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Albert Rojan T.

Padilla
Ligutan
Civil Procedure Case Digest
6:30 9:00
Rule 35 36

Atty.
Mon, 5:30 8.00 Wed,

Nocom v. Camerino,G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009


Facts:
Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile,
the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo
Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn
previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
289237, now S-6135 (109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and
289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters).
Without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun
Management Systems Corporation (SMSC) for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the name of
SMSC.
Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans
amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder. SMSC redeemed the lots from BF.
Earlier respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for "Prohibition/Certiorari,
Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order," docketed as Civil Case No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 256.
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling
on the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to
redeem the subject lots.
The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision by declaring the respondents to be
tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right
of redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000 attorney's fees for lack of legal basis.
SC affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that
had sold the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the
subject properties from SMSC.
SC likewise denied SMSC's motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration and an Entry of Judgment was made.
The present G.R. No. 182984:
Petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Manager's Checks
amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing the price of their
"inchoate and contingent rights" over the subject lots which they sold to him.
Respondents, with the marital consent of their wives, executed an "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" appointing Mariano Nocom as attorney-in-fact to negotiate, deal, transact with all

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persons and entities involved in Civil Case no. 95-020, RTC Branch 256, Muntinlupa City,
which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo S. Santos.
Meanwhile, respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256,
filed a Motion for Execution with Prayer to Order the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to
divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and have the same vested on them. As SMSC refused
to accept the redemption amount of P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission given by
the petitioner, the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts of P9,790,612,
P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced by official receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256. The RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted respondents' motion for
execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 in the name of SMSC
were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in the names of the
respondents. It also ordered that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney," executed on December
18, 2003 by respondents in favor of petitioner, be annotated in the memorandum of
encumbrances of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.
On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against petitioner,
captioned as "Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney," docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, seeking to annul the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney"
dated December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor, and the
payment of attorney's fees and other legal fees.
Respondent Oscar Camerino's complaint alleged that he and co-respondents were asked by
their counsel, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was
urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the contents of the said
document were not explained to him; that in the first week of September 2005, he learned
that TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of Deeds;
that he discovered that the annotation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" on the said
titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August 31,
2005; that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" turned out to be the same document which
Atty. Santos required him and the other respondents to sign on December 18, 2003; that
despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to surrender the owner's duplicate copies of
the said titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the subject lots; that he had no
intention of naming, appointing, or constituting anyone, including petitioner, to sell, assign,
dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim which was annotated on the titles involving the subject lots.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty.
Santos informed him of the desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and assign to
him their "inchoate and contingent rights and interests" over the subject lots because they
were in dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings
as SMSC would probably appeal the CA's Decision to this Court; that they did not have the
amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots; that on December 18, 2003, he
decided to buy the contingent rights of the respondents and paid each of them P500,000 or
a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by Philtrust Bank Manager's Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for
respondent Oscar Camerino), MV 0002061 (for respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062
(for respondent Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV 0002064
(for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003; that on
August 4, 2005, he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as commission; that simultaneous
with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney" dated December 18, 2003; that being coupled with interest,
the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the
parties; and that having received just and reasonable compensation for their contingent
rights, respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots. Petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages,

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P500,000 exemplary damages, and P500,000 attorney's fees plus costs.


Petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense
that respondent Oscar Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots
because the latter and his wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust Bank Manager's check
in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003 and that
being coupled with interest, the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be revoked or
cancelled at will by any of the parties.
Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as
legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached Complaint-in-Intervention, dated
January 26, 2006, seeking the nullification of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" for being
contrary to law and public policy and the annotation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney"
on the titles of the subject lots with prayer that petitioner be ordered to deliver to them the
copies of the owner's duplicate certificate of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897. Their
Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the
controversy and would either be directly injured or benefited by the judgment in Civil Case
No. 05-172; that they were co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in
the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their
consent was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence
perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and petitioner; that sometime in December
2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting which was attended by petitioner and one Judge
Alberto Lerma where petitioner gave them checks in the amount of P500,000 each as
"Christmas gifts"; and that the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was void ab initio as the
same was contrary to law and public policy and for being a champertous contract.
Respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that since the
existence of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was admitted by petitioner, the only issue
to be resolved was whether the said document was coupled with interest and whether it was
revocable in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was proper
because petitioner did not raise any issue relevant to the contents of the "Irrevocable Power
of Attorney"; and that in an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he admitted receipt of a check
amounting to P500,000.00 which was given to him by petitioner as financial assistance.
On February 3, 2006, petitioner opposed respondent Oscar Camerino's motion on the ground
that there were factual issues that required the presentation of evidence.
On February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the petition for the cancellation of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was actually an action
to recover the titles and ownership over the properties; that since respondent Oscar
Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for Summary Judgment that the assessed
value of the subject lots amounted to P600,000,000, the case partook of the nature of a real
action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient; and that due to insufficient
docket fee, his complaint should be dismissed as the RTC was not vested with jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint.
Respondent Oscar Camerino opposed petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing of special
and/or affirmative defenses alleging that it was dilatory and that he had a cause of action.
Respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply to petitioner's Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment claiming that the determinative issue of whether or not the amount of
P500,000 given to him by petitioner rendered the power of attorney irrevocable can be
determined from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on record without the need
of introduction of evidence.

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Respondent Oscar Camerino filed an Opposition to petitioner's Motion to Dismiss stating that
the instant case was a personal action for the revocation of the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" and not for the recovery of real property and, thus, the correct docket fees were
paid.
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention because the
movants-intervenors ([herein respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred
Del Rosario as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario) "have legal interest in the subject properties
in litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino], who
was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 95-020, entitled `Oscar Camerino, et al. v.
Springsun Management Systems Corporation et al.,' where they are the prevailing parties
against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect to the same properties, subject of this
case, in a decision rendered by Branch 256 of this Court." The RTC, Branch 203, also granted
the Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the motion to dismiss and directed the petitioner
to pay the docket fees which has remained unpaid. The Motion for Intervention was also
granted.
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 rendered a Summary Judgment annulling the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney" for being contrary to law and public policy.
The assailed "power of attorney" which was executed on December 18, 2003 is void ab initio
for being contrary to the express prohibition or spirit of the aforesaid law or the declared
state and public policy on the qualification of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform
program. It bears stressing that the redemption price of the subject lots was paid only on
August 4, 2005 or 1 year, 8 months and 14 days after the execution of the assailed power of
attorney.
If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of
his landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter
to persons not qualified to acquire economic size farm units in accordance with the
provisions of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be allowed
to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same.
The right of redemption of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as
upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social
legislation known as Agrarian Reform Code.
Enunciated in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al., vs. Hon.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989) is the policy of the State on
agrarian reform legislation. Said State policy emphasizes the "Land for the Landless" slogan
that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of land among the people.
Furthermore, the assailed Special Power of Attorney is a champertous contract and therefore
void for being against public policy. The pleadings of the parties show that the same special
power of attorney was executed by the petitioner, et al. through the intercession of Atty.
Arturo Santos and at the behest of the respondent. In his own answer to the instant petition
which he is estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement was for the
respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the rights of the petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 without any provision for reimbursement. In
other words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos, petitioner's attorney,
had agreed to carry on with the action for the petitioner et al. at his own expense in
consideration of procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as the absolute owner
thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption price of said lots, as well as separate
amounts of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to each of the five (5) co-plaintiffs in Civil

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Case No. 95-020, including herein petitioner, or a total sum of Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00).
Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the
earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary
relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being
exploited by the former. In other words, the situation created under the given premises is a
clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts
between a lawyer and a client.
A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit,
whereby the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of
the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit,
by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in
consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be
recovered. (Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc. Mo. App. 525 S.W. 2d
819, 823). An Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client's rights is champertous. [JBP Holding Corporation v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own expense in consideration of some
bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co.,
et al., 225 F. 242 (1918). The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction.
The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from
acquiring an interest in the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest
between him and his client.
In the instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent colluded and conspired to
circumvent these prohibitions. Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioner's
counsel, brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the respondent with
respect to the lands subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is
illegal for being a champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.
Be that as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of Attorney is
coupled with interest, the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are
the present intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but have precisely
gone to court and filed the instant petition for its cancellation or revocation. What is
prohibited by law and jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power of
attorney or agency coupled with interest, at will by a party, without court declaration.
Judgment was rendered nullifying the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in question, and
ordering the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897
covering the lots to petitioners an intervenors.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the trial court's
Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 which was
opposed by the respondents.
Respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Final Decision/Appeal which was opposed
by petitioner.
The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration.
Within the reglementary period, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the
corresponding appeal docket fees.
CA affirmed the trial court's Joint Order dated June 9, 2006 and Summary Judgment dated

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June 15, 2006 and dismissed the petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that
as the RTC rendered the assailed Summary Judgment based on the pleadings and
documents on record, without any trial or reception of evidence, the same did not involve
factual matters. The CA found the issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal to be
questions of law. CA concluded that since the issues involved questions of law, the proper
mode of appeal should have been through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court directly to this Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41
thereof and, thus, petitioner's appeal to the CA should be dismissed outright pursuant to this
Court's Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, mandating the dismissal of appeals involving
pure questions of law erroneously brought to the CA.
CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in not voiding the assailed summary judgment for
failure of respondents to implead an indispensable party.
RULING:
Respondents maintain that they were deceived into executing the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" in favor of the petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of their own
lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had connived with petitioner in order to effect
the fraudulent transaction. In this regard, respondents should have impleaded Atty. Santos
as an indispensable party-defendant early on when the case was still with the RTC, but they
failed to do so. However, their procedural lapse did not constitute a sufficient ground for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172.
SCourt explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable
parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the
court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered
by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void. There is lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as
to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner or plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or plaintiff's failure
to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In
the present case, the RTC and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos
as party-defendant or respondent in the case. The operative act that would lead to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be the refusal of respondents to comply with the
directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.

Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware


G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
Facts:

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On March 3, 1995, herein respondent filed with the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite a Complaint for a
Sum of Money and Damages against herein petitioners alleging that during the period of
November 19, 1992 to January 5, 1993, defendants [herein petitioners] made purchases of
various construction materials from plaintiff corporation [herein respondent] in the sum of
P259,809.50, which has not been paid up to the present time, both principal and stipulated
interests due thereon. Plaintiff made several demands, oral and written, for the same
defendants to pay all their obligations due plaintiff herein, but defendants fail and refuse to
comply with, despite demands made upon them, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.

In their Answer to Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases from respondent,
but alleged that they do not remember the exact amount thereof as no copy of the
documents evidencing the purchases were attached to the complaint. Petitioners,
nonetheless, claimed that they have made payments to the respondent on March 4, 1994
and August 9, 1994 in the amounts of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00, respectively, and they
are willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness after deducting the payments made and
after verification of their account.
In a Manifestation dated July 18, 1995, petitioners stated that in order to buy peace, they
were willing to pay respondent the principal sum of P259,809.50, but without interests and
costs, and on installment basis.
In its Counter Manifestation, respondent signified that it was amenable to petitioners' offer
to pay the principal amount of P259,809.50. However, respondent insisted that petitioners
should also pay interests, as well as litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all
incidental expenses.
Subsequently, on August 11, 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings contending that petitioners were deemed to have admitted in their Answer that
they owed respondent the amount of P259,809.50 when they claimed that they made partial
payments amounting to P130,301.80. Based on this premise, respondent prayed that it be
awarded the remaining balance of P129,507.70. Petitioners filed their Opposition to the said
Motion.
On September 11, 1995, the RTC issued an Order deferring resolution of respondent's
Motion for Partial Judgment on the ground that there is no clear and specific admission on
the part of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.
On January 30, 1996, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of court, alleging
that between October 1992 until January 5, 1993, petitioners purchased from it (respondent)
various construction materials and supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50;
that only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.
In their Answer to Amended Complaint, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their
Answer to Complaint.
On March 8, 1996, respondent filed a Request for Admission asking that petitioners admit
the genuineness of various documents, such as statements of accounts, delivery receipts,

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invoices and demand letter attached thereto as well as the truth of the allegations set forth
therein.
Respondent basically asked petitioners to admit that the latter's principal obligation is
P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid.
On June 3, 1996, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC praying that
since petitioners failed to timely file their comment to the Request for Admission, they be
considered to have admitted the genuineness of the documents described in and exhibited
with the said Request as well as the truth of the matters of fact set forth therein, in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
On June 6, 1996, petitioners filed their Comments on the Request for Admission stating their
objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.
On January 24, 1997, respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of
court. The amendment modified the period covered by the complaint. Instead of October
1992 to January 5, 1993, it was changed to July 29, 1992 until August 10, 1994. The
amendment also confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the sum of P110,301.80 but
alleged that this payment was applied to other obligations which petitioners owe
respondent. Respondent reiterated its allegation that, despite petitioners' partial payment,
the principal amount which petitioners owe remains P259,809.50.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint denying the allegations
therein and insisting that they have made partial payments.
On September 4, 1997, respondent filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary
Judgment claiming that petitioners' Comments on respondent's Request for Admission is a
mere scrap of paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel and not by petitioners
themselves and that it was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court.
Respondent goes on to assert that petitioners, in effect, were deemed to have impliedly
admitted the matters subject of the said request. Respondent also contended that it is
already entitled to the issuance of a summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only
failed to tender a genuine issue as to any material fact but also did not raise any special
defenses, which could possibly relate to any factual issue.
In their Opposition to Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment, petitioners
argued that respondent's request for admission is fatally defective, because it did not
indicate or specify a period within which to answer; that verification by petitioners' counsel
is sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court; that petitioners' request for admission
should be deemed dispensed with and no longer taken into account as it only relates to the
Amended Complaint, which was already abandoned when the Second Amended Complaint
was filed; and that summary judgment is improper and without legal basis, as there exists a
genuine controversy brought about by petitioners' specific denials and defenses.
On September 28, 1998, the RTC issued an Order infavor of the defendant in which the
petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Then appealed to the CA.
Then appealed again to the SC.

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ISSUE: Whether or not there should not have been a summary judgment against
defendantsappellants (petitioners)
RULING:
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the CA was correct in sustaining the
summary judgment rendered by the RTC.
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10)
days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing
affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the
hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven
summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
In this respect, the Court's ruling in Nocom v. Camerino, is instructive, to wit:
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim. Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact,
except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
Phil. Business Bank v. Chua
G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010
FACTS:

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On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST
Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of
Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu
Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime
Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does
before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.
In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that sometime in February
2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a
director and the President of CST, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
124275 and 157581, titles to lands owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January
2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as
collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST
stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.
From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a
Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly
constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the
name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use
CSTs properties as security for these loans. Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis
Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00), and used CST properties as collateral. Respondent Chua
signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as
well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this
loan.
When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted, Tan
filed the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and
mortgage made out in CSTs name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered
into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company.
In its Amended Answer, PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding
mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and
documents accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished
secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In
addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as collaterals.
PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding
payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua
In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB, he claimed that he never applied for
a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans
in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans. Nevertheless, he admitted
that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John
Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes
after the loans had already been consummated, "in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis
Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles."

Page 10 of 34

PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already
admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five
Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00), insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there
was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued
that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to
persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an
accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it
does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.
Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim on
July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes
amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing
as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes,
even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the
amount of P75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.
Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to challenge the
December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to disallow his appeal the December 21,
2005 order, granting PBBs motion to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement
the writ of execution; and the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for
reconsideration and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary
judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question
the propriety of the partial summary judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed an error in recalling and
setting aside the writ of execution and all the proceedings taken for its implementation on
the wrong notion that the partial summary judgment has not become final and executory.
Ruling:
Nature of Partial Summary Judgment
PBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section
1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses
at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial.21 When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried,

Page 11 of 34

the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts.22
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full
adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the
Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule, judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section
reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final
judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff
either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." 23 The Rules provide
for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the
court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts
which are not in dispute.
After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary
judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In
this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, 24 an
interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.
Buncayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Property, G.R. No. 170483, Apr. 19, 2010
FACTS:
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who
introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort
Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area and later formed themselves into the
DSierto Beach Resort Owners Association, Inc. (DSierto)
6 parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) where the resort situated were transferred
to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704
Petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit.
Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore
application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5hectare portion applied for by DSierto members.

Page 12 of 34

DENR Regional Executive Director denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto
members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either
within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent.
The DSierto members appealed the denial of their applications- DENR Secretary denied the
appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the titled property of
respondent based on the final verification plan.
Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager invited the DSierto to discuss common
details beneficial to all parties concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor
Bongbong Marcos, was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials to mediate over the conflict
among the parties. Atty. Marcos offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in
consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition that they would vacate the
area identified as respondents property. A DSierto member made a counter-offer of
P400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting,
manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue
pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of
Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim1 in favor of respondent.
Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the RTC- Laoag
against respondent alleging that his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed
was void and not binding upon him. The issue raised by petitioner was his claim for damages
while respondents issue was only his claim for possession of the property occupied by
petitioner and damages.
RTC Dismissed the claim of plaintiff for and granted the counterclaim of the defendant for
recovery of possession of the lot occupied by the plaintiff.
Pet went on appeal to CA-affirmed RTC, Hence, petition was filed in SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is appropriate in this case.
Ruling:
Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide

Page 13 of 34

the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is
such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact,
except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
Since limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary judgment has
been properly rendered in this case.
Smart v. Aldecoa G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On March
9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of lease4 with Florentino Sebastian in which the
latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square
meters, located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its
contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed and installed a cellular base
station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower,
rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on
three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base
station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of
respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry
Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.
Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for
abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction.
In the end, petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents Complaint; the denial of
respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction; the award of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts
which the court deem just and reasonable; and the award of attorneys fees in the sum
of P500,000.00 and litigation expenses as may be proven at the trial.
Respondents then contested petitioners allegations and averred in their Reply and Answer
to Counterclaim. Respondents likewise filed on September 21, 2000 their Opposition to
petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that there were several genuine
issues relating to the cause of action and material facts of their Complaint. They asserted
that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations in their Complaint, as well
as the defenses put up by petitioner.

Page 14 of 34

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 35 applies to this case.


Ruling:
Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of
which state:
SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there
must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including
documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to
produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving
party is entitled to a summary judgment.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or
question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable
inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Phil. Business Bank v. Chua G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010
FACTS:
On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST
Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of
Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu

Page 15 of 34

Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime
Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does
before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.
In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that sometime in February
2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a
director and the President of CST, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
124275 and 157581, titles to lands owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January
2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as
collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST
stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.
From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a
Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly
constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the
name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use
CSTs properties as security for these loans. Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis
Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00), and used CST properties as collateral. Respondent Chua
signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as
well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this
loan.
When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted, Tan
filed the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and
mortgage made out in CSTs name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered
into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company.
In its Amended Answer, PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding
mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and
documents accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished
secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In
addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as collaterals.
PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding
payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua
In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB, he claimed that he never applied for
a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans
in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans. Nevertheless, he admitted
that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John
Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes
after the loans had already been consummated, "in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis
Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles."
PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already
admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five
Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00), insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there
was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued

Page 16 of 34

that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to
persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an
accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it
does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.
Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim on
July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes
amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing
as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes,
even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the
amount of P75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.
Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to challenge the
December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to disallow his appeal the December 21,
2005 order, granting PBBs motion to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement
the writ of execution; and the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for
reconsideration and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary
judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question
the propriety of the partial summary judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed an error in recalling and
setting aside the writ of execution and all the proceedings taken for its implementation on
the wrong notion that the partial summary judgment has not become final and executory.

Ruling:
Nature of Partial Summary Judgment
PBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section
1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses
at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial.21 When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried,
the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts.22

Page 17 of 34

The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full
adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the
Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule, judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section
reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final
judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff
either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." 23 The Rules provide
for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the
court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts
which are not in dispute.
After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary
judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In
this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, 24 an
interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.

Gotamco v. Chan Seng


G.R. No. L-22737, November 28, 1924
Facts:
Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000
among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he
described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his
three adopted sons, Tan Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a
resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be required.
Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were
appointed and qualified as commissioners, and later they published the usual notice to
creditors to present their claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena, of
Manila.
The commissioners presented their report to the court in which, among others, they
reported the allowance of the claim here in question. At the time all of the heirs, including
Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as
also had the widow of the deceased. When such report has been filed, the executor filed a
motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his own choice as curador ad litem for

Page 18 of 34

the minor heirs which, among other things, that the heirs who are interested in the estate of
the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20; Tan Kim Hong, age 12;
Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China,
and the day of their return to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the estate which
court ignored but appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment as only formality
such that he did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved.
In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect
their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of
the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey
ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by
Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor heirs,
including the claimant, who made a written report to the court. The report concluded with a
recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the
annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong. After the report was filed, a hearing was had and
testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of
removal, among other things, said that commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received
any claim; that the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the
business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does
not appear in the report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books
and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed.
After such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the
present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the
claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the
application of the present guardian to the claimant to require the administrator to pay the
claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong
appeals, contending that the lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to
the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the administrator for authority to
pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and
filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on July 14, 1921;
that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code,
and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying
upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes.
Issue: Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became
final.
Ruling:
NO. The court found as a fact that in the De los Santos vs. Reyes case, supra, there was a
substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements, and the decision in that case
was based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and
those in the instant case. Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is
conclusive that at the time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve
years of age, and that all of the other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that
Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and
present his claim or to represent him, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim
or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any knowledge of the fact that the claim

Page 19 of 34

was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China in September, 1922. As a
matter of fact, there is no evidence that the claim in question in any manner, shape or form
was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. For aught that appears in the record,
the claim was allowed by the commissioners on their own motion and of their own volition. It
also appears that the entries which were made in the books of the deceased were made by
his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show that they were made by the authority of the
deceased. It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the
entries were made, and that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in
question.
A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as
the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a
judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the
application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by
the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It
should be noted that only is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an
action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .
In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally
speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of
a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.
Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and
requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It appears from the record
before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to
the claim in question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were
not res judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the claim
was a fraud upon the appellee.
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)
Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of
3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They
agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance
of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose
(Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of
the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the
vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir.
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the
properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana

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commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC). Javellana prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from
dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute
registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a
motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that
the complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla
countered that the RTC order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on
time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal,
Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21,
2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded
the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." The CA denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.
Issue: Whether or not the RTCs decision denying of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal a final order and appealable;

Ruling:
Yes. First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be
done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly
a final order, not an interlocutory one. The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule
enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013

Page 21 of 34

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four hildren. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
While the action was pending, the trial court granted Calderons request for support pendent
lite (while the action for nullity is pending).
On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void,
awarding custody of the children to the mother and ordering Roxas to provide support to the
children. Several actions were raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of the
monthly support while Calderon asking for an increase in the amount and Roxas payment
on his arrears for support.
ISSUE: This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail the nullity of their marriage but,
rather, is premised on whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is already
interlocutory and final
Ruling:
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the
assailed orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce supportwhich was
granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out
that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final orders
assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.
An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if
the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage
of the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
suggests.
Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by
the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the
early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of
court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting
support pendente lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support
while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal
support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order
granting support pendente lite.
Petitioners theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in
questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly
dismissed by the CA.
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002

Page 22 of 34

FACTS:
It appears that in an Information dated December 1, 1983 petitioner Romeo Nazareno and
his wife, Elisa Nazareno, were charged with Serious Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite and that upon arraignment, both pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged.
After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April 24, 1986,
but the same was postponed due to petitioners filing of a motion to re-open the case on the
ground of non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be produced during the trial
proper. Said motion was opposed by the prosecution. On November 27, 1987, after Presiding
Judge Manuel C. Diosomito was suspended, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Aurelio
Icasiano, Jr. issued a resolution denying the motion to re-open.
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14329. In the
meantime, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. set the promulgation of judgment
on April 15, 1988. On April 15, 1988, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr.
promulgated the Decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting
Elisa Nazareno but convicting the petitioner as charged. However, on the same date, the
Court of Appeals in said CA-G.R. SP No. 14329 issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Icasiano, Jr. from proceeding with the promulgation of said judgment since a copy of
the same resolution containing the temporary restraining order was received by the
Metropolitan Trial Court only after said date.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the Court of Appeals a supplemental petition in said CA-G.R. SP
No. 14329 to declare the nullity of judgment, on the ground that the decision, having been
signed by Judge Diosomito, should have also been promulgated by him, and not by Acting
Judge Icasiano, Jr. Petitioner also alleged that the decision is void since at the time of the
promulgation of the decision by Judge Icasiano, Jr., Judge Diosomito who signed the subject
decision has already retired from office. Said supplemental petition, however, was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its decision dated February 11, 1991. Reconsideration of the said
decision of the appellate court was denied in a Resolution promulgated on March 13, 1991.
Petitioner interposed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning
the February 11, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals but the same failed for having been
filed out of time, more specifically twelve (12) days late. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated September 18,
1991. On October 3, 1991, petitioner received a copy of the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration, and on the same date he filed his notice of appeal with the said
Municipal Trial Court of Naic, appealing its decision to the Regional Trial Court.
On October 10, 1991, the records of the case were forwarded to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, presided by the respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario who, in a
decision dated October 12, 1992, dismissed the appeal of petitioner for having been filed out
of time. Reconsideration was sought by petitioner but the same was denied by respondent
Judge Almario in his Order dated February 4, 1993.
Undaunted, petitioner interposed a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals upon the premise that respondent Judge Almario, in dismissing the appeal,
unlawfully neglected to perform a duty resulting from his office to give due course to

Page 23 of 34

petitioners appeal which was already approved. The appellate court dismissed the
petition. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in a
Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1993.
Issue: Whether or not the Judgment has become final and executory.
Ruling:
Yes. Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review (G.R No.
97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his choices of
remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue
importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed. Rules of
procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is within the power of
this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules
are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the
higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a
particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in
the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil.

Re: Hon. Suan, A.M. RTJ-04-1849, September 20, 2004


Facts:
The Report of the Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated
May 15, 2002, disclosed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Ozamiz City, had as of
December 14, 2001, an inventory of two hundred twenty-three (223) civil and criminal
cases, of which thirty-nine (39) had already been submitted for decision, but had yet to be
acted upon.
Earlier, presiding Judge Pedro L. Suan, in his December 13, 2001 Letter, requested an
extension of time within which to finish the foregoing backlog. In a Resolution dated
February 11, 2002, this Court granted his request and gave him one hundred eighty (180)
days from notice to decide the cases. During the extended period, only fifteen (15) cases
were disposed of within the mandated reglementary period. Thus, he left a total of twentyfour (24) unresolved cases.
On account of this delay, the Court, in a Resolution dated August 12, 2002, directed Judge
Suan to a)
to DECIDE within thirty (30) days from notice Civil Cases Nos. 93-64 (Guani
Milling vs. PPA); 99-12 (Rural Bank of Ozamiz City, Inc. Vs. Casco) and 97-39 (Tee vs. Argelio,
et. Al.) And Criminal Case No. 2795 (People vs. Jamago); and to SUBMIT copies of his
decisions, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within (10) days from
rendition/promulgation thereof;
b)
to inform the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days
from notice hereof, whether or not the following cases were decided/resolved within the
reglementary period to wit: Civil Cases Nos. 07-99 (Heirs of Roberta de Ruedas, et. Al., vs.

Page 24 of 34

Lolita Carpio); OZC-98-65 (Constancio Suezo IV vs. Guadioso III): OZC00-24 (Leo Obut vs.
Hilda E. Hamot); SP-01-0146 (In Re: Petition for Adoption, Fuentes, petitioner), OZC-98-21
(Florida vs. Sps. Role), SP-022-01 (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Joshua Tecson), OZC 00-46
(Uy vs. Standard Insurance) 98-42 (Tudela Evangelical Church, Inc. Vs. United Church of
Christ of the Philippines), 97-46 (Heirs of C. Villagoagalo vs. Anslag, et al.) And 21-01 (Go vs.
PNB) and to SUBMIT copies of his decisions through the Office of the Court Administrator
within ten (10) days from rendition/promulgation thereof;
c)
to IMMEDIATELY RESOLVE the pending motions in Criminal Case No. 2710 and Civil
Case No. 91-19; and to SUBMIT a report thereon within twenty (20) days from notice;
d)
to TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the three (3) cases which were not acted upon
and/or without further setting after the lapse of considerable length of time namely; Civil
Cases Nos. 97-40 and 2910 and Criminal Case No. 2811, and on the following ten (10)
criminal cases which may be acted upon in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A92 dated 21 June 1993, re: Guidelines in the archiving of cases, namely: Criminal Cases Nos.
2925, 2998, 2999, 3001, 3004, 2991, 3005, 3006, 3007 and 3011, to SUBMIT a report
thereon, within twenty (20) days from notice, and to FURNISH this Court copies of his
decisions on the twenty-eight (28) cases subject of his request for extension of time to
resolve cases in A.M. No. 02-1-41-RTC, within ten (10) days from rendition/promulgation
thereof.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Suan to have incurred delays in deciding
cases and to have decided cases even after his retirement. It also found that these Decisions
had inappropriately been promulgated by Judge Inting. Hence, it recommended that they
both be held liable for gross inefficiency and ignorance of the law
Issue: Whther or not the judgments made by Hon. Suan was valid.
Ruling.
No. Under Article VIII of Section 11 of the Constitution, judges shall hold office during good
behavior until the age of seventy or until they become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office. Because Judge Suan compulsorily retired on May 29, 2002, he could no
longer continue -- after that date -- to exercise the powers of his office, including the
authority to decide and promulgate cases. Thus, his Decisions in Civil Case Nos. 93-64, 9842 and 95-01 -- promulgated on July 19, 2002, August 18, 2002 and July 3, 2002,
respectively -- are null and void.
Entrenched in our jurisprudence as early as 1917 is the principle that for judgments to be
valid and binding, they should be made by legally constituted judges. Further, not only must
judges make their judgments during their tenure, they must also promulgate these within
that period. As reiterated in People v. Labao, for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly
signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it; otherwise, it
cannot acquire a binding effect.
UP v. Hon. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2010
Facts:

Page 25 of 34

The UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction
Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), for the construction
of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in
the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos (UPLB). When the UP failed to
pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent
officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Stern Builders. Following the RTCs
denial of its motion for reconsideration, the UP filed a notice of appeal. Stern Builders and
dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved
for the execution of the decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within
the reglementary period because the UPs Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon
City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. Both the CA and the RTC found the
filing on June 3, 2002 by the UP of the notice of appeal to be tardy. They based their finding
on the fact that only six days remained of the UPs reglementary 15-day period within which
to file the notice of appeal because the UP had filed a motion for reconsideration on January
16, 2002 vis--vis the RTCs decision the UP received on January 7, 2002; and that because
the denial of the motion for reconsideration had been served upon Atty. Felimon D. Nolasco
of the UPLB.Legal Office on May 17, 2002, the UP had only until May 23, 2002 within which
to file the notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco
was defective considering that its counsel of record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City
Ruling:
Yes. Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel
of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service
should be made.
That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only on
May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June
1, 2002, rendering the filing of the UPs notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well
within the remaining days of the UPs period to appeal.
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made
upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. The fact that Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the
UP at the UPLB Legal Office did not render the service upon him effective. It is settled that
where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. 95 Service
on the party or the partys employee is not effective because such notice is not notice in law.
This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which
explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of
any paper served upon him by the opposite side." As such, the period to appeal resumed

Page 26 of 34

only on June 1, 2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in
Diliman of the copy of the decision of the RTC, not from the date when the UP was notified.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such
that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it
would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable
thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002.
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied
the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for
filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly
adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule
that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received
the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the
context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a
Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within
which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If
the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a holiday.
Amovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154559, October 5, 2011
Facts:
On August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI)
obtained loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the total amount
of P4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI defaulted in the
payment of the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and
sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure on June 23, 1977 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union. The
action was docketed as Civil Case No. 2794. After trial, the CFI, by then renamed Regional
Trial Court, rendered a Decision: (1) nullifying the foreclosure of BCBIs mortgaged
properties; (2) ordering the cancellation of the titles issued to GSIS and the issuance of new
ones in the name of BCBI; (3) ordering BCBI to pay GSIS P900,000.00 for the debenture
bonds; and (4) directing GSIS to (a) restore to BCBI full possession of the foreclosed
properties, (b) restructure the P4.25 Million worth of loans at the legal rate of interest from
the finality of the judgment, (c) pay BCBI P1.9 Million representing accrued monthly rentals
and P20,000.00 rental monthly until the properties are restored to BCBIs possession, and (d)
pay the costs.

Page 27 of 34

GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 09361. It
appears that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be the counsel of BCBI sometime before the
appeal of GSIS. The said law firm and BCBI dispute the legality of the replacement, with BCBI
claiming that the Armovit Law Firm had been remiss in its duties as BCBIs counsel. On
January 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision with modification.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on February 10, 1988 and
the records were remanded to the court a quo on March 14, 1988. The GSIS did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson
(wife of Romualdo Bengson) delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 only. Atty.
Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.00 (twenty percent
of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengson made assurances that he will be paid the
balance.
On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received an order emanating from the trial
court in the tenor as follows:
During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's charging lien on October 11, 1988,
Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorney's charging lien, which
was duly approved by the Court, after which the Court directed the parties to comply
faithfully with their respective obligations.
In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading denominated as
compliance alleging that petitioner (Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff the
sum of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorneys fees. With the receipt
by the petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its
obligation.
ISSUE:Whether or not the appellate and trial courts erred in defying the supreme court in its
final and executory decision awarding petitioner a contingent fee.
RULING:
Yes. Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all
times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all
recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, decided in 1969, this Court
awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his
services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more
pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the private respondent's own endeavours
to evade its obligations.
The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere
pronouncements in bodies of Decisions may not be the subject of execution: random
statements can easily be taken out of context and are susceptible to different
interpretations. When not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random statements in
bodies of Decisions can still be the subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate
and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.

Page 28 of 34

Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the execution of the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision that
"we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be
unreasonable."All things considered, it was the interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law Firm,
not that of the trial court, which had the effect of varying the final and executory Decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 90983. The instant Petition for Certiorari should therefore fail.
Abrigo v. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013
Facts:
A parcel of land was inherited by siblings Francisco and Gaudencia from their deceased
parents. A partition of the land was agreed upon, whereby the western portion shall pertain
to Francisco and his heirs, while the eastern part shall pertain to Gaudencia. However, no
actual partition occurred and heirs of both parties enjoyed and possessed the property as
co-owners. During this time, the heirs of Gaudencia made improvements on the property,
which encroached upon the western portion of the lot. Eventually, the heirs of Francisco
decided to partition the property.
The Court ruled for the partition in accordance with the original agreement and ordered the
removal demolition of the improvements encroaching upon the western part of the property.
Heirs of Gaudencia prayed to set aside the order of demolition on the basis of a supervening
event. They alleged that one of the heirs of Franciso- Jimmy Flores, sold his share of the
western portion of the lot, thereby making them co-owners thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the sale by a legitimate heir of his share in the estate qualifies as a
supervening event that will justify setting aside the order of demolition or execution of the
partition.
Ruling:
No. A supervening event in order to qualify as exception to the execution as a matter of right
of a final and immutable judgment rule must directly affect matters litigated upon and
substantially alter the rights and relationships of the parties to render the execution unjust.
In this case, even on the assumption that the sale of Jimmy Flores share is true, the same
does not alter or modify the judgment on the property at issue. In addition, the appellate
court found the whole sale transaction suspicious and not supported by evidence. The
execution has dragged on for 17 years now since order of implementation was given, it is
high for the Court to put a stop to further delays to finally enable the heirs and successorsin-interest of Francisco to exercise their rights as legitimate heirs and as winning parties to a
final judgment.
Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004
Facts:
On October 13, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents Willibaldo Uy (Uy),
Chua Ping Hian (Chua) and the latters agent, Laureana P. Borres (Borres). She alleged that
on three separate occasions, she obtained loans from Chua in the total amount of P5.5
million. As security for said loans, she executed a real estate mortgage over a lot covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 124391, registered in her name and located at No.

Page 29 of 34

1661, Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City. Before the third loan could be released, she
signed a deed of absolute sale conveying the lot in favor of Chua in consideration of the
amount of P3 Million upon the assurance of Borres that the deed was a mere formality. On
November 9, 1995, however, she learned that her title over the property was cancelled and
that a new one was issued on November 8, 1995 in the name of Chua.
Thereafter, Chua offered to sell back the property to petitioner for P10 million, which the
latter accepted. However, on December 7, 1995, petitioner came to know that Chua sold the
subject lot for P7 Million to Uy, to whom a new transfer certificate of title was issued by the
Makati Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed a complaint on the following causes of action: (1) annulment of the deeds of
absolute sale over the subject lot in favor of Chua and Uy and the cancellation of the TCT
issued in the name of the latter; (2) recovery from Borres of the amount of P200,000.00
which she allegedly gave as payment of the real property taxes of the lot as well as the
amount of P120,000.00 which Borres unlawfully deducted from her third loan; and (3)
recovery of damages against all respondents.
Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners action which is founded on
fraud is barred by prescription. In their Answer, Uy and Borres contended, among others,
that petitioners cause of action, if any, has been waived or abandoned.
On July 24, 2001 the trial court dismissed the complaint against all the respondents on the
grounds of prescription, ratification and abandonment of cause of action. It held that
petitioner ratified Chuas act of selling the lot to Uy by acknowledging that the latter is now
the owner of the lot in her letter dated December 19, 1995 offering to repurchase the same
and to pay the incidental expenses of the sale.
On October 25, 2001, the trial court modified its order dated July 24, 2001 by reinstating the
complaint insofar as the action for recovery of sum of money against Borres is concerned.
On November 16, 2001, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the July 24, 2001 and
October 25, 2001 orders of the trial court. Chua filed a motion to dismiss petitioners appeal
for failure to file a record on appeal within the required period. On August 19, 2002, the trial
court granted the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that her
complaint seeks to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the fraudulent conveyance of her
property. She claimed that the trial court cannot render several judgment and separate the
liability of Borres with that of her co-respondents. As such, appeal from the decision of the
trial court can be perfected by the filing of a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the questioned order without need of submitting a record on appeal.
On August 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding that the trial court
validly rendered several judgment because the liability of Borres in petitioners third cause
of action is distinct from the liability of the other respondents. To perfect an appeal, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner must file a record on appeal in addition to the notice of
appeal within 30 days from notice of the assailed order pursuant to Section 2(a) and 3, Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Issue: Whether or not there can be several judgments in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner was able to perfect an appeal within the
required period.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides
SEC. 4. Several judgments.In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a
several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the
action to proceed against the others.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct
from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the
subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect
the other.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the
complaint was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several
judgment is proper.
Heirs of Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners - Jose, Julian and Oscar (children of Sy Bang from his 1st marriage to Ba Nga) and
Zenaida and Ma. Emma (children of Sps. Jose and Iluminada)
Respondents - Rolando, Rosalino, Lucio, Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Julieta, Lourdes,
Florecita (children of Sy Bang by his 2nd marriage) and Rosita (2nd wife)
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including
several businesses. May 28, 1980 - Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against Sps.
Jose and Iluminada, Sps. Julian and Rosa, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Oscar, Rosalino, Lucio,
Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, Rosita, and Renato before the CFI of
Quezon.
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed upon
that Jose would manage, supervise and administer the common properties and/or the entire
estate of Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of
petitioners or respondents. o The function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated to Julian,
and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of cinema of the
common ownership was delegated to Rosauro Sy. o The income of the three cinema houses
(Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters) shall exclusively pertain to respondents for their support
and sustenance, pending the termination of the Civil Case for Judicial Partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be two petitions for review.
Ruling:

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NO. The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no
jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance ordered by this Court. The claim for
widows allowance was made before the SC in a case that did not arise from the
guardianship proceedings. The widows allowance is chargeable to Sy Bangs estate. It must
be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Enrique form part of Sy Bangs estate remains unsettled since this Petition
questioning the trial courts 3rd Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there
has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to
Sy Bangs estate. That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no
excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have been identified
i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these properties should be made to answer
for the widows allowance of Rosita.
Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court
found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was
manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and
that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth,
pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, reiterating the following
arguments:
1. That the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action
regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated; and
2. That the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma
proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be separate Judgements.


RULING:
Yes.
Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the
court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all
counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as
to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may
stay its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in
whose favor the judgment is rendered.

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Petitioners further insist that "Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account
because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition
concerning it." However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and
never even substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its
right to file for separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 1379 or in the Rules
which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment only because of statements allegedly made by one party. This Court cannot
countenance the view advanced by petitioners defeating the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379,4 where the laws themselves do
not provide for such limitations.
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the case (i.e. the
power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within
the (Sandiganbayans) jurisdiction." However, he objects to the graft courts purported lack
of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the
Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the
judgment may be enforced.
At the outset, this theory fails to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment,
and its execution. It is basic that the execution of a Courts judgment is merely a ministerial
phase of adjudication.6 The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these
assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioners concerns as to how the ruling may
be effectively enforced.
Associated Anglo-American v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Paul Pelaez, Jr. (Paul) and Roceli Mamisay Pelaez (Roceli) were employees of
petitioner Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (the Corporation). Paul worked as
Sales Supervisor and later as Senior Salesman while Roceli worked as secretary.As salesman,
Paul was required, on April 17, 1986, by the Corporation to post a bond to answer for any
amount which he might fail to turnover to the Corporation. He complied by executing a
mortgage bond over his family's house and lot in favor of the Corporation. The mortgaged
real estate was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 155994 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan.
Upon its determination that Paul had defaulted in remitting the sales proceeds, the
Corporation initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage bond.To stop the
extrajudicial sale, Paul and Roceli filed on August 21, 1987, a Complaint against the
Corporation, Dy and the Sheriff Virgilio S. Villar (Sheriff) before the RTC.
The RTC ruled that The defendants Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and
Florante C. Dy are ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the amount of P23,820.16
representing the overage and the account of Plaintiff Paul Pelaez, Jr. and to release the
mortgage on the parcel of land covered by, and release to plaintiffs. Upon motion of the
spouses Pelaez, the RTC amended its Decision in its February 7, 2001.
On February 20, 2001, petitioners received their copy of the February 7, 2001 Order and on
March 6, 2001, they filed a Notice of Appeal of the September 14, 2000 Decision and the

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February 7, 2001 Order of the RTC. The spouses Pelaez, on the other hand, filed a "Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal and Motion for Partial Execution" dated August 22, 2001.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA found that the September
14, 2000 Decision of the RTC had become final and executory. It found no cogent reason to
disturb the RTC's Decision and its subsequent amendment as embodied in the February 7,
2001 order. After the denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed
the present Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding the trial court's decision to be final and
executory notwithstanding that said decision had been modified, superseded and
substituted by a subsequent order upon which petitioner had duly perfected an appeal
Ruling:
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In
an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the
factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision
which supersedes the original decision.

On the other hand, following the Supreme Court's differentiation of a supplemental pleading
from an amending pleading, it can be said that asupplemental decision does not take the
place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to
bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it supplements

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