TECSON VS COMELEC (CITIZENSHIP)

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a
Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court
may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence
prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,
the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced
by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC (DOMICILE)
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the

constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the
Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the
Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided
in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;
Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to
Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with
the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner
married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Alih vs. Castro (UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite
their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were
acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as
evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the
arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation
was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit
approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so
the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision
against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material.
EBRANILAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (RIGHT TO EDUCATION,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, FREEDOM OF RELIGION)
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant
issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers
and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they
do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them
obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued
by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping
from the list in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6
who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be reaccepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their
right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and
worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by
the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and

compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission
I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion
orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage
in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right receive
free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of
the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that
the state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino,
regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every
Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set
aside.
KOREMATSU VS US
Brief Fact Summary. During World War II, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent to
evacuate the West Coast. The Petitioner, Korematsu (Petitioner), a United States citizen of Japanese
descent, was convicted for failing to comply with the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are subject to
the most rigid scrutiny. But, pressing public necessity may sometimes justify such restrictions.
Facts. President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an executive order
authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be
excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they
were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to Assembly Centers.
The Petitioner, a United States citizen of unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted
under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply with such military orders.

Issue. Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from
the West Coast at the time that they were excluded?
Held. Yes. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified.
Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large number of
American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened
by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
Dissent.
Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over the brink of
constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must extend great deference to the
judgments of the military, it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion. Moreover, the
military order is not reasonably related to the dangers it seeks to prevent.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States Constitution (Constitution)
to approve everything the military may deem expedient.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO (DAP CONSTITUTIONALITY)
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M
for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending.
As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would
have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at
bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of
the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.
However, in the recent decision of the S, the Doctrine of Operative Fact is also applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP.
Montallano vs La Consolacion College of Manila (Illegal Dismissal)
FACTS:
Montallana was a faculty member of La Consolacions College of Arts and Sciences.
On January 16, 2009, Mrs. Nerissa D. Del Fierro-Juan (Juan), the Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences and the immediate superior of Montallana, filed a formal administrative complaint with La
Consolacion against Montallana, charging him of: (a) oral defamation (or slander); (b) disorderly conduct in
the school premises; and (c) discourteous/indecent behavior or using profane or obscene language in
addressing co-employees, superiors, or anybody within the school premises. Aside from this, Mrs. Juan also
filed grave oral defamation against him before the City Prosecutors Office.
Montallana meted the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months and directed him
to submit a written public apology to Juan.
In a letter dated April 22, 2009, Montallana sought reconsideration of his suspension and explained that a
written public apology was inappropriate at that time in view of the pendency of a criminal complaint for
grave oral defamation filed by Juan against him before the City Prosecutors Office. He mentioned that his
issuance of a written public apology while the criminal case was being heard might incriminate himself,
adding too that it was his lawyer who advised him to invoke his right against self-incrimination.
The request having been denied by La Consolacions President, respondent Sr. Imelda A. Mora (Mora), in
her letter dated May 12, 2009, Montallana filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair labor practice,
with prayer for payment of salaries during the period of suspension, andmoral and exemplary damages
against respondents La Consolacion and Mora before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 05-0766709 (illegal suspension case).
In a Decision dated April 15, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Montallana, holding that his
actions did not constitute serious misconduct. Hence, Montallanas suspension from employment was
declared illegal and respondents La Consolacion and Mora were ordered to pay Montallana the amount of
48,000.00 as his salary during the period of suspension.
On appeal, however, the NLRC disagreed with the findings of the LA and found Montallanas acts to be
constitutive of serious misconduct and against the rule of honor and decency expected of any teacher.
While it found sufficient basis to impose the penalty of termination, the NLRC nonetheless sustained the
two (2)-month suspension in deference to the schools prerogative to discipline its employees. Montallana
moved for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Decision dated February 7, 2011. Montallana

no longer elevated the matter to the CA and the NLRCs decision became final and executory on February
28, 2011.
Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, La Consolacion, through its HRD Director, respondent Albert D. Manalili
(Manalili), directed Montallana to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed for failure to submit his
written public apology which formed part of the disciplinary sanction that was sustained with finality by the
NLRC.
In a letter dated June 9, 2011, Montallana begged for La Consolacions indulgence, explaining that he had
no intention of defying the directive to submit a written public a pology and that his inability to comply
therewith was, to reiterate, only in view of the pendency of the criminal case against him. He, nonetheless,
expressed his willingness to comply with the directive once the said case was resolved with finality. Finding
Montallanas written explanation unsatisfactory, Manalili terminated him from work on June 13, 2011.
Asserting that his dismissal for failure to submit a written public apology was unjustified, Montallana filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents La Consolacion, Mora, and Manalili
(respondents).
In a Decision dated November 14, 2011, the LA dismissed Montallanas complaint, holding that his refusal
to apologize was tantamount to serious misconduct and, hence, warranted his termination.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the LAs verdict, and thus, ordered respondents to reinstate Montallana
and to pay him backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to his reinstatement.
However, the CA gave due course to respondents petition and eventually reversed and set aside the
NLRCs Decision .It found that Montallana deliberately refused to obey the directive of the respondents to
apologize and that the pendency of the criminal case against him was not sufficient justification to excuse
him from compliance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montallanas termination from work was lawful and justified.
HELD:
Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work is one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296 (a) (formerly Article
282[a]) of the Labor Code. In order for this ground to be properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal, the
conduct must be willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental
attitude.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Montallanas non-compliance
with respondents directive to apologize was willful or intentional. The Court finds itself in complete
agreement with the NLRC that the disobedience attributed to Montallana could not be justly characterized
as willful within the contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code, in the sense above-described.
The Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 127988 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 31, 2012
and the Resolution dated October 16, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No.
02-000556-12, declaring petitioner Joel N. Montallana (Montallana) to have been illegally dismissed, are
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the order for respondents Sr. Imelda A. Mora and Albert D.
Manalili to pay Montallana his backwages.
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC RIGHT TO SUFFRAGE
Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and
certification as overseas absentee voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such

elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the
Constitution.
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the
OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet
the requirements of residency under the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal
to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the
denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that all qualified overseas
Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.
Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the
same has already been rendered moot and academic?
Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only
insofar as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental
issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee
voter in future elections, which however, remains unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have
meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee
voter under R.A. 9189.
[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the
expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual
citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee
voters.
The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189,
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]