Zuzanna Dziuban
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That assumption, decisive for Freuds interpretation, is supported by
the outcomes of the authors analysis of case studies of das Unheimliche.
Concentrating on a variety of incarnations of the uncanny, such as
compulsion neurosis, involuntary return, male castration anxiety, the figure of
the double, a haunted house, telepathy, cannibalism, or being buried alive,
Freud looks for a feature they would have in common and to which the
appearance of the feeling of uncanniness could be attributed. The described
cases do share one structural characteristic: they are grounded in the fear of
the return of what we would rather not remember, what we did not expect,
and what we do not wish to encounter at all.
Yet, it is exactly the encounter with the forgotten phenomenon
(event, situation, thought) that even if it did not provoke any kind of fear
before is the source of the experience of uncanniness. Freud describes that
characteristic of the uncanny as follows: the uncanny is in reality nothing
new or foreign, but something familiar and old established in the mind that
has been estranged only by the process of repression13 something that,
according to Schellings definition quoted above, ought to have remained...
hidden and secret and has become visible. Thus, in Freuds understanding,
the paradoxical character of the feeling of uncanniness is due to the fact that
the foreignness which is supposed to generate the uncanny feeling is feigned.
The uncanny is in fact something homely, close, and well known which was
deprived of its Heimlichkeit because of repression, being forgotten, or
denied. In Freuds words: This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to
the former heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone
dwelt once upon a time in the beginning.14
That mysterious feature of the uncanny also comes to the fore in
interpretations proposed by Heidegger. The ambivalence of the category in
Heideggers discourse called Unheimlichkeit seems to be crucial for all
modes of its interpretation which were operationalized in the philosophers
papers before and after Kehre. For Heidegger, the paradoxical status of
uncanniness is essential not only with respect to the uncanny (unsettlement)
interpreted in Being and Time as Bestimmung, attunement, a mode (mood) by
which Dasein is disclosed to itself, and to the uncanny understood as deinon,
Wesen of human being (reinterpreted, naturally, in Heideggerian manner)15,
but also to Unheimlichkeit defined in terms of the principle of historicity,
the principle of becoming heimlich.16 For the purposes of this paper I would
like to concentrate exclusively on the interpretation presented in Being and
Time.
In all the abovementioned meanings or contexts the uncanny is,
according to Heidegger, the opposite of homely, familiar, understood, and
assimilated. In Being and Time where Unheimlichkeit functions as a tool
which allows structural description of existence, as Daseins being-in-theworld (understood above all in terms of dwelling with..., being familiar
Zuzanna Dziuban
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being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-at-home, that is, from
the uncanniness which lies in Dasein (...). This uncanniness constantly
pursues Dasein and threatens its everyday lostness in the they.21 Therefore,
the Heideggerian falling prey, which, as an escape or flight into publicness,
guarantees a feeling of security, is at the same time a flight from what is the
most authentic and own for existence: its groundlessness, and thus atopic
character. Heimlichkeit, intelligibility of the world, is not something that one
can access without some kind of effort, or rather hard work, instead, it is an
effect of interpretive activity which constantly tries to hide from itself its
constructive and therefore contingent character. Hence, paradoxically:
Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of
Dasein, not the other way around. Not being-at-home must be conceived
existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.22
That spectacular reversal of the order in which one thinks about the
uncanny (after all, what is uncanny if not the transformability of what is
uncanny, if not the ambivalence and instability of the very category which
sets Heideggers and Freuds discourse in motion) seems to be fundamental
for Heideggers interpretations of Dasein. For the experience of uncanniness,
as an experience of radical contingency of every interpretation and of every
meaning attributed to reality, actually points out to a radically conceived
hermeneutic phenomenon, namely, the fact that our access to the world and
ourselves is always mediated by unstable, contingent, temporary
interpretations, that there is no real reality that would allow us to legitimize
any of our interpretations, that the only sense and meaning to be found is the
one produced by man, and man exclusively is responsible for the shape of the
world that he inhabits.
Thus, Heideggers interpretation radicalizes Freuds position
according to which uncanny events, which come back to haunt us from time
to time, allow us to uncover something that we have forgotten or repressed,
and therefore they make us feel uncanny to ourselves. The author of Being
and Time pushes the uncanniness of the uncanny a little bit further, since, as
he assumes, it is not a temporary condition, or a moment of anxiety (even
though one experiences uncanniness in this way) in which unsettlement and
nothingness of Dasein is exposed and then momentarily covered under the
veil of familiarizing culture (publicness).
Thanks to Heideggers
interpretation we are forced to take a step backward or simply to go back (the
figure of return, of coming back plays a very important part in Heideggers
late works on the uncanny), to leave behind every specific interpretive order
culturally determined Umwelt and face the reality in which Dasein has to
be confronted with its own radical and constitutive contingency: the abyss,
Abgrund, physis. Hence, in a very Nietzschean manner, Heidegger forces us
to look into this abyss: to uncover the Dionysian upheaval that lies beneath
1 See, for instance: N. Royle, The Uncanny, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2003; Uncanny Modernity: Cultural
Theories, Modern Anxieties, J. Collins, J. Jerwis (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
2 This draft paper serves only as an introduction to the ideas that I would like to present at the
conference, therefore the reference to contemporary cultural reality is not made here.
3 A. Vidler, The Architectural uncanny: Essays in Modern Unhomely, The MIT Press, London, 1992, p.
3.
4 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin and Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
5 See: I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
6 A. Vidler, op. cit., p. 4.
7 The double is one of many incarnations of the uncanny. See: N. Ryle, The Uncanny, op. cit., p. 87 nn.
8 S. Freud, The Uncanny, Penguin Books, London, 2003, p. 121.
9 S. Freud, The Uncanny, p. 121.
10 E. Jentsch, On the Psychology of The Uncanny, Angelaki 2/1996, p. 7-17.
11 S. Freud, The Uncanny, op. cit., p. 126-127.
12 S. Freud, op. cit., p. 127.
13 S. Freud, op.cit., p. 145-146.
14 S. Freud, op. cit., p. 150.
15 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990.
16 M. Heidegger, Hlderlins Hymn The Ister, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1996.
17 M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 188.
18 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 189.