Salient Aspects of Summary Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons - Azarraga

VOL.
174, JUNE 20, 1989

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Salient Aspects of Summary Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
ANNOTATION
SALIENT ASPECTS OF SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS
By
JULIANA DE CASTRO-AZARRAGA
1.Venue, p. 164
A.Meaning of resides, p. 164
B.Which determines venue, p. 164
C.Wrong venue waivable; Waiver by laches, p. 166
2.Extrajudicial Settlement By Agreement Between Heirs;General Rule; Judicial
Administration, p. 167
3.Exceptions, p. 167
A.Agreement of adjudication; Requisites, p. 169
B.Requisites common to the two above modes, p. 169
C.Nature of extrajudicial partition, p. 170
D.Purpose of registration, p. 170
E.Finality of partition, p. 171
4.Allowance of a Will, p. 174
A.Nature of proceedings; Requisites, p. 174
B.Probate of a will conclusive as to its due execution and validity; Meaning, p. 174
C.Duties of a probate court, p. 175
D.When court may act on will, p. 175
E.On question of title to property; General rule; Exception, p. 175
5.Miscellaneous, p. 176
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A.Intestate succession only subsidiary, p. 176
B.Support of surviving spouse, p. 176
C.Preference of widow as administratrix, p. 177
D.Demand by administrator against third party, p. 178
E.Encumbrance on real property of estate, p. 178
F.Attorneys fees; Against whom chargeable, p. 179
G.Dismissals which operate as judgment on the merit, p. 179
H.Heirs entitled to allowances for their support, p. 179
I.Remedies of mortgagee against estate, p. 180
J.Extension of time to file claims, p. 180
K.Probate of will mandatory, p. 181
L.Failure to register letters of administration and will; Effect, p. 181
I. Venue
Section 1, Rule 23, of the New Rules of Court provides that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled, his will shall be proved or letters of administration granted
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate.
The rule further provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
A. Meaning of resides.
In the settlement of estate of deceased persons the term resides connotes actual
residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile (Garcia Fule vs. Court
of Appeals, L-40502, November 29, 1976).
B. Which determines venue
Venue is determined by the place of residence of the deceased or location of his
estate.
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In Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449, the Supreme Court distinguished venue from
jurisdiction as provided for in Section 1, Rule 73. It held: Sec. 1 of Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for purposes of special proceedings for the
settlement of estate of deceased persons so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate. The matter really
concerns venue, as the caption of the rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude
different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the rule
specifies that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
It has been held in the case of In the Matter of Intestate Estate of Kaw Singco, 74
Phil. 239, that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, but is merely
one of venue. The Supreme Court said: We are not unaware of existing decisions to
the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the decedent is regarded
as a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. But we decline to follow this
view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has
been submitted in good faith to a Court of First Instance of a province where the
deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, could
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein
completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with
said court but on appeal from an adverse decision, raises for the first time in this
Court the question of jurisdiction of the court for lack of residence of the deceased
in the province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter, the effect shall be that the
whole proceedings, including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be
commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That
this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too
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obvious to require comment. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil.
523). Furthermore, Section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could
not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The law of
jurisdiction (Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5, now Sec. 44 (e) R.A. 296 (Judiciary Act of
1948), confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of place of the deceased. Since, however, there are many Courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act 190, Section 600, fixed
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the Rules of Court the
province where the estate of deceased person shall be settled is property called
venue.
The power to settle decedents estate is conferred by law upon all Courts of First
Instance and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the court (Rodriguez vs. Borja, 17 SCRA 418).
C. Wrong venue waivable; Waiver by laches
Wrong venue in matters involving the settlement of estate is a waivable procedural
defect, and such waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice
of the filing of the probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to
continue for such time before filing a motion to dismiss the same (Uriarte vs. Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 33 SCRA 252).
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2. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs; General Rule; Judicial
administration
The general rule is that when a person dies intestate or, if testate, he failed to name
an executor in his will, or the executor so named therein is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or fails to give bond as required by the Rules of Court, his property shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78.
3. Exceptions
1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between parties;
2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.
A. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement.
Section 1, Rule 74, provides that:
Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of
an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of
an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent, to the filing
of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit
in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in
amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to
under oath by the parties con168
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cerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under
section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the
death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extraju-dicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the proceedings to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court (Utulo vs. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302). And it
has uniformly been held in such case, that judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. (Id.)
It is only when debts exist and there is no way of collecting them extrajudicially
because the creditors have not reached an amicable settlement with the heirs, that
they can compel the filing of special proceedings before the court for the liquidation
of said debts (Cadag vs. Treananes, 40 O.G. 4th supp. 324; Torres vs. Torres, et al., L19644, January 3, 1964).
This section does not preclude the heirs, however, from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to
resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. This section is not
mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the
word may. If the intention were otherwise, the framers of the rule would have
employed the word shall as was done in another provisions that are mandatory, in
character. Note that the word may is not only used once but in the whole section
which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 92 Phil.
273; Arcillas vs. Montejo, L-21725, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 197).
Where the decedent left no debts and the heirs or legatees are
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all of age, there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate because the same
can be effected either extrajudicially or thru an ordinary action for partition. If there
is an actual necessity for court intervention, as contended by appellant, in view of
the heirs failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided
physically, the latter, under Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, have still the
remedy of an ordinary action for partition. This is not to overlook the allegation that
the estate has an outstanding obligation. It is to be noted, however, that appellant
did not specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted, the
bare allegations that the estate has an existing debt from third persons cannot be
considered a conclusive statement to constitute a cause of action. Nor does the
unverified statement that there are other properties, not excluded in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of
an administration proceedings because the same questions that may arise as to
them, viz., the title thereto, and their partition if proven to belong to the intestate,
can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition
(Seguion Torres vs. Torres, et al., supra; Guico, et al. vs. Bautista, et al., L-14921,
December 31, 1960).
A. Agreement of adjudication; Requisites
a) Agreement between the heirs by means of a public instrument; or
b) If there be only one heir, he may make, by affidavit, an extrajudicial adjudication
in his favor of the entire estate.
B. Requisites common to the two above modes
a) That the decedent left no will;
b) That he left no debts or all the debts he left are all paid. In this connection, it
shall be presumed that there are no outstanding debts if no creditors file a petition
or letters of administration two years after the decedents death (Sec. 1, Rule 74,
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Rules of Court; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil. 317; Castillo vs. Castillo, 23 Phil. 364).
c) That the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
guardians;
d) That the agreement or adjudication is made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds;
e) That the parties to the extrajudicial partition, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, file a bond in an amount
equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath
by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under section 4 of this Rule; and
f) That the fact of extrajudicial settlement shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section.
C. Nature of extrajudicial partition
A mere designation and segregationnot a transmission of real rights. In Hernandez
vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, the Court said: No considerations of public policy
enters into a partition of hereditary estate among co-heirs greater than those
involved in a contract between strangers which operate to create, transmit, modify
or extinguish property rights in land. If as between strangers, the creation,
transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by
parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be just in writing, the
present rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction is between coheirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation
of that part of the estate which belongs to each heir.
D. Purpose of registration
The requirement that the partition be put in a public instrument and registered, has
for its purpose, the protection of
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creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the
rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, Hernandez vs.
Andal, supra).
E. Finality of partition
The partition should be considered as a final settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Mendiola vs. Mendiola, 7 Phil. 71).
a)Debts discovered after partition
Such discovery does not destroy the partition made. It simply is a ground for the
application for the appointment of administrator or for the payment of his credit
under Section 4 of Rule 74.
b)Remedy for aggrieved co-heir
It was held that after an extrajudicial settlement is approved by the court, any
aggrieved party has the alternative remedy of filing either a petition for relief under
Rule 38 or a new action to annul the settlement within the period established by the
statute of limitations (Jerez vs. Nietas, L-26876, December 27, 1969; Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730). Even then the better practice is reopening of the case by
proper motion such as intervention under Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court,
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of
which, is successful, would be, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or
order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3; Reosa
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vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737).
c)Disagreement of co-heirs
Should the heirs or legatees disagree as to the division of the estate, an action for
partition, instead of a special proceeding may be brought (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil. 232; Art. 494, Civil Code of the Philippines).
B. Summary settlement of estate of small value
Section 2, Rule 74, Rules of Court, provides:
Summary settlement of estates of small value.Whenever the gross value of the
estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed
ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance
having jurisdiction of the estate by petition of an interested person and upon

hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3)
months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of any executor
or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts
of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified. If otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the cost of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it
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involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registers office.
1) Background of the provision
Taken substantially from section 2 of former Rule 74, but increasing the gross value
of the estate from P6,000.00 to P10,000.00. The former provision was taken
substantially from section 597 of Act 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 2331 and 3370.
2) Summary distribution; Aspects
It is a procedure by which, in a summary manner, the estate of a deceased is
valued; his debts paid, if any; his will, if any, is allowed; the heirs and legatees are
declared and distribution is made, all in a single hearing and in a single order, so far
as this is practicable without the appointment of any executor or administrator. And
this procedure is allowed when the gross value of the decedents estate does not
exceed ten thousand pesos. The sales ordered by the probate court for payment of
debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption. (Abarro vs. de Guia, 72 Phil.
245).
3) Distribution; distributees to receive and enter into possession
The distributees, in their own right, if they are of age, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall be entitled to receive
and enter into possession of the portions awarded to them. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3).
4) Claims of heirs adverse to decedents
If during the summary proceedings some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that
of the decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue which must be decided in a separate suit. (Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil.
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61).
Exception:
The above rule is not applicable where there is no question that the realty belongs
to the decedent, considering that in summary settlements, the judge is expected to
proceed summarily and without delay to determine who are the persons legally
entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them.
(Vda. de Francisco vs. Carreon, et al., L-5033, July 28, 1954).
4. Allowance of a will
A. Nature of proceedings; Requisites
The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is a constructive notice to the whole world,
and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody,
even against the State. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3).
B. Probate of a will conclusive as to its due execution and validity; Meaning
The due execution and validity of a will means that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and not acting under duress,
menace, fraud or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence
of the required number of witnesses; and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding
(Castaneda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. 26), not even in a criminal action for forgery of the
will (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215).
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C. Duties of a probate court
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regard said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so (Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495).
D. When court may act on will
The use of the disjunctive in section 3, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, in the words,
when a will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed plainly
indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedents
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back
to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March
12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontestable (Rodriguez, et al. vs. Borja, et al., L-21993, June 21, 1966).
E. On question of title to property; General rule; Exception
A Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) acting as a probate court,
exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus, has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to a

decedent,
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unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property,
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate
court for adjudgment or the interest of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the
reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (eg. probate, land registration, etc.) is in
reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of
practice which may be waived (Valera vs. Inserto, 149 SCRA 533).
Questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate
proceedings. The probate court can decide only provisionally questions of title to
property for the purpose of inclusion into or exclusion from, the inventory without
prejudice to a final determination of the question in a separate action. It is only
when the parties interested are all heirs and they agree to submit to the probate
court the question as to the title to the property that the probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon (Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, Aug. 14, 1965;
Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495; Lumawag vs. Solis, 131 SCRA 262; Pascual vs.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561).
5. Miscellaneous
A. Intestate succession only subsidiary
In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subordinate or subsidiary to
the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate
succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action (Rodriguez vs. Borja,
et al., L-21993, June 21, 1966).
B. Support of surviving spouse
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court in denying her petition
for support, as well as that denying its
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reconsideration. Both are predicated upon the theory that pursuant to Art. 188 of
our Civil Code, the support of a surviving spouse constitutes, not an encumbrance
upon the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said
estate, and that Mrs. Gurrea is not entitled to such advance, there being neither
allegation nor proof that she had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership
between her and the deceased. In support of this view, his honor, the trial judge,
cited the opinion of Manresa. This has however, been misconstrued by the lower
court. The foregoing view of Manresa is predicated upon the premise that it has
been proven that none of the properties under administration belongs to the
surviving spouse either as paraphernal property or as part of the conjugal
partnership. Upon the other hand the lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea
because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character of the
properties now under custody of the Special Administration. Precisely, however, on
account of such lack of proof thereon, we are bound by law to assume that the
estate of the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership,
one half of which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from such part of the
share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one of the
compulsory heirs, if this alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if
probated, if the provisions therein disinheriting her were nullified (Pijuan vs. Gurrea,
November 29,1966).
C. Preference of widow as administratrix
It is urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for
appointment as administratrix, for as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of
preference under Sec. 6 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. In the language of this
provision, such preference exists if no executor is named in the will or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate. None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The
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Salient Aspects of Summary Settlement of Estates aof Deceased Persons
deceased has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending
probate. Again, said document, names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is
not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only refused
the trust, but has also, expressly accepted it by applying for appointment as
executor, and upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the
duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix not to that of Special
Administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of
the probate court, and is not appealable, (supra).
D. Demand by administrator against third party
When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is
enforced is a third party, not under the courts jurisdiction, the demand cannot be
by mere motion of the administrator, but by independent action against the third
person. The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person.
Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the
administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by the more recent
pronouncement by this Court that even matters affecting property under judicial
administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the
intestate proceedings, if the interests of third persons are prejudiced. (De la Cruz vs.
Camon, L-21034, April 30, 1966, pp. 232-244).
E. Encumbrance on real property of estate
A right of way is an encumbrance upon a real estate. A probate court has no
jurisdiction to make a pronouncement regarding the existence or non-existence of
an encumbrance on real property. It is clear therefore, that the existence or
nonexistence of the aforesaid encumbrance, consisting in a permanent right of way,
being a controverted matter, the probate
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court has no jurisdiction to resolve and pass upon said dispute. (Diaz vs. Sawamoto,
L-22085, April 30, 1966).
F. Attorneys fees; Against whom chargeable
The rule is that attorneys fees for services rendered to an administrator to be
chargeable against the estate, such services must have been so rendered to assist
him in the execution of his trust. Even then the attorney cannot hold the estate
liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to
the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator,
but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate, and reasonable, he is entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. (Beltran vs. Borromeo, et al., L-19722, February
28, 1966).
G. Dismissals which operate as judgment on the merit
The Batangas Court undeniably had jurisdiction in the summary settlement
proceedings to apportion the properties of the deceased among the persons entitled
to participate in his estate. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Batangas Court
directed Patricia to oppose the partition proposed by the widow which Patricia did.
Unfortunately for her, the opposition was dismissed for failure to prosecute; and this
dismissal, which has become final, operated as a judgment on the merits against
her claim (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19783, July 30, 1965).
H. Heirs entitled to allowances for their support
Under Art. 1430 of the Civil Code, the heirs are entitled to certain allowances for
their support out of the estate pending its liquidation. (Gil vs. Cancio, L-21472, July
30, 1965). An heir can sell whatever rights, interests or participations he may have
on the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction
of the probate court (supra).
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I. Remedies of mortgagee against estate
Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim
against the deceased secured by a mortgage, may pursue any of these remedies:
abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the estate or intestate proceeding
and share in the distribution of the estate; foreclose his mortgage making the
executor or administrator a party defendant and if there is a deficiency after the
sale of the mortgaged property, may prove the same in the testate or intestate
proceedings; and rely exclusively upon his mortgage in which case he shall not
share in the distribution of the assets of the estate. (Lumanog vs. Reyes, et al., L19159, Sept. 20, 1964).
A mortgagee may bring action for foreclosure of the mortgage against the special
administrator of the estate of a deceased person. The Rules of Court do not
expressly prohibit making the administrator a defendant in a suit against the estate,
otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations
running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is
delayed. (Lumanog vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-20735, Aug. 14, 1965).
J. Extension of time to file claims

Sec. 2 of Rule 87 of the Old Rules of Court provides that the time for the filing of
claims against the estate shall not be more than twelve months nor less than six
months after the date of the publication of the notice. However, at any time before
an order of distribution is entered, an application of a creditor who has failed to file
his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on
such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one month. It is not controverted in the instant case, that no order of distribution of
the estate has yet been made. The petition to file a claim in the proceedings was
based on the fact that the award of damage in her favor against the deceased, was
contained in the decision of the Court of Appeals which was promulgated after the
six-month period provided in the notice.
181
VOL. 174, JUNE 20, 1989
181
Considering this argument, the lower court found it sufficient to justify the
relaxation of the rule and extension of the period within which to file her claim. In
the circumstances, the action taken by the lower court cannot be considered an
abuse of discretion to justify its reversal by this Court. (De la Rama vs. Palileo, L18935, February 26, 1965).
K. Probate of will mandatory
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceedings. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceedings and the judge assigned to the testate should continue hearing
the two cases. (Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Quebran, 127 SCRA 296).
L. Failure to register letters of administration and will; Effect
The failure to file with the Register of Deeds a certified true copy of the letters of
administration and the will as provided in Sec. 90 of Act 496 does not negate the
validity of the judgment or decree under the will. Sec. 90 refers to the dealings with
registered lands by an executor or administrator. (Lopez vs. Gonzaga, et al., L18788, January 31, 1964).
The transfer of the certificate of title to administrators name would constitute an
open and clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years open
and adverse possession as owner, would certainly suffice to vest titles by
prescription in the administrator. (Lopez vs. Gonzaga, supra)
o0o
[Salient Aspects of Summary Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons, 174 SCRA
163(1989)]

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having jurisdiction of the estate by petition of an interested person and upon

determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to a

VOL. 174, JUNE 20, 1989

J. Extension of time to file claims

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