1. CASE: RICARDO HONRADO vs.

GMA NETWORK
FACTS: GMA Films entered into an agreement with petitioner granting the former
exclusive right to telecast the 36 films for a period of 3 years. GMA Films sued
petitioner to collect P1.6 million alleging that it rejected two out of 36 films.
Petitioner denied liability alleging that he replaced it with another film which GMA
accepted and that GMA Films, being a stranger to the contract he entered into with
the owners of the films in question, has no personality to question his compliance
with the terms of such contracts.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for breach of the Agreement and breach of trust?
LAW: Breach of Contract or Trust under the TV Rights Agreement.
CASE HISTORY: The RTC dismissed the complaint and gave credence to petitioners
defense that he replaced Evangeline Katorse with Winasak na Pangarap. The CA
reversed this ruling finding that GMA films was authorized under Paragraph 4 of the
Agreement to reject Evangeline Katorse and GMA Films never accepted Winasak na
Pangarap as replacement because it was a bold film.
RULING: Petitioner committed no breach of contract or trust. In terms devoid of
any ambiguity, Paragraph 4 of the Agreement requires the Intervention of MTRCB,
the state censor, before GMA Films can reject a film and require its replacement.
GMA Films does not allege that the MTRCB reviewed Winasak na Pangarap and Xrated it.
When GMA films rejected the film on their own, they went beyond its
assigned role under the Agreement of screening films to test their broadcast quality
and assumed the function of MTRCB to evaluate the films for the propriety of their
content.
OPINION: I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Contracts have the force
of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith. Courts cannot
supply material stipulations, read into the contract words it does not contain or read
into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. GMA Films is bound
by the TV Rights Agreement.

2. CASE: DARAUG vs. KGJS FLEET MGMT MANILA, ET AL

FACTS: Petitioner was employed by respondent as motorman on board the vessel.
He accidentally slipped and fell, injuring his left leg. After recuperation, Dr. Lim
declared him fit to work. Petitioner filed a complaint seeking permanent disability
benefits under the CBA. Therafter, he sought the services of Dr. Jacinto who
declared him no longer fit to work. Thus, he contended that the injuries he had
suffered while in service of the respondents entitled him to be compensated.
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to permanent disability benefit based on the injury he
suffered on board?
LAW:
Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local
manning agency) are required to execute the POEA-SEC as a condition sine qua non
prior to the deployment of the seaman for overseas work.
The POEA-SEC is

supplemented by the CBA between the owner of the vessel and the covered
seaman.
Thus, in resolving petitioners claim for disability compensation, the
Court will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and in the CBA.
CASE HISTORY: The Labor Arbiter granted petitioners claim finding the medical
assessment of the company-designated physician unreliable and biased. The NLRC
and CA reversed this ruling giving credence to the time and effort that companydesignated physician spent in monitoring and treating the petitioners condition,
thus acquiring detailed knowledge of his medical condition as compared to just 1
day of examination by Dr. Jacinto.
RULING: Petition is without merit. The petitioner did not comply with the
procedures stated in the POEA-SEC and CBA (the law as between the parties), that
in in case of conflicting assessments on his disability, petitioner has to refer the
matter to a third doctor jointly agreed by him and his employer for a binding and
final opinion. Further, the Court ruled that the petittioners claim for permanent
Disability Benefits was premature. When petitioner filed his complaint with the
arbitration office, he had yet to consult his own physician, Dr. Jacinto. Furthermore,
the Court declared that petitioner is fit to work when he continued to work as
seaman under another employer as evidenced by the several certifications from his
pre-employment examinations.
OPINION: I concur with the Decision of the Supreme Court. Permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work , or work of similar nature, that he was trained for or accustomed to perform,
or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensation, but rather the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity. The claim
of the petitioner, if granted, would be in violation of Unjust Enrichment unjustly
benefiting himself from the expense of respondent employer.
3. CASE: University of Pangasinan Inc.(UPI) vs. Fernandez
FACTS: Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against UPI for declaring them
dismissed from their positions as college instructors for alleged dishonesty, abuse of
authority and unbecoming conduct without just and valid cause. The case went up
to the Supreme Court and the upon denial of petitioners petition, the respondents
moved for a re-computation of their award to include their backwages and other
benefits from the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter up to the finality of the
decision.
ISSUE: What is the proper basis for the computation of backwages and benefits to
be paid to an employee? Is the re-computation of awards from LAs decision up to
its finality violative of immutability of a final and executor judgment?
LAW: Article 279 of the Labor Code states that xxx An employee who is unjustily
dsmissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual

reinstatement.
CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution based on the re-computed
award. On appeal, the NLRC granted UPIs appeal that respondents are entitled
only to the amount awarded by the labor arbiter in its original decision, and not the
recomputed amount. The CA ruled in favor of respondents
RULING: Updating the computation of awards to include as well backwages and
separation pay corresponding to the period after the rendition of LA Gambitos
decision up to its finality is not violative of immutability of a final and executory
judgment. Re-computation is a part of the law specifically Article 279 of the Labor
Code.
Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no
uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of when
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed.
The reckoning period is not
interrupted by the NLRCs reversal of Labor Arbiters finding of illegal dismissal.
OPINION: I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court which is in conformity with
the principle of interpretation or construction of the Labor Code - when there is
doubt, the Labor Code shall be construed in favor of the laborer. By the nature of
illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as
expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. This may be treated as a form of
example to the employers to be very careful in dismissing their employees without
just or valid cause.
4. CASE: LANDBANK vs. IBARRA, ET. AL.
FACTS: Pursuant to the governments Land Reform Program, the DAR acquired the
property of the respondents.
The respondents filed a Complaint for the
Determination of Just Compensation. The RTC issued an Order directing LBP to
make a provisional payment to respondents.
ISSUE: How should the value be computed in incomplete agrarian reform process?
LAW: Section 17 of RA 6657 provides that In determining just compensation, the
cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
CASE HISTORY: The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA, considering that
the RTC arrived at the valuation of the property based on the formula provided by
PD 27 and EO 228 instead of RA 6657, remanded the case back to the RTC for the
final determination of just compensation in accordance with RA No. 6657. Hence,
this case.
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In determining the applicable
formula, the date of the payment of just compensation must be taken into
consideration for such payment marked the completion of the agrarian reform
process. If the process is still incomplete as when just compensation is not settled

prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said
law despite the fact that the property was acquired under PD No. 27. By law and
jurisprudence, RA 6657, upon its effectivity, became the primary law in agrarian
reform covering all then pending and uncompleted processes, with PD 27 and EO
228 being only suppletory to the said law.
OPINION: I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is inequitable on the
part of the landowners to compute just compensation using the values not at the
time of the payment but at the time of the taking in 1972, considering that the
government has already benefited from the land. From the word itself just
compensation, the amount of money due to the owner who was deprived of his
property should be justly compensated.
5. CASE: ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC (ZMC) vs. PHIL HEALTH
FACTS: A case was filed against ZMC for violation of Section 149 of the Revised IRR
of RA 7875 penalizing any health care provider that increases the period of actual
confinement of any patient with revocation of accreditation.
ZMCs clerk
acknowledged that she committed an honest mistake in writing 6-12 August 2003
as the confinement period in the claim form. ZMC presented an Affidavit of
Explanation from Alestre recanting her previous Salaysay explaining that she
misdeclared her dates of confinement in ZMC. In her desire to report and be
compensated for one day of work, Alestre went back and forth between school and
the hospital.
ISSUE: Should ZMC be held liable for violation of Section 149, Revised IRR of RA
7875?
LAW: Section 149 Extending Period of Confinement This is committed by any
health care provider who, for the purpose of claiming payment from the NHIP, files a
claim with extended period of confinement by:
a. Increasing the actual
confinement of any patient xxx
CASE HISTORY: Health Insurance Arbiter found ZMC liable as charged giving more
evidentiary weight to the signature of Alestre in schools attendance logbook. The
Board affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure
on the part of ZMC to attach a valid SPA.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of ZMC giving more credence to Alestres
Affidavit, for the following reasons: 1. Alestre has fully explained why she initially
misdeclared her dates of confinement in ZMC. It is difficult to believe that she
would risk her reputation as a public school teacher, to be an abettor of ZMC; 2.
Alestres admission that she was in two places hospital and school on the same
day; 3. ZMC had in fact admitted to its error in indicating the dates of Alestres
confinement so there is no reason for ZMC to further conceal the actual days of
confinement; 4. The first Salaysay is not notarized.
OPINION: I agree with this Decision. The findings of facts must be respected, so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant. The medical clinics cannot be held liable for the manipulation of
their patients.
On the other hand, the medical clinics should be very careful in

filing their claims with Philihealth stating therein the truth in relation to the period of
confinement of their patients.
6. CASE: HACIENDA LUSITA INC. vs. PARC, et al. November 22, 2011
FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the SC unanimously deny the petitioner filed by HLI and
affirm the resolution of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan and placing
the subject land in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the
government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. The Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignored. The Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must give way to the right of the original qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land
distribution.
ISSUE:
1. Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since hacienda luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests to third parties, whether they have
fully paid for the lands or not?
2. Cant the Court order the DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Luisita cover
the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac
Devt Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs
SDP?
LAW: RA 6657 and DAO 1 provides that the awarded lands may only be transferred
or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation
patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
CASE HISTORY: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court En Bancs
July 5, 2011 Decision.
RULING: Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even
started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not
the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the
FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or covey their interest in the subject
lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since at the
end of the day, these land will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land
distribution under CARP.
As to the second issue, since what is put in issue is the propriety of the revocation
of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land and not 6,443
hectares, then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75
hectares of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under
its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to
agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were
allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

OPINION: Since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive the Court correctly reconsiders its Decision and resolves to
give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB. After all,
the qualified FWBs should benefit from the land that they have been plowing for a
long time.
7. CASE: DAR vs. DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA, et al
FACTS:
Petitioner compulsorily acquired a portion of respondents property
pursuant to the governments Operation Land Transfer Program under PD 27.
Respondents filed a Petition for Approval and Appraisal of Just Compensation
alleging that the LBP valuation was grossly inadequate and the fair market value of
the subject land should be fixed in the amount of at least P300k/ha. LBP insisted on
the correctness of the valuation having computed under EO 229 keeping in the
mandate of PD 27. The RTC appointed 2 commissioners for the purpose.
ISSUE: Was the subject land properly valued in accordance with the factors set forth
in Section 17 of RA 6657?
LAW: Section 17 of RA 6657 provides that In determining just compensation, the
cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
CASE HISTORY: The RTC rejected LBPs valuation explaining that while the land was
acquired pursuant to PD27, the same is covered by RA 6657, aka CARP, providing
for the factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 in determining just compensation. The
CA affirmed this Decision.
RULING: Yes. When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case
where the just compensation has yet to be paid, just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228
having mere suppletory effects.
Considering that the records of AGR Case No. 1163-G on LBPs petition for review
had already been remanded to the RTC, there is a need to make a similar remand of
DARs present petition to the same RTC for the determination of just compensation
in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657.
OPINION: This course of action is meant to avoid the possibility of any conflict or
inconsistency with any eventual ruling in AGR Case No. 1163-G.
8. CASE: BAEZ vs. SSS
FACTS: Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under the ECC before the SSS for
the demise of her husband based on medical opinions of Dr. Castillo and Dr. Torres.

Petitioner argues that the work of her husband as a Laboratory Technician at the
Chemistry Department of DLSU which involved chronic exposure to chemicals might
have precipitated the latters illness and eventual death.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to the death benefits claim under the ECC?
LAW: In order for the beneficiary of an employee to be entitled to death benefit
under the SSS, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an
occupational disease by ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.
CASE HISTORY: SSS denied petitioners claim on 2 grounds: 1. The cause of death,
cardiac complication of SLE, is not considered work-related; 2. SLE is not included in
the list of occupational diseases. On appeal, ECC affirmed the denial. The CA
dismissed the petition for review because it was filed out of time.
RULING: No. Petitioner relied unqualifiedly on the toxicological report which failed
to prove the causal relationship between Baylons work and his illness. The report
made an indirect link between the SLE and chemicals through drug-induced lupus.
On record, Baylon contracted SLE which is not listed as an occupational disease.
There was nothing on the record which shows that Baylon was diagnosed with druginduced lupus.
OPINION: This case could have been ruled in favor of the petitioner if proper
evidence was presented and proved before the Court. Sympathy must be balanced
by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by law ignores the need to show
a greater concern for the trust fund to which the ten of millions of works and their
families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths
occurred.
9. CASE: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency vs. Joy Cabiles
FACTS: Responding to an ad published by petitioner, respondent applied for a
quality control job in Taiwan. Respondent was deployed to work for Wacoal as
cutter. Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated. She
filed a complaint against petitioner and Wacoal for illegal dismissal. Petitioner
alleged that Wacolas accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to
the Pacific Manpower thus, obligation is substituted with Pacific which the latter
denied.
ISSUE: Should the award of the 3-month equivalence of respondents salary be
modified?
LAW: R.A. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995
CASE HISTORY: The labor arbiter dismissed the case. On appeal, the NLRC declared
Joy as illegally dismissed. It found that Sameer failed to prove that there were just
causes for termination. The CA affirmed NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal
dismissal and awarded her three months worth of salary, but remanded the case to
NLRC to address the validity of petitioners allegation against Pacific.
RULING: Respondent Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the

employment contract that was violated, in accordance with Section 10 of RA 8042.

The award of the 3-month equivalence of respondents salary must be modified
accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25,
1998.
OPINION: To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and
would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.
10. CASE: Montierro vs. Rickmers Marine Agency
FACTS: Petitioner, while employed by respondent, lost his balance and twisted his
legs, thus injuring his right knee. He reported to company designated physician, Dr.
Alegre, who later issued an interim disability grade of 10 for stretching leg of
ligametns of a knee resulting in instability of the joint. One month before Dr.
Alegres issuance of the final disability grading, Montierro filed a complaint for
recovery of permanent disability compensation relying on a medical certificate
issued by his physician of choice, Dr. Jacinto.
ISSUE: Is the 120-day rule applicable, thus entitling the petitioner to full disability
benefits?
LAW: In Kestrel vs. Munar, THE Court ruled that if the maritime compensation
complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the
other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule
applies.
CASE HISTORY: The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner relying on the 120day rule introduced by 2005 case Cystal Shipping vs. Natividad. The NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter. The CA ruled that he was entitled merely to Grade 10
permanent partial disability benefits only, the CA ruled that his disability could not
be deemed total and permanent under the 240-day rule established by the 2008
case Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime.
RULING: The petitioner is not entitled to full disability benefits because his condition
cannot be deemed a permanent total disability. Montierro filed his Complaint on
December 3, 2010, hence it is the 240-day rule that applies.
OPINION: I agree with the Decision of the Supreme Court. Disabilty Grade of 10
was given based on Section 32 of the POEA Contract. Claims for disability must be
decided within a specific limit provided in the contract between the parties. The
amount of the claim and the medical services he received from his employer were
both fair enough.
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