation (4.4), however, decreases to a constant
IEEE-RTS, load =2%50MW

u
u
V
O
32
Ci Equation (4.1) ElEquation (4.2)

Equation (4.3) W Equation (4.4)
Bus number
Fig. 4.7. Failure fiequemies at the IEEE-RTS load buses
98
At bus 2 of the IEEE-RTS

- - -
mquation (4.L) ElEquation (4.2)

Equation (4.3) l
Equation (4.4)
1995
21375
2280
24225
2565
270 7 5
2850
Load Ievels (MW)
Fig. 4.8. Failure fiequencies at bus 2 for dBerent load levels in the IEEE-RTS
At bus 15 of the IEEERTS
1995
2 1375
2280
24225
2565
27075
2850
Load levels (MW)
Fig. 4.9. F d u e fiquencies at bus 15 for dBerent load levels in the IEEE-RTS
positive value, as the load level decreases. This constant positive value, as noted earlier,
corresponds to the eEect of the uninvestigated system states.
The uninvestigated fiequency contributes to the fkquency error limit given in

Equation (4.6). The constant uninvestigated fiequency value for the IEEE-RTS in this
case is 10.50 occ./y, which is not small. The value will decrease to 5.1 1 occ./y, when up
to five generators on outage, up to four transmission lines on outage and up to a

combination of four generators and trifIlSmiSsion lines on outage are nvestigated for the
IEEE-RTS, in which the investigated probability increases to 0.99408579, and the

number of the investigated outage states increases to 294,562 fiom 93,186. The value
will fiutha decrease to 0.62 occ./y, when up to six generators on outage, up to five
transmission lines on outage and up to a combination of five generators and transmission
lines on outage are investigated. The investigated probability, in this case, increases to
0.99945391 and the number of investigated outage states increases to 13,983,327. It is

obvious that more accurate evaluation of the FF mdex involves more computation time.
4.4
State Extension Technique

It is not feasible or even possible to investigate ail the possible system states of a
large practical composite generation and transmission system, as the number of the
system states can be extremely large. The probabilities of the ignored
high level system
outage states are individually very srnall, but the total value c m be sigdicant due to the
Iarge number of these states. The state extension aigorithm presented in Section 3.4 c m
efnciently extend the knowledge of the investigated system states to collectively include
the effects of a large number of the iminvestigated system states. The accuracy of the
adequacy indices, when using the state extension technique, is therefore improved
withoilt investigating the high level system states individually which requires a very large
computation tirne [go]. -
This section provides the basic faiure probability (FP) and failure fiequency (FF)
indices for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS evduated with and without using the state
extension technique. The effect of the state extension technique is itlustrated and
analyzed by cornparhg the o b t h e d results. The upper bounds of the FP and FF using
Equation (3.4) are also presented in this section for the purpose of cornparison and error
estimation. The equations for the two indices without using the state extension tecbnique
are given in Equation (3.8) and are reWntten as follows,
where F is the set of system Mure states.

The equations for the two indices when considering the state extension technique
are given by Equation (3.1 1) and are rewntten as follows,
where
subscript sj+ is designated as state sj subtree,
F1 is the set of investigated system failure states exchiding those in the boundary
outage level, and
F2 is the set of systern fdure states in the boundary outage leveL
The system state probabilities, repair and failure rates required in Equation (4.7) can
be simply calculatecl by Equation (2.7). The probabilities, repair and fidure rates of the
Mure subtrees in the boundary level required in Equation (4.8) are calculated using the
following equation.
where
U2 is a subset of U. U is the set of in-service cumponents in system state si, dehed

for Equation (2.7). The M e r condition applied to being a U2 component is that the
series number of the component is less
than the maximum filed component series
number in the system state si and the link of the component in the system state tree
diagrarn, which is in the lefk side and is close to the component links of the system
state si, Ieads to a system M u r e state.
Evaluation of the RBTS
Two cases were studied in the evaluation of the RBTS. The system states with up to
two components (generating units or transmission h e s ) on outage were investigated in
Case 1. The srjtern states with up to three generaiing units on outage, up to two
transmission lines on outage and up to two combined generating units and transmission
h e s on outage were investigated in Case 2. The total probability investigated in Case 1
is 0.99865846, and inmeases in Case 2 to 0.99994123. Both probability values represent

a comprehensive investigation of the RBTS system states.
Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.1 1 show the load point FP and FF indices for Case 1, in which
the load is constant at 185 MW. Both graphs show that the state extension technique
provides improved adequacy indices of the FP and FF at buses 2, 3 and 4. The FP and
FF at bus 5 are vimially zero when using both the conventional technique and the state
extension technique. The upper bound values at bus 5 shown in the two graphs indicate
that some systern states were not investigated in the calculation of the RBTS.The state
extension technique does not provide an apparent miprovernent for both the FP and FF
RBTS, 2-21;,
Load = 185 MW
_
hithout state extension

l
with state extension
- - - - - - - - - -
Bus nurnber
Fig. 4.10. Failure probabilities at the RBTS load buses (Case 1)
RBTS, 2G+2L, Load = 185 MW
Bus number
Fig. 4.1 1. Failure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses (Case 1)
indices at bus 6 , as shown in the hvo graphs. This is because fdure of bus 6 is
dominated by the faiure of a single transmission line which causes the bus to be isolated.
Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13 show the overd system FP and FF indices at various load
levels obtained in Case 1. The seven load levels were obtained in the fouowing way. The
peak load level of the RBTS is 185 MW. The other load levels successively decrease by
10 percent. Both graphs show that the state extension technique provides miproved FP
I
0.01
0.005
Load ievels, MW
Fig. 4.12. Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS

at various load levels (Case I )
0without state extension

w i t h state extension
R upper bound
Load levels, MW
Fig. 4.13. Failure fiequencies for the overall RBTS

at various load levels (Case 1)
and FF indices at the high Ioad levels. When the load level decreases to 148 MW and
Iower, the FP and FF indices do not change with the load level variation. This is because
the system Mure at the low load levels is mainly due to the isolation of bus 6.
Fig. 4.14 and Fig. 4.15 show the load point FP and FF obtained in Case 2, when the
load is constant at 185 MW. The two graphs show that both the conventional technique
- - - - - - - - - -
mwith state extension
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bus number
Fig. 4.14. Failure probabilities at the RBTS load buses (Case 2)

104
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O
I
rn
Bus number
Fig. 4.15. Failure eequencies at the RBTS load buses (Case 2)
and the state extension technique provide similar values for the FP and FF indices at all
six buses. This result is due to the fct that the total investigated probability in Case 2 is
0.99994123, which is very comprehensive. It is therefore no room for the state extension
technique to show its effectiveness. This is however not a usual situation in the adequacy
evaluation of a large practicd composite power system.
Fig. 4.16 and Fig. 4.17 show the overall system FP and FF indices at various load
levels for Case 2. Both graphs show that the three different techniques provide similar
O without state extension

R with state extension
Load levels, MW
Fig. 4.16. Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS at various load levels (Case 2)
Load levels, MW
Fig. 4.17. Failure fiequencies for the overall RBTS at various load levels (Case 2)
FP and FF values at the different load levels. The effect of the state extension technique
is not obvious in Case 2, as the investigation of the systern states is almost complete in
this case. The following evaluation of the IEEE-RTSprovides more practical uisight into
the effect of the state extension technique.
Evaluation of the IEEE-RTS

Four cases have been considered in the evaluation of the IEEE-RTS. Systern states
involving up to three components (generatuig units or transmission lines) on outage have
been investigated in Case 1. System states involving up to four generating units on

outage, up to three transmission hes on outage and up to three cumbined generating
units and transmission lines on outage have been investigated iu Case 2. System states
involving up to five generating units on outage, up to three transmission lines on outage
and up to three wrnbined generating units and transmission lines on outage were
investigated in Case 3. System dates involving up to five generating units on outage, up
to four transmission luies on outage and up to four combined generating units and
transmission lines on outage were investigated m Case 4. The 24 bus IEEE-RTS has a
total of 70 components (genemting units and transmission line/transforrner links), and
therefore the to ta1 number of the investigated systern states in Case 1 s given by X I C+
~
7oC1+ 7oC2 + 70C3= 57,226. The total number of the investigated system states in each of
the other three cases can be calculated in the same mimer. The total number of
investigated system states provides an approlimiate estimate of the required computation

t h e in each of the four cases. Some general information on the fou.cases is aven in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 . General information of the four given studied cases
Studied Cases
Total number of
the system states
Case 1: 3G+3L
57,226
Case 2: 4Gt3L
Case 3 : 5G+3L
Case 4: 5Gt4L
93,186
294,562
1.175.497
Relative required
coinputation tmies
1 unit
2 units
5 units
21 units
Total probabilify
%
Table 4.1 shows that the total probability inmeases when more system states are
investigated and so does the required computation t h e . The third column of Table 4.1
shows the approximate relative required computation times, which indicate ihat the
required computation tirne increases very rapidly when the level of the investigated
system states increases. The pro posed state extension technique provides improved
adequacy indices without increasing the number of investigated system states.
Fig. 4.18 and Fig. 4.19 show the load point FI? and FF indices obtained in Case 1,
when the load is constant at 2850 MW. Both graphs show that the state extension
technique provides improved FP and FF values at all the load buses. The two graphs also
show that the improvement effect due to the state extension technique at a bus wih high
FP and FE=values is beter than that at a bus with low FP and FF values. This is because
the state extension technique is based on an extension of the investigated system fdure
states. If the FP and FF values associated with the investigated system faiure States are
low, the extension effect will be consequently less. The upper bounds shown in the two
graphs are quite Gir away fiom the FP and FF values obtained by the state extension
technique. This indicates that the probabrlity of the uninvestigated system states in Case
1 is large.
IEEERTS, 3G+3L, Load = 2850 MW
Bus number
Fig. 4.1 8. Failure probabilities at the IEEE-RTS 10ad buses (Case1)
IEEE-RTS, 3G+3L, Load = 2850 MW

40
- - - - - - - - -
Ciwithout state extension

I
Bus number
Fig. 4.19. Failue fiequencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses (Case 1)
?-
Fig. 20 and Fig. 2 1 show the overall system FP and FF indices at various load levels
for Case 1. The data for the seven load levels are given in Table 2.1 . The peak load level
for the IEEE-RTSis 2850 MW. The other load levels successively decrease by a rate of
10 percent. Both graphs show that the eEect of the state extension technique is large at
the 2850 MW load leveL The extension effect is small at the 2565 MW ioad level. At all
the
0 t h
low load levels, the FP and FF indices are zero for the investigated system
states. The upper bound values shown in the two graphs at the low load levels indicate
Load leveis, MW
Fig. 4.20. Failure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load levels (Case 1)
IEEE-RTS, 3G+3L
I
2850
2565
2280
1995
1710
1425
1140
Load levels, !VXW
Fig. 4.21. Failure fkquencies for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load levels (Case 1)
the existence of uninvestigated system states. Fig. 4.20 shows that the total probability of
the uninvestigated systern states is about 0.05. This can be seen from Table 4.1 where
the total probability of the investigated system states is 0.95090484. Fig. 4.2 1 shows that
the eequency correspondhg to the uninvestigated system states is about 26 occurrences
per year. This indicates that the FF value c m increase by 26 occurrences per year if all
the uninvestigated system states are M u r e states.
Fg. 4.22 and Fg. 4.23 show the load point FP and FF indices obtained in Case 2, m
which the load is constant at 2850 MW. The uncertainty due to the minvestigated
systern states in this case is much smaller than that in Case 1. Both graphs show that the
state extension technique provides improved FP and FF vaIues at ail the load buses.
These improved FP and FF values are more acceptable than those in Case 1, as the upper
bounds in this case are quite close to the FP and FF values as shown in the two graphs.
IEEERTS, 4G+3L, Load = 2850 MW
I
Bus number
Fig. 4.22. Failme probabilities at the IEEE-RTS load buses (Case 2)
IEEE-RTS, 4G+3L, Load = 2850 MW

Ilwih state extension
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bus number
Fig. 4.23. Failue fiequencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses (Case2)
Fig. 4.24 and Fig. 4.25 show the overail system FP and FF indices at the given
seven load levels for Case 2. These two graphs are quite simila to those shown in Fig.
4.20 and Fig. 4.2 1, except that the upper bounds in this case are much d e r than those
in Case 1. Cornparison between the FP and FF values in Cases 1 and 2 indicates that the
state extension technique c m provide quite acceptable FP and FF values even when the
number of the investigated system states is relatively small such as in Case 1. The
IEEE-RTS, 4-3L
2850
2565
2280
1995
m t h o u t state extension
1710
1425
- -
1140
Load Ievels, MW
Fig. 4.24. Failure probabilities for the overd IEEE-RTS at various load leveis (Case 2)
IEEERTS, 4W3L
4 o T - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2850
2565
2280
1995
O without state extension

II with state extension
1710
1425
1140
Load Ievels, MW
Fig. 4.25. Failure fiequemies for the overd IEEE-RTS at various load levels (Case 2)
111
required computation t h e can be greatly reduced to obtain acceptable FP and FF indices

by using the state extension technique.
The required computation times become relatively large in the Case 3 and 4 studies.
Fig. 4.26 and Fig. 4.27 show the overd system FP and FF indices calculateci for all the
four cases. The two graphs clearly show that the FP and FF indices provided by the state
extension technique are very close in all the four cases, while the basic technique
JEEE-RTS, Load = 2850 MW
[ ~ w i t h o ustate
t
1
Case
Fig. 4.26. Fadure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS for the four cases
IEEE-RTS, Load = 2850 MW

without state
extension
I
with state
extension
Isupper bound
Case
Fig. 4.27. Failure fiequencies for the overall IEEE-RTS for the four cases
112
provides inaccurate FP and FF indices for Cases 1 and 2, and better FP and FF indices
for Cases 3 and 4. The number of investigated systern states, as shown iu Table 4.1,
increases rapidy fiom Case 1 to Case 4, as does the required cornputation times.
It c m be seen in Fig. 4.27 that the FF index provided by the state extension
technique for Case 3 is a little bit smaUer than for Case 2. This is not consistent with the
sense that the FF 'value should increase when more system states are investigated. This
s m d unusual variation shown in the graph indicates that more system failure states have
been detected in the evaluation for Case 2 than for Case 3, although fewer system states
m Case 2 are actually investigated than in Case 3. This situation is possible in using the
state extension technique when the additional investigated system states only involve
higher level outages on generating units, i.e. fiom level4 in Case 2 to level 5 in Case 3
for the outages of generating units. Thi may not always be the case. The FF index
provided by the state extension technique for Case 2 is larger than that in Case 1,
although the upper bound outage level for the generating units is increased f?om level 3
in Case 1 to level4 in Case 2.

The state extension technique, as shown in the describeci system studies, can provide
more accurate FP and FF indices than the basic technique, without investigating an
extensively large number of system states. The technique is based on extending the
information in the investigated system states. The effect of the extension can be obtained
only if there are system fidure states in the investigated systern states. The effect will be
large if many system failure states exist in the investigated system states. The technique
therefore provides particularly accurate overd system FP and FF indices at reasonably
high load levels, as the overall system FP and FF indices in these cases are usually large
compare-with the values at a single load point. The technique also provides accurate FP
and FF indices at 10ad points which have high FP and FF values. When the load level is
very low or the reliability level is high at some load points, additional system states
should be investigated in order to f S y utilize the state extension technique. The upper
bound values s h o w in the system studies provide important guidance in the estimates of
the FP and FF indices for both the overall systern and the load points.
4.5
Annual Adequacy Indices

EvaIuation of the annual adequacy indices in a composite power system involves
recognition of the chronological variations in the system loads. This c m result in a very
large required computation tirne. Smplined multi-level load models, together with
certain assumptions, are usually appfied in these cases. The required computation times
using multi-level load models c m stiU be very large compared with calculating
annualized adequacy indices at a single load leveL These basic concepts are discussed
earlier in Section 2.7.
A new approach was presented in Section 3.6, which can incorporate the actual
hourly load variation or duration curves directly in the evaluation of the annual adequacy
indices of bulk power systems. The new technique involves ody a single constant load
level in the system state analysis using a network solution technique. It can therefore
provide the m u a l adequacy indices with less required computation time compared with
the traditional approach using a multi-level load model. The new technique provides
consistent tight upper bounds of the annual adequacy indices.
This section provides applications of the new technique to the RBTS and the IEEERTS. The adequacy indices of FP, EENS, FF and ELC are used in this section to
Uustrate the technique. The state extension technique illustrated in Section 4.4 is
&O
appIied to calculate the annual values of the four basic adequacy indices. The annual FP,
EENS, FF and FD indices can be evaluated using Equation (3.13) when the state
extension technique is not applied. When the state extension technique is applied, the
four indices are calculated as foliows.
where
F1 k the set of investigated system faiure states excluding those in the boundary
outage level,
F2 is the set of system m u r e states in the boundary outage level
F1 + F2 = F is the set of all investigated systern M u r e st~tes,

tsi is the total t h e (hours) in which the load is greater than the available capacity
at a specsc load bus in system state si,
Lk is the hourly peak load in one year at the specific load bus in system state si,
Csi is the available capacity at the specifc load bus in system state si,
subscript sj+ is designated as state s j subtree, and

the other symbols are the same as before.
The approach of u s h g a multi-step load model is also used to calculate the annual
adequacy indices of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS for the purpose of cornparison with
the new technique. The formulation used in the step load approach is given in Equation
(3.12). When the state extension technique is considered, Equation (3.12) is mod5ed
and is as follows.
where
L,., is the load curtaihnent at a specific load bus or for the overd system in the
system state si.

The seven-step load model shown in Table 4.2 has been used for both the RBTS
and the IEEE-RTSin this section. The Ioad model data for the IEEE-RTSare given in
Table 2.1 and shown graphically in Fig. 2.1 0.
Table 4.2. A seven-step load model
The FP, FF, ELC and EENS indices at the Ioad points and for the overall system for
both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS were calculated using the seven-step load mode4
using Equation (4.10) and using the single constant peak load model (for annualized
indices). The results are illustrated, compared and analyzed in the following.
EvaIuation of the B T S
The system states with up to three components (generators or transmission Enes) on

outage were investigated in the evaluation of the RBTS. Fig. 4.28 and Fig. 4.29 show
the load point FP and FF indices obtained using the three techniques. The two graphs
that the new technique provides slightly higher FP and FF values at buses 2, 3 and
sh~w
4 than the step load technique, but much lower indices than the amualized values. The
new technique and the step Ioad model both provide nearly zero FP and FF values at bus
RBTS load point FP,3G+3L
Load buses
Fig. 4.28. Failure probabilities at the RBTS load buses using the three methods
R8TS Ioad point FF, 3W3E
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
O step load meth&

W the new method
*
- - - - - - -
Load buses
Fig. 4.29. Fdure fiequencies at the RBTS load buses using the three methods
5 and both provide almost the same FP and FF values at bus 6. As noted earlier the new
technique provides upper bound annual adequacy indices. It is therefore easy to
understand how the FP and FF values provided by the new technique c m be larger than
those obtained using the step load model for situations such as at buses 2, 3 and 4. The
reason that the new technique does not provide larger FP and FF values at bus 6 is that
failwe at bus 6 is dominated by bus isolation, which is not associated with the load
levels. The two graphs show that the new technique provides acceptable annual FP and
FF indices.
Fig. 4.30 and Fig. 4.3 1 show the load point ELC and EENS indices obtained using
the three techniques. The two graphs show that the new technique, compared with the
step load mode4 provides marginally larger ELC and EENS values at buses 3 and 4,
nearly the same values at buses 2 and 5, and slightly smaller ELC and EENS values at
bus 6. The two graphs also show that the annual ELC and EENS values provided by
both the new technique and the step load model are much lower than the annualized
values. Although the ELC and EENS values at bus 6 provided by the new technique are
lower than the values provided by the step load technique, the statement that the new
technique provides upper bound annual adequacy indices still applies. The new technique
in this situation provides accurate annual indices, as the M u e at bus 6 is dominated by
bus isolation or by transmission constraints. The step load technique provides larger
RBTS Ioad point ELC,3-3L
Load buses
Fig. 4.30. Expected load curtailed at the RBTS load buses using the three methods
RBTS load point EENS, 3G+3L
Load Buses
Fig. 4.3 1 . Expected energy not supplied at the RBTS load buses
using the three methods
annual ELC and EENS values at bus 6, due to the fact that only seven load steps are
applied in the evaluation. The step load technique can provide larger or lower annual
adequacy indices in ditfernt situations. The new technique, however, provides
consistent tight upper bounds of the annual adequacy indices. The new technique usually
provides more accurate annual adequacy indices in those situations in which the system
failures corne fiom trammission system constraints and provides less accurate annual
indices due to generating capacity deficiencies.
Il8
Fig. 4.32 - Fig. 4.35 show the overd system FP, FI?, ELC and EENS indices for
the three techniques. The four graphs clearly show that the new technique provides
acceptable annual adequacy indices. The required computation time associated with the
new tec'hique is comparable with that required to calculate the annualized indices.
RBTS overaii system FP,3 W 3 L
Overaii system
Fig. 4.32. Failure probabilities for the overall RBTS using the three methods
RBTS o v e r d system FF, 3G+3L
Overail system
Fig. 4.33. Failure fiequencies for the overall RBTS using the three methods
RBTS overaii system ELC,3G+3L
the new method

constant peak load
1~
Overali system
Fig. 4.34. Expected load curtailed for the overd RBTS using the three methods
RBTS overail system EENS,3G+3L
i
lstep load method
I
the new method
Overaii system index
Fig. 4.35. Expected energy not supplied for the overd RBTS using the three methods
Evaluation of the EEE-RTS

System states with up to four generating unis or thee transmission h e s or three
combined generating units and transmission lines on outage were investigated in the
evaluation of the IEEE-RTS. Fig. 4.36 and Fig. 4.37 present the load point FP and FF
indices obtained using the three techniques. The two graphs show that the new technique
provides considerably higher FP and FF values at some load buses (18 and 20) than
EEE-RTS load point FP,4Gt3L
I
the new method
Load buses
Fig.4.36. Failme probabilities at the IEEE-RTS load buses using the three methods
IEEERTS load point FF, 4G-f-3L

0step Ioad method
constant peak Ioad
10
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
toad buses
Fig. 4.37. Failure fkequencies at the IEEE-RTS load buses usuig the three methods
those obtaied using the step load model- The FP aid FF values, however, are stilI much
lower than the annualized values. The main reason that the step load model provides
lower FP and FF values is that the technique is bas& on the assumption that all loads
vary sImdtaneously. The reason that the new technique provides higher FP and FF
values is that the IEEE-RTS system faimes are primarily due to generating capacity
deficiencies, and the transmission system is relatively strong.
Fig. 4.38 and Fig. 4.39 show the load point ELC and EENS indices obtained using
the three techniques. The two graphs show the same tendencies as for the FP and FF
indices in Fig. 4.36 and Fig. 4.37. The new technique, compared with the step load
model provides quite large ELC and EENS values at buses 18 and 20, but they are
i u c h lower than the correspondhg annualized values. The rationale for the new
\-
technique providing much higher ELC and EENS values at some load buses than those
using the step load mode1 is the same as that for the FP and FF indices.
IEEERTS load point ELC, 4Gt3L
Bconstant peak load
10
13
14
15
16
1%
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 4.38. Expected load curtded at the IEEE-RTS load buses using the three methods
IEEE-RTS load point EENS, 4G+3L
Load buses
Fig. 4.39. Expected energy not supplied at the IEEE-RTS load buses
Fig. 4.40 - Fig. 4.43 show the overall system FP, FF, ELC and EENS indices using
the three techniques. The four graphs clearly show that the new technique provides
upper bound m u a l adequacy indices, which are much lower than the correspondmg
annualized indices. The accurate annual adequacy indices should lie between the values
provided by the new technique and the values provided by the seven-step load method.
The required computation t h e for the new technique, however, is comparable to that
required to calculate the annualized indices and is approxmiately seven times lower than
the time required for the seven-step load approach.
JEEE-RTS overaii system FP,4Gt3L
Ci step load method
O v e r d system
Fig. 4.40. Failure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS using the three methods
RBTS overaU system FF, 3G+3L
C3 step load method

W the new method
E3 constant peak load
Overaii system
Fig. 4.41. Failure fiequencies for the overall IEEE-RTS using the three methods
IEEERTS overall system ELC, 4G+3L
O step loar
I
the new
constant peak load
Fa
Overaii system
Fig. 4.42. Expected load curtded for the overall IEEE-RTS using the hree methods
IEEE-RTSoverall system EENS,4W3L
the new methocl
O v e r d system index
Fig. 4.43. Expected energy not supplied for the overall IEEE-RTS
This chapter presents the results of extensive system studies conducted on the
RBTS and the IEEE-RTS.The RBTS and the IEEE-RTS are bnefly introduced and
desmibed in the chapter. The three advanced techniques presented in Chapter 3 are
successively applied to the evaluation of the two test systems. The numerical indices
obtained using the various methods and the cornparisons and analyses given in this
chapter provide fiirther insight into the basic concepts of the anaIytical approach, the
presented techniques, the basic adequacy indices, and the factors that affect the final
results.
Four equations are used to cdculate the system load bus and overall system faiure
fiequencies of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. The results clearly show that the two new
equations provide consistent tight lower and upper bounds of the fidure fiequency index
at both the load buses and for the overd system. The tight lower and upper bounds can
be combined to give a much improved evaluation of the fdure fequency together with
an exact maximum error limit. The range of the error lirnit depends on the number of
investigated system states in a specific systern adequacy analysis.
The state extension technique is applied in this chapter to cdculate the failure
probability and fkquency indices of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS at both the load buses
and for the overall system. The results show that the state extension technique provides
much improved estimates of the fdure probability and f?equency indices for the two test
systerns without requiring the investigation of a very large number o f the system states.
The results
&O
show that the improvement due to the state extension technique is
considerable when the values of the indices are large and is not as pronounced when the
values of the indices are small. This reflects the fct that the state extension technique is
based on extending the investigated system fidure states. The effect of the extension
technique can be obtained only if system fdure states exist in the investigated system
states. The effect will be large if there are many system Mure states in the investigated
system states. The technique therefore provides particularly accurate Wure probability
and fiequency indices for overall system reliability evaluation at reasonably high load
levels, as the overail spstem indices in these cases are usually large compared with the
values at a single load point. The technique also provides accurate f d u r e probabiiity and
frequency indices at load points which have high index values. When the load level is
very low or the reliability level is high at some load points, more system states should be
investigated to fully utilize the state extension technique. The upper bound values,
however, provide important guidance on the estimates of the M u r e probability and

fiequency indices for both the overall system and the load buses.
Four basic adequacy indices for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS were calculated and
are displayed in this chapter. The indices were obtained using the new algorithm for
annual adequacy indices and the conventional step load and annualized approaches. The
four indices are calculated for both the load buses and the overall systems. The state
extension technique was applied in the caiculation The results clearly show that the
developed dgorithm effectively pro vides consistent tight upper bounds on the mual
values of the four indices. The required computation time for the new technique is
comparable to that required to dculate the annualized indices and is approximately
seven times lower than that required in the seven-step load approach. The technique c m
also be used together with a multi-level load mode1 to provide more accurate annual
adequacy indices. The required computation t h e s using the new algorithm are greatly
reduced compared with previous approaches. .
Concepts and Methods of Adequacy Equivalents

5.1
Introduction
Applications of quantitative reliability techniques in bulk power system planning,
design and operation are increasing. These applications, in addition to many others,
provide numerical input to the detemination of system requirements, to the examination
of alternative configurations, arid to the safe and economic planning of system
operatiom. In many of these applications, however, the requirement o f large
computation times is still a major burden. This is particularly true when the studied
system is large (interconnected multi-area b d k power systems) and detailed andysis is
required.
The required computation t h e s can, however, be signiscantly decreased when the

unchanging portion of a system is replaced by a reduced equivalent model. These
reduced models can be designated as reliability or adequacy equivdents. They can prove
v q useful in the evaluation of large systems where sensitivity studies are to be
performed on a portion of the system, or when the system is to be interconnected to

another system which is to be studied in detail [6 1-7O,91-94]. These situations arise quite
frequently in bulk power system applications. The concept of adequacy equivalents is a
practical extension of the normal pro cess of a power system adequacy evaluation, which
can prove extremely effective and useful in large composite power system adequacy
analyses.
Thw chapter illustrates the concepts and methods associated with the development
of various adequacy equivalents and the application of equivdents in composite power
system adequacy analyses.
5.2
Basic Concepts
An adequacy equivalent is a reduced mode1 which is eqvalent or approximately
equivalent to the original model in a specifed reliability sense [62,63]. The two basic
techniques in adequacy equivalent development cm be designated as network reduction
and state reduction [91]. The network reduction technique c m be used to reduce a
practical complex system to a simple network using a sequential process, while the state
reduction technique represents a cornplex systern by a nurnber of equivalent systm
states containing the essential parameters.
The network reduction equivalent concept is straightforward and easy to
undustand. The technique is useful for hand calculations, for simpWji.ng practical
complex power systems into appropriate models and for many other power system
applications. It is widely used in the reliability evaluation of radial distribution systems
and substations. It is also used in composite system adequacy analysis for simpl@hg
original complex systerns into elemental models. The state reduction equivdent
technique is a more general approach which c m be applied in a wide range of power
system reliability problems. The two techniques are illustrated in the following by
application to simple two-component systems and to one-component systerns with
spares in which a more complex component model is required [9 11. Practical applications
of the concepts in composite system adequacy analysis are also desm'bed.
Network reduction
Series and parallel connections are the basic network connections in many electnc
systems. The essence of the network reduction technique is to apply a set of equations
developed for a series system in which dl components must operate for systern success,
and for a parallel redundant system in which only one component needs to work for
system success. These equations are then used to reduce a more complicated network to
a simple equivalent.
The availability and unavailabity of a single component represented by a two-state

model is given by
where
and ~i are the faiiure and repair rates of component , respectively.
Equation (5.1) uidicates that a single two-state cumponent can be completely

determined by its availability, Mure and repair rates. Any two parameters can be used to
give the third one. For a two-component series system as shown in Fig. 5.1, the
availability of the system, assuming component independence, is the product of the

individual component availabilities, which must be equal to the availability of the
equivalent component. That is
Fig. S. 1 . Simple series system
The series system fails when any one component fa&. The failure rate for the
equivalent component is therefore equal to the sum of the two component M u r e rates,
Applying Equation (5.1) to the equivalent cornponent, the repair rate for the
equivdent can be calculated by
where ri = 1/pi, i=1,2, is the average repair time of component i-
Using the logic expressed in Equations (5.3) and (54,the quivalent faiure and
repair rates of a general n-component series system c m be calculated as
Similar equations to those developed for series system equivalents can be developed
for pardel systems. Fig. 5.2 shows a simple two-component parallef redundant
configuration. It should be appreciated that if the configuration shown in Fig. 5.2 is not
redundant, i.e. the system fi&
when one cornponent fhils, then in a reliability sense the
configuration is a series system regardless of the physical connections.
The system M u r e probability or unavailability in this case is give~.

by the product of
the component unavailabilities, which is
Fig. 5.2. Simple pardel snjtem
The equivalent repair rate is the sum of the two component repair rates, i-e.
Applying Equation (5.1) to the equivalent component, the equivalent M u r e rate can
The equations for the equivalent component H u r e rates and repair rates in series
and paranel configurations can be applied repeatedly to reduce a series-pardel
cofiguration to a single component equivalent for use in fiutha studies. In the case of
more complicated or non-series-pardel configurations, Other t ethniques such as the
minimal cut set approach can be used to convert the configuration to a series-pardel
representation. In many applications, it is usual to represent the repair process by the
average repair time (r) rather than the repair rate (p).
State reduction
The network reduction technique is basically appIicable to systems containing twostate component rnodeis. The state reduction technique c a . be applied to a wide range of
system reliability problam, as the technique is based on a complete analysis of all the
possible system States. The technique is iUustrated by the following example.
In some systems, the restoration of a component to an in-service state takes place in

two distinct phases such as the removal and repai. phases followed by a re-installation
phase [3]. Recognition of this two-stage process can be important in systems that have
one or more spare components. Fig. 5.3 shows the state space diagram for such a single
component system with no spare, where h, p and v are the component filure, repair and
Fig. 5.3. Single component with no spare
Fig. 5 -4. Equivalent two-state model
installation rates respectively. This three-state model can be reduced to the equivalent
two-state model shown in Fig 5.4.
The equations derived for network reduction do not apply in this case, as the system
availabrlity cannot be simply obtabed. The system availability can be obtained using the
general Markov state space technique descriied in Chapter 2 and is equal to the
availability in the equMent two-state modei. This is
The equivalent fdure rate
A,
for the system shown in Fig. 5.3 is the rate of
deparhue fiom state 1 to states 2 and 3, which is
The quivalent repair rate is
This example can be extended to indude the development of equivalent model

parameters for the case in which a spare component exists and c m be used ifavailable to
replace the faied cumponent. The state space model for this case is shown in Fig. 5.5.
Fig. 5.5. Single component with one spare
The system availability is the sum of the steady state probabilities p, and ps4, and is
as follows 131.
P e = Psi
+Ps4
2p2v2 + 2 p 2 ~+( p)
~ 2hpv2
+ D
D
where D = h2 v 2 +2p(h+~)(h+v)(p+v).
The system fdure fiequency must be equal for both the complete model and the
equivalent model i.e.
As p, = p , ~+ ps4 ,the above equation gives
The equivdent repair rate is
In practical power system adequacy analysis, a complex system is not usudy

reduced to a single equivalent component ushg the network reduction technique or
reduced to a two-state mode1 using the state reduction technique. The network reduction
technique c m be used locdy to reduce a complex system into a simpler one in which the
major system wmponents remain and the effects of the major components on the system
adequacy can be frther andyzed. A generator-transformer group, for example, is

usually represented by an equivalent generator in composite power system adequacy
analysis. Station originated events c m be represented by developing a station equivalent,
in which the network reduction technique is used. Station equivalent development is

presented in Section 5.9.
The state reduction technique can be used to represent a complex power system by
a nurnber of equivalent states containing the essential parameters. The number of
equivalent states can be large if high accuracy is required, or small if efficiency of the
systern adequacy evaluation is important. The decision on the appropriate size of an
equivalent is dependent upon the intent behind the system adequacy analysis.
The system state space diagram for a two-cornponent system, in which each
component is represented as a two-state mudel and the components are assumed to be
independent, is shown in Fig. 2.3 and is redram in Fig. 5.6. The essential parameters are
shown in Table 5.1. The four states of the system can be reduced to a two-state
equivalent based on the component connections. In many situations, however, states 2
and 3 cannot be simply categorized as m u r e or success states. They could perhaps be
combined and designateci as a new derated state. A tbree-state equivalent of the twocomponent system can then be formed and is shown in Table 5.2. The system state
probabilities, repair and failure rates can be generally calculated for an n-component
Fig. 5.6. State space diagram for the two-cornponent systern

Table 5.1. Essentiai state parameters
Systern state
li
4
Probability
Repair rate
Psi
Pi- P2
q1- P2
pl.'+:
91-42
Failure rate
1; 1
hi
h+h2
Ctl+P2
Table 5.2. A three-state equivalent

Systern
Probability
&pi& &te
Faiiure Rate
State
Psi
PI.Pz
Crn
hn.
1 (Normal)
2 @erated)
3 (Failure)
q r ~ 2 ~ ~ i - *ea l - p 1 + a z k
41-92
Pl+Ct2
*ai= q i ~ z (/ ~ I P ~ + P ~ Q )
hlf
*al-L2+aZ-hl
O
a 2 = ~ 1 (~~ /I P ~ + P I Q )
system using Equation (5.14), if component independence exists. System state

combination c m be conducted using Equation (5.1 5).
Psi =
Psi =
hsi =
I I P ~IIsm
EU
rn~D
CCL~
meD
Cl,
EU
Pse =
Psi
1 -.Psi
ieE Pse
L e = z - -Psih ,
iEE Pse
where
is the set of in-service components in date i,
is the set of out-of-service components in state i,
pk and hk are the availability and fidure rate of component k respectively,
q, and K, are the unavailability and repair rate of component m respectively.
is a set of the system states that c m be combined as or reduced to one

equivalent state.
A practical multi-state equivalent of a power system, in addition to containhg the
parameters of the state probability, repair and failure rates, also contains available
capacity parameters associated with each equivalent state. Other important parameters
can also be included in an equivalent in various power system adequacy analyses. Several
equivalent models are descnbed in the foUouing section.
5.3
Equivalent Models
The primary objective of developing a reliability equivalent is to reduce a complex
system to a simpler fom while retaining the essentid reliability elernents required for
f.urther evaluation It is therefore important to detemiine what are the essential
parameters which must be retained and which parameters can be discarded. This
reduction pro cess c m take various approaches for dBrent applications [6 1,641.
A power network, when analyzed using an equivalent approach, can be generdy
divided into two areas, the Area of Interest (AI) and the Interconnecteci Area (LA) as
shown in Fig. 5.7. The overd network can then be considered m the f o m shown h Fig.
5.8, which ako represents the situation for two intercomected power systems. The IA
may sometime contain physically separate areas. In this situation, it is possible to

consider several IA connected to the AI. The situation of two LA connected to the AI is
shown in Fig. 5.9. The situation of one IA is however considerd in this thesis to
illustrate the equivalent approach. There are no conceptual difnculties in considering
multi-IA situations.
Interconnected
Fig. 5.7. A power network-dividedinto two areas
Interconnected
--
Fig. 5.8. A network represented by two interconnected areas
Fig. 5.9. A network represented by two-IA and one AI
The simple network shown in Fig. 3.7 is fiirther used to illustrate the composite
power system equivalent technique. This system serves as the IA and it is connected to
another system (the AI) at bus 3 thmugh a -le
tie line. The entire system is shown in
Fig. 5.10. The objective is to develop an equivalent for the IA at bus 3, which c m then
be used to conduct an adequacy evduation of the AI c o ~ e c t e dat bus 3 through the tie
line.
Bus 3 rw
-
Fig. 5.1 0. A simple equivalent example

The essential parameters for the IA are shown in Table 5.3, assuming that system
States up to level2 are investigated. The system state probability, repair and M u r e rates
shown in Table 5.3 were calculated using Equation (2.7) or Equation (5.14) and are
given in Table 3.12. The system state available capacities in column 3 of Table 5.3 are
the available capacities shown in Table 3.12 minus the 115 MW load connected at the
bus 3. The available capacities in Table 5.3 are the available capacities for expoa to the
AI after satis*g
aII the IA system Ioad. The avdable capacities designated in Table
3.12 are those for meeting the bus loads.

A system state available capacity can be positive or negative, as shown in Table 5.3.
It can also be zero although Table 5.3 does not contain such a state. A positive available
capacity indicates that the network has extra power which can be made available to the
AI. A negative available capacity means that the power network needs power support
fiom other soinces or load curtailment must be applied. A zero available capacity
-
indicates that the power system is m balance.
Table 5.3. Essential parameters for the IA

Elem.
Avail. capacity
out
G1
G1,Gl
GI,G2
G1,LI
G 1,L2
G1,L3
G2
G2,G2
G2,Ll
G2U
G2,U
L1
L1,L2
L1,L3
L2
uu
U
25
5
- 15
-25
5
-29
-20
-5
-3 5
-5
-29
-20
25
-55
-20
-29
-1 15
-20
Psi
0.85692158
0.03462309
0.00052459
0.00364454
0.000 12648
O.OOOlS8 10
0.0001 1857
0.09020227
0.00237374
0.0003295 1
0.0004 1188
0.00030891
0.003 13030
0.00001430
0.0000 1072
0.0039 1288
0.0000 1340
0.00293466
The system states that have the same available capacities can be combined to give a
reduced table, as these system states have the same effect on the adequacy in the AI.
This wmbination is done using Equation (5.15). Table 5.4 has been developed fiom
Table 5.3 by making the possible combinations and is designated as the mode1 1
equivalent of the given IA.
Table 5 -4. Mode11 quivalent

vai il. capacity
0
1
-1 15-00
-55.00
-35.00
-29.00
-25.00
-20.00
-15.00
-5.00
5.00
25.00
The model 1equivalent given in Table 5.4 does not uiclude any information on the
systern state outage level, which can sometime be an important factor in considering the
obtained adequacy indices and in determining sigdicant mure patterns. Practical
composite systern adequacy evaluation is n o d y asso ciated with the investigation of

systern states up to certain specified outage levels. The system state outage Ievel
information shown in co1um.n 2 of Table 5.3 c m be expressed using numerical values as
shown in column 2 of Table 5.5, in which the lefi digit hdicates the number of
transmission lines on outage and the right digit indicates the number of generators on
outage in each equivalent systern state. For instance, 01 indicates zero lines and one
generator on outage, 10 indicate one h e and no generators on outage, and 11 indicates
one h e and one grnerator on outage.
Table 5.5. Including outage level information
Outage
level
Psi
Mer including the system state outage level information shown in Table 5.5, the
equivalent state combination is restricted to the equivalent states which have both the
same outage levels and the same available capacities. The equivalent including the systern
state outage levels is designated as the model II equivalent and is shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6. Model II equivalent

Avail- capacity
-1 15-00
-55.00
-35.00
-29.00
-29.00
-25.00
-20.00
-20.00
-20.00
-15.00
-5.00
-5.00
5.00
5.00
25.00
25.00
The mode1 II q ~ v a l e n shown

t
in Table 5.6 contains more states than the mode1 I
equivalent shown in Table 5.4.
The two developed equivalent models contain constant available capacity values,
which do not consider possible load curtailments in the IA which would provide more
available capacity to the AI. It is possible that when there is a capacity deficiency in the
AI, load curtailment will be conducted in both the AI and the LA. The available capacities
of the IA will increase when Ioad curtailment is conducted in the IA.This could occur
when all the loads of the LA and AI have the same pnority, in which case Ioad
curtailments will occur throughout the entire network including both the IA and the AI.
In order to consider this requirement, the available capacity parameter can be expressed
in the form of equivalent generation and equivalent load [61,66,92]. The equivalent
generation and load are deined as follows.
Eouivalent generation is the capacity available at the boundary buses assuming
that all the system load is zero.
Eauivalent load is the equivalent generation minus the capacity available at the
boundary buses afler satisfying the load danand of the system.
The system available capacity is equd to the equivalent generation minus the
equivalent load. Load curtailment cm now be implemented on the equivalent load, which
approximately represent the load curtailment in the LA. This equivalent representation is
designatecl as the mode1 III equivalent and is shown in Table 5.7. In this situation, the
system states which can be combined using Equation (5.15) are those that have the same
O utage
level, equivalent generation and quivalent Ioad.

Table 5.7. Mode1 III equivalent
Outage
level
20
20
02
11
10
02
11
20
10
02
O1
Il
01
11
O0
1O
Equiv. gen. Equiv. load
0.00
60.00
80.00
86.00
86.00
90.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
100.00
110.00
1 10.00
120.00
120.00
140.00
140.00
115.00
115.00
1 15-00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
115.00
1 15-00
1 15.00
The IA equivalent can be utilized for adequacy evaluation of the AI, considering the
effect of the IA. If the applied load curtailment philosophy is that the component outages
occurred in the LA should not cause any load curtailment in the AI, the negative available
capacities of the IA equivalent will have the same impact on the AI as the zero available
capacities. This policy is applied in many interconnected power systems. In a composite
power system, load curtailment is u w d y restricted to as close as possible to the system
problem location, or in other words, system problems should not be allowed to spread
out. This is aIso true for intercomected composite systems in which each area is
controlled by or belongs to an independent electric ut.jlity- The system states with
negative and zero available capacities in this situation c m be combined into one
equivalent state. This equivalent representation is designated as the model IV equivalent.

The model PI equivalent of the example system is shown in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8, Mode1 IV equivalent
--
Si
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Outage
level
02
11
01
20
10
01
11
00
I0
psi
0.00654287
0.00132697
0.09020227
0.00003842
0.00684754
0.03462309
0.00012648
0.85692158
0.00313030
The developed equivalent models can be used in a wide range of situations,

including considering different system operation policies. The choice of the equivalent
model depends on the actual composite system operating philosophy and the specific
system adequacy evaluation. The possible adequacy equivalent models can be very large
for a practical composite power system and in particular when a load flow technique is
used in developing the equivalents. An equivalent rounding technique can be used to
reduce the equivalents to suitable sizes for adequacy equivalent applications. This
rounding technique is described in the following section.
5.4
Equivalent Rounding
The equivalent of a practical composite system may contain a very large number of
states corresponding to the discrete available capacities. This number can be reduced by
rounding the discrete available capacities using a capacity rounding increment [2]. The
rounding increment used depends upon the desired accuracy. The final rounded
equivalent contains available capacity values that are multiples of the rounding
increment. The equivalent size decreases as the rounding increment increases, with a
corresponding decrease in accuracy. The procedure for equivalent rounding is illustrated

using the following example.
143
A simple systern consists of two 3 MW and one 5 MW generators. The generators

have repair rates of 98 occurrences/year and the hilure rates of 2 occurrencedyear. The
system does not contain any transmission fcilities and is actually a generation system
model which can be seen as a specifc situation of a composite system. This simple
example was used in [2] to illustrate the technique for rounding a generating capacity
outage probability table. The rounding technique presented in this section for composite
system adequacy equivalents is an exension of the rounding technique for generating

capacity outage p r o b a b w tables.
The mode1 1 equivalent of the system is shown in Table 5-9. The equivaient c m be
reduced to one containing only available capacities of 0, 5, 10, and 1 1 MW, when a 5
MW rounding increment is used. The I l MW available capacity is a boundary state

which is not rounded. I f this boundary state is rounded to 10 MW and 15 MW, the 1 5
MW available capacity state is not physically realizable as the total system available
capacity is only 1 1 MW. The rounding process is shown in Table 5.10. The f i r d rounded
equivalent is obtained fiom Table 5.10 using Equation (5.15) and is shown in Table 5.1 1.
Table 5.9. Mode1 1equivalent before rounding
System
Avail. capacity
Repair rate
Probabiiity
state
occe
F d u e rate
(occ./y)
Table 5.10. Rounding process

System
A d . capacity
state
0-0
Probabili.
0.000008
Repair rate
Failure rate
Table 5. I 1. Mode1 1equivalent after roundmg

System
state
1
2
3
4
Avail. capacity
PrObability
0
0.0
5.0
10.0
11-0
0.0004784
0.0275968
0.0307328
0.941 1920
Repair rate
Failure rate
(OCC-/Y)
( ~ J Y )
1,1799
2.1534
2.4000
6.0000
120.5498
55.5148
58.8000
0.0000
The general approach for rounding the equivalent state probability, repair and M u r e
rates is shown in Equation (5.16) by application to the state probabilities.
where
Ci is the available capacity of state i wbich is between the required rounding

available capacities Cjand Ck, and
CAis the rounding increment.
This equation is the same as the equation used for rounding the generating capacity
probabilities given in [2]. The system state repair and f'ailure rates c m be rounded in a
similar way. The combinations between the equivalent states which have the same
available capacities are performed using Equation (5.1 5).
The equivalent rounding technique iliustrated on the model 1 equivalent can also be
applied to the other equivalent models. The reduction effect, however, rnay be decreased
when the systern state outage level is included in the equivalent model and the reduction
effect may be ikther decreased ifboth the systern outage levels and the quivalent load
parameters are included in the equivalent model.
The avdable capacity is an essential parameta in an adequacy equivalent for a
composite power system. This parameter can ody be obtained by solvhg the composite
system ushg a complex network solution technique. Methods for obtaining the available
capacities of a composite system equivalent are descnbed in the following two sections.
5.5
Network Solutions for Equivalents

There are two conceptudy different network solution techniques, i.e., the network
flow and the load fiow methods. These two methods have been desm'bed in Section 2.4.
The network flow, or trmportation mode1 has been applied in the adequacy equivalent
approach to composite system evaluation [64-681. The network flow technique can be
used to provide the value of maximum flow fkom a source to a sink. This value is directly
related to the avdable capacity required in the development of an adequacy equivalent.
The network flow technique is therefore ideally suited for fast network analyses when
obtaining an adequacy eqvalent, although the method is generally not as accurate as a
load flow approach.
A technique for obtaining a composite system adequacy equivalent using a d.c. Ioad
flow approach is presented in this section. The d.c. load flow technique descnbed in
Chapter 2 is a widely used network solution method in composite power system
adequacy analysis. It provides more accurate solutions than those obtauied using a
network flow method. The d.c. load flow technique, however, does not consider the
effects of the reactive power elements and bus voltage magnitude variations, which
requires an a.c. load flow approach. The proposed equivaient models in Section 5.3,
however, also do not mclude reactive power and bus voltage magnitude idormation or
effects. The basic concepts involved in usng the d.c. load flow technique for adequacy
equivalents can be extended to the a.c. load flow technique, if appropriate parameters
associated with the reactive power elements are included. As noted in Chapter 2, the d.c.
load flow method is a subset of the a.c. load flow technique, in which the active power
elements are considered. Active power considerations are usually the major concem in
composite system adequacy evaluation.
The objective of a network solution using the d.c. load flow technique is to
detamine the available capacity at the boundary buses in each system state. The d.c. load
146
flow technique cannot be used to directly provide this value as is the case when uskg the
network flow approach. Repeated d-c. load flow calculations are required in each system
state to obtah the desired available capacity. The RBTS [7 11 diagram shown in Fig. 4.1
is used to illustrate the technique. This diagram is redrawn in Fig. 5.1 1. An equivalent at
bus 1 is deveIoped. The available capacity at bus 1 in a given system state is equal to the
maximum load which can be connecte-d at bus 1 without causing any system problems in
the state. Assume that symbol E is designated as the given tolerance. The procedure for a
system state available capacity calculation at bus 1 can be stated as follows.
1.
Assume a load 8,equd to the available capacity at bus 1, is
C O M ~ Cat~bus
~
1.
The load La is initialized to zero, which indicates that initially there is no load
connected at bus 1 or the available capacity at bus 1 is zero. In a system state, ifbus
1 is isolated, the available capacity at bus 1 is then the maximum generathg capacity
at bus 1, othenvise the available capacity at bus 1 without considering the

transmission constraint is simply calculated and designated as Lm.
2.
Conduct a d.c. load flow calculation. If any system problems occur, corrective
action is taken to relieve the problems.
Fig. 5.1 1. The RBTS
Let La be equal to L m and then conduct a d.c. load flow cdculation. If no system
problems occur due to the load h,the calculation stops. Otherwise, let L n r L d 2
and L = L a - Lm If L m < E, the calculation stops.

Conduct a d.c. load fiow calculation. Let L e L d 2 .
If no system problems occur, let La=L+Lrn. If w

e
m problems occur, let b=LrLm.
If L m < E, the calculation stops, otherwise go to step 4.
The above procedure is applied to all the investigated system states. The systern
state available capacities c m then be obtained. In the case of more than one boundary
bus, the above procedure c m be applied to each boundary bus in sequence for each
system state. The nnal avdable capacity at al1 the boundary buses is the sum of the
calcdated individual boundary bus available capacities. An equivalent at buses 1 and 2
for the RBTS, for an example, can be obtained by frst applying the procedure to bus 1
and then, based on the result for bus 1 available capacity, to bus 2 for each system state.
The d.c. load flow approach takes more computation tirne than the network flow
approach. In the equivalent development, repeated calculations are required when using
the d.c. load flow technique. The required computation time using the d.c. load flow
technique can be much higher than that using the network flow rnethod in adequacy
equivalent development. Numerical examples using the RBTS are aven in the folIowing
section, which provide m e r insight into the drffrence between the equivalents
established using the network flow method and the d.c. load flow method.
5.6
Numerical Example
A mode1 IV equivalent for the RBTS at bus 1 has been established using the d.c.
load flow procedure given in Section 5.5. The equivalent contains 148 states in total,
which is large for the small RBTS system. The f k t twenty states of the equivalent are
shown in Table 5.12. System States with up to three components on outage have been
investigated. The total probability of the investigated system states is 0.99994349. The
maximum avdable capacity of the equivalent is lEnited to 50 MW, which is the carrying
Table 5.12. The RBTS equivalent usnig d.c. load flow

Repair Rate
WJF)
521.463451
341.252361
1215.628487
1946.666667
389.333333
1245.1 12676
1265.333333
1265.333333
584.000000
389.333333
1238.666667
1936.421053
1946.666667
532.038685
353.939394
1229.939394
353.939394
1229.939394
1946,666667
1070.666667
Fdure Rate
(=./yr.)
48.422832
5 1.287576
49.032622
47.600000
48.600000
45.834991
46.600000
49.600000
46.600000
50.600000
48.846575
44.494737
46.766667
50.417021
53.600000
50.885714
50.200000
46.141 176
46.616529
47.8857 14
--
capacity of the tie line between the IA and the AI. Systern state available capacities
which are higher than 50 MW have been curtailed to 50 MW. The frst four states in
Table 5.12 have the same zero available capacity but dif5erent component outage
situations. As the outage level numbers indicate, state 1 has three generators on outage,
state 2 has two generators on outage, state 3 has two generators and one transmission
h e on outage, and state 4 has one generator and two transmission lines on outage.
The available capacity values shown in Table 5.12 are very close each other. This is
the reason that the equivalent is relatively large for the small RBTS. If the system state
levels are not included in the equivalent, all the systern states that have the same available
capacity can be combined into one equivalent state. If the outage level information is not
included, the equivalent can be reduced to one containhg only 49 states. This equivalent
is shown in Table 5.13. If the equivalent is established using the network flow method, it
contains 53 states when the state outage level information is hcluded and 18 states when
Table 5.13. The reduced RBTS equivalent using d.c. load flow
State
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Repair Rate
Failme Rate
(=./yr-)
51.088471
48.473283
46.600000
49.600000
50.502 102
53.130991
49.6589 14
47.3 1O963
52.5913 16
49.409258
55.396484
51.423 1O8
45.498492
48.569739
46.014264
46.370768
48.599105
48.23851 1
5 1.414763
49.768367
50.134884
46.600000
48.088064
50.664586
53.370841
51-6OOO
50.414886
51.421374
55.4 164-44
50.148837
54.4533 19
48.700000
48.760772
52.570961
45.230161
48.IO7372
49.595931
50.607672
54.596584
52.062423
53.559732
5 1 S7987L
52.596694
56.596584
52.745566
53.594323
54.5979 19
58.596580
56.836820
the outage level information is not included. The 18-state equivalent established using
the network flow method is shown in Table 5.14 to provide a numerical cornparison.
rable 5.14. The reduced RBTS equivalent using network flow

Probabiiity
0.00833936
0.00142498
0.00000 137
0.00 141814
0.06958266
0.00007262
0.00002839
0.00000256
0.00 143270
0,00142515
0.06987221
0,00000008
0,00000014
0.00000005
0-00033778
0.00000266
0.01664502
0.82935534
Repair Rate
(=./Y)
388.0052
402,1573
1950.4645
401.33 19
206.279 1
1768.9894
561.9639
1935.5454
387.8 173
386.3 694
190.5268
263 1-5789
1 946.6937
1901 .fl-&l8
411,7118
1924.1927
216.8682
24.8204
The equivalent shown in Table 5.14 contains fewer capacity levels, as the
transmission line carrying capacities are the only constraints in the network flow
approach, while in the d.c. load low approach, the power balance equations must be
satisfied. The equivalents established using the d.c. load flow technique contain many
more states than those established using the network fIow method. The need to appIy the
rounding technique descri'bed in Section 5.4 is much stronger in the d-c. load flow
approach than in the network fiow approach to developing a composite system
equivalent.
U'hen applying the rounding technique to both Tables 5.13 and 5.14 and assuming
the rounding uicrement is 5 MW, both equivalents are reduced to 11 states, as shown in
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 respectively. The equivalent state fiequencies are also calculated
using Equation (2.8) and are included in Tables 5.15 and 5.16. Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13
respectively show the equivalent state probabilities and fiequencies obtained using the
d.c. load flow and the network flow methods and the ciifference between the equivalents.
Table 5.15. The rounded RBTS equivalent using d.c. load flow
Repair Rate
(occ.&.)
Failure Rate
(occ./yr.)
50.466132
52.0583 18
53.33 1452
47.577901
5:.-244751
54.969456
55.370072
54.035W
54.918342
58.261191
58 -543677
Table 5.16. The rounded RBTS equivalent using network fiow

Repair Rate
State
(occ./yr.)
(occ./yr.)
388.005190
403.347287
401.631165
207.582794
981.853154
390.026617
386.369419
190.530683
414,751171
217.08645 1
24.82043 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Failure Rate
49.367837
49.226923
5 1 .228318
53.221703
49.268894
51.337070
53.343720
55.342889
52.511517
54.5 16557
5 8-475742
RBTS equivalent at bus 1,3G+3L
IO
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Available capacity (MW)
Fig. 5.1 2. RBTS equivalent state probabilities
50
RBTS Equivdent at bus 1,3G+3L
80
70
'
5 6 0
50
40
(t:
a
30
*
20
ro
O
O
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Avaable capacity (MW)
Fig. 5.1 3. RBTS equivalent state fiequencies
Based on the equivalents given in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, it is not possible to state
which equivalent is more accurate than the other. In generai, an equivalent with a large
number of states is more accurate but less efficient in use than an equivalent containing a
sinall number of states. When the rounding increment increases, the number of equivalent
states decreases. Determination of the rounding hcrement depends upon the specifc
systern and the intention and requirement for the system studies.
The developed equivalents can be used for the purpose of adeqilacy evaluation of an
AI comected to an IA. Section 5.7 describes the developed technique. Practical
applications of equivalents in test systern adequacy studies are shown in Chapter 6 to
provide lkther insight into adequacy equivalent development and utilization.
5.7
Utilization of Equivalents
An adequacy equivalent can be perceived as a multi-state generator with or without
the equivdent load depending on the mode1 used. From a topological viewpoint, an
equivalent is smiply a single bus with a multi-state generator representing the IA
available capacities in Merent system states. When the IA is represented by its
equivalent, the entire systern has the form shown in Fig. 5.14. The preceding examples
assumed only one tie line between the
IA and the AI for simplicity. There can, however,
be many tie lines in actual application. The normal process of composite system
Fig. 5.14. Topological equivalent representation
adequacy evaluation descnbed in Chapters 2 and 3 can be applied without any

conceptual difEcuIties to the system s h o w in Fig. 5.14. One specsc feature of the
system in Fig. 5.14 is that there is an additional multi-state generator, which was not
considered earlier. The approach used to soive this specifk composite systern is as
foIlows.
An adequacy analpis using the normal process d e s m i e d in the preceding chapters
is conducted on the AI. In this situation, the system state probabilityyrepair and faiure
rates can be calculated using Equation (2.7). The effect of the equivalent multi-state
generator is kluded by convolving tlie equivalent states with the AI states to create the
combined system states.
If the to t d nurnber of the equivalent states is Q~and the total number of the s y s t m
states for the AI and the tie lines is G,then the tota1 number of the system states for the
entire system is Q~x
%i.
W the % x nai states must be analyzed separately using an
appropriate network solution technique. The seventy of each system state is calculated
and the adequacy indices obtained by s u d g the severities of al1 the system states aBer
the analysis. The outage levels are usually specSed in a given system analysis. The
system state probabilities and the system state repair and mure rates are the basic
elements in the calculation [2,6 1,663.
Let Lq@, pqU),
and
ndequ)be the outage level, the correspondhg probabilityy
rep& and Mure rates of state j for the IA equivalent respectively, and L&),
P,(i),
bi(i)and A&)
be the outage level, the corresponding probability, repair and Mure rates
of state i for the AI and the tie lines respectively. The entire system state outage levek,
probabilities, repair and fidure rates can be cdculated using Equation (5. 17).
where i = 1, 2, ..., w, j = 1, 2,...,%, k = ( i - l ) -%+j.

Fig. 5.15 shows a very simple system used for numerical illustration of the
equivalent method. The IA is originally the IA network shown in Fig. 5.10. The
equivalent shown in Table 5.8, wnich has 9 equivalent states, is used in this example. The
AI contains one generator G, one transmission line LI and the tie line L2. Assume that
L 1 and L2 have no capacity limitations.
There will be four system states in the AI, if cornponent outages up to level one are
considered. The situations of no cornponents on outage and only L2 on outage can be
excluded fiom the analysis, as the load demand cari be saxisfied by generator G and there
will be no contnbutiori to the adequacy indices from these two situations. The two
j: Equiv. states
'
rea of Interest
Fig. 5.1 5. Topological equivalent representation for the example system

155
system states with only G on outage and only L 1 on outage are combined with the 9-
state quivalent to give a total of 18 system states for the entire system of Fig. 5.15.
Assume the repair and fidure rates of the generator G are 99 occ./y and 1 occ./y
respectively, and the repair and Mure rates of the transmission line L 1 are 998 occ./y
and 2 occ./y respectively. The numerlcal, r e d t s are shown in Table 5.17. The system
adequacy indices can be obtained using the values shown in Table 5.17 and the
dennitions given in Section 2.8. The outage level information aven in Table 5.17 can be
usai to determine the adequacy indices for different outage levels.
Table 5.1 7. Adequacy analysis of the system in Fig. 5.1 5
A d . capacity
Outage
level
02+0 1=03
1 lt-01=12
0l+O 1=02
204-01=21
10+01=11
Ol+O1=02
ll+01=12
00+0 1=0 1
10t01=ll
02-+1(2=12
11+10=21
Ol+10=ll
20+10=30
10-+10=20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
5.00
25.00
25.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
5.00
25.00
25.00
Ol+lO=ll
1l+10=21
00+10=10
10+10=20
5.8
Load curtaiied
(MW>
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
25.00
25.00
5.00
5.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
25.00
25.00
5.00
5-00
Cornmon-cause F a k e Equivalents
A cornmon-cause faiure is an event hawig a single extemal cause with multiple
fdure egects which are not consequences of each other 131. This event cannot be
directly included in the previously stated evaluation process in which component
independence is assumed, as the components involved in a common-cause failure are not
independent of each other in this situation. The involved components considered as an
entity are, however, independent of the rest of the composite s y s t a a A usual common156
cause mure in a power system is the situation of two transmission lines on a common
tower, which is bnefiy descnbed in Section 2.2. Two typical cornmon-cause fidure
models are shown in Fig. 2.4 and are redrawn in Fig. 5.1 6. The equivalent development
of the two models shown in Fig. 5.16 is illustratecl in the following.
Equation (5.14) cannot be directly applied to obtain the system state probabilities,
repair and M u e rates, when component independence does not apply. The system state
probabilities c m be calculated using Equation (2.3). The system state repair and fidure
rates can be calculated by
=
AU the entering transition rates to si

AU the leaving transition rates from si.
The transition rate matrix for the mode1 show in Fig. 5.16(a) is
Fig. 5.16. Two common-cause fidure models
The system state probabilities can be dculated fiom
The essentid parameters for the model shown Fig. 5.16(a) are given in Table 5.18.
Table 5.18 is the equivdent if the two parallel comected transmission h e s are not
identical. If the two lixles are identical, states 2 and 3 in Table 5-18 c m be combine&
using Equation (5.151, into one equivalent state. The three-state equivalent is shown in
Table 5.19.
Tcible 5.1 8. Essential parameters for the model in Fig. 5.16(a)
- Robability
Psi
Repair Rate
k
Failure Rate
2 lines
Psi
Line 2
Line 1
Nothing
PSZ
Pd
Ps4
PL
hl+L2+h 12
h2
System+
State
1
2
3
4
CL;!
Pi+P2+Pi2
h i .
1
Table 5.1 9. Equivdent for the model in Fig. 5.16(a)

State
1
2
3
Probabiiity
- Psi
Repair EWe
k
Failure Rate
Ps1
Pd+ P a
PA
hl+h2+J-12
PI
hI
Pr+P2+l.L12
C~L~IL*OIL
2 lines
1 Line
Nothing
The transition rate matrix for the mode1 in Fig. 5.16@) is
hsi
The system state probabilities can then be cdculated fiom
The essential parameters for the Fig. 5.16@) model are shown in Table 5.20. The
quivalent, assuming the two h e s are identical, is shown in Table 5.2 1.
Table 5.20. Essential parameters for the model in Fig. 5.160)
System
State
1
2
3
4
5
Connection
Probability
Repair Rate
Psi
Ps1
Pd
2 Iines
Line 2
Luie t
Nothing
Nothing
' Failure Rate

hsi
h+~2+hl2
h2
hI
Pr
ps3
P2
Pd
CL1+P2
Pd
CL12
O
O
Table 5.2 1. Equivalent for the model in Fig. 5.16(b)

State
Connectini
Probability
Psi
Rate
-air
1
2
2 lines
1 Line
P S ~ +P S ~
F1
Nothing
Pd+ Ps
m l - P4+Pl2 ps5Y
PSi
Failure Rate
hsi
k
O
h+h2+h2
AI
bs4f ~ s 5 )
5.9
Station Equivalents
Composite system adequacy evduation, as descnbed up to now, is concemed only
with the system generators and transmission lines, and does not consider any impacts
fkom switching or transformer station onginated events. The inclusion of stations in
composite system adequacy evaluation c m make the problem very large and very
complicated. The effects of the station onginated events can, however, be evaluated in
.
several approxHnate ways [2,75,76].
This section provides simple equivdents of some
station configurations in a network connection f o m These simple station equivalents

represent the critical effects of the major station M u r e events and can be combined with
the related generator and traxlsmission line components using the network reduction
technique descnbed in Section 5.2. Using this approach, the composite system adequacy
evaluation techniques previously describecl can be directly applied without changes. Load
feeder isolation due to station originated events is considered in the developed station
equivalents and c m be included in the system evaluation if desired. In this case, the bus
related values are extended to represent the actual load point adequacy indices.
The prominent fcilities in a station are the switching elements that respond to
specinc situations. A switchulg station basically consists of breakers and bus sections. A
transformer station contains all these components and in addition, relevant transformers.
The basic fiiure modes in a station reliability evaluation are component short and open
circuits. Short circuit fults are the dominant component Mure phenomenon. They are
usually referred to as active events, as they result in operation of the protection system
Faults associated with open circuits are refmed to as passive events in station reliability
evduation A two-state component model is required for a passive event, while a threestate component model is usualIy used for an active event. The three-state component
model for an active event [2] is shown in Fig. 5.17. A component, in the three-state
model is in the operational state if it is in state U and is on outage if it is in state S or R.
The difference between the S and R States shown in Fig. 5.17 is that in state R only the
U = up state
S = switching state
R = repair state
Fig. 5.1 7. Three-state component model
faied component is on outage, whiie in state S some other components are &O removed
fiom service.
The state S shown in Fig. 5.1 7 creates the major diflculty in accurately considering
station effects in composite +em
evaluation as it involvei multip1e component
interruptions. These multiple interruptions are from a single cause and are therefore not
independent of each other. The effect of multiple component interruptions can, however,
be approltimately considered in an -valent
form, based on analysis of the effects on a
specsc station configuration. The outage thme for the Wed component itself is the
required repair time plus the switching t h e . The outage times for the affectecl
components are only the switchmg times, which are usually much d e r than the repair
thne and are ofien ignored for the filed component. This equivalent approach
considerably sIlnpEes the consideration of station e&ts
in composite system adequacy
evaluation.
Fig. 5.18 shows a single bus cofiguration station and the reliability equivalent
model. The elements (h(G1),r(G1)), @(Tl), r(T1)) and (h(Brl), r(Br1)) in the G1
branch of Fig. 5.18 represent the possible fidures of G1, Tl and Br1 respectivefy, in
which the failed components must be repaired and the branch can then be restored to
service. Sidarly, the three elements in the G2 branch represent the possible filues of
Line
Line
Bus
Br3
qBr4), s(Br4)
h(Br3), s(Br3)
A(Br2), s(BR)
ww,s(BW
h(Brl), s(Br1)
h(Br3), o r 3 1
h(Bus), Ou)
Fig. 5.1 8. Equivalent of a single bus conf7guration station
G2, T2 and Br2 respectively. The switching effect of a Brl fidure is included in the
transmission line and the load feeder. This recognizes that the station will be
discomected fiom the systern and the load wiU be disconnected fiom generation supply
during the switching time for a Br1 failure. The switching effect o f a Br2 Mure is the
same as that of a Br1 milure. The five elements m the h e branch represent the possible
Mures of the bus and Br3, and the switching effects for Br 1, Br2 and Br4 filures. The
five elements on the load feeder represent the fadures of the bus and the Br4, and the
switching effects for Brl, Br2 and Br3 fiilmes. Some effects are due to a single cause,
but they are independently considered in the equivalent. This is an approxnate
representation. The dependency between the elements in the load feeder and the
elements in the other branches does not cause problems, as load feeders are not normally
included in a composite m e m evaluation. The effect of load feeder isolation c m be
considered separately in order to give actual load point indices.
Other station configurations can be equivalently represented in the same way as that
used for the single line configuration shown in Fig. 5.18. Fig. 5.19 shows a ring
~ o ~ ~ g u r a t station
i o n and its equivalent. Fig. 5.20 shows a-breaker-and-a-half (1 1/2)
configuration and its equivalent. In both the ring and the 11/2 breaker configurations, a
Line 1
I
Line 1
Line 2
thd
h d
Line 3
Line 2
Line 3
Fig. 5.19. Equivalent of a ring configuration station

162
h(i3us l), r(Bus1);

A(Bus2). r(Bus2)
Bus 1
Br1
J< Br4
I
>C Br2
Br5
Bus 2
Fig. 5-20. Equivalent of a 11/2 breaker con6guration station

breaker fdure only causes an interruption for the period of the switching t h e and the
effect on composite system adequacy can be very smaii. This effect is approximately
included in the equivalents. One breaker f h k e overlapping another in both the ring and
the 11/2 breaker configurations will cause Iine interruptions. This effect is inciuded in the
equivalents in a parailel connection f o m as shown in Fig. 5-19 and Fig. 5.20. In the 11/2
breaker configuration, a bus Mure does not cause any intmptions at all. Second-order
events are, however, considered in the 1112 breaker configuration equivalent as shown in
Fig. 5.20. There are no pardel forms in Fig. 5.18. This is because the faiure event of
one component includes aU the effects of this component faiure overlapping any others.
The elements in each of the branches of the eqilivdents shown Fig. 5.18 - Fig. 5.20
c m be reduced to single equivalent elements using Equations (5.5), (5.7) and (5.8). For
each line brmch, the elements can be combined with the line f d u r e event and the
equivalent elements at the other temimal of the h e . The station orginated events can be
effectively included in the previously described process for composite system adequacy
evaluation using thk approach. The eEect of load feeder isolation c m be considered
separately to give actual load point indices.
This chapter illustrates the concepts of adequacy equivalents and some applications
in composite systern adequacy evaluations. The primary objective in developing an
equivaient is to represent a complex systm with a reduced equivalent model which

retains the essential parameters required for M e r studies but excludes much of the
system detail. The developed adequacy equivalents can be effectively used to reduce the
computational burden involved in large composite power system adequacy analyses. The
equivalent concepts are also useful and effective in dealing wilh common-cause M u r e s
and station-originated events in a composite systern analysis. It is important, in the
development of an adequacy equivalent, to have a clear understanding of the essential
parameters required in the equivalent and then possible use in subsequent analysis.
The basic concepts associated with developing adequacy equivalents are introduced
in this chapter. The two basic methods for developing adequacy equivalents are
designated as the network reduction and the state reduction techniques. The network
reduction technique is simple in concept and easy to understand. In thk approach, the
equivalent parameters for series or paralle1 configurations are readily attainable in the
f o m of reiatively simple equations. The network reduction technique is useful for

sirnpljfjing a practical complex power systw into a model which is suitable for further
detailed adequacy anaiysis and it is widely used in distriiution and substation adequacy
evaluations. The basic technique applies to systems containing two-state models.
The state reduction technique is very general and can be used to develop adequacy
equivalents for systerns with multiple system states. A general state space approach is
n o d y required in the detemiination of the quivalent parameters. This technique can
be used in a wide range of power system adequacy analyses and it is often used in
composite systern adequacy analysis.
Several adequacy equivalent models for composite power systems based on the
date reduction approach are illustrated m the chapter. These equivalent models are
I
'
improvez~~mts
on previously developed quivalent rnodels and can be used in a wide
range of composite system adequacy analyses. The choice of a specinc equivalent mode1
depends upon the requkements of the specifc composite system adequacy analysis.
These equivalent models are fiustrated and compared with each other using numerical
examples in this chapter.
The network flow method is usually used in the development of equivdents. The
d-c. Zoad flow method is, however, a more accurate and widely used method in
composite system adequacy analysis. A technique which uses the d.c. Ioad flow method
for equivalent development is presented in this chapter. Adequacy equivalents developed
using the d-c. Ioad flow rnethod contain a very large number of equivalent states. A
rounding technique is therefore presented to shrink an equivalent into a reasonable size.
A numerical example is aven to illustrate the difference between the equivalents
developed using the network flow and the d.c. load flow methods.
An approach is presented to consider the effects of common-cause fdures and

station originated events using an equivalent approach. This is an approximate technique
and could be considered as a possible area for fture research activity. The equivalents
associated with common-cause M u r e s and station originated events are iltustrated in the
chapter. The equivalent application in a composite system adequacy analysis is ustrated
using a simple composite system. The equivalent concepts are fllrther illustrateci in
Chapter 6 using several applications of the equivalent approach to systm studies based
on the RBTS and IEEE-RTS.
Applications of Equivalent Techniques

6.1
Introduction
When a composite power system is divided into two IA and AI segments, the IA
equivalent can be very useful for conducting detailed adequacy analysis in the AI. These
studies can be conducted with greatly reduced computation times compared with those
required when solving the entire system directly. The equivalent approach can be used to
investigate the impact of high outage level system states and to provide the annual
adequacy indices effectively. The quivalent technique c m ako include station originated
events or a common cause mode1 as d e s c n i in the last chapter. The performance of
the equivalent approach in dserent applications is fbrthe~iliustrated in this chapter using
various system studies wnducted on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS.
System shidies on the effect of network solution techniques in the development of a
systern adequacy equivalent are first introduced in the chapter. The chapter then
examines the effect of equivalent rounding increments in reducing an equivalent to
diffrent sues. When the
IA equivalent includes system states up to an Li, outage level
and the AI system is investigated for system states up to an Lai level the entire system
can contain the effect of system states up to an Lia+Lai outage leveL This indicates that
the equivalent approach can be used to investigate the effect of system states with high
outage levels, which is normaliy resticted when directly solving the entire system due to
the very large required computation times. These system studies are provided in Section
6.4.
The chapter also presents system studies on the application of the equivalent
approach to calculating annual adequacy indices and in considering the effect of station
originated events using the station equivalent technique desmbed in the 1 s t chapter. AU
the system studies presented in this chapter provide M e r insight into the concepts and
the applications of adequacy equivalents in composite system adequacy evaluation-
6.2
Effect of Network Solution Techniques

The network flow method has been successfilly applied to composite system
adequacy evaluation using an equivalent approach [6 1,63-68,92,93]. The network flow

technique provides the maximum flow eom a source to a sink of a network, which is the
available capacity required in the development of an adequacy equivalent. The network
ffow technique is therefore inherently suitable for f a t network solutions when obtaining
an adequacy equivalent. The method, however, is not as accurate as a load flow

approach. A heuristic technique which uses a d.c. load flow in the network solution for
an adequacy equivalent has been developed and is desmbed in Chapter 5. The d.c. load
flow technique generally provides more accurate solutions than those provided by a
network flow method. It however requires more computation time than a network flow
approach, especially when used for developing adequacy equivdents of composite
systems.
This section presents the results of system studies on an interconnected two-area
RBTS and the IEEE two-area RTS using the equivalent approach. The equivalents of
the IA were established using both the network flow method and the heuristic d.c. load
flow technique. The d-c. load flow technique was used in both cases for the calculation
of the adequacy indices in the AI using the IA equivalents. The obtained adequacy
indices using both the network flow equivalent and the d.c. load flow equivalent are
illustrated and compared. This study provides insight tO the equivalents Obt ained using
the two different network solution techniques. Four equivalent rnodels are proposed in
Section 5.3. The fkst three equivalent models are usually applied when the network flow
technique is used in the equivalent approach for composite systern adequacy evaluation
[6 1,63-68,92,93].The mode1 IV equivalent is however used in the studies describeci in
this section for the evaluations of the intercomected two-area RBTS and the IEEE two-
area RTS by the equivalent approach. The basic annualized adequacy indices of fidure
(FF), expected load curtailed (ELC) and expected
probability (FP), M u r e fiequemy
energy not supplied (EENS) were caiculated for both the Ioad buses and the overall
systern. The
FP, FF, ELC and EENS were calcdated using Equations (2.15), (2.16),
(2.2 1) and (2.1 9) respectively.
Evduation of the t~o-areaRBTS

A symbolic Uitercomected two-area RBTS is shown in Fig. 6.1. The tie line
capacity is assumed to be 50 MW. The M u r e rate and average outage duration of the tie
line are 1 fiiure/year and 10 hours respectiveIy. The left RBTS is designated as the IA.
The right RBTS, including the tie line, is the AI. System states of up to three
components (generating units or transmission lines or both) on outage were investigated
for each area and for the entire system in this study. The total probability investigated
based on the entire two-area systern is 0.99898435, which is quite comprehensive.
5oMW
1 Bus 1
RBTS
hterconnectedArea(1A)
Area of hterest (AI)
Fig. 6.1. Symbolic interconnected two-area RBTS
The equivalent of the IA has 148 states when the d.c. load flow technique is used,
and 53 states when the network flow method is applied. The FP and FF indices at the
load buses using the 148-state and the 53-state equivalents are shown in Fig. 6.2 and Fig.
6.3 respectively. Both graphs show that the two different equivalents provide the same
FP and FF values at buses 5 and 6, and that the 148-state equivalent gives slightly higher
FP and FF values than the 53-state equivalait at buses 2, 3 and 4. Power supply filure
at bus 6 is dominated by the filure of transmission line 9, which causes bus 6 to be
isolated. This is the reason that the FP and FF indices at bus 6 are not sensitive to
variations in the available equivalent capacities, or to the different equivalents used. The
effects of the two equivalents are also not sigdicant at bus 5, due to the very srnail FP
and FF values at the bus. The eEects of the two equivalents on the FP and FF indices are
clearly shown for buses 2,3 and 4. The 53-state equivalent established using the network
flow method contains obviously larger available generation capacities and therefore
provides lower indices in the AI cornpared with the 148-state equivdent established
using the d.c. load flow technique. The network flow method provides optimistic system
date available capacities, as the method follows o d y the nodal power balance law.
An interconnected RBTS, 3W3L
Load buses
Fig. 6.2. Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS using the two
IA equivalents
An interconnected RBTS,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
fl-
Uusing an equivaient (148

states) by d-c.Ioad fiow
using an equivaient (53
states) by network iow
Load buses
Fig. 6.3. Fdure frequencies for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS using the two
LA equivalents
Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5 show the ELC and the EENS values at the load buses in the AI
using the two diffrent LA equivalents respectively. The two graphs show that the two
equivalents give very close ELC and EENS values at the load buses. It is also clearly
shown in the two graphs that the 53-state equivalent provides slightly sIIialler ELC and
EENS values than the 148-state equivalent. Fig. 6.6 - 6.9 show the four adequacy
indices of FP, FF, ELC and EENS for the overd AI using the two different equivalents,
An intercomected WTS, 3G+3L
aT------------------------------states) by d-c. Ioad flow

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-- -
- - - - - - - - --
Load buses
Fig. 6.4. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS using the
two IA equivalents
I
I
using an equivalent (148
states) by d.c. Ioad flow
Load buses
Fig. 6.5. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using the two LA equivalents
respectively. The four graphs indicate that the 53-state equivalent established by the
network flow method provides slightly lower adequacy indices than the 148-state
equivdent established by the d.c. load flow approach. The computation time required for
both establishg and using the 148-state equivalent is however larger than that for
establishg and using the 53-state equivalent.
An interconnected RBTS,3G+3L, 370 MW
Cl using an
o.)(Js
- - - - - - - -
equivaient ( 148
states) by d.c.
load flow
I
P
I
-
using an
equivaient (53
states) by
network flow
Overaii AI index
Fig. 6.6. Faiiure probabilities for the overd AI in the two-area RBTS using the two IA
equvalents
An interconnected RBTS,3G+3L, 370 MW

-
lJusing an
equivalent (148
states) by d-c.
load flow
l u s i n g an
equivalent (53
states) by
network flow
Overaii AI index
Fig. 6.7. Failure fiequencies for the overall AI in the two-ara RBTS using the two LA
equivalents
Expected load curtailed

M Wly
Expected energy not

supplied, M Wh/y
ad
Evaluation of the IEEE two-area RTS

A symbolic IEEE two-area RTS [73] is shown E Fig. 6.10. The data for the three
tie lines are given in Table 6.1. The lefi RTS is designated as the I.A. The right RTS,
including the tie lines, is the AI. System states of up to four generating units on outage,
of up to three transmission h e s on outage and of up to three combined generating units
and transmission lines on outage were investigated in each area and for the entire system
in the evaluation. The total probabdity investigated based on the entire two-area system
is 0.83759125, which is much lower than that for the two-area RBTS.
i
600MW
~us23f
AreaA
RTs
Bus13
Bus 7
-,i
i
htercomected Area (IA)
600 MW
208 M W
Bus 15
Bus 3
Ares
RTS
Area of Interest (AI)
Fig. 6.10. Symboiic IEEE two-area RTS
Table 6.1. Data on the three tie lines in the IEEE two-area RTS (F& X
and B/2 are in p-u. with a base power equal to 100 MVA)
Tie lines
23 - 17
13 - 15
7-3
Capacity
(MW)
600
600
208
B/2
0.0095
0.0096
0.0417
0.0735
0.0749
0.1613
0.0773
0.0788
0.0218
Faifure rate
(occJy)
0.46
0.47
0.44
Average outage
duration(hours)
11
Il
lO
The IA quivalent has 1270 states when the d.c. load flow technique is used, and
476 states when the network flow method is applied. The FP and FF indices at the load
buses using the 1270-state and the 476-state equivalents are shown in Fig. 6.1 1 and Fig.
6.12 respectively. The two graphs show that the FP and FF values at many buses are
close t s zero and the maximum FP and FF values both occur at bus 18 and are less than
0.008 and 8 occ./y respectively. These two maximum FP and FF values are quite small,
in
temis
of the fct that they are annualized values b a s 4 on a constant peak load over
one year. The maximum FP of 0.008, for instancey is very much lower than the
uninvesigated probability of the system, which is 1 - 0.83759 125 = 0.16240875. These
low values of the FP and FF indices generally indicate that the IEEE two-area RTS is
quite adequate. The magnitude of the uninvestigated probability, 0.1 6240875, indicates
that more system states should be investigated in order to obtain more accurate adequacy
indices. The required computation time, however, can increase considerably when
extensive high level system states are investigated. The equivalent approach c m be used
to effectively include the effects of many high level system outage states. This application
is descriied in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
IEEE two-area RTS,4G+3L, 5700 MW
0 * 0 1 2 - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.009
-- - - - - Eusing an equivalent (476
10
13
14
15
18
19
20
Load buses in area B
Fig. 6.1 1. Failure probabilities for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS using
the two LA equivalents
LEEE twearea RTS,4G+3L, 5700 MW

-
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Lond buses in area B
Fig. 6.12. Failure fhquencies for the AI load buses in the IEEE two -ares RTS using the
two IA equivalents
Regardless of the absolute magnitudes of the FP and FF mdices shown in Fig. 6.1 1
and Fig. 6.12, the two graphs show that, at .most load buses, the 476-state equivalent
established using the network flow method gives lower FP and FF values than those
given by the 1270-state equivalent established using the d.c. Ioad fIow technique. This
phenomenon is the same as that exhibited in the system study of the two-area RBTS,
except that the phenomenon exists at all the load buses in the two-area RBTS case. The
reason is that the network flow method provides optimistic available system state
capacities, due to the characteristics of the method itself. The network fiow equivalent
provides very small FP and FF values at buses 7, 9 and 10, which are higher than for the
d.c. load flow equivalent, as shown in the two graphs. This can sometimes happen due to
the complexities of the system analysis.
Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14 show the ELC and the EENS values at the load buses in the
AI using the two difErent IA equivalents respectively. The two graphs show that the
476-state equivalent provides smaller ELC and EENS values than the 1270-state
equivalent at all the Ioad buses. The difference is large at some buses and small at o
buses. Fig. 6.15
- 6.18 show the FP, FF, ELC and EENS for the overall AI
using the
two dSerent equivalents, respectively. The four graphs M e r illustrate that the
equivalent established by the network flow rnethod provides lower adequacy indices than
the equivdent established by the d.c. load flow approach, as the network flow rnethod
provides Optmiistic available system state capacities. The computation times required for
both establishg and using the 1270-state equivalent are larger than those required to
establish and use the 476-state equivalent.
IEEE twearea RTS, 4G+3Ly 5700 MW

-
- - - -
- -
- - -
- -
- - -
. - a -
. -,
1--
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -
- -
- - - - - -
I
1
Fig. 6.13. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS
using the two IA equivalents
IEEE twearea RTS,4G+3Ly 5700 MW
IO
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Fig. 6.14. Expected energy not supplied at the load buses of the AI for the IEEE twoarea RTS using the two IA equivalents
IEEE twwarea RTS, 4W3L,5700 MW

.----------________._________________________c______._________
. - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ r _ equivalent
- _ r r - ( -1270
states) by d.c.
. - - - - - - - 7-
1 . .
- . . . .- . . . . . . -
load flow
musing an
equivalent (476
states) by
network flow
Overaii system index for the AI (area B)
Fig. 6.15. Fdure probabilities for the overall A I i

n the IEEE two-area RTS using the
two IA equivalents
0using an
equivalent
(1270 states) by
d.c. load flow
Eusing an
equivalent (476
states) by
network flow
Fig. 6.16. Fdure fiequencies for the overd AI in the IEEE two-area RTS using the
two IA equivalents
IEEE twearea RTS, 4G+3L, 5700 MW
Overall system index for the AI (area B)
Fig. 6.17. Expected load curtded for the o v e r d AI in the IEEE two-area RTS using
the two IA equivalents
IEEE twcFarea RTS, 4G+3L, 5700 MW
Fig. 6.18. Expected energy not supplied for the overail AI in the IEEE two-area RTS
using the two IA equivalents
6.3
Effect of Equivalent Rounding Increment

An adequacy equivalent can contain a large number of equivalent states, especially
when the equivaient is established by the d.c. Ioad flow technique. The rounding
technique descriied in Section 5.4 can be used to d u c e a large size equivalent to a
sutable size depending on the requirements of a specinc system adequacy analysis. This
section frther illustrates the results of system studies on the two-area RBTS shown in
Fig. 6.1 and the IEEE two-area RTS shown in Fig. 6.10 ushg the equivdent approach.
Both the network flow equivalent and the d.c. load flow equivdent for the IA have been
reduced to various sizes in accordance with selected rounding hcrernents. The obtained
adequacy indices ushg different reduced equivalents are illustrated and compared in
order to explore the effect of the selected rounding increments on the accuracy of the
obtained adequacy indices and on the requed computation times. The effect on the
network flow and the d.c. load flow equivalents when the rounding technique is applied
is also illustrated in this section.
The mode1 IV equivalent is used in these studies. The equivalent state outage levels,
however, were not included in the evaluation Ali the equivalent states were applied to
the evaiuation of the AI, regardless of the outage levels. This provides a large probability
value for the total investigated system states but required increased computation times.
The basic adequacy indices of FP, FF, ELC and EENS were calculated for both the load
buses and the overall system with the systern load constant at its peak. The FP, FF, ELC
and EENS were calculated using Equations (2.15), (2.16),
(2.21) and (2.19)
respectively.
Evaluation of the two-area RBTS
The interconnectecl two-area RBTS is shown in Fig. 6.1. System states up to three
components (generating units or transmission lines or both) on outage were investigated
in both the IA and the AI. The system states for the entire two-area system include all
combinations of the system states in the IA and the AI. The total probability investigated
based on the entire two-area systern is 0.99988561, which is larger than the value of
0.99898435 obtained when the investigated system states of the entire systern are
constrained to up to three components on outage as in the case given in Section 6.2. This
total probabity indicates a comprehensive level of state space analysis.
The LA equivalent has 49 states when the d-c. load flow technique is used and
equivalent rounding is not applied or the rounding increment is zero. This equivalent
does not include the outage level parameters and it therefore has fewer equivalent states
than that of the complete mode1 IV equivalent given in Section 6.2. M e n the rounding
increment is set at 5, 10, 20 and 3 0 MW respectively, the corresponding equivalent has
11, 6, 4 and 3 equivalent states respectively. Fig. 6.19 and Fig. 20 show the FP and FF
indices at the load buses when different rounding increments are used. The two graphs
show that there are clear dEerences at buses 2, 3 and 4 in the five rounding i n m e n t
cases, but not at buses 5 and 6. The major toad curtailments at bus 6 result fiom the
isolation of the bus when the single line to the bus is on outage. This is the reason that
the equivalents of the IA do not rnaterially affect the FP and FF values at bus 6. The two
graphs
&O
show that the FP and FF values at buses 2 and 3 in the 30 MW rounding
increment case are cIearly larger than those in the other cases. Increase in the rounding
increment does not necessarily increase the FP and FF values at all the buses.
A two-area RBTS, using d.c. equivalent of the LA
Load buses in the AI
Failure probabilities for the AI load buses ui the two-area RBTS using
different rounding increments for the IA equivalent
A twa-area RBTS, using dc. equivaient of the IA
Fig. 6.20. Failure eequencies for the Ai load buses in the two-area RBTS using
diEferent rounding increments for the IA equivalent
Fig. 6.21 and Fig. 6.22 show the ELC and the EENS at the AI load buses
considering the different rounding increments used for the LA equivalent. The two graphs
show that changing the rounding incranent does not signincantly affect the ELC and
EENS at the load buses, as shown in the two graphs. The ELC and the EENS at bus 3
for rounding increment cases equal to and greater than 20 MW are clearly larger than
those in the other cases. Fig. 6.23 - 6.26 show the FP, FF, ELC and EENS indices for
the overail AI considering the two IA quivalents established using the d.c. load flow and
the network flow techniques and the different rounding increments applied to the two IA
equivalents. The four graphs consistently indicate two phenornena. The first is that the
equivalent established by the network flow method provides lower o v e r d system
adequacy indices than the equivalent established by the d.c. load flow approach in ail the
given rounding increment cases. This is consistent with the results provided in Section
6.2. The second phenornenon is that the overall AI adequacy indices increase when the
rounding inmernent applied to the LA equivalent increases. The o v e r d AI indices in the

case of a 30 MW rounding increment is clearly larger than those in the other cases. The
variation in the overall system indices with the diffierent rounding increments is relatively
small in the two-area RBTS system evaluation.
A twu-area RBTS, using d.c- equivalent of the IA
Fig. 6.2 1. Expected load curtailed for the Al load buses in the two-area RBTS using
A twu-area IRBTS, rishg d c . equivalent of the IA
rounding incremeni-20MW
Load buses in the A i
Fig. 6.22. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS
using dflerent rounding increments for the IA equivalent
A two-area RBTS, overaii index of the AI
Rounding increment, M W
Fig. 6.23. Failure probabilities for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS ushg difkent
rounding increments for the IA quivalent
using d . ~ .
quislent
Rounding increment, MW
Fig. 6.24. Failure fkequencies for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS using dinerent
rounding increments for the IA quivalent
Roundhg increment, M W
Fig. 6.25. Expected load curtailed for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS ushg
different rounding incrernents for the IA equivalent
using d-c.
equivdent
using a.
equivalent
10
20
30
Fig. 6.26. Expected energy not supplied for the overall AI in the two-area RBTS using
direntrounding increments for the IA equivalent

The IEEE two-area RTS is shown in Fig. 6.10. System states of up to four
generating units on outage, of up to three transmission lines on outage and of up to three
cornbined generating units and transmission lines on outage were investigated for both
the IA and the AI. The studied system states for the entire two-area system include all
the combinations of the systern states in the IA and the AI. The total probability
investigated based on the entire two-area system is 0.97157785, which is much larger
than the 0.83759125 value aven in Section 6.2, in which the entire system states of up
to four generating units, of up to three transmission h e s and of up to three cornbined
generating units and transmission lines on outage were studied. This total probability is
acceptable for the IEEE two-area RTS, but is considerably smaller than the comparable
value in the two-area RBTS evaluation.
The IA equivalent has 457 states when the d.c. load flow technique is used and
equivalent rounding is not applied or the rounding increment is zero. This equivalent
does not include the outage level parameters and therefore it has fewer equivalent states
than the complete mode1 IV equivalent given in Section 6.2. The rounding increments
were set at 5, 10, 20, 30 and 100 MW and the corresponding number of states in the
IEEE two-area RTS,using dc. equivalent of the IA

O rounding increment=MW
Hrounding incremen~5MW
W rounding incranenel 0MW
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 1 0 1 3 1 4
Load buses in the Al[ (area B)
Fdwe probabilities for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS using
different roundiug increments for the LA equivalent
IEEE twwarea RTS, using d.c. equivalent of the IA

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ?2l rounding increment4MW
Hrounding increment=20MW
rounding incrernent=lOOMW
Load buses in the
1 0 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
AI (Area B)
Fig. 6.28. Failure fiequericies for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS
using different rounding increments for the IA equivalent
equivalents are 169, 6 1,36,26 and 9 respectively. Fig. 6.27 and Fig. 28 show the FP and
FF indices at the load buses when different rounding increments are used. The two
graphs show that a rounding increment less than 100 MW does not sipficantly affect
the FP and FF values at the load buses. The FP and FF values increase as the rounding
increment increases.
Fig. 6.29 and Fig. 6.30 show the ELC and the EENS at the AI load buses
considering the different rounding Uicrements used for the IA equivalent. The two graphs
show that the ELC and EENS are quite stable even when the rounding icrement
increases to 100 MW. Fig. 6.3 1 - 6.34 show the FP, FF, ELC and EENS indices for the
overd AI considering
IA equivalents established using the d.c. load flow and the
network flow techniques with dEerent rounding inaements. The fou.graphs show the
same phenomena as those for the two-area RBTS. The first is that the equivalent
established by the network flow method provides lower overall system adequacy indices
than the equivdent established by the d.c. load flow approach in all the given rounding
increment cases. The second phenornenon is that the overall AI adequacy indices
increase when the rounding increment applied to the IA equivalent increases. AU the
graphs in this section show that the equivalent rounding technique can be effectively used
to reduce the IA equivalent without signiscantly decreasing the accuracy of the AI

evaluation and that botb the d,c. load flow method and the network flow method can
provide acceptable adequacy equivalents.
IEEE two-area RTS, using dx. equivaIent of the IA
Blrounding inmement-1 OMW
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses in the AI (area B)
Fig. 6.29. Expected load curtded for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS
using dairent rounding increments for the IA equivalent
IEEE two-area RTS, using d c . equivalent of the IA
RI rounding incremenel OMW
Load buses in the AI (area B)
Fig. 6.30. Expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using different rounding increments for the IA equivalent
IEEE two-area RTS, overaii index of the A
10
20
30
1O0
Romiding increment, MW
Fig. 6.31. FaiIure probabilities for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS using
2
O
ct:
2
I
r2
Fig. 6.32. Failme fiequencies for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS using
different round in^ increments for the LA eauivalent
IEEE two-area RTS, overd index of the AI
Fig. 6.33. Expected load curtailed for the overall AI in the IEEE two-area RTS using
different rounding incrernents for the IA quivalent
IEEE two-area RTS, overall index of the Ai
-O
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fig. 6.34. Expected energy not supplied for the overall AI in the IEEE hvo-area RTS
using diffkrent rounding increments for the IA equivalent
6.4
Effect of High Level Outages

Equation (5.17) indicates that the highest outage level that c m be reached in the
equivalent approach is the surn of the highest outage levels achieved in the IA and the
AI. I c for instance, up to four generating units on outage in both the IA and the AI are
investigated separately, up to eight generating units on outage in the combined system

can then be investigated with feasible computation times using the adequacy equivalent
approach. This is an important advantage of the equivalent approach, as the outage level
that c m be reached by the equivalent approach may not be possible using a basic
enmeration method to solve the entire network. This is particularly important in the
evaluation of large power systems. The outage levels considered for investigation cm be
readily controlled usuig Equation (5.17). If the effects and implications associated with
high outage levels are investigated using the equivalent method, the number of system
outage States considered will obviously increase. The cornputation times required may
therefore stiU be large, but may be acceptable as the size of the studied power network is
reduced to the size of the AIThis section provides the results and analysis of system studies on the IEEE two-
area RTS shown in Fig. 6.10 in order to investigate the effects of high level outages
using the equivalent approach [92]. The model III equivalent is used in this section A
network flow method was used for the so1ution of each system outage state in the
evaluation, It hm been assumed that all the loads in the power network have the same
priority and that load curailment is conducted proportiondy at all loads when a system
capacity shortage occurs in the calculation of load point adequacy indices.
The predefined outage levels for both the IA and the AI in this study are the same,
and are as follows. In the case of generator contingencies, events involving four or less
generating unit outages were considered. In the case of line/transformer contingencies,
events involving three or less transmission hedtransformer outages were included. In
the case of combined generator and line/transformer outages, events involving up to two
generators and one lineltransformer, and one generator and two linedtransfomers were
considered. The outage levels for the cornpiete system include up to eight generators, six
transmission lines, and seven combined generators and transmission lines on outage using
the adequacy equivalent method.
The total probability considered is 0.837591 for the above defhed contingency
levels. This indicates that higher level outages whose total probability is 0.1 62409 are
not included in the analysis. The contribution of these outages may be quite signi6icant
since the severity associated with an outage event generally increases as the contingency
level increases. Adequacy analysis of the IEEE two-area RTS was carried out for the
following three cases:
* Using the adequacy equivalent approach based on the denned contingency

levels,
0
Ushg the basic enumeration method to solve the entire network with the same
defined contingency levels, and
Using the adequacy equivalent approach to investigate the effects of higher level
outages
The fkst two studies show the effectiveness of the equivalent approach The two
calculations are based on the same predehed outage levels, and the results are therefore
comparable in that context. The third study shows the effects of higher level outages,
which are not n o d y investigated when solving the entire network. The four basic
adequacy indices of FP, FF, ELC and EENS were determined using Equations (2.19,
(2.1 6), (2.2 1) and (2.1 9) respectively.
Fig. 6.35 and Fig. 6.36 present a cornparison of the overd system FP and FF at
various load levels obtained using the adequacy equivalent approach and the basic
method of solving the entire network for the outage levels stated earlier. The two
approaches provide nearIy identical values for the two sets of indices.
Fig. 6.37 and Fig. 6.38 show the ELC and EENS at the load buses at the constant
peak load level. The values obtained using the adequacy equivalent approach are slightly
larger than those obtained using the basic method. The difference is, however, less then
5%, which is quite small. The ELC and EENS indices shown in Fig. 6.37 and Fig. 6.3 8
are more sensitive to the two evaluation methods than the FP and FF indices-
III
2793
HAdequacy Equivalent Method
273 6
2679
2622
Load Ievels
Fig. 6.3 5. Failure probabilities for the o v e r d AI in the IEEE two-area RTS at dXerent
load levek
IJSolving the Entire Network
2793
2736
2679
- - - - - - - - - - -
2622
Load levels
Fig. 6.36. Failure fiequencies for the overall A I in the IEEE two-area RTS at different
load levels
Bus number
Fig. 6.37. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS at
the system peak load level
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Bus number
Fig. 6.38. Expected load curtailed for the AI load buses in the IEEE two-area RTS at
the system peak load level
Table 6.2 shows the computation times required for the adequacy evaluation using
the two approaches. The adequacy equivalent approach uses much less computation time
than that required to solve the entire network. The example illustrates that the equivalent
technique can be used to provide acceptable and efficient approximations of the
adequacy indices.
Table 6.2. Cornparison of the required cpu times
Solving the
Entire Network
Methods
CPUTirne (Minutes)
24.81
Equivalent Method
(i)*
(2)*
2.20
3.20
* (1) is the CPU time required to develop the adequacy equivalent and (2) is the
CPU time required to cmduct the adequacy evaluation in the AI using the
developed equivalent. Computations are done on a VAX 3600
Fig. 6.39 and Fig. 6.40 shows the effects of different outage levels on the bus ELC
and EENS indices due to generating unit contingencies. This case study is feasible using
the adequacy equivalent approach, but requires an extremely large computation time
using the basic method of solving the entire network. The largest contribution to the
adequacy indices, as shown in both Fig. 6.39 and Fig. 6.40, is fiom the contingencies at
levels 5 and 6, and the remainder is mainly fiom the contingencies at levels 4 and 7. The
c o n t r i i o n fiom lower than fourth level generator outages is negligible. Those higher
than the seventh level should be exarnined for more accurate evaluation of the
intercomected network. The total system has a reserve of 1100 MW, whiIe the largest
generating unit has a capacity of only 400 M W . If the system reserve is large or is
icreased by interconnection, the effects of hi& level outages become increasingly
important. The contnbution of the eighth Ievel generator contingencies was not
detennzed due to the large computational burden, wbich occurs even when ushg the
equivalent approach
The effects due to transmission line outages are shown in Fig. 6.41 and Fig. 6.42.
The contnbution to the adequacy indices due to transmission line outages is very small
Energy curtained in MWh

due to generator oiitages
In"
Load curtained in MW
due to generator outages
fl Outage Level4
0Outage Level3
IOutage Level2
10 13 14 15 16 18 19 20
Load buses
Fig. 6.41. Effects of hi& level transmission line outages on the fdure probabrllty index
Outage LRvel4
0Outage Level3
Outage Level2
10 13 14 15 16 18 19 20
Load buses
Fig. 6.42. Effects of high level transmission line outages on the failure fiequency index
The system studies given in this section show that the adequacy equivalent
technique provides a practical and effective way to conduct adequacy evaluation in large
composite power systems, where the computation time can be excessive when solving
the entire network. Once the adequacy equivalent in the IA has been developed,
adequacy evaluations in the AI can be conducted effectively and with reduced
computation times. The equivdent technique is flexible in regard to considering different
outage levels and is particularly advantageous when considering high levels. The system
studies show that the effect of high level contingencies in the IEEE two-area RTS
network is relatively large. This leads to the conclusion that it is necessary in large power
networks to examine high Ievel contingencies resulting fiom multiple-component
outages. This is an important point in the new deregulated electric utility c h a t e where
traditional utility boundaries are being removed and systems are effectively increasing in
Calculation of Annual Adequacy Indices
6.5
The adequacy indices of a composite power system are obtained by combinlg the
composite system network model and an appropnate system load model. As previously
noted, when the load model is sirnply a single fixed load level assigned over a period of
one year, the adequacy indices are designated as annualized values. The effect of a
variable load level may be cxpressed with reasonable accuracy by a multi-level load
model- The adequacy indices based on a multi-level load model are refmed to a s annual
indices. These concepts have been descriied in detail in Section 2.7. A new algorithm for
annuai adequacy indices is presented in Section 3.6. The techniques for annual adequacy
indices can be used in conjunction with the equivalent approach. This section illustrates
the developrnent of annual adequacy indices using the equivalent approach and a stepped
load model [93].The annual indices usually require much more time to dculate than the
annualized indices. This section illustrates how the equivalent technique can be
effectively used to provide the annual adequacy indices with much reduced computation
times.
System studies for calculating the annual adequacy indices on both the two-area
RE3TS in Fig. 6.I and the IEEE two-area RTS in Fig. 6.10 were conducted. The four
basic adequacy indices of FP,FF, ELC and EENS are determined using Equations (2.19,
(2.16), (2.21) and (2.19) respectively. The results are presented and compared for the
two cases of using the equivalent approach and solving the entire network.
The outage levels of the system States for both the two-area RBTS and the IEEE
two-area RTS are up to four generators, up to three traflsfnission lines and up to three
combined generators and transmission h e s on outage. These d e k e d outage levels were
applied in the IA, the AI and the entire system.
The seven-step load niodel given in Table 4.2 was used for the load representation
in both the two-area RBTS and the IEEE two-area RTS. The mode1 III equivalent was
used. The IA equivalent was developed at the peak load level. At all the other load
leveis, the IA equivalent is simply modifieci by changing the equivalent load. As ail the
other load levels are lower than the peak load level the equivalent loads were reduced
proportionally in accordance with the ratio of the specfic load level to the peak load
level. The equivalent was then used for the evaluation at the specific load level. A
network flow method was used for the solution of each system outage state in the
evaluation. It was assumed in the calculation of load point adequacy indices that all the
loads in the network have the same priority and that load curtaiIment is conducted
proportiondy ai ail loads when a system capacity shortage occurs.
Fig. 6.43 and Fig. 6.44 show the variation in the load bus FP and FF in the AI of the
two-area RBTS obtained using the adequacy equivalent approach and by solving the
entire network. The two methods provide vimially identical values for the two indices.
Fig. 6.45 and Fig. 6.46 show the variation in the load bus ELC and EENS values. These
two graphs show that the two sets of annual indices obtained using the adequacy
equivalent approach are nearly identical to those obtained by solving the entire network.
The multiplication factors noted above the bar charts for bus 6 in Fig. 6.43 - Fig.
6.46 indicate that the actual value is the value shown in the graph multiplied by the
198
multiplication fctor. This normalization allows the indices for this bus to be placed on
the same graph as those for the other buses.
Bus number
Fig. 6.43. Annual fdure probabilities for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS using
the two methods
BUISnumber
Fig. 6.44. Annual M u r e fkequencies for the AI load buses in the two-area RBTS using
the two methods
0.15
O-'
i
-
- - -
- - - - O solving the entire ne-rk
- - -
equident approach
Bus number
Fig. 6.45. Annual expected load curtailed for the Ai load buses in the two-area RBTS
using the two methods
1 r
A
O solving the entire n e ~ r k - - - -
Bus number
Fig. 6.46. Annual expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the two-area
RBTS using the two methods
Table 6.3 shows the computation times required for the an.& adequacy evaluation
of the two-area E2BTS using the two methods and indicates that the adequacy equivalent
approach uses much less computation litne than that reqked to solve the entire
network The ratio of the computation t h e s in Table 6.3 is 8.7. The computation time
requued to solve the entire two-area RBTS is relatively small, as shown in Table 6.3.
The requjred t h e , however, increases exponentially with the nimiber of network
components.
Table 6.3. Cornparison of the required CPU times for the two-area RBTS
"
Methods
'
CPUTime (Seconds)
Solving the
Entire Network
87.6
Equkdent Method
(i)*
(2)*
1.6
8.5
* (1) is the CPU time requirequired

to develop the adequaq equivaIent and (2)is the CPU
time required to canduct the annual adequacy evaluation in the Ai using the
dweloped adequacy equivalent. Camputarions are done on a VAX 3600
Fig. 6.47 and Fig. 6.48 show the variation in the load bus ELC and EENS in the AI
of the IEEE two-area RTS. These two graphs show that the two sets of annual indices
obtained using the adequacy equivalent approach are just slightly larger than those
Fig. 6.47. Annual expected load curtailed for the AL load buses in the IEEE two-area
RTS using the two methods
Bus nurnber
Fig. 6.48. Annual expected energy not supplied for the AI load buses in the
IEEE two-area RTS using the two methods
obtained by solvjng the entire network. The dinerence is less than 5 percent. The
required computation times for the amual adequacy evaluation of the IEEE two-area
RTS using the two methods are s h o w in Table 6.4, which indicate that the adequacy
equivalent approach uses much less computation time than that required to solve the
entire network. The computation times required to solve the IEEE two-area RTS are
very much larger than those required to solve the two-area RBTS, as shown in Tables
6.3 and 6.4. The ratio of the computation times in Table 6.4 is 7.8.
Table 6.4. Cornparison of the required CPU times

for the LEEE two-area RTS
Methods
CPU Time (Hours)
Equivalent Method
Solving the
Entire Network
(1)*
(2) *
0.11
1.1 1
9.50
* (1) is the CPU time required to develop the adequacy equivalent and (2) is
the CPU time required to cunduct the adequacy evaluation in the AI using the
developed adequacy equivalent. Computations are done on a VAX 3600
The system studies presented in this section show that the adequacy equivalent
method provides satisfactory estimates of the annual reliability indices with greatly
reduced computation t h e requirements.
6.6
Effect of the Station Originated Events

System stations are ~,cuallynot inclludecl in composite system adequacy evduaion
due to the cornplexities the system stations create. The effects of station originated
events, however, c m be effectively evaluated using an equivalent approach in which the
stations are appropriately represented by equivalents that recognize the critical effects of
the major station Mure events. These equivalents can be combined with the related
generator and transmission b e components using the network reduction technique
desmied in Section 5.2. The development of the station equivalents is described in
Section 5.9. In this equivaleat approach, the basic generation and transmission
component reliabzty parameters are modifed by the station equivalents and
subsequently utibed in the basic composite s y s t m adequacy evaluation. The effect of
load feeder isolation can be included in the equivalents or considered separately to give
the actual load point adequacy indices.
This section presents system studies conducted on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS to
investigate the eEects of station originated events in the two systems, The four basic
indices of FP, FF, ELC and EENS using Equations (2.15), (2.16), (2.2 1) and (2.19)
respectively were determuied at the load buses and fbr th o v d systems. Three cases were
conducted. In case 1, the adequacy indices were determined without considering the
system stations. In case 2, the adequacy indices were determinecl with the system stations
considered using the equivalent approach. The effect of load feeder isolation was not
included. In case 3, the adequacy indices were determined including the stations and the
effect of load feeder isolation due to station M u r e events. The results are compared and
analyzed to illustrate the effects of the station originated events. System states of up to
four generators, of up to thee transmission lines and of up to tbree combined generators
and transmission lines on outage were investigated in both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS
evaluations. A d.c. load Oow technique was used for the analysis of the system states.
The pass 1 load curtailment policy was used for the RBTS evaluation and the pass 2 load
curtailment policy is used for the IEEE-RTSassessment.
The equations used to include the effect of load feeder isolation are as follows. For
the load point indices, the equations are
For the overall system indices, the equations are
where the superscript number of each index indicates dBerent cases, BLis the set of load
buses, and pi, qi, hi and Li are the availability, mavailability, failure rate and load demand
in MW for the load feeder at load bus i respectively.
AU the stations in the RBTS have a ring configuration. The extended single Iine
diagram of the B T S which includes the station confguratiom is shown in [71]. The
station equipment data are given in Appendix A. A ring configuration equivalent is given
in Section 5.9. Considering the effects of the RBTS system stations, the reliability data
for the generators, the transmission lines and the load feeders are shown in Tables 6.5 6.7.
Table 6.5. Equivdent generator reliability data for the RBTS

Unit no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1O
11
Bus
no.
1 Fduredyear for 1
Uutage hours
1 FaiIures/yar for
Outage hours for
gen. branch
46-12
46.12
46.60
46.32
47.95
47.95
60.96
56.60
56.60
56.60
56.60
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Table 6.6. Equivalent transmission line reliability data for the RBTS
Line Bus Bus
1
no.
j
1
1
3
2
4
2
3
1
2
4
3
4
5
3
5
6
1
3
7
2
4
4
8
5
6
9
5
Failuredyear
for Illie o d y
1.50
5.00
4.00
1 .O0
1 .O0
1.50
5.00
1 -00
1 .O0
Outage hours
for line only
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
Failuredyear
far line branch
1.97
5.47
4.47
1.47
1.47
1.97
5.47
1.47
1.47
Outage hours
for line branch
9.88
9.96
9.95
9.84
9.84
9.88
9.96
9.84
9.84
Table 6.7. Equivalent load feeder reliabiiity data for the RBTS
Load bus
2, 3 , 4 , 5 & 6
Failuredyear
Outage hours
0.2542
69.15061
Availability
0.99799739
UnavaiIabifity
0.00200261
Fig. 6.49 - Fig. 6.52 show the variation in the four adequacy indices at the RBTS
load buses for the three cases. The four graphs clearly indicate the important
contribution to the four basic load point adequacy indices fiom the station originated
events. The graphs show that the effects of the station orginated events are not
consistent, but vary for the diffrent adequacy indices at the Mirent load buses. The
variation of the load bus FP, as shown in Fig. 6.49, indicates that the effect of load
feeder isolation is relatively large and it can be exceed the effect of the station events to
the system, especidy at load buses which have relatively lower FP values. The effect of
load feeder isolation piays a major role on the load bus EENS as shown in Fig. 6.52. The
impact of the station events is however smaller on the FF and the ELC indices than on
the FP and the EENS indices.
RBTS, 4G+3L, Load =185

- - - - - - -
Hincluding stations
Bl load feeder isolation effct
-
Load buses
Fig. 6.49. Failure probabilities for the RBTS load buses at the peak load Ievel in the
three cases
RSTS, 4G+3L, Load =185 MW

-
Cl not including stations
A
=
-
El including stations
1load feeder isolation effect
- - - -
Load buses
Fig. 6.50. Failure 5equencies for the RBTS load buses at the peak load level in the
tbree cases
RBTS, 4G+3L, Load =185 MW
1 m o t including stations
2
Q
C,
~i
Edincluding stations
p"
C)
Q>
O
Load buses
Fig. 6.5 1. Expected load curtailed for the RBTS load buses at the peak load level in the
three cases
RBTS,4G+3L, Load =185 MW

Ci not including stations
- -
1 mcluding stations
1
Hload feeder isolation effect
1--
Load buses
Fig. 6.52. Expected energy not supplied for the RBTS load buses at the peak load level
in the three cases
Fig. 6.53 - Fig. 6.56 show the variation in the four adequacy indices for the overd
RBTS at dairent load leveis in the three cases. The four graphs clearly illustrate the
important contriiution to the four adequacy indices fiom the station origuiated events
under these conditions. The effect of load feeder isolation is distinctly shown in all the
four graphs. Load feeder isolation has a dominant effect on the FP and the EENS indices
at al1 the load levels, and on the FF and ELC indices at the Iower load fevels, as shown in
the graphs. An obvious conclusion is that the effct of the station originated events
especially load feeder isolation events can make a major contribution to overall system
adequacy indices at relatively low load levels.
RBTS, 4G+3L, for the overd system
Hinciuding stations
1 Hload feeder isolation effect
0.01
185
1665
1295
148
III
925
74
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6.53. Failure probabilities for the overail RBTS at dEerent load levels in the three
cases
RBTS, 4G+3L, for the overail system
185
1665
148
1295
including stations
md f d e r isolation effect
111
925
74
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6.54. Failure fiequemies for the overd RBTS at different load levels in the three
cases
RBTS,4G+3L7for the overdl system
O not includuig stations

-
E3 including stations
Load leveis, MW
Fig. 6.55. Expected load curtailed for the overd RBTS at differeni load levels in the
three cases
RBTS,4G+3L, for the overail system
1
-
185
1665
148
17not including stations
1295
including stations
load feeder isolation effect
111
925
1
I
- - .
74
Load Ievels, MW
Fig. 6.56. Expected energy not supplied for the overd RBTS at diffrent load levels in
the three cases
Two basic station configurations, the ring and the 1 1/2 breaker, are used in the
LEEE-RTS. The stations with a ring configuration are at buses 3-1 4, 17, 19, 20 and 2224, and the stations with a 1 1/2 breaker configuration are at buses 1, 2, 15, 16 , 18 and
2 1. The extended single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS, which includes the station
confzgurations, is given in [73]. The station equipment data are given in Appendix B. The
equivalents for the ring and 1 112 breaker configuratiom are illustratecl in Section 5.9.
The modined reliability data for the generators and transmission h e s considering the
eEects of the system stations are shown in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. These tables show the
component parameters before and afier modification. The parameters for the load
feeders are shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.8. Equivalent generator reliability data for the IEEE-RTS
Bus Failuredyear for

Unit
no.
gen. only
no.
22
4.42
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1O
Il
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
22
22
22
22
22
15
15
15
15
15
15
7
7
7
13
13
13
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
23
23
23
18
21
16
--
4.42
4.42
4.42
4.42
4.42
2.98
2.98
2.98
2.98
2-98
9.13
7.30
7.30
7.30
9.22
9.22
9.22
19.47
19.47
4.47
4.47
19.47
19.47
4.47
4.47
9.13
9.13
7.62
7.96
7.96
9.13
Outage hours
for gen. ody
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
20.00
00.00
60.00
60.00
60.00
60.00
40.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
40.00
40.00
50.00
50.00
40.00
40.00
40.00
40.00
100.00
150.00
150.00
40.00
Failuredyear
for gen, branch
Outage hours
for gen. branch
22.74
22.74
22.74
22.74
22.74
22.74
64.67
64.67
64.67
64.67
64.67
41.63
50.79
50.79
50.79
50.65
50.65
50.65
50.8 1
50.8 1
43.25
43.2S
50.8 1
50.8 1
43-25
43-25
40.90
40.90
99.29
15 1.68
151.68
40.90
Table 6.9. Equivalent transmission line reiiabiiity data for the IEEE-RTS
-Line Bus
no i
f
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1O
1i
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
14
15
15
15
15
16
16
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
--
Faifuredyear
for line ordy
0.24
0.5 1
0.33
0.39
0.48
0.38
0.02
0.36
0.34
0.33
0.30
0.44
0.44
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.40
0.39
0-40
OS2
0.49
0.38
0.33
0-41
0.4 1
0.41
0.35
0.34
0.32
0.54
0.35
0.35
0-38
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.45
Outage hours
'
for line only

16.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
768.0
10.0
10.0
35.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
768.0
768.0
768.0
768.0
11.0
11.0
11.0 11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
Failures/year
for Line branch
Outage fiours
for line branch
'
Table 6.10. Equivalent load feeder reliability data for the IEEE-RTS
Load bus
Failuredyau
Outage hours
1,2, 15, 16, 18

3-10, 13, 14, 19,20
0.0343
0.2542
448.1136
69.15061
Availability
0.99824796
0.99799739
Unavzilability
0.00 175204
0.0020026 1
Fig. 6.57 - Fig. 6.60 show the variation in the four adequacy indices for the IEEE-
RTS load buses at the peak load level for the three considered cases. The four graphs
show that the contribution of the station originated events to the four basic adequacy
indices at the load points are not as great as that in the B T S analysis. The main reason
is the dominant contriution of the generator and transmission line failure events to the
adequacy indices in this situation (peak load level). The effect of the station originted
IEEERTS,4G+3L, Load =2850 MW

O not inclading stations
m includin~stations
I
load feeder isolation effect
- - -
Load buses
Failme probabities for the IEEE-RTS Ioad buses at the peak load level in
the h e e cases
IEEERTS,4Cit3L, Load =2850 MW
9 1 0 1 3 1 4
Load buses
Fig. 6.58. Failure fkquencies for the IEEE-RTSload buses at the peak load level in the
three cases
events at this load level is relatively small. Fig. 6.6 1 and Fig. 6.62 show the FP and the
EENS values at the load buses of the IEEE-RTS at a load level of 2565 MW for the
three cases. These two graphs clearly show the effect of the station originated events.
This effect is more pronounced for the EENS index shown in Fig. 6.62. The lower foad
level greatly decreases the impact of the generator and transmission line failure events,
but does not materially reduce the effect of the station origihated events.
IIEEE-RTS, 4G+3L, Load =2850 M W
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 6.59. Expected load curtailed for the IEEE-RTS load buses at the peak load Ievel
in the three cases
IEEE-RTS, 4G+3L, Load =2850 MW
Ei including stations
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 6.60. Expected energy not supplied for the IEEE-RTSload buses at the peak load
level in the three cases
--IEEERTS, 4G+3L, Load =2565 MW
C l not including stations
hcluding stations
E Ioad feeder isoIation effect
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 6.6 1. Fdure probabilities for the IEEE-RTS load buses at the load level of 2565
M W in the tbree cases
including stations
IO
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 6.62. Expected energy not supplied for the EEE-RTS load buses at the load level
of 2565 MW in the three cases
Fig. 6.63 - Fig. 6.66 show the variation in the four adequacy indices for the overall
IEEE-RTS at various load levels for the h e e cases. In both Fig. 6.65 and Fig. 6.66, the
actual ELC and EENS values at the 2850 MW load level shown in the graphs shodd be
muitiplied by the factor 2 (given above the bars). The ELC and EENS values at the 2850
MW load level are too large compared with the values at the other load levels and they
were therefore placed on the graphs at halfof the actual values. The four graphs cleariy
illustrate the important contribution of the station originated events to the adequacy
indices of the overall IEEE-RTS at diffrent load levels. The effect of load feeder
isolation is distinctly shown in al1 four graphs. It has a dominant contribution to the FP
and the EENS indices at all the load levels, and to the FF and ELC indices at the Iowa
load levels.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2850
2565
2280
1995
not inc~udingstations
- 1 El includng stations
Eload feeder isdation effect
1710
1425
I-
1140
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6.63. Failure probabilities for the overall IEEE-RTS at different load levels in the
three cases
2850
2565
2280
1995
1710
1425
1140
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6.64. Failure fiequencies for the overd IEEE-RTS at different load levels in the
three cases
IEEE-RTS,4G+3L, for the overall system
2850
2565
2280
1995
1710
1425
1140
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6.65. Expected load curtailed for the overall IEEE-RTS at different load levels in
the three cases
0not including stations

Hincluding stations
1load feeder isolation effect
2850
2565
2280
1995
1710
1425
1140
Load levels, MW
Fig. 6-66. Expected energy not supplied for the overall IEEE-RTS at different load
levels in the three cases
Two conclusions can be drawn on the effect of station originated events in

composite system adequacy evaluation based on the system studies of both the RBTS
and the IEEE-RTS. The first is that the effect of the station originated events including
load feeder isolation is sigdicaflt and is not sensitive to variation in the Load levels. The
second conclusion is that the effect of the station originated events plays a Iarger role on
the FP and EENS indices than on the FF and ELC indices.
This chapter presents system studies based on the RETS and the IEEE-RTS using
the equivalent techniques shown in Chapter 5. The various applications of the equivalent
techniques in composite system adequacy evaluation and the ef3ects of the various
pertinent factors are illustratecl and discussed in this chapter. The effect of network
solution techniques in the development of a composite system adequacy equivalent is
illustrated first, followed by a discussion on the effect of rounding increments to create a
d e r equivdent. The system studies show that both the network flow and the d-c. load
flow can provide acceptable composite system adequacy equivalentS. Equivalents
obtained by the network fIow method contain somewhat optimistic system state available
capacities, which lead to lower adequacy indices. The network flow method, however,
requires less computation time than the d.c. load flow technique. The system studies
show that the equivalent rounding technique c m be effectively used to reduce the IA
equivalent without si@cantly
decreasing the accuracy of the AI adequacy evaluation
The adequacy indices of the Al increase slightly when the roundmg increment appiied to
the LA equivalent increases.
The equivdent approach can be used to investigate the effect of system States with
high outage levels, which is normally restricted when directly solving the entire system
due to the very large required computation tmie. The system studies show that the effect
of high level contingencies in the IEEE two-area RTS network is relatively large. This
leads to the conclusion that it is necessary in large power networks to examine high level
conhgencies resulting fiom multiple-wmponent outages. This is an important point in
the new deregulated electric utility climate whae traditional utfity boundaries are being
removed and systems are effectively increasing in size.
The systern studies on the applications of the equivalent approach to calculate the
annual adequacy indices show that the adequacy quivalent method provides satisfactory
estimates of the annual adequacy indices with greatly reduced computation times. The
equivalent technique can also be effectively used to investigate the effect of station
originated events ushg the station quivalent technique desm'bed in Chapter 5. The
system studies show that the effect of station originated events including load feeder
isolation events on both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS indices is si@cant
and is not
sensitive to variation in the load levels. The station originated events have a larger impact
on the FP and EENS indices than on the FF and ELC indices.

Equivalent rriodel development is a practical extension of the normal reliability
evduation process, and provides a practical and effective way to conduct adequacy
evaluation in large composite power systems, where the computation time can be
excessive when solving the entire network. Once the adequacy equivalent in the
lntercomected Area (LA) has been developed? adequacy evaluations in the Area of
Interest (AI) can be conducted with reduced computation times. The equivalent
technique c m also be effectively used in many other applications such as evaluating the
effect of station originated events. Equivalent techniques in the adequacy evaluation of
composite systems have not been widely examinecl and recognized but appear to hold
considerable promise as a vdid engineering technique for practical power systern
evaluation.
Reliability CostIBenefit Analysis

7.1
Introduction
Costhenefit analysis of composite power systems is becoming an essential factor in
the determination of systern reinforcernent and expansion projects, due to the impact of
electric utty deregdation and market cornpetition. Power system planning is
traditiondy based on deterministic criteria. A generdy used criterion is that the loss of
any single generating unit or transmission line should not cause load intemiption. This
criterion does not explicitly consider the probability of component fidures and the value
of service to customers. It can therefore result in overbuilt systerns due to low
probabw events. The criterion provides no economic input to the cost associated with
a particular expansion plan in terms of the value of senrice provided to customers.
Deterrninistic approaches are no longer appropriate in the emerging cornpetitive po wer
supply environment.
In the previous chapters, various techniques for composite power system adequacy
evaluation have been developed and illustrated, in which the developed equivalent
approach is particularly useful in the adequacy evaluation of ver- large (multi-area)

composite power systems. These techniques can be successfully used to predict and
quantifl the reliability of composite systern configurations and reinforcement schemes.
The monetary factors associated with the reliability levels were, however, not included in
the preceding composite system adequacy analyses. This chapter illustrates the concepts
and techniques required for composite system reliability costhenefit analysis. The cost
related indices of the RBTS, the IEEE-RTS, the two-ara RBTS and the IEEE two-area
RTS have been calculated and are compared and analyzed in tOis chapter. The adequacy
equivalent approach including the new algorithm for annual adequacy indices have been
applied in these system studies.
Basic Methodology
7.2
The basic concepts of reliability codenefit analysis are briefly desmled in Chapter
1. The reliability codreliability level diagram shown in Fig. 1.6 visually illustrates the
concepts of reliability costhenefit amlysis. NomaUy, system reliability increases with
investment wst. On the other hand, the customer damage cost decreases as the reliability
level increases. The total cost to society is the surn of the project cost and the customer
damage cost. This total cost exhibits a minimum, at which an optimum or target level of
reliability is achieved. The costhenefit approach uses the total cost as a basis for rankllig
the system expansion alternatives [50-551.The approach can be expressed as,
Minimize: Total cost = Project cost + Customer damage cost.
where
the proiect cost usually includes the capital cost and the operatiodmaintenance
cost, and the customer damage cost reflects the value of unsupplied energy.
The project cost is basically deterministic in nature and can be obtained using well
established rnethods. The customer damage cost is conceptually the aggregated value the
customers are willing to pay to avoid load mtemptions or voltage standard violations,
and is a function of interruption fiequency, duration, load lost, location, and other social
effects. In some cases the customer damage costs are tangible, with inherent dollar
values; in other instances the costs are intangible and subjective, depending upon the
type and timing of interruptions and the kind of c o r n e r s .

Mail surveys have been widely used to obtain estimates of the customer damage
costs associateci with electric service interruptions, although this is probably the most
expensive and tirne consuming approach. The philosophy when using customer surveys
within a specific service area of an electric power utility is that the custorners themselves
are in the best position to estimate the losses resulting f?om the service interruptions 145491.
The calculation of the customer damage cost is a necessary and complex task in
reliability costhenefit andysis. The technique to calculate the customer damage cost and
the application of the technique in system studies on one and two-area RBTS and IEEE-
RTS are developed and illustrated in the following sections. The data for calculating the
customer damage costs used in this chapter corne fkorn the mail s m e y s conducted by
the Power System Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan. The concept of
customer damage function is introduced in the following section.
7.3
Customer Damage Function

A customer damage fiinciion (CDF) provides the interruption cost versus
interruption duration for a specified group of customers. This section shows interruption
cost data in the form of sector customer damage functions collected through mail
surveys conducted by the Power System Research Group at the University of
Saskachewan. The section illustrates the derivation of composite customer damage
functions (CCDF)for both the overall system and individual load points in the RBTS and
the EEE-RTS.
Seven sectors, using the Standard hdustrial Classification (SIC) scheme of

Statistics Canada, were identified for data collection. The seven sectors are
1. large user (peak demand > 5 MW),
2. industrial,
3. commercial,
4. agriculture,
5. residential,
6 . govemment & institutions and
7. office buildings.
Table 7.1 shows the seven-sector CDF expressed ni 1987 dollars. The seven-sector
CDF are shown graphically in Fig. 7.1.
Table 7.1. Sector CDF exprased in (%/kW)

sector
Large users
Induskiai
Commercial
ZEZ
GOM-& hst-
Office bldg.
Sector customer damage functions

4Large users
-4-Industrial
4Commercial
Agricultural
4Residential
-e-Goa. & hst.
4Office & Bldg-0-
20
60
240
480
Duration (minutes)
Fig. 7.1. Sector customer damage functions in ($kW)
The CCDF represents the total interruption cost as a function of the interruption
duration for the combined customers in a particdar service area or at a specific bus. The
CCDF for a service area is obtained by weighting the sector CDF by the customer load
composition for that area. The custorner load compositions in terms of peak load and
energy consumption percentages must be known in order to obtain the CCDF for the
combined customers. The annuai peak load percentage is usually used for weighthg
short durations (below 1 hour) and the annual energy consumption percentage is used
for weighting the longer durations (equal and above 1 hour).
Table 7.2 shows the assun'zed load compositions in ternis of the annuai peak load
and energy consurnption percentages for both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. The CCDF
for the service area is obtained as shown in Table 7.3. This CCDF is shown graphically in
Fig. 7.2.
The CCDF at each load bus can be calcdated in the same way as that for a service
area if the sector peak load and energy consumption percentages at every load bus are
known. This is usually done by fkst assigning the peak loads for the different sectors at
every load bus in the system and then calcdating the sector peak load and energy
consumption percentages at each load bus. The sector docation at the load buses in
sector peak loads must be chosen in such a way that meets the following two conditions.
Table 7.2. Assumed load compositions

User sector
Large usas
Industrial
Commercial
Agricultural
Residential
Govt- & Inst.
Office bldg.
Total
1 Seetor peak (%)
( Sector energy (%)
100.0
100.0
Table 7.3. CCDF in ($/kW)

for the test systems
RBTS
service area
Large users
Industrial
Commercial
Agridtural
Residential
Govt. & InstOffice bldg.
Total customer
cost ($.kW)
ition
4 hrs
20 min.
1 min,
1,OO~XO.~O
1.625x0.14
O.38lxO.lO
0.060x0.04
0.00 lxO.34
0.044x0.06
4.778x0.02
3.968x0.3 1
25.I63xO.l9
3 1.3 17~0.09
2.0Wx0.025
4.9 l4xO.3 1
6.558x0.055
68.830x0.02
C=0.67
C=12*14
CCDF for the test systems
20
60
240
480
Duration (minutes)
Fig. 7.2. The composite customer damage fimction in (%/kW)
~ector
at bus k = Peak load at bus k
Allsectors
Bus peak of sector m = Systern peak of sector m

Al1buses
The peak load percentage of a given sector at bus k can be simply calculated as
follows.
Sector peak load percentage at bus k =
Sector peak load at bus k

x 100
Total peak load at bus k
(7.3)
There can be many ways of allocatig the sector energy consumption at the various
buses. An oaen used approach is to assume that the sector load factor (L.F.), which is
the ratio of the sector average load over the peak load, is constant at the various load
buses or for the entire system service area. The sector energy consumption allocation to
the buses can then be cdculated using the sector peak load allocation at the buses and
the sector load factors. The L.F. of a given sector c m be calculated f?om the system
L.F., the sector peak load percentage and the sector energy consumption percentage as
follows.
Sector L. F =
S ector energy percentage
Sector peak load percentage
x System L. F.
The energy consumption percentage of a given sector at bus k can be calculated as
follows,
).
Sector energy consumption

=
percentage at bus k
Sector L. F.xSector peak load at bus k

x 100
Sector L. F.xSector peak load at bus k
Al1 sectors
The same load model has been used for both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS, for
which the system L.F. is 61.40% 1721. The seven-sector L.F. can be calculated fiom the
given system L.F., the sector peak load and energy consumption percentages shown in
Table 7.2 using Equation (7.4). The results are s h o w m Table 7.4.
Table 7.4. Load factors of the seven sectors

User
sector
Large users
Industrial
Commercial
Agricdtural
hidentid
Govt. & hst.
Office bldg.
Sector peak
Sector energy
30.0
14-0
10.0
4.0
34.0
6.0
3 1.0
19.0
9.0
2.5
3 1.0
5.5
2.0
('m
2.0
(%)
Sector L.F.
('m
63 -45
83.33
55.26
38.38
55.98
56.28
61-40
The sector peak load allocations at the RBTS load buses are shown in Table 7.5.
The seven-sector peak load percentages at each load bus can be calculated using the data
given in Table 7.5 and Equation (7.3). The results are s h o w in Table 7.6. The seven-
sector energy consumption percentages at each load bus can be calculated ushg the data
shown in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, and Equation (7.5). The results are shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.5. Sector peak load allocation for the RBTS

User
sector
Large users
indusmal
Commercial
Agricuiturai
Residential
Govt. & hst.
Office bldg.
Total
k load allocation (MW)

Bus4
Bus5
Bus6
16.30
4.70
19.00
0.0
3-05
1-70
7-40
7.85
3.70
8.90
5.55
1.85
20.00
20.00
Table 7.6. Sector peak load percentages for the RBTS
1
:
Peak load percentages

Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Sector
Large users
Industrial
Commercial
System
30.0
14.0
10.0
4.0
34.0
6.0
2.0
100.0
18.50
Agricultural
Residential
Govt. & Inst.
Office bldg.
44.50
27.75
9.25
100.0
Total
Table 7.7, Sector energy consumption percentages for the RBTS

User
sector
Large users
Industriai
Commercial
Agricultural
Residential
Govt. & Inst.
OEce blrig,
Total
Bus 2
24.02
14-84
33-42
25-72
100-0
consumption perc ntages

Bus 6
iifii
23.72
8.77
26.50
41.01
100.0
System
3 1.0
19.0
9.0
2.5
31.0
5.5
2-0
100.
The CCDF at every load bus in the RBTS are calculated by weighting the user
sector costs given in Table 7.1 for each interruption duration by the peak load and
energy consumption percentages shown in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. The peak load
.
percentages given in Table 7.6 are the weightmg factors for the 1 and 20 minute
durations and the energy consumption percentages given in Table 7.7 are the weighting
fhctors for the 1, 4 and 8 hour duratiom. The r e d t s are given in Table 7.8 and are
shown graphically in Fig. 7.3.
Table 7.8. CCDF for the RBTS load buses in ($/kW)
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
1 min.
0.367
0.840
0.707
0.525
0.303
Interruption duration
4 hrs
1hr
20 min,
14,646
1.362
4.167
7.941
1.524
2.906
17.727
1.969
5.621
16.585
4.295
1.607
I 1.276
3-274
1.006
8 hrs
39.322
18.198
42.530
41.163
28.041
++Bus
+Bus
4Bus
4Bus
Bus 4
20
60
240
480
Duration (minutes)
Fig. 7.3. CCDF for the RBTS Ioad buses in ($/kW)
The seven-sector peak load allocations at IEEE-RTS each Ioad bus are shown in
Table 7.9. The seven-sector peak load percentages at each load bus are obtained usjng
Equation (7.3) and are shown in Table 7.10. The seven-sector energy consumption
percentages at each load bus are calculated using the data shown in Tables 7.4 and 7.9,
and Equation (7.5). The results are s h o w in Table 7.1 1.
Table 7.9. Sector peak load allocation for the IEEE-RTS

-
---
Buses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Sum
Lg. user
Sector Ac load allocation in MW

Cornmer-
85.50
42.75
42.75
85.47
213.75
42.75
188.20
110.97
42.86
855.00
14.25
14.25
14.25
14.25
14.25
14.25
14.25
28.55
8.50
14.25
28.55
5.60
34.50
14.25
22.55
14.25
14.25
285.00
Total
108.00
97.00
180.00
74.00
71.00
136.00
125.00
171.00
175.00
195.00
265.00
194.00
3 17-00
100.00
333.00
181.00
128.00
2850.00
Table 7.10. Sector peak load percentages for the IEEE-RTS

Buses
1
Indus.
36.94
Govt.
15.74
35.36
33.22
46.2 1
28.03
29.37
3 1-96
11.64
20.49
22.57
20.59
15-00
9.68
17.10
11-98
13.36
office
Table 7.1 1. Sector energy consumption percentages for the IEEE-RTS

Sector wergy coi
-
Buses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Lg. user
Total
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
Indus.
46-61
43.33
36-78
39.12
43.35
16-39
54.99
22.6
16.39
43.O9
69.93
45.88
56.25
64.3
36.35
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
27.74
30.13
26.44
LOO.
15.66
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
The CCDF at every IEEE-RTSload bus are calculated by weighting the user sector
costs given in Table 7.1 for each interruption duration by the peak load and energy
assumption percentages shown in Tables 7.10 and 7.11. The results are given in Table
7.12 and are shown graphically in Fig. 7.4.
Table 7.12. CCDF for the IEEE-RTS load buses in (%/kW)
Load
buses
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
1 min.
0.658
0.072
0.574
0.094
0.532
0.623
0.574
0.339
0.677
0.587
0.784
0.789
0.934
0.492
1 .O75
0.646
0.385
CCDF for the IEEE-RTS south area load buses
+Bus
*Bus
+Bus
+Bus
-+-Bus
*Bus
*Bus
-++Bus
10
Bus 3
Bus 7
20
60
240
480
Duration (minutes)
(a) South area
CCDF for the IEEE-RTS north area load buses
20
60
240
480
Duration (minutes)
(b) North area

Fig. 7.4. CCDF for the IEEE-RTS load buses in ($/kW)
Expected Customer Damage Costs (ECOST)
7.4
This section illustrates the algorithm used for the calculation of the expected total
cost of customer interruptions (ECOST), or expected customer damage cost, at a

specified system service area or at a Ioad bus. The equation for cdculating the ECOST is
developed fkom the expected energy not supplied (EENS) index de-
in Section 2.8
and the composite customer damage fnction iiiustrated in Section 7.3. The EENS is
deked in Equation (2. H),
and is
EENS = CpSi - LMi - 8760
W e a r ,
siEF
where
F is the set of system M u r e states in which load curtailments occur,
L,., is the load curtailed in MW at a specfic bus or for overall system in system
state si.
The above equation can be applied in adequacy evaluations of both the overail
system and the system load points. In the overall system adequacy evaluation, the F is
the set of the system states in which load curtailments occur in the system and the L,.,i is
the total load curtailed in the system in system state si. If system load point adequacy
evaluation is conducted, the F is the set of system states in wbich Ioad curtailments occur
at a specined system load point and the L,.,i is the load curtailed at the load point in
system state si. The EENS equation can be rewritten in the following form,
where dsi =
8760
hours, which is the expected duration at system state si.
(psi +Asil
The ECOST cari be calculated by replacing the d, in the EENS equation with the
cost c(dSi)of the energy not supplied during the load loss event si. The c(dsi) is given by
the duration dsi and the CCDF for the system service area or load bus. The equation for
the ECOST is as follows.
ECOST = z p s i -(psi+ hsi)*c(dsi)-L,.,

siEF
where c(dSi)is mea~u~ed

in $/kW or k $ W .
The ECOST calculated by Equation (7.6) when based on a single constant load level
is designated as an annualized value. The annual ECOST can be evaluated using a
stepped ioad mode1 in the same way as that for the other adequacy indices desmbed in
Section 2.7. The annual ECOST cm also be directly evaluated using the new approach
desmed in Section 3.6, in which the hourly load duration curve is directly incorporated
in the calculation. In this new approach, the available capacity at the system state si is
fist obtained and is then combined with the load duration curve to obtain the expected
load curtailment. The equation for the EENS using the new approach is given by
Equation (3.13), and is
where
isthesetofallinvestigatedsystemstates,
Lj is the hourly peak load in one year at a specific load bus in system state si, and
Csi is the available capacity at the specific load bus in systern state si.
The direct equation for the annual ECOST can be derived nom the above EENS
equation in the same way as that for the annualized ECOST. In this situation, as the
system state si is not a complete M u r e date using a single constant load, the expected
system state filure duration
is used for the interruption cost calculation. The annual
ECOST is given by,
where
df.si = xl/(pa + h a ) is the hours in which the load is greater than the available
Lj>C,i
capacity at a specific load bus in system state si.
An often used index in reliabiliiy cost analysis is the interrupted energy assesment
rate (IEAR), which is calculated, as the ratio of the ECOST and the EENS at either the
load buses or for the overail system, as s h o w below.
EAR =
ECOST
EENS
The IEAR is a convenient and readily understandable index, which provides a

rnonetary evaluation of energy deficiencies at the load buses and for the overall systern
f?om a custorner damage cost point of view. The ECOST and the IEAR analyses were
applied to the RBTS, the IEEE-RTS, the interconnected two-area RBTS and the IEEE
two-area RTS. The results of these analyses are shown in the following two sections and
provide insight into the variation of the ECOST and the IEAR due to different system
fctors.
7.5
h u a k e d and h u a 1 ECOST for the RBTS and

the IEEE-RTS
This section presents analyses of the ECOST and IEAR for the RBTS and IEEE-
RTS. The annualized ECOST for the load buses and the overd systems were obtained
using Equation (7.6). The annual ECOST for the load buses and the o v e r d systerns
were obtained using Equation (7.7). The IEAR was calculated using Equation (7.8) in
either annualized or annual values. The CCDF used for the RBTS is shown in Table 7.8
and the CCDF used for the IEEE-RTS is shown in Table 7.12. Diffrent load levels have
been utilized for the annualized ECOST and the IEAR, and the variation in the ECOST
and the IEAR due ro the load level is illustrated. Cornparisons have been made between
the annualized and annual ECOST and IEAR. System states of up to four generators, of
up to three transmission luies and of up to uiree combhed generators and transmission
lines on outage were investigated in both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTSevaluations. A
d.c. load flow technique was used for the analysis of the system states. A pass 1 load
curtailment policy was used for the RBTS evaluations and a pass 2 load curtailment
policy was used for the IEEE-RTSassessments.

The total probability of the investigated RBTS states is 0.999973 50 with the given
outage level dennition of 4G+3 L. Fig. 7.5 shows the ECOST at the load buses for three
different load levels. The graph clearly shows that the ECOST at buses 2, 3 and 4
decreases rapidly with the reduction in the load level. This tendency, however, does not
apply to bus 6. This is because the fdures at buses 2, 3 and 4 are mainly due to
generation capacity deficiencies, while Mures at bus 6 are dominated by outage of the
single transmission line which supplies bus 6.
Fig. 7.6 shows the overd system ECOST at the different load levels. There is a
multiplication factor above the bar at the 185 M W load level which indicates that the
actual value of the ECOST is the indicated value multiplied by the factor. The graph
shows that the overall system ECOST decreases rapidly when the load level reduces
from 185 MW to 148 MW and does not vary signiscantly when the load level decreases
fiom 148 MW to 74 MW. This indicates that generation capacity deficiency is a major
factor in the customer damage cost when the system load level is high. The transmission
line capacity constraints becorne the major factor when the system load level is low. The
graph also shows that customer damage cost due to generation capacity deficiencies is
larger than that due to the transmission line capacity constraints.
RBTS ECOST at the load buses, 4W3L
Load buses
Fig. 7.5. Expected customer damage costs for the RBTS load buses at variable load
leveis
RBTS overall system ECOST,4G+3L
185
1665
148
1295
Ill
923
74
Load levels, MW
Fig. 7.6. Expected customer damage costs for the overall RBTS at various load
levels
Fig. 7.7 shows the IEAR at the load buses for three different load levels. The graph
shows that the IEAR for the RBTS is different at each load bus, but does not
significantly change with the selected load levels. There is no IEAR value shown at bus 2
when the load is at the 148 MW level, as in this case both the EENS and the ECOST are
effectively zero and the IEAR is therefore not obtainable using Equation (7.8). Fig. 7.8
shows the overall system IEAR at different load levels. The graph fbrther indicates that
the IEAR index is quite stable with respect to load level variations.
RBTS IEAR at the Ioad buses, 4G+3L
Load buses
Fig. 7.7. Intermpted energy assessment rate for the RBTS load buses at variable load
levels
RBTS overai system IEGR, 4-3L
185
1665
148
1295
Ill
925
74
Load levels, MW
Fig. 7.8. Intemipted energy assessrnent rate for the o v e r d RBTS at various load levels
Fig. 7.9 shows the total annual system ECOST and the distribution of the ECOST at
the load buses. The annual system ECOST, which is 565.057 k$/year, is much smaller
than the annualized value at the peak load Ievel, which is 6632.867 k$/year. The graph
also shows that the annual ECOST at bus 6 is the major wntriiution to the total annual
RBTS ECOST and contriutes 78% of the system annual ECOST. The second major
contributon comes fiom bus 3 which provides 12% of the total system ECOST and the
thud major contriiution comes f?om bus 4 with 10% of the total system ECOST. The
annual ECOST at buses 2 and 5 are very 4.
RBTS annual ECOST at the load buses, Total -565.057 @/y

Bus 2
Bus 3
Fig. 7.9. Distrution of the annual expected customer damage cost in the RBTS
Fig. 7.10 shows the annual IEAR at the load buses and for the overd s y s t e n ~The
graph shows that the annual system IEAR is d e r than the aazlualized system IEAR
and the annual IEAR at the load buses are totally different fiom the anndized values.
This indicates that although the a~ualizedIEAR is relatively stable with load level
variations, the annual IEAR are quite different fiom the anniialized values and should be
calculated separately.
RBTS anuual IEAR, 4G+3L
System
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
Load buses
Fig. 7.10. Annual intemipted energy assesment rate for the overd RBTS and at the
RBTS load buses
The total probability of the investigated system states is 0.98581246 for the IEEE-
RTS at the given outage level of 4G+3L. This probability is not as large as the value for
the RBTS studies. This is mainly due to the larger size of the IEEE-RTS. When the
investigated system states are extended to 5G+3L, the probability of the total system
states increases to 0.99411566. The annual ECOST and IEAR based on the 5Gt3L
systcxn state investigation are also provided in this section.
Fig. 7.1 1 shows the ECOST at the load buses for two dairent load levels. The
graph shows that the ECOST decreases tremendously at all the load buses when the load
level reduces by only 10%. This indicates that generation capacity deficiency is a crucial
fctor in the customer damage costs at the load buses for the system peak load level.
EEEE-RTS ECOST at the load buses, 4GI3L
10
13
14
15
16
18
19
20
Load buses
Fig. 7.1 1. Expected customer damage costs for the IEEE-RTS load buses at variable
Ioad levels
Fig. 7.12 shows the overall system ECOST at different load levels. The system
ECOST at the 2850 MW load level shown in the graph is only one quarter of the actual
value, as the actual value is too large to be placed on the graph. The graph shows that
the o v e r d system ECOST rapidly decreases when the load level drops fiom 2850 MW
to 1995 MW. This indicates that the ECOST of the IEEE-RTS is mainly due to
generation capacity deficiencies and that transmission line capacity constraints are
negiigiile.
IEEE-RTS overail system ECOST,4G+3L
Load levels, MW
Fig. 7.12. Expected custorner damage costs for the overall IEEE-RTS at various load
levels
Fig. 7.13 shows the variation in the IEAR at the load buses for two dinrent load
levels. The graph shows that while the IEAR of the IEEE-RTS varies at the dairent
load buses, it does not vary in accordance with the load levels. Fig. 7.14 shows the
overall system IEAR for different load levels. The graph fiutfier Uidicates that the IEAR
index is quite stable with variation in the Ioad levels. The annualized system IEAR of the
IEEE-RTS is quite close to the annualized system EAR of the RBTS as shown in Fig.
7.8 and Fig. 7.14.
EEE-RTS IEAR at the load buses, 4W3L
a 6
- - - - - - - - -
C)
"p
Load =2565 MW
za -2
t 5
86
- - - - - -
L<
V1
Load buses
Fig. 7.13. Interrupted energy assessment rate for the IEEE-RTS load buses at variable
load levek
IEEE-RTSoverall system IEAR, 4-3L
Load levels, MW
Fig. 7.14. Interrupted energy assessment rate for the overd IEEE-RTS at various load
Ieveb
Fig. 7.15 shows the total annual system ECOST and the distribution of the annual
ECOST at the load buses. The annual system ECOST,which is 39,356.633 U/year, is
much smaller than the annuahed value at the peak load level which is 763,259.170
k$/year. The graph shows that the annual ECOST at bus 18 is the major contributor to
the total m u a l system ECOST and provides 65% of the total annual systern ECOST.
The second major contribution cornes fiom bus 20, which provides 12% of the total
annual system ECOST. The third major contriibution comes fiom bus 10 with 7% of the
total annual system ECOST. The total ECOST for the remaining 14 load buses
contriiute 16% of the total annual systern ECOST.
IEEE-RTS annual ECOST a t the load buses
Total =39,356.633 W y
bus 19
bus 20
12%
bus 1-8
4%
bus 9
4%
bus 10
Fig. 7.1 5. Distribution of the m u a l expected customer damage cost in the IEEE-RTS
Fig. 7.16 shows the annual IEAR at the load buses and for the overall system The
graph shows that the annual system IEAR is Slfliiller than the mualized systern IEAR
and the annual IEAR at the load buses are quite diffiaent Eom the annualized IEAR
values. This M e r indicates that akhough the annualized IEAR is relatively stable with
load level variation, the annuaI IEAR are different fiom the annualized values and must
be calculated separately. The annual system IEAR of the IEEE-RTS is close to the
annual systern IEAR of the RBTS as shown in Fig. 7.10 and Fig. 7.1 6. This is possibly
because both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS are assumed to have the same basic customer
.
composition.
IEEE-RTS anuual IEAR, 4 W 3 L
Load buses
Fig. 7.16. Annual intmpted energy assessrnent rate for the overd IEEE-RTS and at
the load buses
The annual ECOST and IEAR are shown in Fig. 7.17 and Fig. 7.18 respectively for
the studies considering the expanded system states (5Gt3L). Fig. 7.17 shows that the
total system ECOST is now 50,234.014 $Wyear, which is 1.28 times the value of
39,356.633 k$/y obtained when 4Gt3L system states were investigated. There are no
sipifkant variations in the distributions of the load bus ECOST due to the extended
system state investigation. Fig. 7.18 shows that the IEAR are changed slightly compared
with those shown in Fig. 7.16.

IEEERTS annual ECOST at the load buses, 5W3L
Total 40,234.0 14 k$/y
bus 20
bus 19
12%
bus 1-8 bus 8

2%
3%
bus 9
4%
bus 10
bus13-16
bus 18
63%
Fig. 7.17. Dh'bution of the annual expected customer damage cost in the IEEE-RTS
considering 5W3L
IEEE-RTS anuual IEAR, 5-3L

z
Load buses
Fig. 7.1 8. Annual interrupted energy assessment rate for the overall IEEE-RTS and at
the load buses considering 5G+3L
7.6
ECQST for the Two-area RBTS and the IEEE Two-area RTS
Using the Equivalent Approach
This section provides analyses of the ECOST and IEAR for the two-area RBTS
shown in Fig. 6.1 and the IEEE two-area RTS shown in Fig. 6.10, using the adequacy
equivalent approach. The annualized ECOST was calculated using Equation (7.6) at the
system peak load level. The annual ECOST was obtained using Equation (7.7). The
IEAR was determined using Equation (7.8) for both the annualized and the annual
values. The CCDF used for the RBTS is shown in Table 7.8 and the CCDF used for the
IEEE-RTS is shown in Table 7.12. The d.c. load low technique was used to establkh
the IA equivalent and in the ECOST analysis of the AI in both the two-area RBTS and
the IEEE two-area RTS. A pass 1 load curtailment policy was used for the two-area
RBTS evaluation and a pass 2 Ioad curtailment policy was used for the IEEE two-ma
RTS assessment.
Evaluation of the two-area RBTS
System states of up to three components (generators or transmission lines or both)

on outage in both the IA and the AI were investigated. AU the combinations of the
system states in the IA and the AI were included in the analysis of the two-area
RBTS.
The total probability investigated in the evaluation is 0.99988399. The IA equivalent was
rounded to 11 states using a rounding increment of 5 MW. This 11-state equivalent is
shown in Table 5.15.
Fig. 7.19 shows the distribution of the annualized ECOST in the AI of the two-area
RBTS at the system peak load level. The total a ~ u a l i z e dAI ECOST of 1798.741
k$/year shown in Fig. 7.19 is much d e r than the annualized system ECOST o f
6632.8668 k%/yearfor a single RBTS at the peak load level shown in Fig. 7.6. This
reduction of the ECOST is a benefit in systems which are interconnected and can assist
each other.
Gnnualued ECOST at the load buses in the AI

of a twwarea RBTS, total =1798.741 k$/y
Bus 2.6%
Fig. 7.19. Distri'bution of the annualized expected customer damage costs in the AI for
the two-area RBTS
Fig. 7.20 shows the distnhtion of the annual ECOST in the
AI of the two-area
RBTS. The total annud AI ECOST of 433.246 k$/year shown in Fig. 7.20 is d e r
than the amual system ECOST of 565.057 k$/year for a single RBTS shown in Fig. 7.9.
It is also much smaller than the mualized AI ECOST of 1798.741 k$/year. Fig. 7.20
indicates that the annual AI system ECOST is almost totally due to the M u r e of bus 6,
which is a remote bus comected to the system by a single transmission h e .
AM& ECOST at the load buses in the AI

of a two-area RIBTS, total =433.246 k%/y
Bus 6
99%
Fig. 7.20. Distnibution of the m a l expected customer damage wsts in the AI for the
two-area RBTS
Fig. 7.21 shows the annualized IEAR for the overall AI at the system peak load
level. Fig. 7.22 shows the annuai IEAR for the overd AI in the two-area RBTS. The
two graphs show that the annual system IEAR is slightly larger than the annualized
systern IEAR. The annual IEAR at buses 2 , 3 and 4 are all lower than the curresponding
annualized values and the annual IEAR at bus 6 is close to the annualized value.
Anuualized IEAR for the AI of a two-area RBTS

at the peak load level
System
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
Load buses
Fig. 7.2 1. Annualized intempted energy assesment rates for the overali AI and at the
AI load buses for the two-area B T S
Anuurtl E A R for the AI of a two-area RBTS
System
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
Load buses
Fig. 7.22. Annualized intemipted energy assessrnent rates for the overd AI and at the
AI Ioad buses for the two-area RBTS

System states of up to four generators on outage, of up to three transmission lines
on outage and of up to three combined generators and transmission lines on outage in

both the IA and the AI were ivestigated. AU the combinations of the +em
states in the
IA and the AI were included in the analysis of the IEEE two-area RTS. The total
probability investigated in the analysis is 0.97157788. The equivalent of the iA was
rounded to 36 states using a roundiing inmement of 20 MW.
Fig. 7.23 shows the distn'bution of the annualized AI ECOST at the system peak
ioad level. The total annualized AI ECOST of 145,812.847 k$/year shown in Fig. 7.23 is
much smaller than the annualized system ECOST of 763,259.1 70 k%/yearfor a single
IEEE-RTS at the peak load level shown in Fig. 7.12. This frther indicates the benefits
of system interconnection and mutual assistance in order to lower the ECOST and
increase the system reliability.
Fig. 7.24 shows the distriiution of the annual Al ECOST. The total annual AI
ECOST of 5,679.565 k$/year shown in Fig. 7.24 is much smaller than the annual system
ECOST of 39,356.633 k$/year for a single IEEE-RTSshown in Fig. 7.15. It is also
much d e r than the amualized AI ECOST of 145,8 12.847 k$/year. Fig. 7.24 indicates
that the annual ECOST at bus 18 contriiutes the most to the total annual AI ECOST.
Anniiaiized ECOST at the load buses in the AI of the
IEEE two-area RTS, total =145,812.847 k%/y
bus 18
25%
18%
Fig. 7.23. Distribution of the annualized expected customer damage costs in the AI for
the IEEE two-area RTS
Annual ECOST at the ioad buses in the AI of the

IEEE two-are8 RTS, total =5,679.565 H/y
bus 19-20
12Vo
bus 18
75%
Fig. 7.24. Distnbution of the annual expected customer damage costs in the AI for the
IEEE two-area RTS
This chapter describes the basic concepts required for composite system reliability
costibenefit analysis. The basic approach in reiiability costhenefit analysis is to minunize
a total cost composed of the overali project cost and the customer damage cost. The
project cost is deterministic in nature and c m be obtained using weIl established
methods. The customer damage cost is probabilistic and is concqtually the aggregated
value the custorners are willing to pay in order to avoid load interruptions or voltage
standard violations. The customer damage cost is a fnction of interruption fiequency,

duration, load lost, location, and other social effiects.
The chapter illustrates the cdculation of the ECOST (expected customer damage
cost) and the related IEAR (intempted energy assessrnent rate) indices in composite
power systems. The basic data required to calculate the ECOST and IEAR used in this
chapter corne fkom the mail surveys conducted by the Power System Research Group at
the University of Saskatchewan. The ECOST and the IEAR of the RBTS, the IEEERTS, the two-area RBTS and the IEEE two-area RTS were calculated for various
conditions. In these studies, the new algorithm for annual adequacy indices presented in
Chapter 3 and the adequacy equivalent approach were used. The results are illustrated,
compared and analyzed in the chapter to provide insight into the variation of the ECOST
and the IEAR with different system fctors.
The results of the system studies show that the ECOST decreases rapidly with
reduction in load level for those load buses at which possible Mures are m a d y due to
generation deficiencies. The ECOST can be very large and very sensitive to system load
level variations, when the system load level is relatively- high. The results &O show that
the m u a l ECOST at the load buses have a very different distribution than do the
annual.zed values. The system studies show that the mualized IEAR index does not
change sign.ifcantly with variation in system load level. This result was recognized in
previous research work [48,49]. A fiirther resuit shown in this chapter is that the actual
annual IEAR values for the overall system and the load buses are not equal to the
corresponding annualized vahies, although the annualized IEAR is stable with load Ievel
variation. The mual IEAR values should be calculated separately. The chapter
illustrates the essential techniques and philosophy of reliability costhenefit analysis in
composite power systems.
Summary and Conclusions

This thesis extends the state-Of-the-art of adequacy evaluation of composite
generation and transmission systems using the analyticd and equivalent mode1
approaches. The thesis provides a description of the basic concepts, the mathematical
foundations, the pertinent factors, the adequacy indices and computer program design
concepts associated with the basic contingency enmeration approach to bulk power
systern adequacy evaluation. Three advanced algorithms are presented, which can
effectively improve the accuracy of the obtained adequacy indices without considerably
increasing the required computation times. The adequacy equivalent concepts and th&
applications in composite system adequacy evaluation are cumprehensivelydescnbed and
ikstrated in the thesis. The thesis also illustrates the concepts of reliability costhenefit
analysis and the utilization in this area of equivalent techniques and the new algorithm for
annual adequacy indices. The thesis illustrates the concepts and techniques using simple
network configurations and by applications to the two refiability test systems.

Chapter 2 descriies the state space technique, which is the mathematical fondation
for system reliability assesment using the d y t i c a l approach. The chapter illustrates the
basic procedure for composite systern adequacy evaluation and the concepts associated
with miplementation of the procedure. The basic equations required are clearly
fonnulated in the chapter. Network solution techniques, remedial actions, load

curtament policies and load models are the major pertinent factors associated with the
process of composite power system adequacy evaluation The chapter provides brief
descriptions of the basic network solution techniques, i.e., the network flow, the fst
dewupled a.c. load flow and the d.c. load flow methods, and provides descriptions of
the remedial actions, the ioad curtailment philosophies and the load models applied in the
thesis.
Three advanced algonthms have been developed and are descnibed in Chapter 3.
The algorithm are illustrated by application to simple networks and M e r illustrated
using simple numerical examples in this chapter. The new algorithms effectively provide
improved assessrnent of composite system adequacy without considerably increasing the
requked computationd effort. The fist algotitiun is concerned with improved calculation
of the fidure fiequency and duration indices. The dficulty involved in the filure
fiequency calculation is the need to recognize the transitions between the Mure system
states. Two equations are developed to provide tight lower and upper bounds of the
Mure fiequency index. The upper bound will become the exact failure fiequency if all
possible system outage states c m be investigated or if al1 the Mmvestigated system
outage states are M u r e states. It can be expected that most of the uninvestigated higher
level states wdl be systern fidure states in a practical composite system adequacy
evaluation, simply due to the fact that these system states wntain high outage levels. An
effective algorithm based on the equations for the tight M u r e fkequency bounds has
been developed, which provides an estimate of the fdure fiequency with an exact
maximum error M. The Mure fiequency error limit is a h c t i o n of the total
investigated system state probability. Investigation of an extensive number of system

states leads to a decreased m o r lirnit, and therefore an improved fdure fiequency index.
The second algorithm, designated as state extension, can effectively and eEciently
extend the knowledge of the investigated system states to include the effect of many
uninvestigated systern states in a collective form. The technique can therefore provide
much improved estimates of the adequacy indices for composite power systerns. The
accuracy improvement using the state extension technique applies to the basic Mure
probabiIity, fiequency and duration indices for the overall systern and at the individual
system load points. The accuracies of all the related indices are
&O
improved. The
algorithm, together with the error limit estimation of the calcuiated indices, effectively
decreases the uncertainty associated with the fct that a large number of high level
system states are ignored in practical composite system adequacy assesment.
The third algorithm deals with the evaluation of the annual adequacy indices.
Extended long computation times are usually required to calcdate aanual indices, in
which variable load levels are considered. The traditional method for composite system
adequacy evaluation focuses on the load curtailments anshg at a constant load level. The
new algorithm focuses on the available capacities at a given constant load level. This
change makes it possible to incorporate actual load variation c m e s directly in the
composite system adequacy analysis. The propose-new algorithm effectively provides a
consistent tight upper bound on the annual indices andrequires load ffow calculations at
only a single constant load level. The technique can aIso be used together with a multilevel load mode1 to provide more accurate m u a l adequacy indices. The required
computation time using the new algorithm is greatly reduced compared with previous
approaches.
System studies on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTSwere conduced using the concepts
given in Chapter 2 and the advanced algorithm presented in Chapter 3. The results are
provided in Chapter 4. These system studies provide f.urther insxght into the basic
concepts of the analytical approacb, the developed advanced techniques, the adequacy
indices, and the pertinent fctors that affect the final results. The results show that the
developed equations for the Mure fiequency index provide consistent tight Iowa and
upper bounds both at the load buses and for the overd system- The tight lower and
upper bounds can be combined to give an improved evaluation of the filure fiequency
dong with an exact maximum error limit. The range of the mor limit depends on the
number of investigated system states in a specific system adequacy and@.
The system study results show that the state extension technique providw much
improved estimates of the fidure probability and fiequency indices for the RBTS and the
IEEE-RTS for both the load buses and the overall systern without considerably
increasing the required computation tirne. The results indicate that the improvement
effect of the state extension technique is considerable when the index values are large
and can be minor when the hdex values are small, This reflects the fct that the state
extension technique is based on an extension of the investigated system Mure states.
The enct of the extension technique is obtined only if system Mure states ex& in the
investigated system states. The technique provides particularly accurate fdure
probability and fiequency indices for overall system reliability evduation at reasonably
high load levek, as the overall system indices are usually large compared with the values
at a single load point. When the load level is very low or the reliability level is high at
some load points, more system states should be investigated in order to obtain the state
extension effect. The upper bound values provided by the technique provide important
guidance on the estimates of the failtue probability and ffequency indices both for the
overall system and at the load buses.
System studies were conducted on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS using the new
annual adequacy index algorithm, the seven-step load approach and the basic amuahzed
method. Four adequacy indices were calculated for the two test systems for both the
load buses and the overall system. The state extension technique was applied in the
cdculation. The results clearly show that the developed algorithm effectively provides
consistent tight upper bounds on the muai values of the four adequacy indices, which
are much Iowa than the correspondhg annuaiized indices. The required computation
time for the new technique, however, is comparable to that required for calculating the
annualized indices and is approximately seven h e s Iowa than the seven-step load
approach. The technique can also be used together with a multi-level load model to
provide more accurate annual adequacy indices. The required computation tirne using the
new algorithm is greatly reduced comparecl with previous approaches.
The concepts of adequacy equivalents and applications of the equivalent concepts in

composite power system adequacy evaluation are illustrated in Chapter 5. The primary
objective in the development of an adequacy equivdent is to represent a cornplex system
by a reduced equivalent model which retains the essential parameters required for M e r
studies but excludes much of the system detaii. The developed equivalents c m be
effectively used to reduce the computational burden involved in large composite power
system adequacy analyses. The equivalent concepts are also very useful and effective for
deaiing with common-cause fdures and station-originated events in composite system
analysis. It is important, in the development of an adequacy equivalent, to have a clear

understanding of the essential parameters required in the equivalent and their possible
use in subsequent analysis.
The basic concepts associated with developing adequacy equivalents are described
in Chapter 5. The two basic techniques for developing adequacy equivalents are
designated as the network reduction and the state reduction techniques. The network
reduction technique is simple in concept and easy to understand. In this approach, the
equivalent parameters for series and parallel configurations are readily attainable in the
f o m of relatively simple equations. The network reduction technique is useful for
simplifiuig a practical complex power system into a mode1 which is suitable for further
detailed adequacy analysis and is widely used in distnibution and substation adequacy
evaluations. The network reduction technique basically applies to systems containing
two-state inodels.
The state reduction technique is very general and can be used to develop the
adequacy equivalents of a wide range of systems with multiple systern states. A general
state space approach is normally used for the detennination of the equivalent parameters.
This technique c m be used in a wide range of power systern adequacy analyses. Several
composite power system adequacy equivalent models based on the state reduction
approach are illustrated in Chapter 5. These equivalent models are improvements on
previous equivalent models and can be used in a wide range of composite system
adequacy analyses. The choice of the equivalent models depends upon the requirernent
of the specific composite system adequacy analysis. The quivalent models are clearly
iuustrated and compared with each other using numerical examphs in this chapter.
The network flow method is usually used in adequacy equivalent development. The
d.c. load flow method is, however, a more accurate and widely used method in
composite system adequacy analysis. A technique for using the d.c. load flow method in
equivalent development is presented in Chapter 5. The adequacy equivalents developed
using the d-c. load flow method contain a very large number of equivalent states. A
rounding technique is therefore presented to shrink the equivalent to one of reasonable
size. A numerical example is given in the chapter to illustrate the difference in the
equivafents developed using the nework flow and the d.c. load flow methods. The
utibation of an equivalent in a composite system adequacy analysis is illustrated using a
simple composite system. The equivalents associated with common-cause fdures and
station originated events are also illustrated in this chapter.
The results of s y s t w studies based on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS using the
equivdent techniques presented in Chapter 5 are provided in Chapter 6. The various
applications of the equivalent techniques in composite system adequacy evaluation and
the effects of the various pertinent factors are illustrated and investigated in this chapter.
The effect of network solution techniques on the development of a composite system
adequacy equivalent together with the effect of equivalent rounding increments in

reducing an equivalent to diffrent sues are illustrated in this chapter. The system study
results show that both network flow and d.c. load flow can provide acceptable adequacy
equivalents of a composite system. The equivalent obtained by the network flow method
contains somewhat optunistic available system state capacities, which lead to lower
values of the indices. The network flow method, howeva, requires less computation
time than the d.c. load flow technique. The results also show that the equivalent
rounding technique c m be effectively used to reduce the IA equivdent to one of smaller
size without sigdicantly decreasing the accuracy of the AI adequacy evaluation. The
adequacy indices of the A.?increase slightly wwhen the rounding inmement applied to the
IA equivalent increases.
The adequacy equivalent approach can be used to investigate the effect of high level
outage states, which is normally restricted when directly solving the entire system due to
the very large required mmputation times. The system studies show that the effect of
high level contingencies in the IEEE two-area RTS network is relatively large. This lads
to the conclusion that it is necessary in large power networks to examine high level
contingencies resultjng fiom multiple component outages. This is an important point in

the new deregirlated electric utility c b t e where traditional utility boundaries are being
removed and systems are effectively increasing in size.
The systern studies on applications of the equivalent approach to calculating annual

adequacy indices show that the adequacy equivalent method provides satisfactory
estimates of the annual adequacy indices with greatly reduced computation times. The
equivalent technique can also be effectively used to investigate the eEect of station
originated events using the station equivalent technique described in Chapter 5. The
system studies show that the effect of station originated events including the load feeder
isolation events in both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS indices is si@cant
and is
insensitive to the load level variations. The station orginated events have greater impact
on the FP and EENS indices than on the FF and ELC indices.
Equivalent model development is a practical extension of the nomial reliability
evaluation process, which provides a practical and effective way to conduct adequacy
evaluation in large composite power systems, where the computation tirne can be
excessive when solving the entire network. Once the adequzcy equivalent in the
Interconnecteci Area (LA) has been developed, adequacy evaluations in the Area of
Interest (AI) can be conducted with reduced computation times. The equivalent
tec'anique can also be effectively used in many other applications such as evaluating the
effect of station originated events. Equivalent techniques in composite system adequacy
evaluation are expected to play a very important role in practical power systern analysis
m d evduation.
Costhenefit andysis of composite power systems is becoming an essential factor in

the determination of system reinforcement and expansion projects, due to the impact of
electric utility deregulation and market cornpetition Power system planning is
traditionally based on detenninistic criteria. A generally used criterion is that the loss of
any single generating unit or transmission h e should not cause load intemption. This
criterion does not explicitly consider the probability of component faiures and the value
of service to customers. It can therefore result in overbuilt systems due to low
probability events. The criterion provides no economic input to the cost associated with
a particular expansion plan in terms of the value of service provideci to customers. This
deterministic approach is no longer appropriate in the emerging cornpetitive power
supply environment. The concepts of composite system reliability
CO sthenefit
analysis
using the equivalent approach are described and illustrateci in C h a p t ~7.

The basic approach in reliability costhenefit andysis is to minimize a total cost
which is composed of the overd project cost and the customer damage cost. The project
cost is detemiinistic in nature and can be obtained usmg well established methods. The
customer damage cost is however probabilistic and conceptuaiiy is the aggregated value
the custorners are willing to pay to avoid load interruptions or voltage standard
violations. The customer cost is a h c t i o n of the interruption fiequency, duration, load

lost, location, and other social effects.
The chapter illustrates the calculation of the ECOST (expected total customer
damage cost) and the related IEAR (interrupted energy assessrnent rate) indices for
composite power systems. The basic data used to calculate the ECOST and IEAR are
fiom the mail surveys conducted by the Power System Research Group at the University
of Saskatchewan. The ECOST and the IEAR of the RBTS, the IEEE-RTS, the two-area
RBTS and the IEEE two-area RTS were calculated for various conditions. In these
studies, the new algorithm for annual adequacy indices presented in Chapter 3 and the
adequacy equivalent approach were used. The results are illustrated, compare. and
analyzed in the chapter to provide insight into the variation of the ECOST and the IEAR
with different system fctors.
The results show that the ECOST demeases rapidly with reduction in load level at
s mainly due to generation deficiencies. The
those load buses at which possible ~ u eare
ECOST c m be very large and very sensitive to system load level variations, when the
system load level is relatively high The results also show that annual ECOST at the load
buses have a very m i r e n t distributon than do the annualized values. The system studies
show that the annualized
IEAR index does not change significantly with variation
in
system Ioad level. This result was recognized in previous research work [48,49]. A
frther result shown in the system studies is that the actual annual IEAR values for the
overall system and at the load buses are not equal to the corresponding annualized
values, although the annualized IEAR is stable with load level variation The annual
IEAR values should be calculated separately. Chapter 7 illustrates the essential

techniques and philosophy of reliability costhenefit andysis in composite power systems.
This thesis clearly illustrates that the adytical technique for composite system
adequacy evaluation can be extended using the adequacy equivalent approach to aaalyze
Large bullc electric power systems. It is believed that M e r research in this area will
provide additional benefits and applications of the equivalent mode1 approach to bulk
po wer system evaluation.
References
1. W.G. Ireson, C.F. Coombs and R.Y. Moss, Handbook of Reliability Engineering
and Management, 2nd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.
2. R. BiUiton and RN. AUan, ReliabiZity Evaluation of Power Systems, 2nd Edition,
New York: Plenum Press, 1996.
3. R. Billinton and R-N. Man, Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems Concepts

and Techniques, 2nd Edition, New York: Plenum Press, 1992.
4. J. Douglas, "Power quality solutions", IEEE Power Engineering Review, March
1994, pp. 3-7.
5. J. Douglas, "Buying and selling power in the age of cornpetition", IEEE Power
Engineering Review, vol. 14, Oct. 1994, pp. 12-15.
6. R. Billinton and R.N. Ailan, "Power system reliability in perspective", IEE Journal
on Elec~onicsand Pawer, March 1984, pp. 23 1-236.
7. R. Billinton, R.N. M a n and L. Salvade-ri,Applied Reliabiliry Assesment in Electric
Power Systems, New York: IEEE Press, 1991.
8. J. Endrenyi, Reliability Modeling In EIectric Power Systems, Toronto : Wiley, 1978.

9. IEEE PES Task Force, 'Tooling generating unit data for improved estimates of
performance indices", IEEE Trans. Power Systemr, vol. 10, no. 4, November 1995,
PP. 1912-1917.
10. R.O. Gunderson, M.P. Bhavarajy R. Billinton, D. Klernpel M.A. Klopp, M.G.
Lauby, R.P. lu do^ M.F. McCoy, T.C. Mielr3c, A.W. Schneider, E.P. Weber and
T.S. White, "Current industry practices in bulk transmission outage data collection
and analysis", IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, Feb. 1992, pp. 158-166.
11. CEA Equipment Reliability Information System, Generation Equiprnent S t a ~
Annual Report, CEA, Canada, December, 1996.
12. CEA Equipment Reliability Information System, Forced Outage Per$ormance of
Transmission Equipment for the penod January 1. 1991 to December 31. 1995,
CEA, Canada, December, 1996.
13. IEEE PES Task Force, "Bbliography on the application of probability methods in
power system reliability evaluation (197 1-1977)", IEEE Trnns. PAS-97, no. 6 ,
Nov/Dec, 1978, pp. 2235-2242.
14. R N . M a n ,
R Billinton and S.H. Lee, 'Bibliography on the application of probability
methods in po wer system reliabfity evaluation (1977- 1982)", IEEE Trans. PAS- IU3,
no. 2, 1984, pp. 275-282.
15. R-N. M a n , R. Billinton, S.M. Shahidehpour and C. Singh, ''I3Biography on the
application o f probability methods in power system reliability evaluation (19821987)", IEEE Tram. Power Systems, vol. 3, no. 4, November 1988, pp. 1555-1564.
16. M.Th. Schilling, R. Billinton, A.M.Leite da Silva and M . k El-Kady, cLBibliography
on composite system reability (1964 - 1988)", IEEE Trans. P o w r Systems vol. 4,
110.3,August 1989, pp. 1122-1132.
17. R. Billinton and P.RS. Kuruganty, "A probabilistic index for transient stability",
lEEE Tram PAS-99, Jan./Feb. 1980, pp. 195-203.
18. R. Billinton and M.E. Khan,"A secbas& approach to composite power system
IEEE Tram Power Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, Feb. 1992, pp. 65reliability eval~ation'~,
71.
19. A.M.Leite da Silva, J. Endrenyi and L. Wang, "Integrated treatment of adequacy and
security in bullc power system reliability evaluation", IEEE Trans. Power Systems,
vol. 8, no. 1, March 1993, pp. 275-285.
20. S. Aboreshaid and R. Billinton, "Secunty evaluation of composite power systems",
IEE Proc. Part C, vol. 142, September 1995, pp. 51 1-516.
2 1. R. Billinton and G. Lian, "Composite power system health analysis using a security
constrained adequacy evaluation pro cedure", IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vo 1. 9,
no. 2, May 1994, pp. 936-94 1.
22. B. Porretta and E.G. Neudorf, "Conceptual famework for evaluation and
interpretation of the reliability of the composite power system", IEEE Trans. P o w r

Systems, vol. 10, no. 2, May 1995, pp. 1094-1103.
23. M.E. Khan, '%ulk load points reliability evaluation using a security based model",
IEEE Tram Power Systems, vol. 13, no. 2, May 1998, pp. 456-463.
24. M.E. Khan, A Security Bared Approach to Composite P o w r System Reliability
Evaluation, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 199 1.
2 5. G. Lian, Composite System Operating State Risk Evaluation, Ph. D . Thesis,

University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1993.
26. R. Billinton and W. Li, Reliabiliq Assessrnent of Electncal Power Systems using
Monte CarIo Methods, New York: Plenum Press, 1994.
27. N. Gubbala and C. Singh, c'Modelsand considerations for pardel implementation of
Monte Carlo simulation methods for power system reliability evaluation", IEEE
Trans. Poww Systems, vol. 10, no. 2, May, 1995, pp. 779-787.
28. R. Billinton and L. Gan, "Monte Carlo simulation rnodel for multi-area generation
system reliability studies", IEE proc.. Part C, vol. 140, 1993, pp. 532-538.
29. J.R Ubeda and R.N. Allan, "Sequential simulation applied to composite system
reliabiiity evaluationy IEZ Proc., Part C, vol. 13 9, no. 2, March 1992, pp. 8 1-86.
30. M.P. Bhavaraju, IL Billinton, N.D. Reppen, R.J. Ringlee and P.F. AIbrecht,
"Requirernents for composite systm reliability evaluation models", IEEE Trans.
Power System, vol. 3, Feb. 1988, pp. 149-157.
3 1. W. Li, Y. E4ansouq J.K Korczynski and B.J. Mills, "Application of transmission
reliability assessment in probabilistic planning of BC Hydro Vancouver south metro
system", IEEE Tram Power System, vol. 10, no. 2, May 1995, pp. 964-970.
32. T.A. Mikolinnas, W.R. Puntel and R.J. Ruiglee, "Application of adequacy assessment
techniques for bulk power systems", IEEE Trans. PASIOI, no. 5, May 1982, pp.
1219-1228.
33. J. Endrenyi, P.F. Albrecht, R. Billinton, G.E. Marks, ND. Reppen and L. Sahaderi,
"Bulk power system reliability assessment, Why and How? Part 1: Why?", IEEE
Trans. PAS-IOI, Sept. 1982, pp. 3439-3445.
34.5. Endrenyi, P.F. Albrecht, R. Billniton, G.E. Marks, N.D. Reppen and L. Salvaderi,
" B a power system reliability assessment, Why and How? Part II: How?", IEEE
Tram. PAS-101, Sept. 1982, pp. 3446-3456.
35. R. Billinton and E. Khan, "Utilization of contingency selection techniques in the
adequacy evaluation of composite generation and transmission systems", CEA
Transactions, Vol. 28, 1989.
36 . T.A. M i k o h a s and B.F. Wollenberg, "An advanced contingency selection
dgorithm", IEEE Tram PAS-100, Feb. 1981, pp. 608-6 17.
37. IEEE PES Task Force, '73ulk power system reliability criteria and indices - trends
and fure needs", LEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 9, no. 1, Feb. 1994, pp. 181190.
38. IEEE PES Task Force, bXeporting bulk power systern delivery point reliability",
IEEE Trans. Power System, vol. 11, no. 3, August, 1996, pp. 1262-1268.
39. KA. Clements, B.P. Lam, D.J. Lawrence and N.D. Reppen, "Computation of upper
and lower bounds on reliability indices for buk power systems", IEEE Trans. PAS103, no. 8, August 1984, pp. 23 18-2325.
40. T.A.M. Sharaf and G.J. Berg, 'Toadability in composite generatiodtraTlSmiSsion
power system reliabiIity evaluation", IEEE Trans. Reliability, vol. 42, 1993, pp. 393400.
4 1. G. Hamoud, "Probabilistic assessment of interconnection assistance between power

systems", IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 13, no. 2, May 1998, pp. 535-542.
42. J.M.S. Pinheiro, C.R.R. DomeIlas, M.Th. Schilling, A.C.G. Melo and J.C.O. MeUo,
Trobing the new IEEE Reliabity Test System (RTS-96), HL II assesment'', IEEEE
Tram. Power Systems, vol. 13, no. 1, February 1998, pp. 171-176.
43. E.G. Preston, N.M. Grady and M. L. Baughrnan, "A new planning mode1 for
assessing the e e c t s of transmission capacity constraints on the reiiability of
generation supply for large nonequivalenced electric networks", IEEE Trans. Power
Sjtstems, vol- 12, no. 3, August 1997, pp. 1367-1373.
44. S.K. Agarwal and W.V. Torre, "Development of reliabiiity targets for planning
transmission facilities using probabilistic techniques - a utility approach", IEEE

Tram. Power Systemr, vol. 12, no. 2, May 1997, pp. 704-709.
45- R Billinton, G. Wacker and E. Wojczynski, "Comprehensive bibliography of electric
service interruption costs", IEEE Trans. PAS-102, 1983, pp. 1831-1837.
46. G. Tollefson, R. Billinton and G. Wacker, "Comprehensive bibliography on reliability

worth and electrical service interruption costs 1980- 199O", IEEE Tram Power
Systems, vol. 6, no. 4, November 1991, pp. 1508-1514.
47. G. Toffeson, R. Billinton, G. Wacker, E. Chen and J. Aweya, "A Canadian customer
survey to assess power system reliability worth", IEEE Trans P o w r System, vol. 9,
no. 1, Feb. 1994, pp. 443-450.
48 - J. Oteng-Adjei, Cost/Benefit Assessrnent in Elechic P o w Systems, PP.D. Thesis,
University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1990-
49. R.F. Ghajar, Evaluation of the Marginal Outage Costs in Elechic Power S'stem,
PbD. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1993.
50. V. Udo; S.K. Aganval, A. Vojdani and M.I. Harlacher, "Balancing cost and
reliability - a quantitative study at Atlantic Electric", IEEE Trans. Power Systems,
vol. 12, no. 3, August 1997, pp. 1103-1 108.

51. W. Li and R. Billinton, "A minimum cost assessrnent method for composite
generation and transmission system expansion planning", IEEE Trans. Power
Systems, vol. 8, no. 2, May 1993, pp. 628-635.
52. E.G. Neudorf, D.L. Kiguel G.A. Hamoud, B. Porreta, W.M. Stephenson, R.W.
Sparks, D.M. Logan, M.P. Bhavaraju, R. Billinton and D.L. Garrison, "Cost-benefit
analysis of power systern reliability - two utility cases", IEEE Trans. Power Sysrems,
vol. 1O, no. 3, August 1995, pp. 1667-1675.
53. J.D. Dalton, D.L. Garrison and C.M. Falion, 'Value-based reliability transmission
planning", IEEE Tram. Power Systems, vol. 11, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 1400-1408.
54. M. Sullivan, T. Vardell, N. Suddeth and A. Vojdani, ''Intemption costs, customer
satisfaction and expectations for service reliability", IEEE Tram Power Sysrems,
vol. 11, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 989-995.
55. A.F. Vojdani, R.D. Williams, W. Gambel, W. Li, L. Eng and R N . Suddeth,
"Experience with application of reliabity and value of semice analysis in system
planningy', IEEE Trans. Power System, vol. 11, no. 3, Feb. 1996, pp. 1489-1496.
56. R- Billinton, L. Salvaderi, J.D. McCdy, H. Chao, Th-Seitz, RN. Ailan, J. Odom
and C. Fallon, "Reliability issues in today's ekctric power utility environment", IEEE
Tram Power Systems, vol. 12, no. 4, November 1997, pp. 1708-1714.
57. R. Billinton, 'XefiabiLity considerations in the new electric power utility hdustry",
CEA Transactions, Canada, 1997-
58. Jan Carr, "Restnicturing the Electricity Transmission Business", CEA Transactions,
Canada, 1997.
59. C. Lankford, J. McCdey and N. Saini, "Bibliographyon transmission access issues",
IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 11, no. 1, February 1996, pp. 30-40.
60.1. McCalley, S. Asgarpoor, T. Gedra, M. Halpui, N. Saini and M. Schrameyer7
"Second bibliography on transmission access issues", IEEE Trans. Power Systems,
vol. 12, no. 4, November 1997, pp. 16%- 1659.
6 1. W. Zhang, An Adequacy Equivalent Approach for Reliability Evaluation of
Composite Power Systems, M-Sc. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada,
1995.
62. R. Billinton and ILL. Hossain, "Reliablity equivalents - basic concepts", Reliability
Engineering 5, England: Applied Science Publishers Ltd., 1983, pp. 223-238.
63. R. Billinton and KL. Hossain, 'Xeliability equivalents - power system applications",
ReZiabiZity Engineering 5, England: Applied Science Publishers Ltd, 1983, pp. 239257.
64. S. Kumar, Adequacy Equivalents Ni Composite Power Systems, PbD . Dissertation,

University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1987.
65. R. Billinton, H.J. Koglin and E. Roos, 'Reliabilty equivalents in composite system
reliability evaluation', LEE Proc., vol. 134, pt. C, no. 3, May 1987, pp. 224-232.
66. R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "An adequacy equivalent approach for composite power
system reliability evaluation", E E E FESCAAIEX Proceedings, Canada, 1995.
67. S. K m and R. Billinton, "Pertinent factors in the adequacy assessrnent of

composite generation and transmission systems", CEA Transactions, Canada, 1986.
68. S. Kumar and R. Billinton, "Adequacy equivalents in composite power system
evaluation", IEEE Trans. PAS-3, August 1988, pp. 1167-1173.
69. R Billinton and S.K Agarwal, cZ~arnination

of severe contingencies in a d area
of a large composite power system using adequacy equivalents7', IEE Proceedings,
vol. 137, pt. C, no. 2, Mach 1990, pp. 107-114.
70. R.N. Fontoura Filho, M.Th Schilhg, J.C.O. MeIIo and J.L.R. Pereira, "Topological
reduction considering uncertainties", IEEE Tram. Power Systems, vol. 10, no. 2,
M a y 1995, pp. 739-744.
71. R. Billinton, S. Kumar, N.Chowdhury, K. Chu, K. Debnath, L. Goel E. Khan, P. Kos, G.

Nourb&-h
and J. Oteng-Adjei, "A reliab*
test system for educational purposes basic data", IEEE Trans. P o w r Systemr, vol. 4, August 1988, pp. 1238-1244.
72. IEEE PES Task Force, "IEEE reliability test system", LEEE Trans. PAS98,
Nov./Dec. 1979, pp. 2047-2053.
73. IEEE PES Task Force, "The IEEE reliability test system - 1996", LEEE 96 W 3 2 6 9 m.
74. R. Billinton, T.KP. Medicherla and M.S. Sachdev, "Application of common-cause
outage models in composite system reliability evaluation", LEEE Trans. PAS-I OU,
1981, pp. 3648-3657.
75. R. Billinton and T K P . Medicherla, "Station originated multiple outages in the
reliability analysis of a composite generation and transmission systemy7,
IEEE TrnnsPAS-100, 1981, pp. 3870-3878.
76. R. Billinton, P.K. Vohra and S. Kumar, "Effects of station originated outages in a
composite system adequacy evaluation of the IEEE reliabizity test system", IEEE
Trans. PAS-104, no. 10, Oct. 1985, pp. 2649-2656.
77. S. J o ~ a ~ i t h u&
l aR. Billinton, 'Topological andysis in bufk power system reliabsty
evaluation", IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 12, no. 1, Feb. 1997, pp. 456-463.
78. L.R. Ford and DR. Fulkerson, Flows In Networks, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1962.
79. Don T. Phlips, A. Ravindran and James J. Solberg, Operations Research Principles
and Practice, New York: Wiley, 1976.
80. R.K Ahuja, T.L. Magnanti and J.B. Orlui, Network Flows -- Theory, Algorithm and
Applications, Englewood Clif&, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993.
8 1. B. Stott and 0. Aisac, "Fast decoupled load flow", IEEE Trans. PAS93, May/June
1974, pp. 859-869.
82. John J. Grainger and William D. Stevenson, Jr, Power System Analysis, New York:
McGraw-HU, 1994.
83. A.C.G. Melo, M.V.F. Pereira and A.M. Leite da Silva, "A conditional probabrlity
approach to the calculation of fiequency and duration indices in composite reliability
evaluation", IEEE Trans. Power System, vol. 8, no. 3, August 1993, pp. 11 18- 1125.
84. A.C.G. Melo, M.V.F. Pereira and A.M. Leite da Silva, 'Trequency and duration
calculations in composite generation and transmission reliability evaluation7', IEEE
Trans. Power System, vol. 7, no. 2, May 1992, pp. 469-476.
85. R Billinton and W. Li, "A system state transition sampling method for composite
system reliability evaluation", IEEE Trans. Power Systemr, vol. 8, no. 3, Aug 1993,
pp. 761-766.
86- R Billinton and W. Zhang, "Algorithm for Mure fiquency and duration assesment
of compositl~power systems", IEE Proc. -Gener. Tramm. Dishib., vol. 145, no. 2,
March 1998, pp. 117- 122.
87.J.D. Hall, R.J. Ringlee and A L Wood, 'Trquency and duration methods for power
system reliability calculations, part 1- generation system model", LEEE Trans. PAS87, 1968, pp. 1787-1796.
88. R.J. Ring1ee and A.L Wood, 'Trequency and duration methods for power
reliability calculations, part II - demand model and capacity reserve model", IEEE
Trans. PAS-88, 1969, pp. 375-388.
89. C. Singh and R Bilbton, System Reliability Modeling and Evaluation, London:
Hutchinson, 1977.
90. R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "State extension for adequacy evaluation of composite
power systems", Accepted for publication in EIechic Power Systems Research,
1998.
91.R. Billinton and W. Zhang, 'Equivalents in adequacy evaluation of power systems",

PMAPS Conference, Vancouver, Canada, 1997.
92. W. Zhang and R BiUuiton, "Application of an adequacy equivalent method in bulk
power system reliability evaluation", IEEE Trans. Power S'stems, vol. L 3, no. 2,
May 2998, pp. 661-666.

93. R. Billinton and W. Zhang, 'Tnhanced adequacy equivalent for composite power
system reliability evaluation", LEE Proc. -Gener. Transm. Distrib., vol. 143, no. 5,
September 1996, pp. 420-426.
94. R. Billinton, P. Wang and W. Zhang, '72eliability assessrnent of power systerns by a

network equivalent approach", IEEEE F E E S C m Proceedings, Canada, 1 997.
Appendices
A. Data of the RBTS
The basic data for the buses, transmission lines, generators and tenilinal station
equipment are shown in Tables A- 1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 respectively. The base power is
100 MVA for the p.u. values given in the tables. The system load mode1 is the same as
the IEEE-RTS, which is aven by the weekly peak load in percent of annual peak, the
d d y peak load in percent of weekly peak and the hourly peak load in percent of daily
peak. These load mode1 data are s h o w in Tables B-4,B-5 and B-6.
Table A- 1. Bus data ( in p-u.) for the RBTS
--
--
Table A-2. Line data ( in p.~.)for the RBTS
Line
no.
-Bus Bus
1
1
2
5
6
3
1
2
4
5
8
9
i
3
4
2
4
5
3
4
5
Faihues
per year
IS O
5-00
4.00
1.O0
1.O0
1S O
5.00
1.O0
1.O0
Table A-3. Generator data for the RBTS
Rating (MW)
Failmes per
year
40.00
6.00
45.00
~ e p a i tr&
Table A-4. Terminal station equipment data for the RBTS

Equipment
Active M u r e
Rate ( M . / y )
Passive filure
Circuit breaker
Bus section
Transformer
0.0066
0.22
O.02
0.0005
rate (fil./y)
--
--
Outage duration
@s)
72
10
Switching
time (hrs)
768
--
B. Data of the IEEE-RTS

The basic data for the buses, transmission lines and generators are shown in Tables
B- 1, B-2 and B-3 respectively. The base power is LOO MVA for the pu. values given in
the tables. The data for the tennixld station equipment is the same as those for the
RBTS, which is shown in Table A-4. The system load model is given by the weekly peak
load in percent of amual peak, the daily peak Ioad in percent of weekly peak and the
hourly peak load in percent of daily peak. These load model data are shown in Tables B4, B-5 and B-6.
Bus
-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Table B- 1. Bus data ( in p.u.) for the IEEE-RTS
Table B-2.
-Line Bus Bus
no.
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
i
2
3
5
4
6
9
24
9
10
10
8
9
10
11
12
Il
12
13
14
13
23
23
16
16
21
21
24
17
19
18
22
21
21
20
20
23
23
22
Line data ( in p.u.) for the IEEE-RTS

Failures
per year
0.24
O S1
0.33
0.39
0.48
0.38
0.02
0.36
0.34
0.33
0.30
0.44
0.44
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.40
0.39
0.40
0.52
0.49
0.38
0.33
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.35
0.34
0.32
0.54
0.35
0.35
0.38
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.45
Table B-3. Generator data for the IEEE-RTS

Unit no.
Bus no.
Failmes per
year
4.42
4.42
4.42
4.42
4.42
4.42
2.98
2.98
2.98
2.98
2.98
9.13
7.30
7.30
7.30
9.22
9.22
9.22
19.47
19.47
4.47
4-47
19.47
19.47
4.47
4.47
9.13
9-13
7.62
7.96
7.96
9.13
Table B-4. Weeldy peak load in percent of annual peak
Week
Peak load Week
1
2
Peak load Week Peak load Week
14
3
4
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
75.5
81.6
80.1
88.0
72.2
77.6
80.0
72.9
72.6
70.5
78.0
69.5
72.4
27
28
29
30
31
15
16
Peak load
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
72.4
74.3
74.4
80.0
88.1
88.5
90.9
94.0
89.0
94.2
97.0
100.0
95.2
Table B-5. Daily peak load in percent of weekly peak

Day
Peak load
Monday
93
Tuesday
100
Wednesday
98
Thursday
FricTay
96
94
Saturday
77
Sunday
75
Table B-6. Hourly peak load in percent of daily peak

Wmter, 1.
Wkdy
67
63
60
59
59
60
74
86
95
96
96
95
95
95
93
94
99
100
100
96
91
83
73
63
Summe
Wkdy
64
60
58
56
S~rinflal
Wkdy
63
62
60
58
56
58
59
65
64
76
72
87
95
99
1O0
99
1O0
1O0
97
96
96
93
92
92
93
87
72
85
95
99
1 O0
99
93
92
90
88
90
92
96
98
96
90
80
70
C. Collection of Reliabity Data

The collection of system component reliability data is a fundamental task in srtem
reliabillty evaluation Many electric power utilities have traditionally r ecorded the
perfomiance o f power system components. These recordings are the primary sources of
the component reiiability data required for the purpose of conducting power system
reliabiliiy evaluation. It is important to collect the component and system operation and
outage information fiom many power utities and to produce relevant reliability
parameters fiom the coUected raw data, which c m be used in power system reliability
assessment. National collection of power system operation and outage data in North
America started in the late sixties. The North American Electnc Reliability Corncil
(NERC) and the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) are the main organizations in
North America involved in power system reliabiliw data collection. The following
provides a brief description of the two organizations concerned with power system
reliability data collection
The NERC (http://www.nerc.corn/) was formed in 1968 in the afterrnath of the

November 9, 1965 blackout that affected the Northeasteni United States and Ontario,
Canada. NERC's mission is to promote the reliab5t-y of the electricity supply for North
America. It does this by reviewing the past for lessons learned, monitoring the present
for compliance with policies, standards, principles and guides, and assessing the fiiture
reliability of the bulk electric systerns. The NERC created the Generating Availabrlity
Data Systern (GADS) database to record operating information for improving the
performance of electric generating equipment. GADS Services maintains this database
and provides assistance to electnc utilities and others in researching the vast amounts of
information collected on power plant outages. GADS data are compiled annually and
reported in the Generating Availability Report (GAR) and its accompanying summary
statistical brochure. GAR presents data for the most recent five individd years and the
five-year average. Generating unit availability statistics are provided on both a capacity
weighted and non-weighted basis.
The CEA @ttp://www.canelect.com/), founded in 1891, is the national forum and

voice of the evolving electricity business in Canada The CEA established the Equipment
Reliability Information System @RIS) in 1975 and the Electric Power System Reliability
Assessrnent (EPSRA) in 1985. The E N S and EPSRA were meated in consultation with
the Consultative Corrimittee on Outage Statistics (CCOS),a group established by the
CEA and presently chaired by Professor Roy Billinton. The methodology developed for
collecting data using a cornmon set of definitions is now the industry standard. Canada's
electrical industry has a reliability record among the world's leaders, and the national
data collection system established by CEA is at the forefiont of utility activities in this
area.
The EMS provides statistics which are used to monitor equipment performance and
provide the basic data required for reliability calculation and probabilistic planning. The
EPSRA provides s e c e continuity statistics for the bulk electric system, and for the
power system as a whole, enabling utilities to document how well they have performed.
Through ERIS and EPSRA, the CEA collects data on 90% of all generation equipment,
and 80% of electric utility customers in Canada (approximately 9.5 million). The data is
then compiled and analyzed by the CEA, md pubJished in annual and special reports to
subsmbers. The ERIS and EPSRA together provide performance and reliabitity
information which measure how welI Canadian utilities are serving their customers, and
provide the basis for predicting how well fture systems wiU behave. The annual reports
are available in the Generation, Transmission, and D i s t r i i o n Service Continuity areas
of ERIS and EPSRA. The anouai reports all have composite versions available in
addition to utility versions. The composite versions are available to aU interested parties,
whde the utility versions contain specinc individual utility statistics and are available only
to the system participants. The infonrzation coUected nom power utilities is vital in
supporting their reliability and availability analyses and decision-making processes.

A Thesis On Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

A Thesis On Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems

using Analytical and Equivalent Approaches

A thesis Submitted to the College of

Graduate Studies and Research

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

O Copyright Wei Zhang, 1998. AU rights reserved.

395 Wellington Street

395. nie Wellington

Your IW Vorre relermce

Our hie Noire reMrence

The author has granted a nonexclusive licence allowing the

L'auteur a accord une licence non

The author retains ownership of the

L'auteur conserve la proprit du

College of Graduate Studies and Research

of the requirements for the

Department of Electrical Engineering

Dr. T.S, Sidhu

Chair of Advisory Conmittee, Department of

SupeMsor, Department of Electrical Engineering

Department of Electrical Engineering

Departrnent of Electrical Engineering

Department of Civil Engineering

Dr, R.W. Menzies

EtELIABILWY EVALUATION OF BULK POWER SYSTEMS

due to the converging forces of deregdation, technologicd revolution and evolving

performed on a portion of the systern or when the systern is to be intercomected to a

many other applications in composite system evaluation.

This thesis illustrates the mathematical foundations, evaluation procedures, pertinent

equivalent concepts and their applications in composite system evaluation. System

Born in Weihai, China

B-Eng., Electncal Engineering, Chongqing University, China

Elecrical Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Canada

R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Algorithm for filure eequency and duration

R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Enhanced adequacy equivalent for composite power

R. Billinton and W. Zhang, "Equivalents in adequacy evaluation of power systems",

University of Saskatchewan in any use of the material in this thesis. Copying or

This thesis illustrates the mathematical foundations, evduation procedures, pertinent

achowledged. It has been a w o n d e f i opportunity and expenence to work under hi

2 Basic Concepts and Evaluation Techniques . . . . . . .

5 Concepts and Methods of Adequacy Equivalents . . .

6 Applications of Equivalent Techniques

Effect of the Station Originated Events .

8 Summary and Conclusions

Data of the RBTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Seven step load data for the IEEE-RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Failure fiequencies at bus 15 for different load levels in the IEEE-RTS

Expected energy not supplied at IEEE-RTS the load buses using

Fig. 6.10. Symbolic IEEE two-area RTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of S p b o l s and Abbreviations

Link fiom bus i to bus j

Probability of system state si

Frequency of system state si

Duration of system state si

Composite Customer Damage Function

Customer Damage Function

Cana&m Electrkity Association

Camposite System Reliability Evaluation Program.

Expected Customer Damage Cost

Expected Energy Nat Suppfied

Expected Load Cuaailed

Hourly Load Variation *e

Inten-upt ed Energy Assessrnent Rate