[JSRNC 6.

2 (2012) 215-231]
doi: 10.1558/jsrnc.v6i2.215

JSRNC (print) ISSN 1749-4907

JSRNC (online) ISSN 1749-4915

_________________________________________
Religion, Disaster, and Colonial Power in
the Spanish Philippines in
the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries
_________________________________________
Alvin Almendrala Camba
School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
University College London,
Tiigi 3-4, Tartu, Tartumaa 51003, Estonia
aacamba@gmail.com

Abstract
In the !eld of disaster studies, scholars have focused on the social
construction of disasters in various historical periods, but they have not
attended to the ways in which these social constructions were differentiated within the same period. During the Spanish colonization of the
Philippines in the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, two types of
disaster discourses existed. In internal cases, where Spanish elites had to
deal with one another over issues of distribution of power, decision
making capacity, and the allocation of resources, there were multiple and
competing constructions of disasters. Conversely, in external cases, where
the Spanish elites had to deal mainly with the other (Filipinos) over issues
such as colonization and Christianization, there was a convergence in the
constructions of disasters, which facilitated conquest and the consolidation
of power for the Spanish Crown. The act of interpreting disaster was
intimately tied with the legitimation and exercise of power.

Keywords
Historical disaster studies, environmental history, religion in Southeast
Asia

Speci!c geographic circumstances, particularly location, make the

Philippines one of the more disaster-prone areas of the world. Those
who live on the archipelago experience the constant threat of a wide
variety of natural hazards, including earthquakes, typhoons, volcanic
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eruptions, plagues, droughts, and !res. By examining the history of

Spanish colonization in the Philippines, I aim to demonstrate how an
imperially minded group of people with their own historically derived
perceptions of disasters used and adapted their discourses upon moving
into the Southeast Asian archipelago.1 The Spanish regime in their
imperialist pursuit not only had to deal with the indigenous population;
they also had to face the hazardous geographic and environmental
conditions of the Philippines. Here I focus on how the Spaniards reacted
to such natural conditions as they colonized the region during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and how their perceptions of
disaster altered as a result of the encounter.
I deploy a discursive approach to establish that the disaster narratives
that the Spanish producedwhich have a predictable form, namely,
identifying causes, people to blame, and suitable responseswere
embedded in their ways of interpreting social and political events.
Discursive analysis aims at understanding the underlying structures and
meanings of events to develop a horizon of expectations of how those
meanings translate into reality. These meanings are directly linked to the
exercise of power because whoever created the discourse would be able
to amass political capital in the colony and thus redirect policies against
political opponents. Focusing on speci!c cases of disasters, I argue that
these individual cases re"ect signi!cant political tensions that were simmering during this period. I aim to show that these disaster discourses
led to a common, intersubjective way of thinking about disasters that
had actual political and social outcomes; and that because of these
political implications, such discourse was widely contested among the
Spanish elites.
In so doing I build on recent work in disaster studies that has noted a
distinction between natural hazards and natural disasters. While natural
hazards refer to the physical phenomena of destruction itself, natural
disasters are de!ned as the con"uence of social, political, and economic
developments to these naturally occurring events. The point that the
natural and the social are inextricably tied to each other forms the pillar
of this work (Bankoff 2007a; Meier 2007; Asdal 2003; Oliver-Smith 2003).
Scholars of disaster in the Philippines have generally assumed a broad
unity in residents interpretations of disaster (e.g. Bankoff 2004, 2007a,
2007b, 2007c). In contrast, I !nd that there were many competing constructions of disaster, and that understanding regarding when and how these
1. For some of the basic references to European discourses of disasters, see Meier
2001, 2007; Juneja and Mauelshagen 2007; Rohr 2003; Schenk 2007; Soergel 2007; and
Smoller 2000.
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constructions differed will shed important new light on colonial

dynamics. Disasters present an opportunity for a society to re"ect both
on its relationship with nature and on its relationship with itself, and to
ignore the huge variety of ways in which the colonizers interpreted these
disasters is to ignore important implications for the distribution and
exercise of power during the colonial period.
Speci!cally, I argue that in internal casesor situations in which
Spanish political elites argued with one another over issues such as the
distribution of power, decision making capacity, and the allocation of
resourcesthere were multiple and competing interpretations of disaster
because each interpreter sought to further his own ends by attributing
divine favor to them. Conversely, in external casesor situations in
which the Spanish elites had to deal mainly with Filipinosthere was
typically widespread agreement over interpretations of disaster in order
to attribute divine will to the Spanish Crowns efforts and goals. In thus
constructing a uni!ed discourse in external cases, Spanish elites showed
a shared desire to acquire more power for themselves and the Spanish
Crown. The next section demonstrates the multiple and contested
interpretations of disaster that arose in internal cases.
Internal Cases:
Competing Constructions of Disaster Caused by Sin
Because of their numerous disagreements in governance, colonization,
and power distribution, the competing religious and political factions
among the Spanish elites in the Philippines attempted to enhance their
own positions by interpreting disasters as punishments for the sins of
their opponents. Asserting a particular cause of a disaster became a strategic move in the struggle for power, legitimated with visible proof of
Gods displeasure. While these religious and political elites argued that
disasters were punishment for speci!c instances of grave sins, I demonstrate that their concept of sinfulness actually re"ected the social and
political fault lines of the Filipino social context. Speci!cally, disagreements over Christianization, civic issues, and political controversies were
all tied to speci!c struggles for power. Before examining four cases that
demonstrate this contention, some historical background will be useful.
Research on Spanish colonization of the Philippines has established
that colonization of the Philippines and of Latin America differed due to
the roles played by geography, Christianization, and resource extraction.
In particular, the Philippines distance from Spain discouraged Spaniards
from settling there, leading Spain to have a manpower problem in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a result, Spain relied heavily on
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the motivational strength of religious orders during the initial stages of

invasion. Later, secular of!cials could not hinder the administrative and
societal abuses of the friars in the provinces; these of!cials had to work
with the local friars in order to maintain their power.2 Over time, the
power of the friars and the reluctance of secular of!cials to sti"e such
abuses on most occasions became institutionalized, leaving a strong
clergy even in the twenty-!rst century (Phelan 1959).
During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the Spanish
Empire dealt with numerous political and religious issues involving
crisis and the struggle to stabilize the colony. These issues included the
Christianization of the population, the persistence of the Filipinos in
retaining their indigenous beliefs, and the attacks by the Dutch and the
Moros, or those Filipino ethno-linguistic groups that had converted to
Islam. In addition, there were deep tensions between the Seculars, who
were religious of!cials under the Spanish Monarchy with positions such
as Lay Priest, Bishop, and Archbishop, and the Regulars, who were
members of Spanish religious orders such as the Jesuits, Dominicans,
Augustinians, and Franciscans.
Spains colonization of the Philippines had long been a source of
competing economic and political interest among various factions in the
Spanish Empire. The Seville merchants, for example, wanted Spain to
abandon the poor islands because it was costing the Empire crucial
funds that could have gone elsewhere. Yet historians have established
that the Philippines were a warehouse of Christianitya stronghold of
Christian faith in Asia designed to evangelize the non-Christians of
China and Japan. This led religious of!cials to support ardently colonization efforts there. Given this context, it is not surprising that Spains
decision to colonize the Philippines led to con"ict, which expressed itself
in frequent battles over whose sin had caused the most recent disaster(s).
The Treatment of the Manila Converts
The !rst example of such con"ict has to do with a disagreement of
Spanish elites over the treatment of the newly converted Manila population. The encomenderos, Spanish soldiers turned landowners, had been
known to overwork the Filipinos for agricultural production, while the
Church was known to protect the Filipinos from such abuse. Domingo
de Salazar, the !rst Archbishop in Manila, argued that Spanish of!cials
had caused a series of recent disasters by overworking and enslaving
new Christian converts. Since the conversion of the indigenous people
was crucial to Spanish colonization, Salazar argued that God would
2.

This is in relative terms. See Phelan 1959.

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protect indigenous people who converted to Christianity. By this logic,

those who converted to Christianity should be protected from disasters
and deserving of Gods blessings. On December 31, 1586, stating that
overworking the converts would be considered a sin, Salazar enforced
religious anti-discrimination (the !rst ever of its kind issued by the
Archbishop in the Philippines), arguing that disasters were caused by
prejudice against those indigenous Filipinos in Manila who had already
converted to Christianity and were trying to follow its tenets vigorously
(Salazar 1911 [1588]: 57-69).
Salazars writings are important in that his complaints re"ected the
differing priorities of the religious and secular authorities of the time. In
roundly condemning the seculars behavior, Salazar shifted attention
away from the very real political and economic issues of the colonythe
need to defend the colony militarily, the desire of the seculars to enrich
themselves, and the budgetary problems of the colonyall of which
contributed to the seculars behavior. Since colonization was considered
a holy mission, the seculars believed that labor from Filipinos was Gods
divine reward. The seculars use of the new converts to increase agricultural outputs made much more sense in this context of economic and
political uncertainty. Salazar and those running the encomenderos had
different notions of what constituted sin.
Military Expeditions and Colonial Defense
The second example concerns con"icts between ecclesiastic and civic
authorities over military defense and religious expedition. Baltasar de
Santa Cruz, a Dominican, wrote in 1634 that the Dominicans were
inspired to Christianize Formosa (present day Taiwan), which had
potential to open the way for Christianizing China and Japan. Yet a
military emergency caused by Dutch threats to invade the Philippines
led the Spanish to withdraw their military troops from the island. The
Spanish also abdicated the Christianization mission and moved the
clergy from the towns to military forts at Formosa. As feared, the Dutch
arrived at Formosa and defeated the Spanish, forcing the Dominicans to
abandon their mission and return to Manila. Santa Cruz blamed
Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, the Governor General of the Philippines
at that time, for refusing to protect the mission; Corcuera left reserved
forces on the island, which were, in Santa Cruzs opinion, composed of
boys and cripples, and thus were wholly inadequate (Santa Cruz 1911
[1693]: 43). Even further, he argued that the dictatorial attitude of the
governor general was precisely what the devil wanted (1911 [1693]: 29).
Santa Cruz blamed the loss of the island on Corcueras inability to
muster suf!cient military force.
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Santa Cruz also interpreted subsequent disasters as punishments for

the governors misguided policies. Referring to a typhoon that wrecked
the galleon Nuestra Senora de la Conception, for example, he argued
that our sins are the cause of those calamities (Santa Cruz 1911 [1693]:
44). Santa Cruz believed that the governor general should suffer most of
the consequences not only because of his refusal to protect the mission,
but also because of his absolutist decision-making style. As Santa Cruz
said, Corcuera should shoulder a great part of the misfortunesand
more so when, rendering himself inaccessible to counsel, he carries out
his own resolution (1911 [1693]: 44). Again, the divide between Santa
Cruz and Corcuera shows how the difference between religious and
secular goals led to a particular interpretation of the disaster.
Santa Cruz neglected the political and economic factors of the time
the necessity for the military defense of the colony, the desire of the
seculars to enrich themselves, and the budgetary problems of the colony.
Since the Dutch threat was imminent and if successful could have isolated the Philippines, it was militarily unwise to remain in Formosa.
There were also other reasons that Corcuera decided to give up Formosa
to the Dutch, including resource constraints, manpower limitations, and
basic strategy. While Formosa was an important staging area for the
evangelization of Japan and China, surely protecting Manila was a
higher political and military goaland protecting it no doubt an easy
choice for Corcuera to make. As an internal case, Corcueras military
decision to protect Manila instead of Formosa led Santa Cruz to blame
Corcuera for the disasters, an interpretation which attributes divine
disfavor to Corcueras military decision and divine favor to Santa Cruzs.
Power Struggle in the Pardo Controversy
The third example deals with a power struggle between various political
factions in a series of events known as the Pardo Controversy. In the
1680s Archbishop Pardo, known for his dictatorial and arbitrary decisionmaking, thus fostered resentment among the political factions in the
Philippines. As jurisdictional issues erupted between Archbishop Pardo
and Bishop of Nueva Segovia,3 another religious of!cial, the Audiencia
a body of magistrates that could overpower the Governor Generaltook
advantage of the political situation and intervened. The intervention
resulted in a long legal battleappeals, decrees, protests, censures
until the tribunal decided to banish Pardo to the provinces. After Pardos
banishment, his right hand man, Bishop Barrientos, had the right to take
3. Nueva Segovia was one of the major provinces in the Spanish Philippines. This
town is currently known as Vigan and it was the Spanish center of power in the North.
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the Episcopal jurisdiction in Pardos place. Yet the secular of!cials

intervened and declared the jurisdiction vacant. This issue divided the
Spanish elites in the Philippines, until the appointment of the new
Spanish governor, Curuzelaegui, who then decided to restore Pardo to
his authority. Retribution was swift when Pardo excommunicated exgovernor Vargas, the Audiencia, Bishop Antonio de Viga, and other
of!cials responsible for his banishment. Indeed, upon his return Pardo
initiated a political witch-hunt, subjecting his enemies to imprisonment,
exile, privations, and death.
Soon afterward, a series of disasters visited the Philippines. As the
Augustinian historian Camisiro Diaz put it, there were !erce typhoons
that caused great harm to the galleon Santo Nino, a great !re during the
Holy Procession at Binondo (a quarter in Manila for the Chinese) which
consumed areas of Estacada, Baybay, Tondo, and the barrio of Bancusay,
a great plague, and powerful earthquakes that shook the colony. The two
opposing camps attributed different causes to these disasters. Pardo
believed that the disasters had been caused because the body of one of
his enemies, Bishop Antonio de Viga, had been buried in the Cathedral
of Lalo (a village in the Spanish Philippines). Accordingly, Pardo ordered
the remains of his enemy to be removed from the Cathedral (Diaz 1911b
[1718]: 264). Later, in 1687, as part of the surviving camp against Pardo,
Diaz wrote that various misfortunes follow each other, which were
generally felt by all citizens, in order that they might share in the punishment merited by their offenses, since always proves true the proverb,
Delirant reges, simper plectuniur Archivi (Punishment to those who follow
the tyrannical rulers) (1911b [1718]: 264). Writing on behalf of Pardos
victims and reacting to the typhoons at the time, an unknown writer,
seeking to know only the truth, blamed the typhoons on Pardos thirst
for vengeance, saying that in the greatest of calamities there was no
recourse except to God (Unknown 1911 [168389]: 239). The Pardo
Controversy shows that the concept of sin was contested, re"ecting the
fault lines of bitter power struggles in the Spanish Philippines, including
the unity of Church and State, the jurisdictional divide between the seculars and the regulars, and the inconsistent intervention from Madrid.
The Distance of the Philippines from Mexico and Spain made the Spanish
Crown reliant on delegating more power to previously authorized elites,
since turnover of authorities was !nancially costly and bureaucratically
inef!cient. As distance and travel time prevented the Spanish Crown
from sending more soldiers and of!cials to govern the country, deeply
embedded political elites were left to be deal with political con"icts.

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Sin and European- Filipino Sexual Encounters

The fourth example deals with the varying interpretations of Spanish
elites of the increasing frequency of sexual encounters between European
and non-European people. Though considered a sin, such sexual contact
was not prohibited by law, and the number of mestizos in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries clearly demonstrates that it happened with
some frequency.4 The disapproval of the religious elites proved to be
ineffective, probably in large part because although the Church of!cially
discouraged these types of interethnic marital practices, many friars had
mestizo children with their Filipina mistresses (Rios Coronel 1911 [1620]:
300-301).
The narrative of Hernando Coronel de Rios, the Procurator General
the sole representative of the Philippines to the Spanish High Court
spoke of Spanish sailors taking slave women with them during long
travels for sexual pleasure, resulting in the births of babies while on
board. Hernando Coronel de los Rios wrote to the King in March 1620,
asking for a royal decree to put a stop to such practice (Rios Coronel
[1911] 1620: 300-301). Rios believed that such a decree regulating the
practice would prevent slave women [being] conveyed in the ships, by
which many acts offensive to God will be avoided (1911 [1620]: 301).
Like the !gures explored above, he believed that it caused divine
retribution in the form of disasters, arguing that it is not right that there
be any occasion for angering God when there is a great risk in the
voyage, as I dare to af!rm; and it is certain that, in the last ten years,
while this has been so prevalent, many disasters have happened (1911
[1620]: 300-301). Coronel de los Rios even believed that the many
disasters that ships encountered during the voyage to the Americas were
due precisely to this practice. Commenting on the same matter, the
Archbishop of Spain had threatened excommunication for those who
continued to bring slave women aboard.
It is important to consider the context of Rioss writings. While he
presented a list of forty provisions to the King of Spain (Rios Coronel
1911 [1620]: 300-301), he only presented the !rst ten of those articles to
4. Mestizos generally means the mixture of the two racesFilipino and
Spanish. Mixing was frowned upon because of two reasons. First is the consideration
that the Spanish was a more superior race than the Filipinos since they were the
colonizers, the bearers of Christianity, and since they were European. A manifestation of such repugnance is Spains policy not to teach Spanish to Filipinos because the
latter was an inferior group. Despite these considerations, the Spanish elite and the
friars continued to avail themselves of Filipina women. The latter, most especially,
were known to have had mistresses, as documented by the Philippine national hero,
Jose Rizal, in his works which inspired the revolution against Spain.
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the governing council in the Philippines, the Audiencia, and told the
king that he did not inform the body of the other articles because of
considerations. It appears that the Spanish elites in Manila, some of
them members of the Audiencia, instructed Rios to present only those
ten articles. This is likely because the other thirty articles include Rioss
recommendations for bureaucratic changes, new laws that would constrain the Spanish elites, and most of all, a suggestion to ban mixinga
clear attack on the informal practice of the political and religious elites in
the Philippines. Rios had been known as a loyal servant to the king for
many years and by reputation was trusted by Spanish of!cials in Madrid.
That the elites in Manila told Rios not to report the mixing issue to the
whole Audiencia suggests they did not agree with Rioss suggested ban.
The order to Rios shows hesitance on the part of the Spanish elites in the
Philippines to implement such an anti-mixing law in the colony, a
re"ection of a divide between an ambiguous attitude toward this
common practice, and the of!cial societal norm of ethnic purity.
There could be several reasons for their reluctance. First, like their
ordained brethren, the Spanish elites themselves were already entangled
with the Filipinos in an identical fashion. Indeed, the political elites were
among the most "agrant violators of this norm, and any law preventing
it would affect them just as much as their religious counterparts. Alternatively, the hesitation could demonstrate an unwillingness to critique
openly powerful members of society. A third possibility is that the
Audiencia did not want to diminish the morale of Spanish sailors in the
Philippines. It was well known that soldiers in the Spanish Philippines
endured harsh conditionsthe climate, separation from family, adjustment to the new context, and poor economic compensation. Giving the
soldiers access to women may have been seen as a necessary compromise in order to secure their services in defending the colony. The idea
that mixing angered God was nothing new to European purists who
regarded sexual interaction between the two groups as immoral. Indeed,
mixing had previously been blamed for epidemics in Europe. Given this
background, it is not surprising that the belief that mixing angers God
and caused disasters arose during the European encounter with the
disaster-ridden Philippines.
It should be clear that all the internal cases presented so far have
dealt with issues of the internal distribution of power and the allocation
of decision-making capacities. In dealing with each other, the Spanish
elites had competing interpretations of the causes of natural disasters,
which re"ected the groups internal discord. The realm of politics among
the different Spanish factions and the realm of the natural world merged
in the form of competing explanations for the causes of the disasters. The
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cases involving Salazar, Santa Cruz, Pardo, and Rios all happened
during and after natural disasters from the sixteenth to the seventeenth
centuries. While there was agreement that these disasters were caused
by sin, what sins and who was to blame was hotly contested. The fault
lines among the Spanish elites and the friars in the Philippines were
re"ected in the reframing and construction of competing explanations
for the disasters.
External Cases: The Discourse of Christianization
In external casesa separate set of narratives during this period in
which the Spanish elites had to deal mainly with Filipinos about issues
of evangelizationthere was generally widespread agreement over the
interpretations of a disaster, arguably because this helped imply Gods
approval of the Spanish Crowns efforts and goals. In constructing this
common discourse, Spanish elites showed a shared desire to acquire
more power for themselves and the Spanish crown. Thus disasters were
usually interpreted as protection given to them by God (when the disasters were avoided), divine favor for Spanish imperial rule, and divine
punishment for the persistence of non-Christian practices. This is still a
widespread Spanish beliefthat their rule was prescribed and legitimized by heaven and by God. In this line of reasoning, disasters were
divine expressions of punishment against those who, in rejection of
Christian-Spanish rule, stubbornly clung to their self-autonomy, government, traditions, and practices. This belief was not unique to the Filipino
context. For example, it is widely known that the Spanish condemned
the practices of the Aztecs in Mexico, believing that they were sent by
God to hinder these inhumane sacri!ces and works of the devil.5
A similar condemnation of non-Christian practices occurred in the
Philippines, although in two ways, it unfolded in a slightly different way
than it did in Mexico. First, the discursive practices arose within the
context of Spains failure to conquer the Philippines completely;6 and
second, Christianization of the Philippines was rooted in Spains imperial
belief that it was their destiny to save the world from sin (Phelan 1959:
54). Merging this fervent belief in the mission of Christianization with
5. In addition, according to P!ster, a historian of the Middle Ages, one motivation for the frequent witch-hunts of the era was the increasing climate-based stress
from the changing weather patterns, which authorities and other members of society
believed to be caused by non-Christian sorcery (2007: 33).
6. Spain never conquered Mindanao and was engaged in evangelization
missions in many parts of the country.
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the experience of natural disasters gave rise to three important interpretations of such disasters as: (1) punishment for engaging in nonChristian religious beliefs and practices; (2) af!rmation of the legitimacy
of Spanish rule and the practice of Christianization; and (3) the Devils
way of opposing the spread of Christianity.
Interpretation 1: Punishment for Engaging in Non-Christian Religious Beliefs
and Practices
Spanish priests frequently condemned Filipinos who continued their
non-Christian practices as drawing Gods wrath through their attachment to their indigenous faith. The interpretation is demonstrated by the
writings of two different Jesuit missionaries to the Southern Islands of
the Philippines: one by the name of Gregorio Lopez, and !fty years later,
another named Francisco Combes.
On 1 July 1610, believing that it was Spains destiny to Christianize the
world, Gregorio Lopez commented that the Spanish nation would
spread like the plague, buttressed by their increased encounters with
Gods calamities (Lopez 1911 [1610]: 119), which were caused by the
heathens and the pagans. When the people of Silan, a town in the
Spanish Philippines, were preparing for the celebration of the saints, a
group of Filipinos took out along with them a tiny idol formed of a
twisted mass of hair (Unknown 1911 [1610]: 60) and presented the !gure
to the people. The people of Silan were terri!ed as a series of disasters
rain and storms, powerful winds, and the !re that burned down the
Churchbeset them. In 1610, divine judgment was again perceived as
punishment for the continued practice of indigenous traditions when a
!re destroyed the Jesuits church. After its destruction, laborers from
surrounding communities and government funding helped rebuild the
church. The Church saw the penitentiary as a display of even stronger
devotion to God, thereby ensuring future safety from the wrath of
heaven (Unknown 1911 [1610]: 62).
The discourse of disaster as punishment for non-Christian faith is
further demonstrated in the testimony of Francisco Combes of the
Jesuits, who encountered Filipinos in the Island of Bisleg. Combes said
that incest caused droughts, an inadequacy of rain, and the drying of
rivers (Combes 1911 [1667]: 150). As a result, the Filipinos decided to
punish the offenders. Combes apparently agreed with their action,
saying that no other meanscan placate the wrath of heavenwhen
they suffer long droughts, or other general plagues from heaven (1911
[1667]: 150). After the punishment, the drought ended and the rains
returned, causing Combes retrospectively to interpret the previous
disasters as having been caused by the unacceptable practices of the
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Indians (1911[1667]: 151). An interesting point is that the same case was
presented in Basilan, an island in the southernmost area of the Spanish
Philippines, but in this case the offenders were instead tried by malicious information, or rumor and hearsay (1911 [1667]: 152). Combes
believed that God did not approve of the use of unveri!ed information
within the justice system and that he had intervened through a typhoon.
As a result, the people of the island were forced to seek better information, found that the offenders were innocent, and freed them!
Interpretation 2: Af!rming the Legitimacy of Spanish Rule and the Practice of
Christianization
The second interpretation of disaster within the discourse of Christianization in the Philippines had to do with the af!rmation of the role of
the Sovereign as Gods direct representative. Done successfully, the
discourses of disasters in the Christianization process would serve to
extend the legitimacy of the Spanish order and the Catholic sovereign,
raising the Spanish king to the level of a deity in the ongoing colonization. The Spanish Governor General Sebastian Hurtado De Corcuera
provides us with an example of a secular of!cial who used a religious
framework in the interpretation of disasters in such a manner. Corcuera
was writing to request permission to wage war against the Moros for
numerous transgressions that they had committed against the Spanish
regime: plundering the islands, capturing Filipino Christians, burning
villages, sacking the churches, and taking all the ornaments. The Governor General implied that the Moros had committed a crime against God
and the king through these actions:
[T]he blasphemies which these Moros had utteredsaying that by carrying away the monstrances with the most holy sacrament they were carrying
the God of Christian captives, trampling upon them, and mocking them in
other ways; spitting in chalices; and using the patens as receptacles for the
saliva from their buyochewing [playing with saliva in their mouths]all of
these obliged me, Sire [to go on this quest] (Corcuera 1911 [1636]: 348).

In reporting to the king about the military campaign against the Moros
in 20 August 1630, Corcuera recounted a blessing of good fortune when
the war boatsor caracoasof the Moros were crushed by a storm in
the province south of Manila known as Camarines. Corcuera wrote that
before arriving at the battle, he could take only a few men, four caracoas,
and two champans on account of the stormy weather.7 When they
arrived at the battle, he con!ded more in the goodness and mercy of
7. Caracoas are maritime Southeast Asian warships similar to a galley in Europe,
while champans are small scouting boats, usually rowed by an oarsman.
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God than in the[ir] number[s] (Corcuera 1911 [1636]: 350), yet despite
their disadvantages, Corcuera and his men prevailed because the storm
had destroyed the Moros ships. He wrote to the king that God was
pleased to give your majesty the victory (1911 [1636]: 360) and afterwards, he made his men confess and receive communion.
At the end of the letter, Corcuera concluded that it was God who had
planned all the events that led to the victory. Furthermore, he perceived
that it was the will of God for him to !ght despite being at a disadvantage; the will of God had secured the Spanish a victory. Lastly, having
his men confess and receive communion after the battle demonstrates
that faith, disasters, and the political mission of colonization were, for
them, closely tied together.
Interpretation 3: As the Devils Way of Opposing the Spread of Christianity
The third interpretation of disaster shifts the agency behind the disasters
from one supernatural entity (God) to anotherthe devil. In this
interpretation, disasters were seen as the devils attempt to hinder the
evangelization of the Philippines. Often in such cases exorcisms were
used to oppose the devils power and halt the disasters. This interpretation makes clear the self-serving underpinnings of the Churchs
interpretation of disasters: when things went well, it proved God was on
their side. When things went against them, it was the devils work.
Regardless of whether the disaster helped or hurt their cause, they
placed it within an interpretive framework that legitimized their efforts.8
An example comes from Diaz, who opined in 1641 that during a
powerful typhoon, the Devil was very angry at the great war, and that
the Spanish people would have to wage [a war] because of the holy
prelates and the priests who came on that galleon (Diaz 1911a [1718]:
190). He also wrote the following lines in the context of the Galleon San
Francisco Javier, which transported important secular and religious of!cials from Acapulco to the Philippines: the winds rebelled against the
ship at the Island of Mindoro, and so frightful a tempest arose that the
galleon was all but lost, and in danger of going to pieces on some high
reefs about that island. The solution lay in the archbishop conjuring
[against] the storm, which immediately calmed itself (Diaz 1911a [1718]:
190). The Galleon survived after an encounter with three typhoons.
8. Similar concern over the devils role in causing disasters also rose in Europe as
the increasing climatic stress led the authorities to attribute these changes to the
weather magic of witches, leading to increased persecution of non-conforming individuals. When the failure of grain crops from Hungary to the Alps increased the angst
of the population, the response in Europe was to torture and blame non-conforming
eccentric individuals; and the cause of disaster was pinned to the notion of evil.
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One way of dealing with these disasters was exorcism. Following the
same logic in 1640, the Dominican historian Diego Aduarte mentioned
that the typhoon in the sea during evangelization was aided by some
evil will (Aduarte 1911 [1640]: 201). Aduarte also wrote about exorcism
in response to disasters during a 1640 voyage to evangelize Mindanao:
The clergymen repeated the exorcisms against the tempest, upon which it
subsided a little; but when the exorcism was completed it came back with
as much force as at !rst, almost capsizing the vessel, and [compounding
the ship with sea water]. When the exorcism was renewed, the tempest
moderated itself anew; but when the exorcism was completed, its fury
returned as before. Thus they perceived that this tempest was not merely a
tempest of wind and of waves, but was aided by the devilwho at the
words of the exorcism lost his strength, and as soon as that ceased received
it again, to hinder the ministers of the gospel (Aduarte 1911 [1640]: 201202).

The quotation demonstrates that exorcism was a practice used during at

least one of the missions to evangelize Mindanao. To these Spanish
Christians, the disasters were not only obstacles because of their physical
consequences, but also because they were created by the enemy of God.
To counter the power of the devil, it was necessary for the evangelizers
to call out the power of God through their own rituals. In this way,
disasters in the Spanish Philippines were also interpreted as battles
against the devil.
Regarding these external cases, all the foregoing interpretations dealt
with the legitimation and acquisition of power as part of the Spanish
Crowns effort to Christianize the Philippines. As the preceding paragraphs have shown, disasters were interpreted with signi!cant uniformity, with little controversy between religious and secular of!cials. Thus,
in contrast to the internal cases explored in the !rst part of the paper,
where the Spanish elites argued amongst themselves, in dealing with
Filipinos, they presented a uni!ed front in interpreting the meaning of
disasters. This is because in the external cases all parties shared the
common goal of acquiring power for the entire Spanish polity; thus
Spanish elites repeatedly used Christian discourses to justify their
actions and advance their political agenda.
Conclusion
We have seen that when arguing amongst themselves the various
Spanish factions constructed competing meanings of disasters. That
disasters were inherently ambiguous in terms of their causes offered the
various elites opportunities to promote interpretations that served their
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229

own ends. All equally powerful and equally quali!ed to opine, in these
internal cases the Spanish were free to debate amongst themselves
what the correct interpretation should be.
By contrast, when they were dealing with the indigenous Filipinos, the
Spanish presented a united front: God supported their work, and any
obstacles were the Devils work. In these external cases, their linkage of
disasters to the process of Christianization may thus be seen as an
attempt to assert and extend the legitimacy of Spanish rule and the
Catholic Monarch, elevating the role of the king to Godhood in the
ongoing colonization effort. On the whole, it thus appears that although
the strategies differed depending on whether the case was internal or
external, interpretations of the meaning of disaster almost universally
furthered the interpreters goals; Gods will was in the eye of the
beholder. Analyzing disaster discourse thus appears to shed light on
colonial dynamics, especially regarding the distribution and use of
power.
Yet something must also be said about the co-existence of naturalistic
and religious explanations at the time. The Catholic Church was already
a global religion in the 1500s, inasmuch as the Spanish Empire was a
worldwide empire. People were constantly moving around, exposed to
various ideas, both Christian and scienti!c in origin (although the
distinction was not as clear then as it is now). Several authors and even
members of the clergy in the Philippines during this time advanced
naturalistic explanations for the disasters, arguing that they were not
caused by the divine wrath or assistance of God. The archival data used
in this paper suggest, however, that during times of disasters, it was
more common to use religious explanations, even if naturalistic explanations also existed. There are two possible reasons for this. First, while the
Church was interested in naturalistic explanations, they were still operating primarily under a religious paradigm, subsuming these scienti!c
explanations under the rubrics of faith. Political and secular elites as well
had to work under the paradigm of religion, sin, and God, even if their
interpretations differed amongst themselves. More pivotally however,
while the Catholic Church did know about some naturalistic explanations of disasters, they could not advance them because to do so would
weaken their in"uence. In fact, the Churchs interpretive monopoly was
an important source of their power, and one they were loathe to relinquish. Perhaps they sensed that alluding to naturalistic explanations
would transfer this power to secular of!cials who might then seek to
limit the Churchs activities. In the Age of Exploration as in later eras,
controlling the discourse was the !rst step toward controlling the
outcomes of the various campaigns in which the Church was involved.
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Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture

In the end, they lost control, and philosophers and scientists gained the
upper hand; but during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, those
who argued convincingly for their interpretations of Gods will more
often accomplished their own.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Aaron Francis Chan, Nicholas McCann, Joanna Sta. Isabel,
Cristobal Aljovin De Losada, Noel V. Teodoro, Maria S. Diokno, and
Ruel Pagunsan for generous and helpful comments on this essay.
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