Accidents Involving Passenger Ship Stability

1 SUMMARY
Various accidents at sea highlight the stakes modern marine transport represent towards safety of life and
environment. Though such accidents normally are initiated by human errors, by poor maintenance, or both, the
outcome might in many cases have been different if design and control of operation by authorities had been
better. This paper, written by a former officer, call for improvement of these matters. Furthermore this paper
briefly illuminates the use of time-domain simulations to support functionalistic design and to motivate ship
crew as well as control authorities for proper actions. Real-time analyzes of roll to verify ship stability is shortly
discussed. Below the surface of the text is the old engineering concept questioned: Paragraph Ships, the state of
the art!

2. INTRODUCTION
Since the MV Estonia sank on 28 September 1994
the public of Sweden and Estonia seem not to have
accepted the official investigation performed by the
Joint
Accident
Investigation
Commission
(JAIC).[1] Estonian authorities were forced to
reopen the investigation in the spring of 2006 but
Swedish authorities refused to participate. They
were, however, forced to start their own
reinvestigation shortly afterwards. The Swedish
reinvestigation was halted in the autumn as the
chancellor of justice requested the government

whether to include the initial part of the original

investigation or not. The Swedish government
decided in January 2007 to do a full reinvestigation
and to exempt divers from promise of secrecy. As
the case now stands one may summarize some key
elements:
The official investigation report seems utterly
unsupported as its findings do not fit observed
sinking scenario.
The Royal Swedish Navy screened covert
diving operations shortly after the sinking.

Figure 1: Computer generated pictures [1]

The MV Estonia disaster caught my interest in the
autumn of 2005 and I have been working on the
subject ever since. In coherence with a study of
theory of science I have prepared an article; MV
Estonia, a Plausible Sinking Scenario, as well as an
essay; Ethics of European Ships Design, in addition
to this paper.
Radar and modern navigational equipment have in
many ways reduced probability of collision and
grounding. Consequently disasters like the Titanic
and the Empress of Ireland, where approximately
2500 seafarers perished in a couple of years, are
more unlikely today than in those days. However, if
such incidents are to happen, modern carriers of
passenger are hardly much better suited to handle
the consequences. In other words: The probability

of a major disaster, if damage occurs, remains very

high. This was highlighted last year, in 2006, when
the loss of 1069 seafarers in the Al Salam
Boccaccio 98 case caused average loss to triple for
that year. Though statistics of accidents at sea are
not easily obtainable, the average seems to be
approximately 600 for the Ro-Ro Pax versus
approximately 1000 for aviation. This is in my
opinion quite unacceptable and this particularly so
as minor changes might improve safety
substantially. Unfortunately the costs of these
disasters are passed on to the bereaved and the
countries of the victims while commerce seems
nearly undisturbed.[2] Fortunately Panamanian
authorities have decided to strengthen their Marine
Accident Investigation Bureau in the aftermath of
the Al Salam Boccaccio 98 case.

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Vigilance and common sense are important

qualifications for ship command and many disasters
are due to lack of such. In this paper vigilance by
the naval architectural community and the maritime
administrations will be focused on as a number of
passenger ship accidents, which have caught my
interest, will be discussed.

3. SHIP SURVIVAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES.

This chapter is primarily intended for those
unfamiliar with ship design principles. It may
however be worth reading for naval architects as
well, to focus on some essential design principles,
important for the safety of seafarers.

3.1. COLLISION AND ENGINE ROOM

BULKHEADS

Figure 2: Collision and engine room bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships colliding
by head, ships are required to have a forward
collision bulkhead located far enough behind the
stem to ensure water not penetrating into the main
part of the submerged part of the hull. All ships are
expected to survive absolute destruction in front of
this bulkhead. Similarly an engine-room bulkhead
is positioned in front of the engine-room in case of
collision by the stern. Furthermore, the raised decks
at each end of the ship is higher than for the middle
part of the ship and these volumes, forecastle and
poop represent spare buoyancy of outmost
importance in time of peril.

3.2. FURTHER SUBDIVISION TO SURVIVE

COLLISION BY BEAM

Figure 3: Additional transversal bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships colliding
by the beam the region between above mentioned
bulkheads are subdivided into watertight
compartments. Passenger ships are expected to
withstand destruction of ZERO, 1 or 2 such
compartments depending of their size and other
factors thus the ships are called ZERO, 1 or 2
compartment ships. Other more complicated rules
apply for cargo ships, as they are expected to have a

certain degree of survivability depending on their

size.

3.3. SUBDIVISION TO PREVENT SINKING

AFTER RAKING/SHOALING

Figure 4: Double bottom

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships raking
shoals, double bottom is used. Passenger ships are
in general expected to withstand raking while cargo
ships are not. Many cargo ships do, however, have
double bottom of various reasons thus they do have
excellent survivability in case of raking. Others do
not, and the problem of raking damage for cargo
ships was highlighted by the Rocknes case.
For many years, high speed passenger crafts were
exempted from the raking survivability principle,
and this is particularly strange as raking is highly
probable for high speed crafts. Taking into account
that such ships were likely to capsize / sink too fast
to allow disembarkation, huge number of casualties
had to be expected.

3.4. FIRE PROTECTION

Figure 5: Fire-resistant bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability in case of fire,
passenger ships are subdivided vertically into fire
resistant bulkheads with doors that may be remotely
closed by ships command. The failure of such
closure may be disastrous as fire may move
horizontally.[3] Modern ships make use of fire
resistant materials to prevent fire to ignite and
develop. Nevertheless, the fire of Scandinavian Star
proved such materials did not comply with the
intention and the fire diverged rapidly. Sprinkler
systems in a ship-hotel where evacuation has to
be done upward should be of tremendous help.
Surely such systems have to be accompanied by
drainage systems to prevent capsize.

3.5. THE RO RO EXEMPTIONS

In order to facilitate driving of vehicles aboard the
Ro-Ro ships, they are exempted from normal
subdivision rules above the main deck and this is
primarily a problem for the offshore ferries.

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Furthermore, to lower the center of gravity, the

garage is located as low as possible. Consequently
the height of the watertight bulkheads is minimized.

rule is not fully working and minor amendments are

carried out. Now and then major amendments are
agreed upon though the industry is permitted long
time to carry out such upgradings.

Garage

4. A COUPLE OF NORWEGIAN
ACCIDENTS
Figure 6: The Ro-Ro Pax garage
The buoyancy of the traditional forecastle is
expected to be maintained by a closable barrier
extending the collision bulkhead. Similar barrier is
not requested astern and consequently these ships
do not have a poop in case of damage. Furthermore,
the weather-tight openings in the hull must be
considered a weakening of the structure. The garage
of these ships represents tremendous spare
buoyancy when intact. However, while damaged it
is a potential accumulator of water, which may
cause internal monster-waves at time of peril.

3.6. THE GRANDFATHER CLAUSE

The Grandfather Clause is a guideline for IMOs
rulemaking. It is a common agreement that rules
shall not have retroactive effect.[3] The Grandfather

4.1. MF EIDFJORD
In the Eidfjord case an unsecured bus with 8
passengers aboard rolled off a Norwegian inshore
ferry. 6 of them perished. The following day the
director in charge of passenger ships at the
Norwegian Maritime Directorate could tell the
media that a feared horror scenario had been: A
passenger attempting to open the bus-door, while
the bus-driver was sitting in the ferries saloon,
could accidentally open the brakes rather than the
door causing the bus to roll off the ferry.[4] The
potential consequence of brake failure had been
demonstrated the previous year when a semi-trailer
started to roll off a similar ferry. The semi-trailer
was saved as the chassis of the wagon fastened to
the deck while the pulling car was hanging by its
hook outside the ferry.

4.2. SLEIPNER II

Figure 7: Sleipner II

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Sleipner I (1976), St Malo (1995) & Sleipner II

(1999) were all twin hull high speed passenger
crafts which suffered raking. Though raking must
have been considered a very likely scenario from
the outset and the Norwegian naval forces had quite
some experience in that respect; the problem was
not addressed initially. Whether mere negligence or
saving of weight and energy was the motive is
unknown but it is quite obvious that the use of these
ships invited for disaster.
Nobody perished in the Sleipner I sinking.
However, the vulnerability of these ships was
demonstrated and it was a close race. The toll could
have been 170 causalities. Thus warned one should
expect authorities to prevent similar incidents from
becoming disasters by introducing suitable
regulations. That was not the case; the trades
change to bigger ships increased the potential of
disaster.
Nobody perished in the St Malo close to disaster
either. Certified for 400 passengers she carried only
300 passengers, at time of raking. The preliminary
investigation concluded:[6]
$12.21: The accident has demonstrated that for
this kind of craft a relatively minor grounding
can cause catastrophic damage with
potentially grave consequences for the safety of
passengers.
$12.14: It is questionable whether seven crew
members is sufficient number to control the
evacuation of 300passengers. More control
was needed in the liferafts themselves

the sort. Fortunately, to ensure better second hand

value, some Norwegian owners orders new ships
according to present international regulations.
The perils of these crafts should be well known to
Norwegian Maritime Authorities as their director
was member of the Sleipner II commission of
inquiry. They have in fact, due to the accident,
required such ships to record names of passengers.
The owners of Sleipner II, however, did not inform
their crews properly regarding this requirement.[7]

5. RO RO PAX
Ro Ro Pax, the huge offshore ferries so important
for modern car-tourism have from the beginning
been considered hazardous due to the huge garages,
as potential accumulation of water on the cardeck
might move the center of gravity and endanger
rapid capsize. As capsize may trap everybody
inside the ship, the potential is total loss. In many
cases fortune has been better, still the toll is
extreme.
Ro Ro Pax represents a tremendous trade off
between safety and freightage which I doubt is
reasonable for society. These ships seem by nature
primarily designed for holiday transport of private
cars and passengers. In the off season they transport
lorries in the garage, while cheap conferencing and
weekend tourism, based on tax exemptions, is
carried out in the hotel. Stricter safety would, I
presume, be affordable and preferable for the
seafarers involved.

Sleipner II, designed after the St. Malo accident,

was built without double bottom though the
designer and the authorities were fully aware of the
perils. The college of her hometown had warned
them and before construction commenced, the
students were lectured regarding the damage
scenario that soon was to prove disastrous. Shortly
after her maiden voyage Sleipner II struck a shoal
close to the one Sleipner I had struck and 16
passengers perished. The toll could have been much
higher if fully loaded.
The Sleipner II commission of inquiry pointed out,
regarding a prospective raking requirement, that
there was no reason to accept leaner inshore than
offshore requirements.[4, $3.2.1] All the same,
Norwegian authorities nowadays employ leaner
regulations than internationally recommended.
Consequently a much worse disaster than the
Sleipner II may occur at any time in our waters.
From a safety point of view it is difficult to accept
such lenience. One should rather expect extra
buoyancy fitted inside the tanks of existing ships,
either by foam, by rubber pontoons or something of

Figure 8: Cougar Ace 25/07/06

Since Ro Ro cargo ships has no windows, inflow
rate will be very low. Consequently probability of
disaster is much lower for cargo ships.

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5.1. HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE

Figure 9: Herald of Free Enterprise

The bow-visor of Herald of Free Enterprise was
pulled aside rather than lifted and the visor was
consequently invisible from the bridge whether
open or closed. She had repeatedly sailed with bow
and / or rear doors open and the captains had, to no
avail, requested alarms or monitors.[8] Her
timetable was so tight, there was not sufficient time
to make ready for sea and her ballast pumps were
not adequate to trim her by stern prior to departure.
She frequently carried far too many passengers,
exceeding life saving equipment and certificates.
Checking list was not being used.

5.2. ESTONIA
While the investigation of the Herald of Free
Enterprise disaster seems respected, the Estonia
investigation is thoroughly criticized and it has
recently been reopened both in Sweden and Estonia
due to severe political pressure. From Norwegian
recent history we had a resembling case, the fishing
boat Utvik Senior which disappeared at the western
coast of Norway during a naval maneuver. The
initial investigation was heavily criticized and the
authorities was forced to reinvestigate when private
investigation proved, beyond any reasonable doubt,
that the fishing boat had been knocked of the ocean
by tremendous force. A readers letter summed it
up this way: The Utvik Senior case proves
authorities to have manipulated, lied, conceived
evidence, etc until the authorities trousers were
pulled down by two journalists.[10]
A German group of experts working on behalf of
the designers and the shipyard which constructed
Estonia published a report prior to the official
report because the German group of experts was
utterly alarmed by the official investigation.[11]
The Swedish Naval Architect Anders Bjrkman,
calls the official report a disaster-investigation and
the biggest fraud in maritime history at his
website.[12] He seems to be far from proud of the
Swedish civil service in this respect.

At the day of the disaster she completed loading

slightly behind schedule. She left harbor with
forward trim due to final loading operations and
ballast was pumped to trim her on the stern. The
boatswain in charge of the bow visor was on duty
though sleeping in his bed. Nobody noticed this and
the ship left harbor, her bow wide open, trimmed on
the bow and behind schedule. To catch up with the
schedule the captain ordered extra power ahead
when the ship sailed in shallow water. The
combination of shallow water, forward trim and
high speed created a huge bow wave and water
flowed rapidly into the garage. Presumably the
captain did not have any tip-off until the ship
shortly afterwards became instable.
The water trapped on the car deck started to
oscillate thus causing the ship to roll from side to
side after which she capsized. The shallow water
being partly causative to the water inflow now
saved the ship from a roll over which presumably
would have killed everybody aboard.
Monitoring systems were later installed on such
ships and I have been told UK based Ro Ro Pax
vessels are not allowed to carry passengers below
the car deck and that such ships have to weight the
cargo prior to loading in UK.
The
investigation
investigation.[9]

opened

for

criminal

Figure 10: The visor and ramp of MV Estonia

In their preliminary report JAIC pointed that the
Swedish / Finish failure to respect international
safety agreement probably was causative to the
incident becoming a disaster.[13] In order to
lengthen the effective car deck, the required
extension of the collision bulkhead had not been
carried out for ships registered in these countries.
The ramp functioned as a barrier but it was located
too far forward and did not represent the
redundancy expected. Consequently one may argue
that the dispensation from IMO rules granted by
Finland and Sweden severely compromised one of

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the most vital ship survival principles.($3.1) If the

bow were to fail, the garage would be wide open.
The probability of such a scenario had been prewarned the previous year when a Swedish ship with
similar bow, damaged her visor in heavy weather.

it is quite obvious she could not sink if the volume

below the cardeck was un-flooded. Such flooding
would either be by hole in the hull or by staircases
and/or the ventilator-shafts which were positioned
in the center plane of the ship.

The main problem with the highly criticized sinking

scenario of JAIC is that both visor and ramp had to
be open for a considerable time to allow flooding
similar to that of the Herald of Free Enterprise
disaster. However, the ramp, though slightly
damaged, was found closed when the wreck was
inspected. The official explanation was that the
ramp was forced open when the visor was knocked
off, then the ramp remained open for a while after
which it closed itself. The theory is quite
extraordinary and it is hard to imagine the lowered
ramp could sustain the forces as the ship
encountered the impacts from wave after wave at
full speed. During that period, the ramp would only
be supported by the hinges, and the closing devices
which were obviously not designed to handle other
forces than the gravity of the ramp itself. The story
about the ramp is thoroughly contradicted by
Anders Bjrkman and the German group of experts.

The German group of experts stated, as a matter of

fact, that the ship had an underwater leakage as
water was up-flooding by the elevator shaft from
the sauna located at deck one forward. Anders
Bjrkman launched a theory that the engine-room
was flooded and that a stabilizer fin might have
been ripped of. Both of these theories were
contradicted, after the JAIC report was completed,
by former participants of the JAIC.[14]

Figure 11: Sketch by engine crew [1]

Water was observed penetrating through openings
beside the ramp from the engine control room and
presumably the ship command witnessed the same
video at the bridge. Simultaneously a passenger
noted the visor was moving up and down indicating
that the void between visor and ramp was filled by
water under pulsating pressure. The German Group
of Experts further pointed out that the bow of
Estonia had been severely weakened when Estonia
had forced her way through ice rather than being
assisted by ice-breakers during the preceding
winter.
Anders Bjrkman has argued that the ship should
be unsinkable if the hull below the garage was
undamaged and he has stressed that the ship would
capsize bottom up immediately if the ship became
instable due to water on cardeck. It seems likely
that the ship would have capsized immediately and

Figure 12: Expected water flow

It is well known that the movement of water inside

a tank may be phase delayed in proportion to the
movement that causes it. Phase delay will probably
be particularly long for ships with center-casings
which require water to flow around the centercasings. Consequently internal waves from
entrapped water may be in counter phase with the
movement. One may expect that the internal waves
might become very huge and able to dislocate
cargo. Such ships are expected to withstand a
collision including two compartments but then the
freeboard from the punctured garage could be
perilously low. If such a damaged ship rolls and
pitches due to bad weather, one may expect water
entering the hole to become trapped at the cardeck.
Consequently one may not rule out that some of the
damage scenarios such ships were expected to
survive might cause capsize due to water
accumulation.
The Estonia disaster entailed a safety conference
where some states agreed to install closable barriers
on the cardeck in addition to the extension of the
collision bulkhead. Such barriers would of course
prevent huge amounts of water to be trapped in the
garage as the accumulation would be restricted to a
small region, the phase delay would be low and the
out-flowing pressures would increase rapidly.
Anders Bjrkman highlighted that all watertight
doors in the passenger accommodation had to be
open aboard MV Estonia to give access to toilets.
Furthermore it is common practice to keep doors in
the engine division open. Though such doors may
be remotely closed from the bridge, in a couple of
minutes, a lot of water might flood the undamaged
compartments prior to doors being closed. The
Empress of Ireland demonstrated the problem when

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she sank in 14 minutes. A full impact of a modern

ship might very well make a much bigger hole thus
initial flow rate may be expected to be much faster.
Some argue these ships should have side-casings
rather than center-casings to allow water from the
garages to drain down the stairways as precaution
to capsize. I doubt passengers like huge amounts of
water to block their route of escape, thus these ships
should, in my opinion, rather be equipped with
strong drainage systems by precautions.
Experience from the Skagerak accident in 1966
suggests doors at cardeck should be watertight to
prevent down-flooding of the engine-room. The
Queen of the North accident suggests these doors
should be watertight to prevent up-flooding when
grounding. Thus the garage would function as a
life-belt for the ship in case of raking. Ships
constructed to comply with the Stockholm
Convention strengthened the doors from the garage
to prevent down-flooding from partly filled
garages. The doors were however, not able to
withstand up-flooding. For new builds this has
changed as they are required to have water locks
separating garage from volumes located below the
garage.
Estonia was originally sailing under Finish flag and
transferred to Estonia 1 year before the disaster.
When an Estonian / Swedish company bought the
ship and named her Estonia, the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development required the ship
to be registered in Cyprus to obtain a mortgage
loan. The ship was, however, double registered in
Estonia. How Cypriote authorities carried out their
maritime duties is unknown though they seem to
have been absolutely absent during the
investigation. Estonian authorities delegated their
maritime duties to Bureau Veritas, who had been
the classification society from the keel was laid.
Estonian maritime authorities were at the time of
the accident being trained by Swedish maritime
authorities to comply with the Paris Memorandum
of Understanding on Port State Control. During the
last day in Tallinn the trainees made a thorough
Port State Control inspection of the ESTONIA and
were supervised and instructed by two senior
inspectors
from
the
Swedish
Maritime
Administration. The official report states: The
Swedish inspectors leading the exercise have been
interrogated by the Commission and have stated
that the vessel was in good condition and very well
maintained. Anders Bjrkman and the German
group of experts disagree in this regard and Mr
Bjrkman stated, according to information he had
obtained, that one of the inspectors initial reactions
was to stop the ship and that the inspector contacted
the highest ranking Swedish authority in this regard
shortly prior to departure.[15, $ 2.3]

A similar ship, built 5 years previous to Estonia,

was sold by a Norwegian ship-owner in 2006. They
roughly estimated such ships, when 30 years old, to
be priced at 10 to 20% of the value of new builds.
A Ro-Ro pax, Al Salam Petrarca 90, which sank
outside Dhiba port in 2002, was later salvaged to be
scrapped. Though the scrap value was higher at that
time than now, the Red Sea is closer to the scrap
marked, and the ship might have been considered
an navigational obstacle, one may still question if
similar salvage of MV Estonia might have made
economic sense?
The Swedish Maritime Directorate concluded that
no private company would care to salvage the ship
though nobody could prevent them.[16] That may
be correct but Stolt Comex Seaway argued that
rapid rescuing of the bodies surrounding the wreck
was important as they otherwise might drift off.[17]
Stolt Comex Seaway offered to perform a search
and rescue on a strictly cost based rate, but the offer
was rejected, and classified as secret by the
Swedish Department of Commerce.
The Swedish Government decided not to bring up
the perished. This contrasts with the custom of
states of comparable economic strength, to bring
home soldiers lost overseas at the time of the
disaster. In comparison tremendous efforts was
used after the tsunami 10 years later at search,
rescue and identifying the perished. The
international community defined, on request of
Sweden, the site of MV Estonia as a sea tomb. The
130 bodies which had been observed by divers were
not brought home and search for the approximately
600 who were not accounted for were not
performed. Furthermore, diving in the area as well
as salvage of the wreck became banned. When one
later learned that the Swedish Navy screened covert
diving operations shortly after the accident and that
parts of the video inspection of the hull has been
lost, some unrest by the public seems quite
understandable.

5.3. AL SALAM BOCCACCIO 98

Al Salam Boccaccio 98 capsized and sank in the
red sea February 2006 and more than 1069 persons
lost their lives. Very few details have been
published but one may summarize the course of
events:
1. Fire started at cardeck and firefighting by
sprinkler system commenced.
2. The drainage system did not function
satisfactorily and water accumulated on
the cardeck.
3. The captain ordered to stop the firefighting
due to drainage problem and grave list.
4. The list increased and the ship was lost.

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Since Al Salam Boccaccio 98 sank very fast, rather

than capsizing bottom up, questions similar to those
regarding the sinking scenario of Estonia should be
raised. It is noteworthy that the radio officer put on
the table, or passed information from others to the
captain, that one might open the pilot-door to drain
off the water.[18] This may indicate that mariners
and others involved in the trade are not entirely
content with the drainage systems. Surely, if the
pilot door of Al Salam Boccaccio 98, or any other
door to the garage,e was open at time of disaster,
this could have contributed to the rapid sinking.
As the hull probably was undamaged at the time of
disaster one should expect damage stability to have
been neither causative nor contributive. However, a

press release from the classification society, RINA,

stirred my interest as the freeboard seemed to be far
too low.[19] Al Salam Boccaccio were originally
designed for a draft of 5.40m but obtained 5.56m
after construction. However, after the sponsons and
the 3 extra decks were fitted in 1991, draft was
increased to 5.80/5.90. As neither damage stability
nor any other relevant stability calculations seem to
have been performed after this major redesign it is
not obvious the ship complied with all relevant
regulations. Such calculus is of course of particular
interest as the ship was heightened rather than
elongated which is the normal way to increase
capacity. The reduced freeboard lowered discharge
capacity from the garage as pressure height was
reduced. Whether or not this was compensated by
increased pipe dimensioning is unknown.

Figure 13: Al Salam Boccaccio, [19]

A mere look at the drawing from the RINA press
release suggests a vertical hole including the garage
and any one of the compartments below may
capsize / sink these ships rapidly. As the press
release repeatedly referred to an exemption rule and
RINA has not documented the stability after the
major redesign, one may question if they might
have exaggerated the elasticity of the exemption
rule in question.
The sponsons of Al Salam Boccaccio could have
been extended upward to improve stability at high

angles and to increase time of rescue. Though such

extension might not improve statutory stability one
may argue that it could have been considered
contributive, if the redesign was accepted due to an
exemption rule.
When the ship was sold in 1999 and re-flagged in
Panama, the cardeck at mid-height of the garage
was removed. If this deck previously were fixed,
rather than hoistable, the removal increased the
capacity to carry lorries. Consequently the capacity
for overloading by draft, as well as stability,
probably increased as well.

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A sister-ship of Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Al Salam

Petrarca 90, suffered a similar accident in 2002, off
Dhiba port, and one seafarer perished. Since the
same owners, flag state, harbor states, classification
society and P&I club seem to have been involved in
both of these cases one may question if prudent
steps were taken to prevent similar accident as the
one in 2002?
Al Salam Boccaccio was originally designed for
Mediterranean trade under the Italian classification
society RINAs supervision. It seems Italian
authorities delegated a lot of their responsibility to
RINA and that RINA was their marine technical
supervisor. When the ship changed to Panamanian
flag this was done under RINAs supervision and it
seems Panama delegated their responsibilities to
RINA much the same way Italy had done.

6. AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND

TRANSMISSION OF SHIP DATA
The loss of MV Server, in January 2007 outside
Bergen, suggests real-time access to vital ship
parameters could help authorities to control coastal
traffic. The knowledge that such data is being
transmitted and recorded might have sobering effect
on captains twisting the rules.
Of more interest to this conference is automatic
detection of ship roll parameters, as these, in
combination with synchronous wind and wave
parameters, may indicate whether or not ships have
too low stability, or are treated too roughly. Such
data could further be used to examine ships realtime behavior and risks and this may lead to better
tuning of stability criteria by authorities.

Figure 14: Finnbirch 01/11/06

The increased amount of light cargo being
transported overseas may tempt captains to neglect
established stability criteria and the need for simple
and time-efficient GM-detection will increase.

Though I have not studied neither the accident of

the Cougar Ace (a car vessel) nor the Finnbirch (a
container vessel) which both capsized in heavy
weather the autumn of 2006, I mention these ships
as examples of carriers of light cargo, and vessels
that might need particular attention regarding roll
response.
At time of design the operational need for high CG
may be underestimated thus the ballast segregation
may be under dimensioned. Consequently one may
argue that the introduction of functionalistic
regulations should be followed by improved GM
control by authorities. This was demonstrated quite
clearly in the Rocknes case. After her initial
redesign she was expected to carry huge amounts of
ballast in loaded condition and one may very well
argue the ship was well designed for in-statutory
operation.[20] Equipment to monitor and transmit
such data should be rather cheap to produce and
easy to operate. Consequently owners might find
such equipment attractive, if insurance premium
reflects the improved quality control and safety.
Furthermore, coastal states should consider
requiring such equipment for ro-ro pax as safety of
these are of tremendous interest to the harbor states.

7. TIME DOMAIN SIMULATIONS

For years offshore operations have been dependant
on time domain simulations to study various
operations in advance. Ship design as well, could
probably be improved, if one has to demonstrate by
use of time domain simulations, that the design is
functionalistic for its purpose. Furthermore, if the
loading calculators were designed to handle time
domain simulations, ship command might analyze
most damage scenarios real time, and train on
realistic scenarios. Under all circumstances, ship
command should have access to a set of time
domain simulations on video, to know their ships
better. Control authorities and decision makers as
well, might benefit from studies of videos
demonstrating reality.

8. CONCLUSION
It seems that many disasters involving passenger
ships could and should have been avoided if the
shipping industry, and authorities, had prudently
ensured such ships to comply with global ethical
standards rather than unsatisfactory rules and
dispensations. As long as such rules and their
enforcement continue to be unsatisfactory, incidents
will develop into full scale superfluous disasters
and the loss of seafarers will carry on.
Improving safety by design may in many ways be a
good option. However, if the ships are not properly
maintained, and operated, even the best designed

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ship will not be safe. In addition to control of

maintenance, methods to control operation should
be improved.
The evolvement of functionalistic regulations
should include the use of time domain simulation
for various conditions the ships are not expected to
survive. Roll response should be studied to verify if
GM may be detected due to ships behaviour at sea.
Since harbour-states rather than commerce and
flag-states carry the burden of the passenger ship
accidents, harbour-states or regions of such should
demand a more precautionary and vigilant role. As
all the examples used in this article have its origin
in European shipping-culture I welcome the newly
appointed European Maritime Safety Agency and
strongly support their goal:

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

European citizens have the right to expect

their maritime passenger and goods
transport to be safe, secure and clean.[21]
These matters will be discussed in depth in my
unpublished essay; The Ethics of European Ship
Designs.

12.

13.
9. AUTHORS BIOGRAPHIES
Rolf C. Imstl holds the current position of
assistant professor at Bergen University College.
He is responsible for lecturing of Mathematics and
Science at Institute of Mechanical and MarineTechnical Engineering and he guide students doing
their theses in the field of hydrostatic stability.
Additionally he acts as marine technical & nautical
consultant for solicitors working on behalf of many
bereaved and some survivors in the Al Salam
Boccaccio 98 and Rocknes cases. He has previously
published a set of articles regarding the Rocknes
capsize.

14.

15.

16.

17.
10. REFERENCES:
1. Joint Accident Investigation Commission,
Final report on the MV ESTONIA disaster
of 28 September 1994, The Government of
the Republic of Estonia. 1997
2. James Brewer, A peaceful year with fewer
disasters creates goodwill among insurers,
Lloyd's List. 21 December 2006
3. The Commission of Inquiry, The
Scandinavian Star accident, 7th of April
1990. NOU. 1991.
4. The Commission of Inquiry, The HighSpeed Craft MS Sleipner Disaster 26
November 1999, $3.2.1. 2000, NOU.
5. Fared horror scenario, in Bergens Avisen.
1985: Bergen.

18.

19.

20.

21.

The Commission of Inquiry, Preliminary

inquiry into the grounding and evacuation
of the high speed catamaran "Saint-Malo"
off Corbiere point, Jersey 17. april 1995.
New Jersey, 1995.
Leirvik J. B. and G. Mjanger, HSD
Careless recording, NRK Hordaland. 2006.
The Commission of Inquiry, The Merchant
Shipping Act 1894 : MV Herald of Free
Enterprise : report of court no. 8074
:formal investigation. . 1987, H.M.S.O.
Zeebrugge disaster was no accident. 1987,
BBC.
Utvik Senior compensation and
governmental expenditure, in Troms
Folkeblad. 2005: Troms.
Holtappels, P. and W.Hummel, 1st
Investigation report on the capsizing on 28
September in the Baltic Sea of the Ro-Ro
Passenger vessel MV Estonia. 1997.
Swedish.
http://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_R
eport_1.pdf
Bjrkman, A., Disaster Investigation, The
biggest Fraud in maritime History.
http://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.ht
m
Joint Accident Investigation Commission,
Preliminary Technical report on the MV
ESTONIA disaster of 28 September 1994
1996, Estonia.
Karpinnen, T., M.Huss, and K. Rahka,
Estonia: Hard Facts and realities. The
Naval Architect, 1998. Sept 98.
Bjrkman, A., New fact regarding EstoniReport regarding the explanation. 1999.
Swedish.
The Swedish Maritime Directorate, Report
regarding the technical and legal
conditions to find and rescue the bodies
from Estonia. 1994. Swedish.
http://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/res
que.pdf
Stenquist, A. 1994, Stolt Comex Seaway.
Norwegian.
http://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SC
S.pdf
Black box transcript reveals four hours of
confusion and fear as ferry sank. Lloyd's
List, 24 April 2006.
Press Release, MV Al Salam Boccaccio
98, #3 2006, RINA
http://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccac
cio_update3.PDF
Rolf Imstl, TU.no Articles regarding the
Rocknes Disaster. Norwegian Technical
Review, 2005.
http://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/0002
7/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdf
EMSA, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/

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