Arendt, Identity, and Difference

Author(s): B. Honig
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 77-98
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191648
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ARENDT, POLITICS, AND THE SELF

III. ARENDT, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE

B. HONIG
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity

HANNAH ARENDT'S TheLifeoftheMind(LOM) is a provocativeandbewildering

muchof
becauseitchallenges
work.Provocative
of
about thinking
and the mentalexperience
traditional
thinking
persons.
Bewildering
becauseitwaswritten
byan authorwhothroughouthercareerinsisted
thatthephilosophical
adamantly
preoccupation
withtheinnerlifeoftheselfwasmisbegotten.
commentators
Arendt's
haveconcentrated
ofLOM, butit
onthefirst
andthird
volumes
mainly
in thesecondvolume,Willing,
is primarily
thatArendtenhances
her
of herviewson identity
theoryof actionwithan explication
and a
revision
oftheearlieraccountofthewill.Thosefewwhohaverecently
to Willing
turnedtheirattention
thatthisaccountis
claim,however,
incoherent
orinconsistent
withArendt's
earlier
work.'Beginning
witha
geneticaccountof Arendt'sview of the will and endingwitha
ofone ofthesecritiques,
I hopeto showthatArendt's
consideration
accountofthewillin Willing
andtheconceptoftheselfuponwhichit
reliesareinternally
coherent
andimportantly
consistent
withherearlier
accountsofactionandidentity.
In herearlierwriting,
Arendt
isdismissive
oftheinnerlifeoftheself
in part becauseshe believesthatknowledgeof the innerselfis
to RichardFlathman,WilliamConnolly,
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful
Peter
Digeser,TomKeenan,andCharlesEuchnerfor
comments
onearlier
their
ofthis
drafts
article
andtoMrs.Catherine
herhelpinmastering
themeansofitsproduction.
Groverfor
totheSocialScienceandHumanities
I amalsoindebted
Research
CouncilofCanadafor
financial
support.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol.16No. 1,February
198877-98
1988SagePublications,
Inc.

77

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78

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

unattainable.
To this"inwardness
... no otherhasaccess"because"the
oftheself
accounts
humanheart... isa verydarkplace."2Psychological
for"feelings,
cannomore
andactionareillicit,
passionsandemotions
becomepartandparceloftheworldofappearances
thancanourinner
organs."3In short,on Arendt'saccount,the psychological
(and
selfisnotthesubjectofaction.Becauseitdwellsintherealm
biological)
the privaterealm,dominatedby a concernforlifeof necessity,
it
beleftbehindwhenweenterthepublicrealmtoact,
must
sustenance,
for"inpolitics,
notlifebuttheworldis at stake."4
oftheselfaretime-bound,
features
Psychological
limiting,
and,most
"never
of
the
as
Arendt
self:"If
important,
unique"5
for,
says
biological
to
all
look
But
thisinsidewere appear,wewould
alike."6 motives
and
aimsare notonly"typical,"
theyare action's"determining
factors";
them."7
"actionisfreetotheextent
thatitisabletotranscend
indeed,
In
thepublicspherethereare universal,
to these
timeless
counterparts
inherently
finitemotives."Principles"
inspireus "fromwithout"
to
whichdetermine
action,unlikemotives,
usfromwithin.
are
Principles
in thehumanworldthoughonlywhenwe actupon
"fullymanifest"
them.Andtheyare"toogeneral
toprescribe
particular
goalsalthough
every
particular
actioncanbeexplained
inlightofitsprinciple
oncethe
acthasbeenstarted."
Unlikethegoalofan action,"theprinciple
ofan
actioncan be repeatedtimeand again,and in distinction
fromits
motive,the validityof the principle
is universal."
In otherwords,
principles
areneither
agentnoraction-specific;
theyare"inexhaustible.'M
On thisearlyaccount,drawnprimarily
fromBetweenPast and
Future(BPF), thefaculty
ofthewillis distinguishable
frompsychologicalattributes
likemotives
andintentions
butitshareswiththemtwo
important
features:
itssphereof operation
is theinnerselfand it is
determinative.
action"isfreetotheextent
Consequently,
thatitis able
totranscend,"
notjust"motives
andaims,"butalsothedeterminism
of

thewill.9

Arendt's
latefocusonthelifeoftheminddoesnotsignala changein
herrigorously
dismissive
approachto theinnerlifeoftheself.Arendt
totreatthissubjectbecauseshefelttherewasa needfor
wasprovoked
suchan accountwritten
byan authorwhodidnotbelievethat"whatis
insideourselves,
our'innerlife,'is morerelevant
to whatwearethan
whatappearsontheoutside."'0"
Andshedevoted
a volume
tothefaculty
of thewillbecauseit was crucialto herprojectthatshe developa
ofthewillthatcouldserveas an alternative
conception
to traditional
philosophical
conceptions
ofthatfaculty,
onemoresuitedto a theory

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

79

In LOM, Arendt
thatprivileges
actionandtheworldofappearances.
selfwiththe
maintains
heridentification
ofthepsychological
steadfastly
distinsheinsistently
biologicalself.Stillhostileto all psychologisms,
guishesthelifeofthemindfrom
psychological
life.Thelifeofthemind
is madeup ofthreementalfaculties-thinking,
andjudgingwilling,
in its own way,to theperformance
or
each of whichcontributes,
of action.ButArendtremainswaryofthesemental
meaningfulness
theactivity
faculties,
for,inherview,"mental
activities,
andespecially
arealways'outoforder'whenseenfrom
theperspective
of
ofthinking,
intheworldofappearances.""I
ourbusiness
totheworldof
a mental
relates
Willing,
however,
"although
activity,
In LOM, Arendt
inwhichitsprojectis to be realized."''2
appearances
ofchoice
identifies
twowaysofunderstanding
thewill:"as a faculty
. .. and, on the other
betweenobjectsor goals, theliberum
arbitrium
forbeginning
a seriesintime'(Kant)
hand,as our'faculty
spontaneously
or Augustine's
utessethomocreatusest,'man'scapacityfor
'initium
becausehe himselfis a beginning."'3
The latteris the
beginning
alternative
offered
in LOM. Herethewillis an autonomous
mental
thatdoesnothing
faculty
lessthanmakeaction,a beginning,
possible.
It
liberatesus fromthetrivialpreoccupations
of theprivaterealmby
themostimportant
overcoming
to action:
andtenaciousimpediment
thebiological,
psychological,
andmentalselfthatdwellsintherelative
comfort
andsafety
oftheprivate
is a necessary
realm.Although
willing
ofactioninbothBPFandLOM, onlyinLOMis thewill'srole
condition
intheproduction
ofactionnondeterminative.
Hereactionisa beginning
notinspiteofthewillbutbecauseofitfor,unlikethewillofBPF, the
willofLOM doesnotdictateaction;itcommands
theselfonbehalfof
action.
WhileArendt's
accountofthewillinLOM isnotconsistent
withher
earlier
aremarked
thetwoaccounts
account,
byimportant
continuities,
In
inlightofwhich
theshift
inherviewturns
outtobeoflimited
import.
bothaccountsthewillis imperatival,
its"essential
activity"
consisting
"in dictateand command."''4
In neither
accountis thewill,properly
speaking,"free,"forthe "power to command. . . is not a matterof

buta questionofstrength
In BPF, Arendt
freedom,
or weakness."''5
thatfreedom
insists
beidentified
withaction:"Menarefree... aslongas
theyact,neither
before
norafter
fortobefreeandtoactarethesame."'"6
And she remainstrueto thisin LOM, wherefreedom
is neither
an
attribute
nora direct
ofthewill.Characterized
product
as the"organof
thewillofLOM makesactionandtherefore
spontaneity,"'7
freedom

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80

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

possiblebystaging
a "coupd'etat"againstthosedeterminative
features
oftheselfthatdeterusfromentering
thepublicrealm.Ourconcern
for
ourbiological
needsisoverridden
bythewill;motives,
goals,andintentionsaresweptaside;andthementalfaculties
ofthinking
andjudging
andevenwilling
aresilenced.Here,as elsewhere,
Arendt's
accountof
innerlifeparallels
herpolitical
Justas liberation
from
theory.
necessity
setsthestagefortheconstitution
offreedom
inthepolitical
sothe
world,
liberation
fromtheprivateself,wonbythewill'scoupd'etat,setsthe
condition
fortheappearanceof theactingselfwhoseactionmakes
18Butwilling
freedom
manifest
inthehumanworld.
isneither
itself
free
norunfree
in Arendt's
strict
sense.'9Andthereis no overlapbetween
liberation
andfreedom,
between
andacting.Between
eachpair
willing
thereis a hiatusmarkedbycontingency-for
a moment
is
everything
uncertain.
Thisuncertainty
is thepricewe payforfreedom.20
And,although
Arendt
thepriceishigh,21
understands
shedoesnotthink
itbeyondour
means.She is relentlessly
criticalof thosewho,unprepared
or unequippedtopayitsprice,resituate
freedom,
takeitoutofthecontingent
worldandinternalize
itbyattributing
ittothewill."Thephilosophical
tradition
... distorted
theveryideaoffreedom
... bytransposing
itfrom
itsoriginal
field,
therealmofpolitics
andhumanaffairs
ingeneral,
toan
inward
domain,
thewill,where
itwouldbeopentoself-inspection."22
As
a result,
Arendt
argues,
freedom
becomesan"innerfeeling....
Without
outermanifestations
andhence... bydefinition
politically
irrelevant,"23
ithasno "worldly,
tangible
reality."124
Freedom,
Arendt
insists,
canbe
manifest
onlyinthepublicrealmbecauseonlytherearewecapableof
calling"something
intobeingwhichdidnotexistbefore."25
Onthisreading,
Arendt's
accounts
offreedom
andactioninBPFand
LOM appeartobeconsistent.
Butoneimportant
changehasbeenmade.
In LOM, thewill,an autonomous
mentalfaculty,
is the"organof
spontaneity"
and the"springof action."Here,willingis a necessary
condition
ofactionthatdoesnotinterfere
withaction,forwilling
does
notaddressitselfto actionbutto theselfon action'sbehalf.Indeed,
willing
ceasesbeforeactionbegins.In BPF, however,
thewill,in the
serviceof theintellect,
is notautonomous
and functions
lessneatly.
There,itisnotthewillbuttheintellect
that"grasps"
the"desirability"
of
a "future
aim."The intellect
thencallsuponthewillto do whatthe
intellect
cannot-to "dictateaction."126
Thus,willingis a necessary
condition
ofactionbut,becausethewilldictatesaction,actionis free
onlyinsofar
as itisnot"underthedictate
ofthewill."s27
Onthisaccount,

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

81

thenondeterminative
ofactionsmustbe theprinciples
that
catalysts
inspire
usfrom
tothe
without
andthatdo notappeartobeatallrelated
willnortoanymental
Buttheinspiration
oftheprinciples
isnot
faculty.
sufficient
to lead us to forsaketheprivaterealm.We mustalso have
couragefor"courageliberates
menfromtheirworry
aboutlifeforthe
freedom
of theworld."128
In LOM, however,
no mention
is madeof
courageand principles.29
The willactsas a catalyst
and "de-sensed"
thought-objects
providedbythinking
Thesethoughtgiveit content.
objectsaresomewhat
reminiscent
ofArendt's
earlier
both
"principles":
areuniversal,
timeless,
andgeneral.
UnlikethewillofBPF,thewillofLOM isself-generating
andcanbe
countedupontoseetoitthatitsownactivity
toa timely
isbrought
end,
thusensuring
thatitdoesnotdetermine
action.According
to Arendt,
nowilling
iseverdoneforitsownsakeorfinds
intheactitself.
itsfulfillment
Every
volition
... looksforward
toitsownend,whenwilling
willhavechanged
something
intodoingit.In otherwords,thenormalmoodofthewilling
egois impatience,
andworry
disquiet
(Sorge)... becausethewill'sproject
anI-canthat
presupposes
is bynomeansguaranteed.
Thewill'sworrying
canbestilled
disquiet
onlybythe
thatis bya cessation
ofitsownactivity
I-can-and-I-do,
andreleaseofthemind
from
itsdominance.30

The will'sroleas liberator

oftheselffrom,amongotherthings,
the
mentalfaculties
allows
it
including
itself,
to serveas an antecedent
or
conditionof actionwithouttainting
or determining
its consequent,
thereby
action'sspontaneity,
preserving
novelty,
andunpredictability.3'
Thebestwaytounderstand
theshift
inArendt's
viewandtoidentify
therootsofthelateraccountintheearliertextis to focuson Arendt's
debtto twothinkers
citedin bothaccounts:Augustine
and Kant.In
BPF, Arendtadoptsan Augustinian
viewofthewillas dividedand
She speaksof"an acquaintance
self-sabotaging.
witha willwhichis
broken
initself,
whichwillsandwillsnotatthesametime."32
Thismuch
is unchangedin LOM. Here,each mentalactivityis "reflexive,"
"backuponitself,"
recoiling
butthisreflexivity
is strongest
in "the
" Inthe
willing
the"I-willisinevitably
ego,"where
countered
byan1-nill.
conflict
between
willingand nillingthevictornevercompletely
vanquishesits opponent."Thereremainsthisinnerresistance."33
But
Arendt
nowseesthisviewas incomplete
andshecriticizes
Augustine
for
nothavinggonefurther.
Augustine
shouldhaveallowedhisbelief,
that
"every
man,beingcreated
inthesingular,
isa newbeginning
byvirtue
of
hisbirth,"
toinform
hisviewofthewill.Had hedoneso,Arendt
argues,

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82

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

"he wouldhavedefined
butas
men,not,liketheGreeks,as mortals,
ofthewillnotas the
thefreedom
'natals'and he wouldhavedefined
ofwhichKantspeaks... the
liberum
... butas thefreedom
arbitrium
freedom
ofspontaneity."134
herself
hadnotyetdrawnthisconclusion.
In BPF, however,
Arendt
offreedom,"
whichshe
There,indebted
toKant,shespeaksofa "faculty
tobegin,"35
defines
as "thesheercapacity
she
but,stilltruetoAugustine,
doesnotlinkthisfaculty
orcapacity
tothewill.OnlyinLOM,where
the
offreedom"
does
term"faculty
is replacedby"organofspontaneity,"
Arendtidentify
thisorganas thewill."Thefreedom
ofspontaneity
is
Itsmentalorganis thewill."s36
partandparcelofthehumancondition.
ThusArendtpromotes
thewillfroma subservient
anddeterminative
toaction,necessarily
taintsit-to an
faculty-which,
though
necessary
autonomous
thatserves
as a necessary
condition
of
organofspontaneity
actionwithout
it.ButArendt's
fundamental
to
corrupting
commitments
actionas novel,to actingas spontaneous,
andto theidentification
of
freedom
withactioninthepublicrealmremainunchanged.
Thesefundamental
commitments
dependupona particular
concept
of the self,articulated
in detailforthe firsttimein Willing,
and
ofArendt's
tofocusonthat
challenged
byoneofthefirst
commentators
volume.37
In "HannahArendt
andtheWill,"SuzanneJacobitti
claims
thatArendt's
conceptoftheselfis "incoherent."
Jacobitti
arguesthat
theelements
ofArendt's
thatsheis"impressed
theory
with"and"would
liketo save"require"a strong
conceptofself,"a selfthatis "firmly
in
chargeofall mental,
andbodilycapacities,"38
psychic
a "selfwhichhas
continuity
overtime,whichliveswithitspastactions,
whichiscapable
of commitment
and whichcan be held responsible,
judged and
Inwhatfollows,
forgiven."39
I hopetoshowthatArendt's
concept
ofthe
selfisnotnearly
as untenable
asJacobitti
believes
andthatitistherefore
to amendArendt'saccountin the mannersuggested.
unnecessary
Moreover,
theseamendments
are,inmyview,deeply
incompatible
with
Arendt's
project
fromhertheory
ofactionin TheHumanCondition
to
heraccountofidentity
inLOM.
In TheHumanCondition,
Arendtdescribes
a selfthatis discona selffundamentally
tinuous,
divided.
A life-sustaining,
psychologically
determined,
trivial,
andimitable
biologicalbeingintheprivate
realm,
thisselfattains
identity-becomes
a 'who'-byentering
thepublicrealm
andacting.
Insodoing,itforsakes
thepsychological
features
thatdefine
itintheprivate
realm,
theveryfeatures
thatmoreconventional
theorists
ofidentity
believetobeamongthebasicelements
ofpersonal
identity.40
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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

83

Thisselfis relatively
complacent
intheprivate
realm,reluctant
toleave
becauseterrified
of riskingits biologicallife.And yet,somehow,
itenters
sometimes,
fortified
withcourageandinspired
bya principle,
thepublicrealmandisreborn
action."Withwordanddeedwe
through
islikea second
insert
ourselves
intothehumanworldandthisinsertion
"41 The metaphorof rebirth,
a constantthemethroughout
birth.
is
toherclaimthatour"capacity
forbeginning
Arendt's
work,isrelated
rootedinnatality."42Becausewewereoncenewina worldthatpreceded

intotheworld.
oftheintroduction
ofnovelty
us,wecanbethevehicles
Becausewewerebornonce,wecanbebornagain.Butwecanbereborn
cordthattiesustowombofourbiological
onlyifwesevertheumbilical
andpsychological
existence.
itmust
Likefreedom
isnotgiven;
then,
toArendt,
identity,
according
be attained
action.Untilweact,weknowonly'what'weare.
through
Whatweareiscomposed
oftherolesweplayintheprivate
realmandof
our"qualities,
talentsandshortcomings,
which[we]maydisplay
gifts,
orhide."Through
actionandspeech,"menshowwhotheyare,reveal
their
actively
andthusmaketheirappearance
uniquepersonal
identities
inthehumanworld."Butthisdisclosure
of'who'wearecannotbedone
It "can almostneverbe achievedas willful
deliberately.
purposeas
thoughone possessedand could disposeof this'who' in thesame
manner
he has andcan disposeofhisqualities.On thecontrary,
itis
morethanlikelythatthe'who,'whichappearsso clearlyand unmisto others,
remains
takably
hiddenfromthepersonhimself."43
Thus we are incapableof being"in chargeof" ourselvesor our
actions.But,inArendt's
tomaster
ouractionsisnot
view,ourinability
dueonlyto ourinability
tomaster
ourselves.
Actiontakesplaceinthe
publicrealmwhere,fallingintoan "alreadyexisting
webof human
it is affected
relationships,"
by "innumerable
conflicting
willsand
intentions."
Consequently,
"actionalmostneverachieves
itspurpose."44
Actiondoes haveconsequences,
however,
"boundless"
consequences
that,again,weareunabletocontrol.
Indeed,"onedeed,andsometimes
oneword,suffices
tochangeeveryconstellation"
and"theprocessofa
singledeed can quite literally
endurethroughout
time."45
Action,
isina predicament,
the"predicament
moreover,
ofirreversibility."
One
is"unabletoundowhatonehasdonethough
onedidnot,andcouldnot,
"46Theonlywayoutofthispredicament,
haveknown
whathewasdoing.
Arendtargues,is through
"forgiving,
dismissing,
in orderto makeit
possibleforlifeto go on byconstantly
releasing
menfromwhatthey
have done unknowingly."47
Jacobitti
claims,approvingly,
that"the

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84

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

... a prerequisite
attribution
ofresponsibility
foractionis,forArendt
of
forgiving."48
mutualrelease,"
But,inArendt's
processof"constant
the
attribution
ofresponsibility
isunnecessary.49
Indeed,Arendt
goessofar
as tocongratulate
Kantforhaving
"hadthecouragetoacquitmanfrom
theconsequences
ofhisdeed,"claiming
"thissavedhimfrom
losingfaith
inmanandhispotential
greatness."50
ButArendt's
fortheir
insistence
thatactorsnotbe heldresponsible
actions,though
toherbeliefthatactionis contingent,
indebted
clearly
andirreversible,
is morefundamentally
uncontrollable,
relatedto her
claimthatactionis uniqueand sui generis.She believesthatthe
ofresponsibility
to actioncompromises
thisuniqueness
application
by
actionto judgment
to standards
subjecting
externalto it,
according
standardsderived"fromsome supposedlyhigherfacultyor from
experiences
outsideaction'sownreach."5'
Unlikehumanbehavior-which
the Greeks,like all civilizedpeoplejudged
to'moralstandards,'
according
intoaccountmotives
onthe
taking
andintentions
onehandandaimsandconsequences
ontheother-action
canbejudgedonlyby
thecriterion
ofgreatness,
becauseitis innature
tobreakthrough
thecommonly
accepted
andreachintotheextraordinary
where
whatever
istrueincommon
and
lifeno longerappliesbecauseeverything
everyday
thatexistsis uniqueandsui

genern.52

Action,according
to Arendt,
hastwo"moralprecepts"
ofitsown:
forgiving
and promising.
Both,she argues,serve"to counterthe
enormous
risksofaction."s53
Promising
enablesusto"setupintheocean
of uncertainty,
whichthefuture
is by definition,
islandsof security
without
whichnotevencontinuity,
letalonedurability
of anykind,
wouldbepossibleintherelationships
between
men."154
Thus,Jacobitti
is
rightto notethat,in Arendt'sview,promising
"permits
whatever
stability
existsin humanaffairs."55
But,although
Jacobitti
meansto
endorsethiselementof Arendt's
view,she ultimately
subverts
it by
amending
Arendt's
conceptofselftoa "strong
conceptofself'thathas
"thecontinuity
and capacitywhichArendt'sconceptof actionreOntheamended
quires."56
account,
promising
isnolonger
thesourceof
"whatever
stability
existsin humanaffairs."
Thiscreditcan nowbe
giventoJacobitti's
revised
conception
oftheselfthatisnothing
ifnota
sourceof stability.
And promising
no longer"partially
dispels"the
"unpredictability"
ofthehumanworldthatis partly
dueto "thebasic
unreliability
ofmenwhonevercan guarantee
todaywhotheywillbe
tomorrow."57
On thecontrary,
promising
nowpostulates
promisers,

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

85

menwho are reliableand wellable to guarantee

who theywillbe
ofanystability
tomorrow
createdbypromising.58
independently
Arendt
valorizes
thecontingency
ofthehumanworldbecauseonlyin
a contingent
worldcan actionbe trulynovel and unpredictable.
Contingency,
And
then,"is thepricehumanbeingspayforfreedom."
thiscontingency
includes"man'sinability
to relyuponhimself
or to
havecomplete
faithinhimself
Mancannot
(whichisthesamething)."59
relyuponhimself
becausehecannotbeself-knowing.
partly
Introduced
as an epistemological
is
claim,Arendt'sbeliefthatself-knowledge
unattainable
has normative
Theoriesof actionthat
implications.
an agentinchargeofitself,
postulate
coherent
becauseto someextent
coherence.
self-knowing,
imposeupontheselfan unwarranted
They
toseekthecoherence
thereby
denytheselftheopportunity
appropriate
toit-an identity
theperformance
attainable
ofactionsworthy
through
ofbeingturned
intostories.
thecontingency
ofthe
Andtheyundermine
humanworldby seeingin their'coherent'
selfa sourceof stability.
Arendt
agreesthathumanbeingscannotliveina completely
contingent
thatsourcesofstability
world,andsheunderstands
mustbesought.
But
thatpromising
sheinsists
be thesourceofstability
inthehumanworld
because "the functionof the facultyof promisingis . . . the only

alternative
toa mastery
whichreliesondomination
ofone'sselfandrule
over others."60
Unlikethe strategy
of self-mastery
or autonomy,
promising
createslimitedand isolatedareas of stability
in the inbetweenof thepublicrealm.Consequently,
it does notrequirethe
excessiveand comprehensive
orderingof the selfthatautonomy
InArendt's
demands.6'
isneither
a form
view,autonomy
offreedom
nor
an ideal worthy
of pursuit,
forself-domination
leavesno spacefor
to be.62
contingency
Arendt's
characterization
ofautonomy
as a formofself-domination
is indebted
toherview,articulated
fully
forthefirst
timeinLOM, that
thereis "difference
inidentity."63
TheselfofLOM is a plurality
whose
parties,in theabsenceof anyhierarchical
ordering,
oftenengagein
Onceagain,Arendt's
struggle.
accountofinnerlifemirrors
herpolitical
In 7heHumanCondition,
theory.
Arendt
arguesthatplurality,
which
"hasthetwofold
character
ofequality
anddistinction,"
isthe"condition

sine qua non for. .. the public realm."64Justas thatpluralityis an

ineliminable
feature
ofhumanexistence
nottobe denied,so toois our
innermultiplicity
anineliminable
feature
ofourselves,
nota weakness
to
be mastered.
to overcome
Attempts
plurality
or multiplicity,
Arendt
warns,willresultin "theabolitionofthepublicrealmitself"
andthe

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86

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

of all others,"
or in "theexchangeofthereal
"arbitrary
domination
one wheretheseotherswouldsimplynot
worldforan imaginary
exist."65
is criticalofphilosophers
Arendt,
therefore,
with
who,confronted
andjudging,
the"autonomous
nature"ofthinking,
to
willing,
attempt
inallthesetheories
"Whatis so remarkable
theself'smultiplicity.
unify
and doctrinesis theirimplicitmonism,the claim that. . . behindthe

of man'sfaculties
and abilities,
obviousplurality
theremustexista
isunmistakable.
Onthispoint,Arendt's
debttoNietzsche
In
oneness."'66
that"theassumption
ofone
The WillTo Power,Nietzsche
suggests
itisjustas permissible
to
singlesubjectisperhaps
unnecessary;
perhaps
assumea multiplicity
ofsubjects,
whoseinteraction
andstruggle
isthe

basis of our thoughtand our consciousness-in general?.

. .

My

thesubjectas multiplicity."67
hypothesis:
toendorse
Thus,whenJacobitti
attributes
refusal
a concept
Arendt's
oftheselfthatis "firmly
in chargeofall mental,
and bodily
psychic
toher(unnecessary)
toa "spontaneous
capacities"
commitment
will,"68
shemistakes
forcause.Arendt
refuses
toendorse
a concept
of
symptom
a selfin chargeofitselfbecause,likeNietzsche,
sheis committed
to a
viewof theselfas multiplicity.
Arendt'sselfis thelocus of several
anddivisions:
struggles
amongitsbiological,
andmental
psychological,
needs;amongthethreemental
and
within
each
of
faculties;
themental
faculties.
Arendt's
characterization
oftheinternal
ofthemental
division
ofthinking
is particularly
faculty
inthiscontext.
enlightening
likewilling,
Thinking,
is a "two-in-one."
According
to Arendt,
thespecifically
humanactualization
ofconsciousness
in thethinking
dialogue
between
meand myself
thatdifference
suggests
and otherness,
whicharesuch
outstanding
characteristics
oftheworldofappearances
as itisgiventomanforhis
habitatamonga plurality
ofthings,
aretheveryconditions
fortheexistence
of
man'smental
egoas well,forthisegoexistsonlyinduality.69

Arendt
goesontoargue:"Thisoriginal
thefutility
of
duality...explains
thefashionable
searchforidentity.
Ourmodern
identity
crisiscouldbe
resolved
onlybyneverbeingaloneandnevertrying
tothink."70
Inshort,
whenwe thinkwe activatethetwo-in-one
of thinking,
thusmaking
this"original
present
duality"
andmaking
a mockery
ofourquestforan
identity
thatisoriginal
unity.
ButArendt
doesbelievethatwecanattain
an identity,
henceherclaimthatour"modernidentity
crisis"can be
"resolved."
Thisresolution
canbe achieved,
shesayscryptically,
"only

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

87

byneverbeingaloneand nevertrying
to think."Since,according
to
Arendt,
theonlytimewhenwe aremostassuredly
notaloneandnot
trying
to thinkis whenweareactinginthepublicrealm,itseemsthat
hereArendt
isreiterating
ofaction.
herclaimthatidentity
istheproduct
Jacobitti
thatwhenhe acts,"the'person'who... is the
suggests
subjectofall this[mental]activity"
will"disintegrate
But
entirely."7'
there
isnodisintegration
wasnounity
here,forthere
tobeginwith.The
personsimply
doesnotpresent
hisprivate
selfinthepublicrealm,and
hisinner
lifeisnotondisplay.
Inthepublicrealmheactually
ceasestobe
awareofhimself
as a mentalbeingbecauseheis"awareofthefaculties
ofthemindandtheirreflexivity
onlyas longas theactivity
lasts."They
"disappear"
when"therealworldasserts
itself."72
intothe
Indeed,entry
publicrealmis thefirst
steptowardstheselfss
attainment
ofidentity.
Rebornupon entering
the publicrealm,the selfachievesidentity
throughaction,throughthe "spontaneous
of something
beginning

new."73

The will is the midwife

of thissecondbirth.As the "organof
itenablestheselfto act spontaneously
spontaneity,"
byliberating
it
fromthedeterminism
of theprivaterealm.Fromthisperspective,
Arendt's
commitment
to an autonomous
ofthewilldoes not
faculty
appearto standin thewayofher"havinga coherent
senseofselfor
person."174
Onthecontrary,
thewillistheagentoftheproduction
ofjust
sucha self,a selfwhois notdefined
bymultiplicity
butisidentitied
and
whole.Theactor'smomentary
engagement
inactioninthepublicrealm
himan identity
grants
thatis fixedandconstant,
lodgedforever
inthe
storiestoldof his performance.
As GeorgeKatebputsit: "Political
actionintroduces
coherenceintothe selfand its experience.
Such
coherence
is redemptive.
Narrative,
dramatic
orpoeticartperfects
the
coherence."75
The actor'sidentity
is derivative
ofhisaction;actionis
overtheactor.
privileged
In TheGenealogy
of Morals,Nietzsche
challenges
ourconceptual
andpractical
commitment
to thenotionofagency:
It is onlythesnareoflanguage... presenting
all activity
as conditioned
byan
agent-the'subjects-that
blindsus to thisfact.... popularmorality
divorce[s]
from
strength
itsmanifestations,
as though
there
werebehind
thestrong
a neutral
freetomanifest
agent,
itsstrength
orcontain
it.Butnosuchagentexists;
there
isno
thedoing,
'being'behind
acting,
becoming;
the'doer'hassimply
beenaddedtothe
deedbytheimagination-the
doingis everything.76

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88

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

thatwehaveno essence,no givenunity

ArendtagreeswithNietzsche
"Thereisno'being'behind
thedoing."
orrealization.
awaiting
discovery
Arendtbelievesthatwe shouldadoptan artistic
And,likeNietzsche,
forArendt,our actionis our artand
approachto our multiplicity;
thereward
fora virtuoso
identity
performance.77
On Arendt'saccount,theselfcharacterized
never
by multiplicity
leavestheprivaterealm.In thepublicrealmthereis onlyaction,for
Here the actoris, to remainwith
there"thedoingis everything."
untilhe
"notsomething
Nietzsche,
given."He has,after
all,noidentity
addedand invented
and
has acted.The actoror hero"is something
toArendt,
thisinvention
is
whatthere
projected
behind
is.j"78
According
whocreateandrelatetheactor'sstory.
The
theworkofthespectators
of theperson,thoughdisclosing
itselfin act and speech,
"identity
oftheactor'sandthespeaker's
life."79
becomes
tangible
onlyinthestory
Thusthe"appearing
self'isnot,as Jacobitti
"determined
claims,
bythe
autonomous
is merely
bornofthelatter.Noris the
will";theformer
He simply
actordetermined
reliesonhis
by"whatother
peoplethink."80
to hisactionandhimself
to grantmeaning
andidentity
spectators
by
to hisperformance.
witness
bearing
Without
theworldwouldbeimperfect;
theparticipant,
as heis
absorbed
spectators
in particular
cannotsee how all the
thingsand pressedby urgentbusiness,
intheworldandeveryparticular
deedin therealmofhuman
particular
things
fittogether
and producea harmony
affairs
whichitselfis notgivento sense
andthisinvisible
inthevisible
forever
if
perception
worldwouldremain
unknown
tolookoutforit,admire
there
werenospectator
outthestories,
it,straighten
and
putthemintowords.81

Jacobitti
thatArendt's
accountofactionas freeisthreatened
implies
by Arendt'sclaimthatthe actor"is not his ownmaster,not . . .
autonomous;he mustconducthimselfin accordancewithwhat
spectatorsexpectof him."82But thisis consistent
withArendt's
insistence
onsevering
theconnection
between
autonomy
andfreedom.83
Anditis nota qualification
ofthefreedom
ofactionbuta condition
of
itsmeaningfulness
and intelligibility
thatit be comprehensible
to its
audience.84
herwork,Arendt
Throughout
insiststhatthemeaning
of
actionis exhausted
byits"perlocutionary
force,"
as itwere.And"the
finalverdict
ofsuccessorfailure
isin[thespectators']
hands."85
So,even
inthepublicrealm,wherewedo havea coherent,
identitied
self,wedo
nothavea selfinchargeofitself.
Thestoriesrevealan actor,butthis
actoris not "an authoror producer."His storyand identity
are

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

89

is"cannotbe
for"theessenceofwhosomebody
community
property,
toanaccount
thatviewsthe
"reified"
byhimself.86
Andthisseemsfitting
thatidentity
is
selfas multiplicity,
actionoveractor,insists
privileges
toidentify
notthecondition
buttheproduct
ofaction,refuses
freedom
a vantagepointfromwhich
withautonomy,
grantsonlyto spectators
action can be witnessedfully,and assignsto themthe task of
itintoa story.
immortalizing
theeventbyturning
Theseelements
of Arendt'sview,albeitcontroversial,
are,in my
to Arendt's
opinion,morevital,powerful,
and fundamental
position
thanthoseJacobitti
wantsto save.Andthey,alongwithotherbasic
elementsof Arendt'sview,cannotsurviveJacobitti's
revisionof
morecontinuous
selfinchargeof
Arendt's
conceptofselftoa stronger,
ofrebirth,
itself.
Asevidenced
Arendt's
byhermetaphor
private
public/
distinction
a discontinuous
self.Jacobitti's
revisions
postulates
underminethisdiscontinuity
of
its
as
the
will
role
the
byrelieving
organof
her
the
"reflects"
the
spontaneity.
On revised
"selfs
account, willmerely
character"87
as identity
becomesa given,not something
we strive
to attain.As theselfis madestronger,
of
episodically
thecontingency
thehumanworld,so valuedbyArendt,
is diminished,
andso arethe
fortheintroduction
of novelty
intotheworld.Actions
possibilities
sometimes
butthey
performed
bya selfinchargeofitself
might
goawry,
inArendt's
wouldnotbe unpredictable
sense.Moreover,
as thedegree
ofcontrol
thattheselfhasoveritself
anditsactionsisincreased,
sotoois
theresponsibility
it bearsforitsactions.The uniqueness
ofaction,a
critical
ofArendt's
feature
view,is thereby
compromised,
as actionis
tomoraljudgment
andtheprimacy
oftheself,together
subjected
witha
certainkindofinner-directedness,
are reestablished.
Butthegreatest
to Jacobitti's
challenge
revisions
is Arendt's
provocative
andperspicaciouscharacterization
ofautonomy
as self-domination.
Thisidealof
inArendt's
theinternal
self-rule,
anddifference
view,destroys
plurality
thatareas muchconditions
ofactionas aretheexternal
plurality
and
ofthehumanworldofappearances.
difference
Jacobitti's
viewsoftheself,identity,
andactionarefundamentally
at
oddswiththoseofArendtand are moreakinto thosegivensuccinct
expression
byRebeccaWest'sRichardYaverland
in TheJudge.Upon
someofhispastdeeds,Yaverland
reviewing
wasconscious
thathehadbehaved
wellontheseoccasions
andthattheyhadbeen
fullofbeauty,
buttheyhadnotnourished
him.Theyhadendedwhentheyended.
Suchdeedsgavea mannothing
better
thantheexultation
oftheactor,
wholoseshis

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90

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

valueandbecomes
a suspended
soul,unabletofulfill
hisfunction
whenthecurtain
falls.'Butyouarecondemning
thewholeofhumanaction!'heexpostulated
with
thewholeofhumanaction,'hereplied
himself.
'Yes,I amcondemning
tartly.88

ofArendt
then,
Jacobitti's
criticisms
mustleadtothisgrave
Ultimately,
thewholeofhuman
condemned
andproblematic
charge:thatArendt
actionevenas shetriedto saveit. Consequently,
it is impossible
for
to"profitably
oftheArendtian
Jacobitti
build"uponelements
corpus.
ofArendt's
oftheselftoa self"incharge
Indeed,sincea revision
concept
of"itselfis nowhere
endorsedbyArendt,89
and sincesucha revision
createsfarmoreproblems
thanitsolves,thetermsoftheengagement
needto be recast.Containedin Jacobitti's
paperaretheseedsofan
important
and timely
debateon thenatureof theself,identity,
and
mustbeJacobitti's
action,a debateinwhichArendt
opponent,
nother
ally.

NOTES
1. JeanYarbrough
andPeterSternnotebriefly
thatArendt's
revised
accountofthe
willin LOM entailsan important
changein Arendt's
offreedom
theory
for,inLOM,
"political
freedom"is
complemented
(forthefirst
time)by"freedom
ofthewill"(346).
See
"VitaActivaandVitaContemplativa:
Political
inTheLifeoftheMind,"Review
Thought
ofPolitics(July1981),323-354.
RonaldBeiner,
inanessayonJudging,
notesinpassing
thatArendt's
laterviewofthewilldiffers
from
herearlier
account,
buthedoesnotattempt
to accountforthechange.He pointsto onedifference
thetwoaccounts,
onlybetween
seemingly
thesameoneremarked
byYarbrough
andStern.On Arendt's
earlyaccount,
Beinerargues,"actionbutnotthewillis saidtobefree.... In herlaterformulation,
by
contrast,
[the]will... [is]seento be free."ButBeinerplacestheYarbrough
andStern
claimin questionbynotingthatin thiscontext,
free,forArendt,
meansmerely
"not
subordinate
to theintellect"
(pp. 126-127).
See "Judging
ina WorldofAppearances:
A
on HannahArendt'sUnwritten
Commentary
Finale,"Historyof PoliticalThought
(Spring1980),117-135.
(I discusstheclaimmadebyYarbrough
andSterninmoredetail
below.See n. 19)
In oneoftheonlysustained
treatments
of Willing,
SuzanneJacobitti
arguesthatthe
selfofLOM is so fragmented,
it is "incoherent."
See "HannahArendt
andtheWill,"
PoliticalTheory,
in thisissue.I respondto Jacobitti's
criticisms
in detailbelowand
tosomeofthecriticisms
thereby
ofArendt
madebyJ.GlennGray;Graytooisprovoked
bythefragmented
character
oftheselfofLOM. Hisconcern,
however,
is notthatthis
fragmented
selfis incoherent,
butthatitoffers
littlesecurity
againstevildoing
(p. 240).
heworries
Moreover,
that,inembracing
contingency,
Arendt
embraces
meaninglessness
(p. 233).See "TheAbyssofFreedom-andHannahArendt,"
in TheRecovery
ofthe
PublicWorld,
ed.byMelvyn
A. Hill(NewYork:St. Martin's
Press,1979),225-244.

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

91

ed.
inBetween
PastandFuture(henceforth
2. "WhatIs Freedom?"
BPF),enlarged
(NewYork:Penguin,
1977),146,149;cf.OnRevolution
(NewYork:Penguin,
1981),95-96
(henceforth
OR).
3. TheLifeoftheMind,vol. 1,ed. MaryMcCarthy
(NewYork:Harcourt
Brace
Jovanovich,
1978),31(henceforth
LOM 1).
4. BPF, 156.
of ChicagoPress,1958),206
5. The Human Condition(Chicago:University
(henceforth
THC).
6. LOMI, 29.
7. BPF, 157.
8. BPF, 152.
9. BPF, 151-152.
10. LOM I, 30.
11. LOM II, 12.
12. LOM II, 35-37.
13. LOM II, 158,emphasis
original.
14. BPF, 145;seeLOMI, 155;LOM II, 58.
ofthewill.. .
thatthefaculty
15. BPF, 152.Criticizing
Kant,Arendt
saysitis"strange
offreedom"
shouldbe theharborer
(BPF, 145).
16. BPF, 153.
17. See,forexample,
LOM II, 110.
inthiscontext
18. See LOM II, 203andOR, 142.It is worth
thatthesimile
noting
Arendt
usestodescribe
thewill'sactivity,
a coupd'itat,("inBergson's
felicitous
phrase"
thevocabulary
ofpolitics.
LOM II, 101)is itself
drawnfrom
19. InLOM,Arendt
itisimportant
tobe
doesoccasionally
usetheterm
"free
will,"but
clearaboutwhatshemeans(anddoesnotmean)bythis.Attimes,
as RonaldBeiner
points
meansthatthewillis autonomous,
undetermined
and
out,shesimply
byotherfaculties
freeoftheruleoftheintellect
to whichitwassubjecton herearlieraccount.(See n. 1
above.)
For the mostpart,however,
morefundamental
thanmeresemantic
something
carelessness
isinvolved.
andSternarecorrect
whentheynotethat,in
Indeed,Yarbrough
Arendt's
freedom"
iscomplemented
ofthewill";their
view,"political
error
is
by"freedom
toseethisas a newdevelopment
inArendt's
lastworkfor,already
inBPF, Arendt
says,
"Freedomas relatedtopoliticsis nota phenomenon
ofthewill"(BPF, 151,emphasis
in LOM whenshedistinguishes
mine).WhatArendt
implieshere,shemakesexplicit
from
"philosophic
freedom"
"political
freedom"
(LOM II, 200).
Moreover,
Yarbrough
andSternalsomisleadingly
implythat,inherlateraccount,
Arendt
is no longerhostileto inneror philosophic
a new
freedom,
havingdeveloped
forthefreedom
ofthewill.ButonbothofArendt's
respect
accounts,
philosophic
freedom
is,ina fundamental
sense,notrealbecauseitisincapable
ofexpression
ormanifestation
in
theworldofappearances
which
Arendt
privileges
equallyinbothBPFandLOM. InBPF,
Arendt
argues
that"inner
freedom"
is"politically
irrelevant"
becauseitlacksany"worldly
tangible
reality"
(146,169).And,in LOM, herwording
barelychanges:onlypolitical
isa "stabletangible
freedom
reality"
(LOM II, 203).Consequently,
Arendt,
forthemost
part,doesnotdescribe
thewillas free.In LOM, thewillis described
as a "faculty
of
"a possibleharbinger
beginning"
(LOM II, 217),"ourmentalorganforthefuture,"
of
ofaction"(LOMII, 155).And,whenshedoesuse
novelty"
(LOM II, 18),andthe"spring

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POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

thetermfree
will,Arendt
thatshemeansbythis"thefreedom
explains
tostart
something
new"(LOM II, 32).
unpredictably
20. Arendtis criticalof bothphilosophers
and revolutionaries
forattempting
to
militate
ofthishiatus.See BPF, 145andLOM II, 203-217.
againstthecontingency
21. See,forexample,
THC,233.
22. BPF, 145.
23. BPF, 146.
24. BPF, 169;cf.LOM II, 203.
25. BPF, 151.
26. BPF, 151.Thisshift
inArendt's
viewofthewillisparalleled
inherviewof
bya shift
judgment
as it is characterized
by RonaldBeiner.Notingthatin BPF, "judgment
is
associatedwiththeintellect,"
whilein LOM "judgment
is seento be free. . . not
totheintellect"(p.
subordinate
lastwork,
127),Beiner
argues
that,inArendt's
as
"judging
an activity
is placedexclusively
within
thelifeofthemindrather
thanbeingassigned
a
moreequivocalstatus"
(130,n. 37).
27. BPF, 152.
28. BPF, 156.
29. As RichardFlathman
has suggested
to me,Arendt's
of
earlycharacterization
courageas a necessary
condition
ofactionisproblematic
becausecourage
isa disposition
anddispositions,
onArendt's
ofaction.Objections
cannotbeconditions
ofthis
account,
sortmayhaveprovoked
Arendt
toreviseheraccountandassigntothewillinLOM the
function
earlier
tocourageincombination
entrusted
withtheprinciples.
30. LOM II, 37-38.Itshouldbenotedinthiscontext
that,ultimately,
action,unlike
involves
notan'I-can'buta 'we-can';
willing,
foraction,
onArendt's
takes
account,
always
placein concert:
in whicha We is alwaysengagedin changing
"Action,
ourcommon
world,standsinsharpest
tothesolitary
possibleopposition
business
ofthought....the
We[is]thetruepluralofaction"(LOM Il, 200).
31. Throughout
herwritings,
Arendt
isuncompromising
inherinsistence
thatnovelty
andunpredictability
arefundamental
features
ofaction.ThisleadsMichaelOakeshott
to
note,inan obviousreference
toArendt,
thatherstories
willcharacteristically
open,not
with"a conditional
'Onceupona time. . . " but"withtheunconditional
'In thebeginning. . .' " On HumanConduct(OxfordUniversity
Press,1975),105.(Cf.LOM II,
202-203.)
ItiscrucialtoArendt's
theory
ofactionthatwilling
ceasebefore
actionbegins
for,in
Arendt's
view,allantecedents
havea causalquality.
"A powertobeginsomething
really
newcouldnotvery
wellbepreceded
byanypotentiality
which
thenwouldfigure
as oneof
thecausesoftheaccomplished
act"(LOM II, 29;cf.LOM II, 110).Hencetheimportance
oftherevised
will'scoupd'6tatwhichvanquishes
all possibleantecedents
ofactionand
ensures
thatactionwillbe a "beginning"
characterized,
likeall beginnings,
by"startling
unexpectedness"(THC,
178);hence,
too,theimportance
oftherevised
will'sautonomy.
In
response
tothequestion
"Whatsetsthewillinmotion?"
Arendt
answers
withAugustine
"'Eitherthewillisitsowncauseoritisnota will,"'for,inArendt's
ownwords,
"Thewillis
a factwhichin itsownsheercontingent
factuality
cannotbe explainedin termsof
causality"
(LOM II, 89).
32. BPF, 159.
33. LOM II, 69.
34. LOM II, 109-110.
35. BPF, 169;cf.TheOrigins
ofTotalitarianism,
rev.ed.(Cleveland:
Meridian,
1958),

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

93

473."Freedom
as an innercapacity
to begin."
is identical
withthecapacity
36. LOM II, 110.
37. Jacobitti
isthefirst
toexamineWilling
as a contribution
ofthe
toArendt's
theory
selfandaction.RonaldBeiner's
brief
remarks
on Willing
comeinthecontext
ofanessay
on Judging.
likeYarbrough
Others,
and Stern,and ElizabethYoung-Bruehl,
discuss
Willingonlybriefly
as partof a generaldiscussionof TheLifeof theMind.(See
"Reflections
on HannahArendt's
TheLifeoftheMind,"PoliticalTheory
[May1982],
277-305.)
Andalthough
J.GlennGraydoesdiscussWilling
atlength,
heislessconcerned
withArendt's
oftheselfperse thanwithhertheory
concept
offreedom.
38. Jacobitti,
andtheWill,"PoliticalTheory
"HannahArendt
(thisissue),seeunder
"Arendt's
ConceptoftheSelf,"emphasis
mine.
39. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
40. The claimthattheself'spsychological
havenothing
attributes
to do withits
identity-that
theyinfactobscure
andhinder
theself's
identity
efforts
toattain
it-hasno
partin themodern
debateon identity.
Allpartiesto thisdebate,whether
to
indebted
LockeandHumeortoDescartes,
seepsychological
features
oftheselfassomehow
related
topersonal
inthisregard,
identity.
Theydisagree,
onlyonthedegreeofsignificance
they
assignto thesefeatures.
See,forexample,
DerekParfit,
ReasonsandPersons(Oxford
University
Press,1984);and BernardWilliams,Problemsof the Seyl(Cambridge
University
Press,1973).
41. THC, 176.
42. LOMII, 217,emphasis
Cf."OnViolence"in
original.
Crises
oftheRepublic(New
York:Harcourt
BraceJovanovich,
1972),179.Arendt's
oftheactoras, in
description
"bornagain"istypical
effect,
oftheChristian
toneofherrhetoric
whenever
discussing
our
forbeginning."
"capacity
Shedescribes
"thefactofnatality"
as"themiracle
thatsavesthe
world"(THC,247);shesays:"Thepurpose
ofthecreation
ofmanwastomakepossible
a
beginning"
(LOM II, 217).Arendt's
rhetoric
islikely
influenced
thatfreedom
byherbelief
and"religious
conversion"
arehistorically
connected.
"Thereis no preoccupation
with
freedom
inthewholehistory
ofgreatphilosophy
from
thePre-Socratics
uptoPlotinus,
the last ancientphilosopher.
And whenfreedom
madeits firstappearancein our
philosophical
itwastheappearance
tradition,
ofPaulfirst
andthenofAugustine
which
gaveriseto it"(BPF, 145-146
andseeLOM II, 6).
43. THC, 179.
44. THC, 184.
45. THC,190,233.
46. THC,236-7.Thisviewisunchanged
inLOM. "Intherealmofaction. .. nodeed
canbe safely
undone"
(LOM 1!,30).
47. THC, 240.On Arendt's
account,forgiveness
sharesmanyfeatures
invirtue
of
which
actionisvalorized.
Thisispartly
becauseArendt
understands
forgiveness
tobe"one
ofthepotentialities
ofhumanactionitself"
(THC,237).According
toArendt,
"theactof
cannever
forgiving
bepredicted....Forgiving
istheonlyreaction
which
doesnotmerely
re-actbutactsanewandunexpectedly,
unconditioned
bytheactwhichprovoked
itand
therefore
fromitsconsequences
freeing
boththeonewhoforgives
andtheonewhois
forgiven"(THC,
241);Here,aselsewhere,
Arendt
islikely
indebted
toNietzsche,
whoalso
themerely
distinguishes
reactive
from
thespontaneous
andactiveandvalorizes
thelatter.
See TheWillTo Power(henceforth
WP),ed. byWalterKaufman
(NewYork:Vintage
Books,1968),916;and TheGenealogy
ofMorals(henceforth
GM),trans.byFrancis
vol.2 (NewYork:Doubleday,
Golffing,
1956),xi-xii.

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94

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

ButArendt
overestimates
thepowerof"forgiveness."
Evenifweacceptherclaimthat
theactof
oftheoriginal
freesbothpartiesfromtheconsequences
forgiving
trespass,
The parties
has consequences
of its ownwhichArendtdoes notconsider.
forgiving
As
and"theonewhoisforgiven."
"theonewhoforgives"
involved
become,respectively,
and thelattergrateful
and
or generous,
has causeto feelvirtuous
such,theformer
indebted.Thus relationsof equality,crucialto Arendt'saccountof politics,are
arebyphilanthropy.
SeeDoctrine
undermined
byforgiveness,
justas,inKant'sview,
they
ofPennsylvania
trans.byMaryJ. Gregor(Philadelphia:
of Virtue,
University
Press,
1964),434,472.
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
48. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
in TheHuman
offorgiveness
inArendt's
discussion
49. THC,240.Indeed,nowhere
forthe
doesthetermresponsibility
Condition
appear,anditsabsenceis problematic,
offorgiveness.
wouldhave
isa postulate
Arendt
attribution
ofsomeform
ofresponsibility
to avoidthetermforgiveness
andto substitute
for
donebetter
altogether
"dismissing"
have
thetwoas synonyms.
insteadoftreating
"forgiving"
(Had shedoneso,shemight
shemight
havereliedmore
avoidedtheproblem
notedabovein n. 47.) Alternatively,
mutual
release"
onherowndescription
oftheprocess
as oneof"constant
heavily
(THC,
inwhich
onJesus'formulation
shedidnotdothisbecausesherelied
240).Inalllikelihood
'fortheyknownotwhatthey
the"reasonfortheinsistence
ona dutytoforgive
isclearly
do"'(THC, 239).
the
Arendt's
reliance
onthisformulation
obscure
andheruseofthetermforgiveness
Nietzsche
in
extent
towhich
thispartofheraccount
isindebted
toNietzsche.
seesnovirtue
as strength:
In the"murky
"idealsare
forgiveness,
onlyweakness
disguised
shop"where
manufactured
. . . to be unableto avengeoneselfis calledto be unwilling
to avenge
oneself-even
('Fortheyknownotwhattheydo-we aloneknowwhatthey
forgiveness
inNietzsche's
norof
do)" (GMI, xiv).Thetruly
strong,
view,havenoneedofforgiveness
"Indifferent"
to trespasses,
in what
punishment.
theydismissthemwithout
ceremony
wellbecalleda processof"constant
mutual
release"
might
(seeGMII, xi)."Itisa signof
richtemperaments
thattheycannotforlongtakeseriously
theirenemies,
strong,
their
their
forsuchcharacters
haveinthemanexcessofplastic
misfortunes,
misdeeds;
curative
power,andalso a powerofoblivion."
Theyare"unableto forgive"
becausetheyhave
"forgotten"
(GM II, x-xi).Thisischaracteristic
notjustofstrong
individuals
butalsoof
communities.
toNietzsche,
strong
According
whenever
a community
gainsinpowerandpride,itspenalcodealwaysbecomes
morelenient.... It is possibletoimagine
a society
flushed
withsucha senseof
powerthatitcouldafford
toletitsoffenders
gounpunished.
Whatgreater
luxury
is
therefora society
to indulge
in?'WhyshouldI botherabouttheseparasites
of
mine?'sucha societymightask. 'Let themtakeall theywant.I haveplenty'
[GM II x].
50. THC,235,n. 75.
51. THC,246.Arendt's
useoftheterm
"suigeneris"to
describe
actionisnotcareless.
Itfollows
from
hercontroversial
claimthat"thefaculty
ofactionisontologically
rooted"
in"thefactofnatality"
(THC, 247,emphasis
mine;cf.LOM II, 217).
52. THC,205.Compare
Nietzsche,
"InPericles'famous
funeral
oration...hetellsthe
Athenians:
'Our boldnesshas gainedus accessto everyland and sea, and erected

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

95

noteswithapproval,"This
for bothgood and evil'!"Nietzsche
to itself
monuments
...
sudden,
improbable
absurd,
andincalculable,
ofnobleraces,soheadstrong,
'boldness'
(GM I, xi). Thisshortpassagecontains
andcomfort"
to safety
theirutterindifference
for
viewofaction:Disdainforourconcern
ofArendt's
itmanyoftheessentials
within
whicharespontaneous
ofperformances
theglorification
safety
andcomfort;
(physical)
ofitsgoodness.
andtheclaimthatthegloryofactionis nota function
andsurprising;
53. THC,245.
tomake
"To breedananimalwiththeright
Nietzsche:
54. THC,237.Again,compare
inthecaseofman?Is it
hassetitself
taskthatnature
promises-isnotthistheparadoxical
the"problem"has
bywhich
man?"(GMII,i). Theprocess
regarding
nottherealproblem
inthesecond
scathing
criticism
is theobjectofNietzsche's
historically
been"resolved"
in Twilight
of theIdols,7-8).
(Cf."TheFourGreatErrors,"
essayoftheGenealogy.
to resolvethisproblem
bygivingan accountof
Arendtmightbe seenas attempting
andlessbloody,thanthe
andcoercive,
is lessdemanding
whichshebelieves
promising
ofwhichNietzsche
is so critical.
historical
practice
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
"HannahArendt
55. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
56. Jacobitti,
57. THC,244.
thewayin
isaninstanceof
ofpromising
treatment
ofArendt's
concept
58. Jacobitti's
ofaction
thatanytheory
byherconviction
ofArendt
is complicated
whichherreading
isshared
thatthisconviction
herassumption
a 'coherent'
agent.Moreover,
mustpostulate
thatArendt's
Jacobitti
believes
Forexample,
hercriticisms
ofArendt.
though
weakens
claim"thatpeoplewilljudgeusbyhowweappearintheworldandthatinthissenseonly
inmuchofArendt's
andvalidtheme
others
cantruly
say'who'weare,is an important
theneedfora selfwhoistheagentof
thatthis"doesnotobviate
earlier
sheinsists
thought,"
andtheWill,"seeunder"Notes,"n. 60,emphasis
action"(Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
the
ofactioninwhich
ofArendt's
theory
critique
mine).Butshestopsshortofa broader
projectis,
aimsoftheArendtian
centralissuemustbe thefactthatoneofthecentral
to"obviate
theneedfora selfwhoistheagentofaction."
precisely,
ofthehumanworldechoes
ofthecontingency
59. THC,244.Arendt's
valorization
Nietzsche's:
What
man,fearofevilpredominates.
Intheinner
oftheprimitive
economy
psychic
thesudden....[But]a stateispossible
theuncertain,
chance,
isevil?Threethings:
inlawandcalculability
enter
consciousness
inwhich
thesenseofsecurity
andbelief
and
theuncertain
thedelight
inchance,
intheformofsatiety
anddisgust-while
thesuddenbecomes
titillating
[WP 1019].
60. THC,244.
an
toocomprehensive
61. Nietzsche,
ofautonomy
becauseitdemands
too,iscritical
of theself.He claimsthat"thetermsautonomous
and moralare mutually
ordering
exclusive"
(GM II, ii) and argues"thatethicshas neverlostits reekof bloodand
(GM II, vi).
smacksofcruelty"
imperative
torture-not
eveninKant,whosecategorical
theory:
political
62. Onceagainan analoguetothisviewcanbe foundinArendt's
Thedangerandtheadvantage
inallbodiespoliticthatrelyoncontracts
inherent
leavethe
andtreaties
is thatthey,
unlikethosethatrelyon ruleandsovereignty,

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96

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

ofhumanaffairs
unpredictability
andtheunreliability
ofmenas theyare.... The
moment
islandsofcertainty
promises
inanoceanof
losetheir
character
as isolated
uncertainty
... theylosetheirbinding
powerandthewholeenterprise
becomes
self-defeating
[THC,244].

And,onceagain,Arendt
echoesNietzsche,
whosays:"To acceptanylegalsystem
as
ofpower
inthestruggle
anduniversal-to
as aninstrument
sovereign
acceptit,notmerely
which
canonly
butas a weaponagainst
. .-is ananti-vital
complexes,
struggle.
principle
a reign
aboutman'sutter
ofnothingness"
bring
demoralization
and,indirectly
(GMII, xi).
63. LOM I, 187.
ispossible
64. THC,175,220;
cf.THC,234andLOMII, 200("Political
freedom
only
in thesphereofhumanplurality').
of
as a postulate
BecauseArendtseesdifference
in thepublicrealm,forcompassion,
in herview,
politics,
she mistrusts
compassion
thedistance
abolishes
andthis"in-between"
isessential
topolitical
between
life.
persons,
ThisrecallsKant'sviewthatrespect,
theexpression
ofourcognizance
ofthedistance
ofthepoliticalrealm.In TheHuman
whichseparates
attitude
us,is theappropriate
Arendt's
debttoKantonthismatter
ishardtomiss."Respect... is a kindof
Condition,
'friendship'
without
intimacy
andwithout
itisa regard
from
the
closeness;
fortheperson
distance
whichthespaceoftheworldputsbetween
isindependent
of
us,andthisregard
qualities
whichwemayhighly
esteem"
(THC, 243).
65. THC,220,234.
66. LOM I, 70.
67. WP,490.
68. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"see
under"Arendt's
Concept
oftheSelf"
and"Conclusion."
69. LOM I, 187.CompareOR, 102:"Theidentity
ofthisperson
[whois both"agent
andonlooker'],
incontrast
totheidentity
ofthemodemindividual,
wasformed
notby
oneness
butbya constant
hither-and-thither
oftwo-in-one;
andthismovement
foundits
andpurest
inthedialogueofthought."
highest
actuality
70. LOM 1, 187.Notethatit is nottheselfwhichis an "original
duality,"
butits
thinking
faculty.
Thisfaculty
isjustoneofmanyfeatures
ofa selfwhichis an original
Arendt
the"original
multiplicity.
emphasizes
ofthinking
duality"
inthiscontext
because
sheaimstochallenge,
notjusttheassumption
thatwehaveanoriginal
unified
identity,
but
alsotheconviction
thatthatidentity
canbediscovered
through
thinking
andintrospection.
71. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"see
under"Arendt's
Concept
oftheSelf."
72. LOM I, 75.
73. THC,234.
74. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
75. GeorgeKateb,HannahArendt:
Politics,
Conscience,
Evil(Totowa,
NJ:Rowman
andAllanheld,
1983),8.
76. GM I, xiii.
77. ForNietzsche's
viewsonhowmultiplicity
istobeapproached,
see WP,912,928,
966,1049,1050;TheGayScience(henceforth
GS),trans.
byWalter
Kaufman
(NewYork:
RandomHouse,1974),299,355,andesp.290.
78. WP, 481.

79. THC, 193.Cf.LOM II, 155("Nottherecordofpasteventsbutonlythestory

makessense').
80. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"see
under
"Arendt's
Concept
oftheSelf."

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Honig/ IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

97

81. LOM I, 132-133.

CompareNietzsche:
andespecially
thoseofthetheater,
Whatshouldwinourgratitude-Only
artists,
havegivenmeneyesandearstoseeandhearwithsomepleasure
whateachmanis
us theartof
himself,
experiences
desireshimself;
himself,
onlytheyhavetaught
viewingourselves
a distanceand,as it were,simplified
and
as heroes-from
transfigured-the
artofstaging
andwatching
ourselves.
Onlyinthiswaycanwe
dealwithsomebasedetailsinourselves
[GS 78].
andtheWill,"see
82. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
under"Arendt's
oftheSelf,"
Concept

quotingLOM I, 94.

83. "Ifitweretruethatsovereignty
andfreedom
arethesame,thenindeedno man
couldbe free,becausesovereignty,
theidealof uncompromising
and
self-sufficiency
is contradictory
to theverycondition
. . . onlyunderthe
mastership,
of plurality.
ofonegod... cansovereignty
andfreedom
bethesame"(THC, 234-235).
assumption
84. Arendt
saysthat"oursenseofunequivocal
issoboundupwiththepresence
reality
ofothers
thatwecanneverbesureofanything
thatonlyweourselves
knowandnoone

else" (OR 96). Cf. LOM 1, 19-20,50; THC, 58.

85. LOM II, 94.

86. THC,184-193.
87. Jacobitti,
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"seeunder"Conclusion."
88. RebeccaWest,TheJudge(NewYork:Dial Press,1980),64.
89. Insupport
ofherclaimthat"onecanfindglimpses
of['a strong
concept
of']selfin
Arendt
andthat,indeed,
attimessheisstruggling
todevelopit,"Jacobitti
citesArendt's
characterization
"ofthepersonas the'who'thatis revealed
ina lifetime
ofwordsand
thanbyitself,
theheroofa lifestory,
deeds,a 'who'knownbetter
whois also
byothers
morethanthespecific
wordsanddeeds"("HannahArendt
and theWill,"see under
AsJacobitti
thisisa "who... known
"Conclusion').
notes,
however,
better
than
byothers
this"who,"onArendt's
isthesubject
byitself."
ofa "biography,"(THC,
Indeed,
account,
Thisis nota "selffirmly
186)notan autobiography.
inchargeof"itself
buta selfwhose
is inthehandsofothers.
Ifthisselfis "morethanspecific
story
(andtherefore
identity)
wordsanddeeds,"itis becauseithasbeenturned
into"theheroofa lifestory"
bythe
Moretothepoint,thisisnota continuous
spectators.
self.Actionisinherently
episodic
andeachepisodebegins
anew,undetermined
actions
anddisclosures.
byprevious
Because
inself-disclosure
eachexercise
isuniqueandunrepeatable,
evena selfwhich
hasdisclosed
itself
before
isunabletopredict
'who'itwilldisclosethenexttimeitacts.Inpartforthis
reason,actionis alwaysrisky.
Jacobitti
goeson to arguethatArendt
gestures
towards
a strong
conceptoftheself
whenshesays,"Just
asthinking
theselffortheroleofspectator,
prepares
willing
fashions
it intoan 'enduring-I'
thatdirectsall particular
actsof volition.
It createstheself's
character"
"HannahArendt
andtheWill,"seeunder
(Jacobitti,
"Arendt's
Concept
ofthe
Self,"quotingLOM II, 195).Jacobitti
placesgreatemphasis
on thisreference
to an
asdoesElizabeth
"enduring-I",
Young-Bruehl
("Reflections
onHannahArendt's
TheLife
butthisemphasis
ismisplaced.
RecallthatWilling
iswritten
oftheMind,"p.283-284),
as a
of understandings
history
or,forthemostpart,misunderstandings
ofthewill.This
accountofthewillasthecreator
oftheself's
character
iscitedbyArendt
as anexample
of
oneofthesemisunderstandings.
Thesentence
whichbegins"It[i.e.,thewill]creates
the

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98

POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY1988

as ... the
understood
wassometimes
"andtherefore
goesonas follows:
selfscharacter,"
that
"Understood,"
mine).
195,emphasis
specific
identity"(LOMII,
sourceoftheperson's
ofphilosophy.
inthehistory
Note,too,thatthispassageis
butbyothers
is,notbyArendt
ofthewill
that"everyphilosophy
warning
Arendt
issuesherfamiliar
onlyafter
introduced
Kant's'professional
notbymenofactionbutbyphilosophers,
andarticulated
isconceived
ofJ.S. Mill'sreliance
Arendt's
critique
(LOM II, 195).See alsointhiscontext
thinkers"'
(LOM nI,96-97).
an"enduring-I"
on,whatsheterms,
tothepassage
refers
clearly
which
bya passageinThinking
isbuttressed
Thisreading
of
intracing
thehistory
tofollow
outthecoursesheintends
setting
hereinquestion.
After
thewill,Arendt
says:
inthehistory
ofthewill
AtthesametimeI shallfollowa paralleldevelopment
mendecideabout'whom'
bywhich
capacity
towhich
volition
istheinner
according
intheworldof
theyaregoingto be,inwhatshapetheywishtoshowthemselves
is projects,
not
In otherwords,itis thewill,whosesubjectmatter
appearances.
objects,whichin a sensecreatesthepersonthatcan be blamedor praisedor
foritsactionsbutforitswhole'Being,'its
notmerely
anyhowheldresponsible
which
playsucha greatrolein
TheMarxianandExistentialist
notions,
character.
andmaker,
thatmanis hisownproducer
thought
andpretend
twentieth-century
has'made'himselfor
itisclearthatnobody
restontheseexperiences,
eventhough
(LOM
isthelastofthemetaphysicalfallacies
this,Ithink,
existence;
'produced'his
mine).
I, 190,emphasis
thatArendt
asserts
ofthispassage,Jacobitti
exclusively
onthesecondsentence
Relying
ofwhich
weare
byvirtue
thatbecausethewillisthefaculty
"follows
tradition
inarguing
ofwhichweareheld
byvirtue
ofwhichweact,itis alsothefaculty
freeandbyvirtue
"HannahArendtand theWill,"see
(Jacobitti,
accountable"
and morally
responsible
Arendt
doesnotendorse
however,
under"Arendt's
Concept
oftheWill').Onmyreading,
opposesit.
thisviewofthewill;shevehemently

a dissertation
B. Honigis completing
titled"Virtue
and Virtuosity:
Politicsina
Post-Kantian
World."

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