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Burden of proof

Quiajano v Gonong - XXXXX


Conclusive presumptions
Lozano v Delos Santos And Anda
Facts:
Petitioner files damages against Anda before the MCTC of Pampanga. Petitioner os the
president of Kapatiran Jeepneys association while respondent is president of the SAmahang
angeles-mabalcat jeppney operators. They agreed to elect one set of officers to collect the
daily dues. Both ran for president and the petitioner won. Respondent protested alleging
fraud and decided to unfollow their agreement. Petitioner filed damages for the amount of
25k. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it is then lodged on
the SEC.
MCTC: dismiss
WON the SEC has jurisdiction
Held: NO.
Controversy must arise out of intracorporate relations between and amongstickholders
members an associates. The associations are both registered with the SeC but they are two
separate entities which are not subject to intracorporate disputes. Doctrine of estoppel
alleged by respondent cannot override jurisdictional requirements.

FLOR CAPILITAN V VIRGINIA DELA CRUZ


Facts:
dela cruz filed with Rural progress administration for the purchase of 2residential lots in
tondo manila. I was approved. 5 yrs later Capilitan filed with the Buraeu of Lands for the
purchase of the same lots. The application of capilitan was approved. From the receipt of the
decision, dela cruz moved for filing of extension for motion for reconsideration. It was
granted. The decision was reversed awarding the lands to dela cruz. Capilitans MR was
denied due to lapse of period. RTC: sustained the reversed decision.
WON the 30 day period for the filing of MR is a rule of procedure.
Held:
Yes. The decision of th RTC should be sustained. Capilitan never questioned the late filing.
The period to file motion for reconsideration as provided in the Land Tenure Administration
do not preclude extension.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY V NAVIDAD


Facts:

Nicanor entered the LRT drunk. The guard of LRT approached NAvidad which caused a
misunderstanding and a fist fight. Nicanor was struck by a train when he fell on the tracks.
Heirs of nicanor files damages against LRTA.
RTC: Pay plaintiff. Prudent, the security agency, was also liable for damages
CA: Exonerate prudent.
Issue: WON LRT is negligent?
Held: Yes.
Common carriers should exercise utmost diligence. Contract of carriage has been created.
There was a breach of contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. Prudent should be absolved because its negligence in
selecting its employees was not proven.

Disputable presumptions
PEOPLE V NAVAJA
Facts:
Accused was the object of a buy bust operation but he successfully evaded arrest. He was
then arrested and was charged with Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425. The evidence was
positive for marijuana. The accused denied that he was selling marijuana and that he had
never smoked it. He likewise denied that he was caught selling the prohibited drug
presented as Exhibits "A" and "B" by the prosecution in a buy-bust operation conducted on
30 August 1989. 12 All three (3) defense witnesses testified that the accused has never been
known as "Sindak" and that the accused's namesake, Alexander Navaja alias "Sindak," the
son of Pepe Navaja, was the person selling marijuana in the area; however, the said
"Sindak" was killed in January 1990 by his financier and associate, Oscar Parba.
RTC: guilty due to positive identification of apprehending officer and the buy bust operation.
WON there is a need to present all officers in the buy bust as witness to testify
No. There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific or minimum
number of witnesses to sustain a conviction for any of the offenses described in the
Dangerous Drugs Act. It is the prosecuting fiscal's prerogative to determine who or how
many witnesses are to be presented 17 in order to establish the quantum of proof necessary
for conviction. In this case, the prosecution deemed it sufficient to present Pfc. Espina alone
since any other testimony which would have been given by the other members of the buybust team would be merely corroborative in nature. The non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case.
WON he was positively identified
Yes. no reason to doubt his positive identification of the accused. Although he was eight (8)
to ten (10) meters away from the spot where the transaction took place, considering that

the incident occurred in broad daylight (1:00 o'clock in the afternoon) and, as admitted by
the accused in his Appellant's Brief, the said fence is a wire fence, 24 it could not have been
impossible for Pfc. Espina to see and recognize the accused as the person with whom the
poseur-buyers transacted business.
WON the witness was credible
Yes. the rule is well-settled that the issue of the witnesses' credibility is to be resolved
primarily by the trial court because it is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard such witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Accordingly, the trial court's findings on the matter of the credibility of the witnesses
are entitled to the highest degree of respect and would not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.

PEOPLE V BALUDDA
Facts
The RTC found Baludda guilty of violating Sec 4 of RA 6425. They were apprehended when
the police officers wanted to search the sacks they were carrying. The accused ran away
which made the officers fire shots. The officers looked at the sacks and found marijuana.
The accused contested the legality of their arrest. RTC: Guilty.
WON they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Yes. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him. [9] In U.S. vs.
Bandoc,[10] the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the
premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi and is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. [11] The
constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of
one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on the possessor of the dangerous drug to
explain absence of animus possidendi.[12] In the case under consideration, it is not disputed
that appellant was apprehended while carrying a sack containing marijuana. Consequently,
to warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was innocent and done without intent to
possess, i.e. without knowledge that what he possessed was a prohibited drug. The legality
of the warrantless search and arrest in the case under scrutiny is beyond question. It bears
stressing that appellant was caught transporting a prohibited drug in flagrante
delicto. Consequently, a peace officer or any private person, for that matter, may, without
warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and the person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Hence, the warrantless search in this
case, being an incident to a lawful arrest, is in itself lawful.

PROCEEDINGS TO BE RECORDER RULE 132 SECTION 2


PEOPLE V OBNGAYAN
Spouses bagay were loading their palay on their carabao when they heard gunshots. They
saw the appellant in the nearby open field holding a .30 carbine. Pedro Bagay was shot and
fell to the ground. P.C. Investigator Emiliano Agustin was able to take his ante
mortem statement. According to Emiliano Agustin, he questioned the victim about the
incident, and his questions, and the answers given by the latter, were written down by him,
after which the victim affixed his thumbmark thereon using his own blood. These
proceedings were witnessed by Severo Bello and Federico Belisario who also affixed their
signatures on the same document. In the aforesaid ante mortem statement, the deceased
pointed to appellant as the person who shot him.
Appellant assigns in this appeal the following errors: (1) Irregularity in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation viz: the alleged lack of notice to appellant and the failure of the
investigating magistrate to accord him the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses; (2) the unusual zeal of the trial judge in cross-examining appellant and in
propounding questions favorable to the prosecution, thus allegedly showing his manifest
partiality; and (3) the trial court's error in giving more credence and weight to the ante
mortem statement (Exhibit B) and the testimony of Alingan Bagay than to the testimony of
appellant.
Held:
It is already a settled law that where the accused has already entered a plea of not guilty to
the information he is deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation and to
have abandoned his right to question any irregularity that may have attended the
same. 1 Moreover, appellant posted bail after his arrest, waived the preliminary investigation
proper and failed to raise in issue the validity of the preliminary investigation at any stage of
the proceedings in the trial court.
We have examined the record of the trial and We find no basis for appellant's contention
that the trial judge has asked improper questions which manifest a patent partiality in favor
of the prosecution to the prejudice of the defense. A reading of the questions propounded
merely indicate the trial judge's concern to ascertain the truth. There are obviously certain
rights inherent to the trier of facts due to the nature of his function. Among these is the
right to question a witness with a view to satisfying his mind upon a material point which
presents itself during the trial and as to the credibility of such witness. 4 In thus crossexamining an accused and his witnesses, the trial judge merely makes use of this inherent
right, and this actuation, if exercised within reasonable bounds, does not amount to a denial
of the fundamental right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due
clause of the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, a written dying declaration which is not read by the declarant or read to him
by another and is not signed or in any way recognized by him after it is written, is not

admissible in evidence. 8 This error, however, is of no moment, considering that the P.C.
investigator, Emiliano Agustin, before whom the declaration was given, testified as a
witness in the case, and he related the statements made to him by Pedro Bagay, and these
statements are clearly admissible as a dying declaration of the latter. The admissibility of
dying declarations is not dependent on their being made in any particular form. It may have
been an oral statement or ejaculation made to a casual bystander, a mere formal statement
to a physician, relative or friend, or answers to questions put by the person to whom the
declaration is made or a writing signed by the declarant, or an affidavit. 9
There is no question that the declaration was made with full realization on the part of the
deceased that he was in a dying condition. Considering the degree and seriousness of the
wound, and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards, such circumstances may be
considered as substantial evidence of consciousness.
ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITNESS
PEOPLE V SALAS
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but
before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended,
to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner,
taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court
of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent
judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances.
WON trial in absentia was declared properly
Held: No. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now
allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned;
b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that
trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified
under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice
precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear
at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape
"rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately
absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally
speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will
continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.

The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section
19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his
trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make
his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the
pale, and protection, of the law.

CROSS EXAMINATION, ITS PURPOSE, EXTENT


PEOPLE V FABRE
Accused was charged of raping his own daughter. The trial court gave credence to the
evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young complainant.
RTC found him guilty. The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of
appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct crossexamination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
WON the prosecution erred in not availing cross examination.
Held: No.. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the
witness is called.[5] The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the
statements of a witness made on direct examination.[6] The party against whom the
witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any
other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be
believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to
give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is
not cross-examined by the other party.
HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
PEOPLE V RELUCIO
One of the witnesses, Angeles, testified that they were in the movies with the deceased,
Talastas. When he left the moviehouse, he saw Relucio going inside the moviehouse and
suddenly heard gunshots. During the trial, the sworn statement of the same witness given
to Detective Justiniano E. Fernandez of the Cabanatuan City Police on January 11, 1972,
which the defense presented for impeachment purposes, strangely without objection on the
part of the prosecution notwithstanding that the defense failed to lay the predicate therefor.
In said statement, Angeles gave practically a different story from beginning to end - from
the reference to the time place and reason how he and Talastas and Amanda came to be
together that fateful afternoon up to the Identification of Ige or Egi (Miguel Padrones) as the
one who shot Talastas) from that related by him on the witness stand. n brief, in court,
Angeles' account of the participation of appellant in the shooting of Talastas was vague and

inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and specifically to
appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and categorically
referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones.
WON the testimony of angeles may be impeached
Held: Yes. It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be
truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are
evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first
be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations he
at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means
simply that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of
prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to
give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when
no reasonable explanation is given by him that he should be deemed impeached. the
prosecution did not object to the presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for
impeachment purposes, notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the
opportunity to give his own explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the
trial judge and the appellate courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can,
possible reconciliation on the basis alone of logic and common experience. The omission to
object on the ground of failure to lay the predicate is waived by the omission to interpose
the same when the impeaching contradictory statement is offered .

CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS RULE 132 SEC 19


JOSON V BALTAZAR
Atty. Gloria M. Baltazar, now Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre, is charged with violation of the Revised
Penal Code and grave malpractice as a lawyer. In his complaint, Marciano Joson alleged that
on 10 July 1957, respondent Atty. Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre notarized a deed of sale executed
by complainant in favor of one Herminia Feliciano, but:
1. respondent had made it appear in the deed of sale that complainant-vendor sold 150
square meters of his unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan, instead of only 50 square meters
which was the real agreement of the parties; and
2. at the time respondent Baltazar notarized the deed of sale, she was no longer authorized
to do so since her notarial commission had expired on 31 December 1956 and was renewed
by her only on 17 September 1957.
WON she is guilty of the charges? Yes.
Under the foregoing case, respondent Baltazar's conduct must be similarly characterized as
malpractice and falsification of a public document. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, 9and renders it admissible in court without

further proof of its authenticity. 10 Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the
public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
YTURRALDE V AZURIN
Facts:
Defendant Consuelo G. Azurin was close to Carmen Yturralde even when she was still a
child. Because Baltazara Yturralde, elder sister of Carmen, was the wife of Consuelo's uncle,
Pedro Gella, and was her godmother. Everytime she went to Sibalom to visit and stay with
her uncle and aunt, she met Carmen who was then staying with Baltazara. She fondly called
Carmen Yturralde Tia Carmen. By 1925, Carmen and Consuelo's relationship was closer. For
in that year, the Azurins transferred their residence to Sibalon where defendant, Dr.
Raymundo Azurin, Consuelo's husband, became the President of the Sanitary Division. Dr.
Azurin in time became the family physician of the Pedro Gellas and also of Carmen
Yturralde. During the last war, Dr. Azurin, who was a guerilla assigned in Kalibo, Aklan, on a
number of occasions had to travel by foot from Kalibo just to be able to administer
treatment to Baltazara who was then suffering from cancer of the tongue. It is not disputed
that on February 13, 1955, Dr. Azurin went to Sibalom on an urgent call because Carmen
Yturralde had suffered a stroke. She became partly paralyzed. From then on, Dr. Azurin
attended to her. plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde came over to the house of the Azurins at San
Jose, told them of Carmen Yturralde's desire to see them. The couple went to Carmen's
house. Carmen informed them that the reason for the call was that she wanted to donate
her properties to Consuelo. Reason for the donation was the fear entertained by Carmen
that her brother, Cipriano a gambler, would only waste her properties if she predeceased
him. Carmen then wanted an assurance that from the produce of the lands, the Azurins
would support her and her brother, Cipriano, construct a house for them, and repair, put in
good condition, and maintain Carmen's family mausoleum. The Azurins accepted. All of
these were taken up in the presence of plaintiff. The Azurins took steps to have the deed
registered. They learned that the Torrens titles were with the spouses Mariano Vagilidad and
Luz Manaquit upon loans from them obtained by plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde. The spouses
Vagilidad refused to part with the titles upon the averment that the obligation really was
Carmen's, not Cipriano's. This led the Azurins to take two court actions: First, a petition in
the cadastral proceedings to procure delivery of the titles to them; and Second, upon
learning that there was an alleged document judgment of mortgage executed by Carmen
Yturralde in favor of the Vagilidads. Plaintiff claimed the deed was fraudulently made by the
Azurins.
WON the deed was a fraud
Held: no. A rule of long standing which, through the years, has been adhered to is that a
notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.

It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, as plaintiff now seeks
to do, there must be evidence that is "clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant." 13 Our task now is to weigh the evidence with a view of ascertaining
whether plaintiff has made out a case conformably to the foregoing standard. It is
undisputed that plaintiff has been a priest of the Philippine Independent Church for a long
time. He talks and writes Spanish very well. He knows how to read English. The judge below,
who signed the decision and who had the opportunity to observe plaintiff on the witness
chair, gave the opinion that although plaintiff was already old and a little bit deaf, he was
"fairly intelligent to say the least, and definitely ... not feeble-minded." This is the man who
claims to have been misled by defendant Dr. Raymundo Azurin.
In addition to the foregoing, other circumstances there are which betray plaintiff's testimony
as thoroughly unbelievable. If the intention of the Azurins were to palm off donation for
mere administration, they would not have chosen such a time when not only plaintiff but the
latter's nephew, a person also of mature age, were present. They would not have then
exhibited the document, allowed the execution thereof. The ways of fraud are such that it is
unlikely that the Azurins would risk the success of their alleged nefarious scheme in the
presence of those who, by the nature of things, are bound to protect the interests of a close
relation.
We find, as did the lower court, that the deed of donation was properly executed.
Since the donation was made in a public document specifying the immovables donated, and
the conditions for the donation, and that acceptance thereof was made in the same deed of
donation, 18 that donation should be given effect.

PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS


ONG V PEOPLE
Facts:
Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for P362,000.00 from the Solid
Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no
machine could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier
mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein
petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead
filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that liability, if any, would be
civil and not criminal in nature. This dismissal was, however, reversed by the Department of
Justice. Estafa was filed to MeTC. Demurrer of evidence was denied thus defendant filed
certiorari in RTC.
MeTC: prima facie evidence presented, guilty
Rtc: Reversed

CA: No acquittal
WON the petitioner is guilty
Held: No. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and
authenticity of the document sought to be presented must first be reasonably
established. Where there is no proof as to the authenticity of the executor's signature
appearing in a private document, such private document should be excluded. The
documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private instruments, being
instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a public notary or of
other persons legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced, or set forth (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and
authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of any one who saw the
writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals,
however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never proved. In
fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these
documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these
documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this Court cannot rightly
appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document; much
less, accord it evidentiary value. Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies
of the originals. Thus, they are secondary evidence and as such are not admissible unless
there is ample proof of the loss of the originals
HOW GENUINENESS OF HANDWRITING PROVED RULE 132 SEC 22
SECURITY BANK V TRIUMPH LUMBER
FACTS:
it appears that plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of defendant banks branch at Sucat,
Paraaque. Plaintiff also claims that due to defendant banks gross negligence and
inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the
encashment of plaintiffs checks whose amount exceed P10,000.00 and in determining the
forgery of drawers signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by
unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff then
requested the defendant to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks
which were wrongfully encashed in the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due demand the
defendant failed to pay its liability. On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court

found no preponderance of evidence to support private respondents complaint. The private


respondent failed to show that the signatures on the subject checks were forged. It did not
even present in court the originals of the checks. Neither did it bother to explain its failure
to do so. Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were wilfully suppressed and
would be adverse to private respondents case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on the
checks were not compared with the specimen signature appearing on the specimen
signatures cards provided by the private respondent upon opening its current account with
petition.
CA: Reversed
WON the signature was forged
Held: NO. Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting
was not observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to serve as
a standard of comparison.[20]
In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,[22] we had the occasion to the rule that the
genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the following: (1) by the
admission of the person sought to be charged with the disputed writing made at or for the
purposes of the trial, or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the standards written or
to whom or in whose hearing the person sought to be charged acknowledged the writing
thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the standard has acquiesced in
or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by him in his business
transactions or other concerns.
We find in the records only photocopies, not the originals, of the long bond papers
containing the alleged specimen signatures.[23] Nobody was presented to prove that the
specimen signatures were in fact signatures affixed by Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok Teng.
Although the former took the witness stand, he was never called to identify or authenticate
his signatures on the said photocopy. Clearly then, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the guidelines set forth in BA Finance v. Court of Appeals[24] were not complied
with.
Besides, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, Tabo (The expert witness presented
by the respondent) could by no yardstick be considered to have adequate knowledge of the
genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures on the questioned checks were claimed
to be forged. That knowledge could be obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some
other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known
to him to have been written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c)
examining, in or out of court, for the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the
documents said to have been written by the person in question (ex comparatione
scriptorum).[28] Tabo could not be a witness under the first and the second. She tried to be
under the third. But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain specimens of handwriting
were seen and considered by her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person in
question.[29] Now, as stated above, Tabo had no adequate basis for concluding that the
alleged specimen signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the
parties whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged. Moreover, we do
not think that the alleged specimens before were sufficient in number.[30]

OFFER OF EVIDENCE RULE 132 SECTION 34


VDA DE ONATE V CA
The controversy involves Lot No. 1571, a riceland located at Toran, Aparri, Cagayan covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5168. On January 10, 1980, an action for specific
performance with damages was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Branch
II by Eulalia Marcita Taguba in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Leonor Taguba against Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate. As the trial court found, the deceased
Leonor Taguba bought the subject parcel of land from Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate sometime
in 1976 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four (4) installments. Accordingly, she
paid P2,250.00 on January 20, 1976, 1 P750.00 on February 23, 1976, 2 P1,000.00 on March
20, 1976 3 and P1,000.00 on July 29, 1976. 4 After full payment was made on July 29, 1976,
the parties however failed to reduce their contract in writing. On December 30, 1976,
Leonor Taguba died. The instant complaint was filed when demand was made upon Elvira
Mato Vda. de Oate to execute a public document of sale in favor of the deceased and her
heirs and she refused.
RTC: It is a contract to sell not loan as alleged by the petitioner.
CA: Petitioner contended that the plaintiffs evidence was marked but was never formally
offered, thus should not be accepted by the court. Affirmed rtcs decision
WON the evidences presented should be considered by the trial court?
Held: yes. Section 35 (now Section 34) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must
be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence
of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 10 we had the occasion to make a distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said
that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial
court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a 11 citing People v. Mate, 12 we relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case.
In the case at bench, we find, as respondent court did, that these requisites have been
satisfied.

The evidence in question refers to Exhibits "F," receipt for P2,250.00 dated January 20,
1976; "F-1," receipt for P750.00 dated February 23, 1976, "F-2," receipt for P1,000.00 dated
March 20, 1976; and "F-3," receipt for another P1,000.00 dated July 29, 1976, all showing
the varying amounts paid by Leonor Taguba to Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate. These exhibits
were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. In fact, the payment of
P5,000.00 was admitted by herein petitioners in the same pre-trial. Herein subject exhibits
were also incorporated and made part of the records of this case.
SHERATON PALACE V QUIJANO xxxx
PEOPLE V BARELLANO
Epifanio Cabales and his friends Simplicio Garong, Benjamin Alico and Jose Dayola were
drinking tuba in the evening of August 14, 1993 at the side of the auditorium in the middle
of Barangay Tigbao, Matalom, Leyte when he was approached from behind and shot at the
right side of the head with a .38 (paltik) revolver. He fell down on the ground face up. As he
lay thus, his assailant fired a second shot which hit him at the right side of his upper
lip. Thereafter, the malefactor walked away and then fired a third shot in the air.
For the fatal shooting of Epifanio Cabales, accused Pacifico Barellano @ Junior was
indicted for Murder in an Information
Rtc: Guilty
WON the medico-legal photocopy will be admissible
The argument that the xerox copy of the autopsy report should not be admitted in evidence
inspite of his counsels admission of its authenticity will not extricate accused-appellant
from his predicament. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the document is indeed
inadmissible in evidence and is not given any evidentiary weight, still it would not alter the
judgment of conviction because accused-appellant was found guilty primarily on the basis of
the testimonies of the eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the
crime. The fact of death was sufficiently established through the credible and
straightforward testimonies of these eyewitnesses who saw the victim die as a result of the
gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant.
At any rate, it is a trifle too late at this time for accused-appellant to raise the question of
the autopsy reports supposed lack of evidentiary value because he never objected to its
admissibility when it was offered in evidence and was, in fact, admitted to be genuine by his
counsel during trial. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may
be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Particularly instructive on this
point is Quebral v. Court of Appeals,[51] where the Court said that:
Even if it were true that Exhibit K consisted of a mere photocopy and not the original of the
petitioners letter, petitioner nevertheless failed to make a timely objection thereto. As to
when an objection to a document must be made, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc.
v. Aviles:[52]

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not
earlier. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it.
Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to
the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to
the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case at bench, no such timely objection was ever made. Consequently, the evidence
not objected to became the property of the case, and all the parties to the case are
considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. x
x x

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATION V CA


Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. executed a Surety Agreement in favor of Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM for short) with defendant-appellee Joseph L.G. Chua, as one of the
sureties. On October 24, 1983 Chua executed a Deed of Exchange (Exh. "F") transferring a
parcel of land with improvements thereon covered by TCT No. S-52808 (343721) to JALECO
Development, Inc., in exchange for 12,000 shares of said Corporation with a par value of
P1,200,000.00. As a result, TCT No. 126573 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering the
aforementioned parcel of land was issued in the name of JALECO Development, Inc., on
November 24, 1983. Fortune motors failed to meet their financial obligations. PBCOM filed a
civil case. PBCOM was able to obtain a levy on the properties of Fortune Motors. When
plaintiff was able to locate Chua's former property situated in Dasmarias, Makati, Metro
Manila, covered by TCT No. S-52808 containing an area of 1,541 square meters which was
already transferred to JALECO Development, Inc., under TCT No. 126573 by virtue of the
Deed of Exchange dated October 24, 1983, PBCOM filed Civil Case No. 7889 for annulment
of Deed of Exchange with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.
RTC: Case dismissed
CA: Affirmed because the deed was never offered as evidence
WON the case should be dismissed
Held:
Yes. The Deed of Exchange was attached to the petition. Necessarily, JALECO's contention
that it has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deed
of exchange becomes an invalid or ineffective denial pursuant to the Rules of Court. Under
the circumstances, the petitioner could have easily asserted whether or not it executed the
deed of exchange. Considering the admission by Chua and the non-denial by JALECO of the
document forming part of the petition, the appellate court committed reversible error in not
admitting the deed of exchange as evidence.

PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT RULE 133 SEC 1


PEOPLE V MATRIMONIO
Accused was charged for the rape of his own daughter which resulted to her pregnancy. He
alleged she offered herself to him without force or intimidation. He allaged that for him to be
convicted of rape, there must be proof of struggle and resistance in which the prosecution
did not prove during the trial.
RTC: Guilty.
CA: guilty
WON accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Held: Yes. In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral
ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. We sustain
the trial court for the prosecution's evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant intimidated Rowena into consummating the sexual acts with him on 27 December
1985 and 5 April 1986. He conveniently availed of two (2) forms of intimidation: threats and
his overpowering moral influence. With respect to the first incident, he craftily threatened
her during the initial stage by telling her not to shout or else she would be killed; he also
threatened the lives of her mother, sister and brothers to force her to yield her honor and
privacy when he was already on top of her. To an innocent girl who was then barely fourteen
(14) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or
frustrate the bestial desires of the appellant, she, her siblings and her mother would be
killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It
must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. We have said before that the
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and
people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some may faint; and
some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the
intrusion. 44 The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is
whether it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to her,
or those dear to her in this case, her mother, sister and brothers. Where such degree of
intimidation exists, and the victim in cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby
rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist
with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless
be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to
exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consumate the purpose which the accused had in mind. 45 This
is especially true in the case of a young, innocent and immature girl like Rowena, who could
not have been expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel; 46 or
to act like an adult or mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under
the circumstances; or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
PEOPLE V TURINGAN

Both accused and victim, Cortez, was at a cockpit wen accused fired shots towards Cortez
which caused his death. it is the contention of appellant that the evidence of the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish his identity and guilt as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. In support of that exculpatory proposition
RTC: guilty
WON the evidences/testimonies presented are enough to convict him
Held: Yes. It is perfectly within the discretion of the trial court to accept such portions of the
testimony of a witness as it may deem credible, and reject those which it believes to be
false. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a positive rule of law and is, in fact,
rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. For this maxim to be invoked, the witness must first
be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more points. But even so - when he is
found to have willfully falsified - this does not make his entire testimony totally
incredible. The court may still, in its discretion, admit and credit those portions worthy of
belief depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities as well as
improbabilities of the case. [39]
Appellant likewise assails the trial court for giving full faith and credence to the testimony of
Allan Miramonte who he claims is a biased witness because of his relationship to the widow
of the victim. It is a familiar rule that the clear and positive testimony of witnesses is not
devalued or impaired by the mere fact of relationship to the victim, when there is no
showing of improper motive on the part of said witnesses. Indeed, their natural interest in
obtaining justice and redress by securing the conviction of the parties responsible for the
crime would deter these relatives from implicating persons other than the real
culprits. [40] No improper motive to testify falsely against appellant was imputed against
the said witness, hence there is no reason not to accord his testimony full faith and
credit. For that matter, it is also worthy of note that herein appellant is also a relative of the
victims wife. [41]
The fact that it took this witness four years before he appeared and gave his testimony in
court should not be counted against or detract from his credibility. Eyewitnesses are
commonly reluctant to get involved in criminal investigators. If witnesses do not come
forward immediately, the fact of delay should not, by itself, be considered as seriously
affecting their credibility. Credibility should be assessed independently on the basis of the
substance of the testimony offered and the surrounding circumstances. [42] The natural
reluctance of a witness to volunteer information to the police authorities in criminal cases is
a matter of judicial notice. [43] He might have deemed it the better part of valor not to give
the name of the accused who was still at large and who probably recognized him. Such
reluctance should not affect his testimony. The decisive factor is that he in fact identified
the accused. [44]
The imputed inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are minuscule matters which will not affect their credibility. It bears reiteration
and emphasis that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses with respect to minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity
or the weight of their testimonies. Minor inconsistencies strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the witness for they indicate that they were not coached.

The eyewitnesses for the prosecution could not be expected to narrate the incident in
flawless detail or perfect concordance. For one thing, they could not have viewed the same
incident from the same perspective and with the same composure, or lack of it. They also
did not have the same degree of intelligence or power of recollection, let alone articulation
or vividness of language. In these circumstances, the eyewitnesses would naturally differ
on some of the details of the killings without being deliberately untruthful. What is
important is that there was basic agreement on the attack as a whole among all those who
narrated how the killing was committed. [46] The witnesses testifying on the same event do
not have to be consistent in every detail as differences in recollections or viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable. Total recall or perfect harmony is not required. As long as the
witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details
do not reflect on the essential veracity of their testimony.

PEOPLE V DANAO
Accused was charged with rape with homicide of a 13 year old girl. He raped, attacked,
strangled and drowned the victim. The forthright testimonies of both Feliciana Gonzaga and
Bonifacio Manacho indubitably point to appellants suspicious presence near the mangrove
swamp at around the time that the victim was raped and killed. Feliciana Gonzagas
testimony was clear and positive that she saw appellant inexplicably following the victim as
the latter was on her way home and would have to pass by the mangrove where she was
later found to have been sexually assaulted and drowned. Bonifacio Manacho was likewise
unequivocal in his declaration that it was appellant whom he saw hastily leaving the vicinity
of the mangrove which was the scene of the crime.
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Held: Yes. The testimonies of these two were categorical, consistent and
complementary to the established fact about the joint presence of appellant and the
victim at the mangrove on that day. No ill motives whatsoever have been attributed
to them as to why they should testify against appellant and implicate him in such a
heinous crime. While admittedly Feliciana Gonzaga is a relative of the victim, that
fact alone should not be considered as corrosive of her testimony, especially in light
of the fact that appellant himself is likewise related to the Aparejados. The
concatenation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses unquestionably leads
to the fair, reasonable and logical inference that it was appellant, and no other, who
had raped and killed the victim, Maria Aparejado. Moreover, the straightforward
declarations of Feliciana Gonzaga and Bonifacio Manacho contradict appellants
insipid and discredited defense of denial and alibi that he was at the house of
Zosima Orma at the time. As between a negative assertion and a positive one, the
latter is understandably and justifiedly given more weight under the rules of
evidence. Additionally, the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and
have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which
they can be concocted.[17]

In the case of alibi, we once again stress the two requirements which should be
strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, that is, the
accused must prove that he was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been there at
the time.[18] Without said evidential requisites having been established, reliance on
alibi becomes all the more a liability. Further, it becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his
immediate relative or relatives.[19]
In the case of appellant, the place where he claimed to be at the time involved
is only about two hundred meters away from the mangrove where the victim was
waylaid.[20] In fact, the houses of Zosima Orna, Feliciana Gonzaga, Bonifacio
Manacho and herein appellant are only meters apart from each another. The
victims house, on the other hand, is only one hundred meters away from the
mangrove where she was found dead. Hence, appellants asseverations on his alibi
are entirely unacceptable. Oddly but significantly, appellant himself testified that at
the time that he, his father and his brother were playing billiards in the house of
Zosima Orna, one of those who watched them play was the victim, Maria Aparejado,
and this was at around 5:30 in the afternoon of that day. He in fact stated that he
saw the victim leave briefly afterwards in the direction going to her house
Moreover, the straightforward declarations of Feliciana Gonzaga and Bonifacio
Manacho contradict appellants insipid and discredited defense of denial and alibi
that he was at the house of Zosima Orma at the time. As between a negative
assertion and a positive one, the latter is understandably and justifiedly given more
weight under the rules of evidence. Additionally, the defenses of denial and alibi are
inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to
the facility with which they can be concocted.[17]
In the case of alibi, we once again stress the two requirements which should be
strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, that is, the
accused must prove that he was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been there at
the time.[18] Without said evidential requisites having been established, reliance on
alibi becomes all the more a liability. Further, it becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his
immediate relative or relatives.[19]
In the case of appellant, the place where he claimed to be at the time involved
is only about two hundred meters away from the mangrove where the victim was
waylaid.[20] In fact, the houses of Zosima Orna, Feliciana Gonzaga, Bonifacio
Manacho and herein appellant are only meters apart from each another. The
victims house, on the other hand, is only one hundred meters away from the
mangrove where she was found dead. Hence, appellants asseverations on his alibi
are entirely unacceptable. Oddly but significantly, appellant himself testified that at
the time that he, his father and his brother were playing billiards in the house of
Zosima Orna, one of those who watched them play was the victim, Maria Aparejado,
and this was at around 5:30 in the afternoon of that day. He in fact stated that he
saw the victim leave briefly afterwards in the direction going to her house.

PEOPLE V LORENZO
Accused was charged with murder of her husband with a bolo and a fan knife. When the
police arrived at her house, she confessed to the police that she had killed her husband. She
assaulted, stabbed and chopped her husband. The barangay captain and SPO1 Eclipse was
presented as witnesses against her. The defense told another story that it was a certain
Robert Santos that killed her husband and alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecutions witnesses.
RTC:guilty. She made an extrajudicial confession. There was also a failure to object while the
information was being made before her.
WON she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Held: Yes . Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial


confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is
made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of
another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Except when expressly required by law, 18 the testimony of a single person,
if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 19 In determining
the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered. 20
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does
not question its presence because she knows that it has been
overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material
substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a
murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a
derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It
is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some
person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be
clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It
means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of
the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in
addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify
conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other
evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 21
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 22

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT RULE 133, SEC 4


PEOPLE V SALVAME
Salvame and Dencio (at large) was charged with the murder of Daniel Libres.
Olimpia, wife of deceased, testified that the last persons whom Dencio was with
were the accused. The same was corroborated by the victims father.
WON the testimonies are enough to convict the accused
Held: Yes. There is no reason to withhold full faith and credit to the foregoing
testimony of Olympia and Eliodoro. Their testimony is candid, straightforward, and
categorical, unmarred by any inconsistency or contradiction. A witness who testifies
in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, and remains
consistent is a credible witness. The trial court, therefore, did not commit any of the
errors imputed to it. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Under our Rules of Court, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
(People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191 [1995]). An accused could be convicted on
circumstantial evidence where the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624
[1995]).
Here, more than one circumstance was proven by the prosecution, thusly, the victim
was last seen in the company of the accused; not long thereafter, the victim was
found dead; and the flight of the accused. The above circumstances were proven by
the testimony of Olimpia and Eliodoro, and the flight of the accused was clearly
established by his going into hiding for six long in an effort to escape from his
criminal liability. The combination of said circumstances points to accused-appellant
and possibly his at-large co-accused, to the exclusion of all other persons as the
persons responsible for the death of Daniel Libres.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE 133 SEC 5
FABELLA V CA
DECS secretary Carino issued a return to work order to the teachers who conducted
a strike. He filed an administrative case against petitioners having them to explain
why they should not be punished with the act that they did. Simultaneously, he put
the teachers in preventive suspension. Petitioners filed a case against Carino and his
committee to stop the fraudulent investigation. RTC dismissed the case and DECS

ordered for their employment termination. Respondents, through counsel assailed


the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were
not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation
and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof
on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was
illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers.
WON the teachers were denied due process
Held: Yes. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include
the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS V SALUD (clerk of court)
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and
118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. He filed a
petition to bail while on appeal and such was granted. Meanwhile Atty Madarang
received a phone call from one of the accuseds relatives saying that they still have
a balance and that they sought the help of Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig. Atty
Madarang got the number of respondent and acted as the relative of accused. She
found out that the respondent did not preoperly execute the copies of the resolution
and order of release but gave then to Art Baluran, the alleged relative of Lagua.
Respondent denied extorting money from the relatives.
WON the admission of text messages constitute violation of right to privacy of
accused (Salud)
Held:
Text messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,[45] and shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and

academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that
he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone. This
was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.
[46] In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant
asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending
before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides:

Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text


messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained.

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], Ephemeral electronic communications


shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . In this case, complainant who was the recipient
of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on
their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to
the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this
case.
HEIRS OF SAEZ SABANPAN V COMORPOSA
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of
Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of
1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in
relocating his house. Being a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco
Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos
Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion
of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by
the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners tolerance.
According to CENR that the land was alienable thus it was adversely, openly and
continuously possessed by Comorposa therefore acquiring ownership through
possession.
MTC: in favor of petitioners
RTC: reversed
CA: upheld rights of respondents
WON the CENR certification has evidentiary weight
Held: YES
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham
document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support
of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.[17] and argue that the Certification
is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. x x x[18]
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.[19]

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same
as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile
signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.[20]
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact,
the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his
Order dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997,
certified among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x
the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any person x x x.[21]
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.[22] The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure[23] nor jurisprudence[24] would sanction
the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the
trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to
cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no fullblown trial is held.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE


ONG V DIAZ
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending
litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her
mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. As alleged by Jinky in her
Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted.
This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time,
Jinky was already married to a Japanese national. Rogelio brought Jinky to the

hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all
the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and
stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
the child.
RTC: in favor of petitioner and minor
Ong filed a motion on new trial which has been granted by court. After
the new trial, the court held that Ong is the father of the minor child. Ong
died and was substituted by his heirs.
CA: ordered DNA analysis because of Ongs agreement to do the same.
WON the DNA analysis is proper despite Ongs death
Held: Yes.
with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic makeup. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same
person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can
determine his identity.
Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is
no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at
any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does
not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic
material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing.