Art. 2183.

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage. (1905)
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it
was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge
Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and
dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or
of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs
to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held
responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that
is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on
the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any
one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of
the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person
to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was
bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita
said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.
RULING:

On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need
not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia,
a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia bronchopneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness
became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr.
Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison
v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of
the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia
is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death
certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest
that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage
which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only
as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for
in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents
the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which
they are entitled.
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
Jose Dingcong vs Halim Kanaan
FACTS:
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented
a room in the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store
occupied by the Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria
carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room and it caused water to drip from his
room to the store below. Because of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan were damaged.
Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from Echevarrias room was
defective hence the flooding and the dripping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.

HELD:
Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel (Echevarria). It
was not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage
caused. The pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been provided

with a container to catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is liable to pay for damages by reason of
his negligence.

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although
no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
Coca-Cola vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 293
Facts:
Respondent Lydia Geronimo was the proprietess of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen,
engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland
and to the public. On August 12, 1989, some parents of the students complained that the Coke
and Sprite soft drinks contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She discovered
the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and
a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle. The Department of Health
informed her that the samples she submitted are adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks
plummeted, and not long after that, she had to close shop. She became jobless and destitute.
She demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She then
filed a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan City, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner, on the ground that the complaint is based on contract, and not on quasi-delict, as
there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Thus, on the basis of Article
1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold. The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that Geronimos
complaint is one for quasi-delict because of petitioners act of negligently manufacturing
adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption; and that the existence of
contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against
the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for damages by the proprietess against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects, which must be
filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold, or one for quasi-delict, which can be
filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The action in based on quasi-delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The allegations in the
complaint makes a reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption. The vendees remedies are not limited to
those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict
under Article 2176, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee.
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Liability for quasi-delict
may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the
death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the
event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or
personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for
compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or
as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own
notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for
compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the
employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If afellow worker's intentional malicious act
is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should

be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the
plaintiff's fellow worker.
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned
before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out that the complaint
alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security
for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. Philex invoked that they
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for
remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves
of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by
virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the
regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the
Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex,
and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court,
the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. (n)
So Ping Bun V. Court Of Appeals (1999)
FACTS:
1963: Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI)
Subjects of 4 lease contracts were premises located at Soler Street, Binondo, Manila
Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles.
The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to
occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to
occupy the premises
1976: Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co.
including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.
1986: So Pek Giok died
So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing
August 1, 1989: lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the
latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989.
The rent increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees'
demand.
December 1, 1990: the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase.
Enclosed in their letters were new lease contracts for signing which So Ping Bun did not answer.
Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.

So Ping Bun refused to vacate

So Ping Bun requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing
A suit for injunction was filed
RTC: Granted annulling the four Contracts of Lease without awarding damages
CA upheld RTC
ISSUE:
W/N the injunction should be upheld and
HELD:
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for
damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
asset if
(a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered
with,
(b) the invasion is substantial,
(c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under
general negligence rules
elements of tort interference are:
(1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse
Son Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result deprived
DCCSI's property right damage is NOT an essential element of tort interference lower courts did
not award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable
Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for
entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's
interference.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN

FACTS:
Gilatco, (Court Interpreter) was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk when at Perez Blvd when
she accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. Perez Blvd is a
National Road under the control and supervision of City of Dagupan.
Such manhole is partially covered by a flowerpot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long
and 1 feet wide.
She was hospitalized, operated on and confined. She had been deprived of income. She
sued for damages.
ISSUE:
WON Control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists which makes
City liable under Art 2189
HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
Art 2189 says : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision.
Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City.
In the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided
for in the charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated
by the Municipal Board.
Such control and supervision is exercised through the City Engineer Tangco, who aside
from his official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio Highway Engineer, Ex Officio City
Engineer of Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and received compensation for these
functions.
The function of supervision over streets, public buildings and public works, pertaining
through the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance
Engineer. Although these two officials are employees of the Natl Govt, they are detailed with
the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.
Hence the City is liable.
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
(n)
Worcester v. Ocampo
FACTS:
Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous
publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K.Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino
Aguilar, et al, as the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper
El Renacimiento (Spanish version) and Muling Pagsilang (tagalong version).Worcester
alleged that the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the
newspapers for a long time and they published an editorial entitled Birds of Prey with the
malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as a private person and as a government official as
the editorial obviously referred to him. Worcester alleged that he was likened to birds of prey in
the following manner: Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle
who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl
who affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
TC:
In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages.
ISSUE:
WON the defendants individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for the
damages under the civil and commercial codes,
HELD:
Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved. The present action is a tort.
Universal doctrine:
each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also
jointly liable with his tortfeasors. If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured,
has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the
TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL.
It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal act- e.g. assault and battery
committed by various persons, under the common law, they are all principals. Under common
law, he who aided or counseled, in anyway, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal
as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
General Rule:
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commissionof a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the
Rodriguez-Luna vs IAC
FACTS:

The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The
collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive,
and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license. In a
suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father
Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the
following judgment: Judgment was rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and
Jose dela Rosa to pay, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00
as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and
P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision;
plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. The private respondents
failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution. The execution yielded
only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His
compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose, the father, should be primarily or subsidiary liable with his son, Luis.
HELD:
Primarily liable. The Dela Rosas invoke Elcano vs Hill for subsidiary liability only. In Elcano vs
Hill, it was held that article 2180 was applied to Atty Hill despite the emancipation by marriage
by his son, but as his son attained age, as a matter of equity, Atty Hill's liabilty should only be
subsiadiary as to his son. However, the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply equity instead of
strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is
abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover
from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor
or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Libi vs. IAC
FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter
after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation
but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found
dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein
private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial
court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art
2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from
both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for
quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall
cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun
which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses
had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the
safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left
negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mothers bag where the key was

kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to
prevent such damage.
Maria Teresa Cuadra vs Alfonso Monfort
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in
MabiniElementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed
the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly
shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT
Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be
surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued
Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court
ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and
attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

HELD:
No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that
which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and
may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the
last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was,
as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far
as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame could be attributed to her parents.
JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;
MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,
it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing
in the record that would indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done
anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child.

TAMARGO VS CA
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's
natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was
granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition
for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually
living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of
the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject
to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over
Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It
follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child.
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or agreement which is
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given any effect.
Art. 219. Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same
family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.
Amadora vs. CA
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito
Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics
teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were
dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus
decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning
and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since
the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In
any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school
regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE:
WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if
he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he
was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the

dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined
in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him
without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was
clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting
incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the
injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the
campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by
James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep
in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code
where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a
teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act
or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus,
negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim
failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that
petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an
event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the
road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible
for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of
the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
PSBA VS CA
G. R. No. 84698
February 4, 1992
FACTS:
On August 30, 1985, Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to
death while on the second floor premises of the said school. His parents filed a suit for damages
against PSBA and its corporate officers. It was established that the assailants were not
members of the schools academic community but were elements from outside the school.
PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. CA affirmed the trial courts decision based on the
law of quasi-delicts holding that teachers and heads of the school are liable unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the damages
RULING:
Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. The assailants of Carlitos were NOT students of PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable. Upon enrolment, a contract between the academic
institution and the students is established, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are
bound to comply with. The school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. It has been ruled in Cangco vs
Manila Railroad that the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties. In the case at bar, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would
not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA
FACTS
Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the
national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by
Pangalangan. As a result,Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and
could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders,
Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that
the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no
cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground
thathe is not the manager of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise"
embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose. NO.
RATIO
Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context
of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of
"employer". Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.
LRTA V. Navidad (2003)
FACTS:

October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a token.

While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard
Junelito Escartin approached him.

Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight

Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a
moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman
December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency
ofsecurity guards) for the death of her husband.
LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent
Prudent: denied liability averred that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection and surpervision of its security guards
LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task
RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and
Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable

ISSUE:
W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage
HELD:
NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/
compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers

Civil Code:

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances

Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees
may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees
o

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger

on accountof the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure
Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage
GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in
conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which breaches the contract)
EX: if employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee,
employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee
Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason
that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also
be absolved from liability
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor
and Roman
Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence

NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation
(NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of
the trucks with plate no RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-oncollision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons
riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National
Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the
complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with
the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. On the other hand,
NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of
PHESCO.
RULING OF TRIAL COURT:
The trial court rendered a decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of any liability. The
dispositive portion reads:
Consequently, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon receipt hereof:
1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College the sum of P954,154.55
representing the actual or compensatory damages incurred by the plaintiffs; and
2. To pay the sum of P50,000.00 representing Attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.
RULING OF C.A.:
Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on November 10, 1994
reversed the trial court's judgment. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:
A "labor only" contractor is considered merely as an agent of the employer (Deferia vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 194 SCRA 525). A finding that a contractor is a
"labor only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the owner of the project and the employees of the "labor only" contractor
(Industrial Timer Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 465). So,
even if Phesco hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a "labor only" contractor of
Napocor the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the
employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco).
(Ecal vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 195 SCRA
224.
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there was no
employment relationship between Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of
their assigned task, there must exist an employer- employee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 591).
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the Court renders
judgment sentencing defendant National Power Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P174,889.20 plus P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
The principal query to be resolved is, as between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of
Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck which figured in the accident and which should, therefore,
would be liable for damages to the victims.

RULING:
As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its employee. It alleges
that it did not have the power of selection and dismissal nor the power of control over
Ilumba. PHESCO, meanwhile, argues that it merely acted as a "recruiter" of the necessary
workers for and in behalf of NPC.

Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it is evidently necessary to ascertain the
contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the relationship one of employer
and job (independent) contractor or one of employer and "labor only" contractor?
Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor
carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account
under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the
control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial
capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. Absent these
requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under which the person acting as contractor
is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the
workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by
him. Taking into consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the "Memorandum
of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was
engaged in "labor only" contracting.
It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the
"critical path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. Likewise, the
manning schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to
confirmation by NPC. Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any subcontract or lease, again NPC's concurrence is needed. Another consideration is that
even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPC's
favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipment can be
purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that will be used by
PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the project
being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is related to

NPC's principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC's control over PHESCO in
matters concerning the performance of the latter's work is evident. It is enough that NPC
has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer.
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only"
contracting vis--vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In
labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer
and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal
employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees
had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only"
contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be
considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal
employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over
the employees of the latter.
However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists between it
and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious
acts of the employee of the "labor-only" contractor. Stated otherwise, its liability shall
only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts.
To bolster its position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which reads:
(b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as
contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall
be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly
employed by him.
In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance with the
substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages and shall not
extend to liabilities suffered by third parties, viz.:
Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer contemplated in a "labor only" contract,
should, consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be restricted "to the workers." The
same can not be expanded to cover liabilities for damages to third persons resulting
from the employees' tortious acts under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on the
recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is
the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
To be sure, the pronouncement of this Court in Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, is most
instructive:
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doeremployee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co., finds
applicability in the instant case,viz.: It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is
only liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties. The
defense of independent contractor would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it would
be in the United States. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that
he was an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer
retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two persons
on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an
employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of directing the loading and
transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of
minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law,
Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his
negligence defendant was responsible.

Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured
person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only" contractor. This is consistent
with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a
finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal
contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the
driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse
against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the
action.
Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver, could still have
disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision
of PHESCO and Ilumba. However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said
defense. Hence, by opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due diligence in the
supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to interpose
the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points of law, theories, issues of facts and
arguments not raised in the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal.
Consequently, its liability stands.
Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands
FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent
at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was
bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been
negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond
rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he
cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized
Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible
for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through
a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act
as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN
G.R. No. L-55963, February 27, 1991
FACTS
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an
ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault
and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the
petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for hospitalization
and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees of 20% of the total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely
and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia,
who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration
on January 26, 1990.
NIA believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers Union
Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA,
exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does
not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or
pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government
entity exercising proprietary functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services
were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment
had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be
removed except for valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had
not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the
contract.
ISSUE
Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the
damages
caused
by
its
driver,
who
was
not
its
special
agent
HELD: YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent
and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered
as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus
considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government.
While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and
purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community
as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601
provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as
the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the
approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall

have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for
emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems
constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be
necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost
of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government
policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation
of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation
development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land
benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all
other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all
fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of
Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and
objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law , insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a
government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is
not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who
was not its special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH
FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December
1, 1989is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is
liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for
tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent.
Metro Manila Transit vs. CA; Torts- Vicarious Liability of Employers
Facts:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and Musa was
its driver . The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student
at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.
At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was
driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An
eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for
the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the
bus, and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away
from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to
revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for the
civil liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC,
Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana
Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC, as a defendant therein.
To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise diligentissimi
patris familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral evidence.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Rosales, but made MMTC primarily liable and Musa
secondarily liable.

Issue:
Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.
Ruling
Yes!
Petitioners attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony.
Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on
vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given
tests to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, there is no record that Musa
attended such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed.
No proof was presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records
of daily inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.
The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof
tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the
trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in
view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This
does not make the employees liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid
from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on
quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against
either MMTC or Musa.
From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday that the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the
operation of said vehicle. InBaliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appealsit was held that to
escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Finally, we held in the recent case of
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the liability of the registered owner
of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,
direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver.
Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed upon
that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer
because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve
harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather
than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb
them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to
shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that
an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that
the enterprise is conducted safely.
PUBLIC HUMILIATION
PATRICIO vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE
FACTS:
On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit dance was on-going
in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen
were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the
gate. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of
drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions, struck a bottle
of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached
petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and
before petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face

with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private respondent was
brought by the policemen to the municipal building.
As a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for Slander by Deed was filed by petitioner
with the Municipal Trial Court of Pilar, Capiz, but the same was dismissed.
Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by petitioner with the court a quo.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant), holding private respondent
liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral shock and
social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he experienced
during the town fiesta
RULING:
There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant's
wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. 16 An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2)
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts.
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on
the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before
the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and
private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.
Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on
the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before
the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and
private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.
The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good
customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that
he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is
definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter.
Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code,
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not
adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles
19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical
injury upon the complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the
reason underlying an award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the
injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person, thus
... . Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be

imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good.
Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the
offender. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through
the body politic. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown
that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case
may be, although such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right.
In cases where exemplary damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are also
recoverable.
MARIA FORD VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
There are two sides in the incident of the case. First is Sulpicia Fabrigars, she claims that
on our about July 27, 1973 at around 3:00 to 3:30 P.M., being a head teacher at a public
school of Barrio Sta. Dumalag, Capiz by reason of the deputization of the of all public school
teachers to assist the COMELEC in the conduct of national referendum, was humiliated by
Barrio Captain Vicente Uy because she was telling Vicente Uys son, Elmo Uy, in writing
remarks on the voting sheets. She claims that she was humiliated publicly by Vicente Uy
and that she would be reported to Maria Ford, owner of a sugar central. She further claims
that Maria ford also humiliated her by slapping her in the face publicly.
However, Vicente Uy presented his version that at around 2:00 PM, upon knowledge that
his son was being embarrassed by Sulpicia Fabrigar, approached the latter talked calmly but
the Fabrigar refused to do so and would most likely hit Elmo Uy. Vicente Uy referred the
matter to Maria Ford and that the latter tried to approach Fabrigar but to no avail. Maria Ford
slapped Fabrigar claiming that she was already hysterical in order for her to calm down.
Trial Courts decision: Statements of Vicente Uy which did not call for any comment from
Sulpicia Fabrigar, her silence should be deemed to be an admission of their truth and truth can
not hurt or insult. Hence, he complaint filed by Sulpicia Fabrigar is dismissed.
Court of Appeals decision: The facts obtaining in this case indicate that appellee Ford in
performing the act of slapping the school teacher in front of the people was motivated by
personal animosity we believe that Maria Ford has by deed slandered plaintiff Sulpicia
Fabrigar which would entitle the latter to damages. There can be no circumstance more
humiliating for a headteacher of a barrio school than to be seen by the barrio folks being
slapped in her face. Hence, the court ordered that Vicente Uy and Maria Ford be held
accountable for the damage done to Sulpicia Fabrigar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Ford is liable for damages by slapping Sulpicia Fabrigar?
HELD:
We are satisfied with private respondent's explanation. Her initiative in promptly instituting her
complaint clearly manifests her honest intention to vindicate the wrong committed against her.
She explained that shortly after the incident between her and petitioner Uy, petitioner Ford
came and slapped her. Thus, when the report was made by private respondent to the police
authorities of Dumalag Capiz, the immediate hurt and humiliation being felt by her was not
only the slander committed by petitioner Uy but, primarily and foremost, the slapping by
petitioner Ford. Hence, the police report of private respondent which focused on her being
slapped by petitioner Ford, although inadvertently omitting the incident with petitioner Uy in
view of her emotional state then, should not be construed to mean that private respondent was
not slandered by petitioner Uy.
Grand Union Supermarket Et Al., V. Jose J. Espino, Jr., Et Al.,
FACTS

Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines,
Inc, together with his wife and two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati

Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked it up and held
it fearing it might get lost because of its tiny size

While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt so as he talked, he placed the rat tail
in his breast pocket partly exposed

At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but forgot to pay the file

As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo regardingthe

file in his pocket. He quickly apologized saying "I'm Sorry" and he turned towards the

cashier to pay. But, he was stopped and instead was brought to the rear of the supermarket
when he was asked to fill out an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter"
His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to the first
checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was. She made a remark:"Ano,
nakaw na naman ito". Jose told Ms. Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because
he needed it but she replied "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for
the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them."
Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket
He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5 was his fine
which will be rewarded to the guard. People were staring at them. He took the file and
paid the file at the nearest checkout counter with P50 and got out as fast as they could. His
first impulse was to go back to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass
windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its
due course.
He filed against Grand Union Supermarket et al. founded on Article 21 in relation
to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5 fine
CFI: dismissed
CA: reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages, P25,000 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee

ISSUE:
W/N Grand Union Supermarket should be liable for public humiliation founded on Article 21 in
relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Grand Union Supermarket ordered to pay, jointly and severally moral damages P5,000
and P2,000 as and for attorney's fees; and to return the P5 fine

Jose did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the open
shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the
item with the intention of buying and paying for it

personal circumstances:

graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an

executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and
warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine
government pensionado of the United States for six months; member of the Philippine
veterans Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines
Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose
Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy
Washington

Jose was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident

Fine branding him as a thief which was not right nor justified

the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a
fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the
Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently
rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation
to Article 2219 of the Civil Code

It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and
degrade the dignity of a person

Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code)

His forgetfullness led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him mental
anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. His act of omission contributed to the
occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may
reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code).
Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation
and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a
public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought
or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament.

Grand Union Supermarket acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their
property, a right which the law accords to them. - eliminate the grant of exemplary damages

UNJUST DISMISSAL
Singapore Airlines V. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, Et Al.
FACTS:

August 21, 1974: Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment Engineer Officer with the
opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course requiring him to enter into a
bond with Singapore Airlines Limited for 5 years

Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without
approval of the application during the second year, SIA filed suit for damages against Cruz
and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions

RTC: dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction
ISSUE:
W/N properly cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission
HELD:
YES. records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court

jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts

Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other
claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters

petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without
just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served
upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This,
coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the
terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of
petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings
it within the purview of Civil Law

complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se but on the manner and
consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which
petitioner had to suffer

The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation.
The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken
cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or
separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an
obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.

Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence
of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty?
Unquestionably, this question is beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
DERELICTION OF DUTY
Cornelio Amaro, Et Al., V. Ambrocio Sumanguit (1962)
FACTS:

October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government
building of Silay

Next Day: Jose Amaro, his father Cornelio Amaro and his witnesses went to the office of
the chief of police Ambrosio Sumanguit who harassed and terrorized them in their daily
work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent and he is about
to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting
the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime

A case was filed against Sumanguit on the basis of:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.

CFI: dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that itdoes not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

ISSUE:
W/N the case should not be dismissed for vagueness or because there are other recourse
available
HELD:
YES. set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings

Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the
complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant,
in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to
disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the
Rules.

having another recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal discharge of firearm
supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing their complaint directly with the city
attorney of Silay or by lodging an administrative charge against appellee herein, does not
preclude this action for damages under Article27 of the Civil Code and hence does not
justify its dismissal
VIOLATION of HUMAN DIGNITY and PRIVACY
Rodrigo Concepcion V. Court Of Appeals (2000)
FACTS:

Spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided in an apartment leased to them by
the owner Florence "Bing" Concepcion who joined Nestor's business venture by contributing
capital on condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned
would be divided equally among them

Second week of July 1985: Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of
Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at their apartment in the presence of his wife and
children, neighbors and friends and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship
with Florence by shouting "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing
Concepcion ng P100,000 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon
ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo. But the same accusation was hurled by
Rodrigo against Nestor when they confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence

Rodrigo called Florence reiterating his accusations and threatening to kill her should
something happen to his mother if she heard about the affair

Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no
longer face his neighbors, Florence stopped contributing capital so their business declines,
not being able to meet demands and the spouses had frequent bickerings and quarells as
Allem was doubting his fidelity.

Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages
which Rodrigo ignored so the spouses filed a suit for damages against him.

RTC and CA: favored the spouses granting P50,000 moral damages, P25,000
exemplary damages, P10,000 attorney's fees, plus costs of suit

Rodrigo criticize the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge
who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the
witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case
ISSUE:
W/N Rodrigo should be held liable for damages
HELD:
YES. CA affirmed

The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for
preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by
private respondents as to foreclose a reversal

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details and collateral

matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.

under article 26, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided
for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are
merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore

are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language
Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation,
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.
a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her
not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it

ABORTION AND WRONGFUL DEATH

ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz.
After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC
and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less
than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the
sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo,
private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents
may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never
having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue
to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the
Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was
dead when separated from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased child.
DAMAGES
Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations
mentioned in Article 1157.
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.

Custodio et al vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida
Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasas
house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their property.
This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and
the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost
tenants because of the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of
Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and
right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA
modified the rulingby awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral
damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
HELD:
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left
because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well
within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement
agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the
right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was
created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation.
Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is
no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be
borne by Mabasa.
Heirs Of Borlado V. Vda. De Bulan G.R. 114118 (2001)
FACTS:

April 15, 1942: Serapio Borlado sold the lot to Francisco Bacero

February 1948: His widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, as legal guardian of her
minor children, sold the lot to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon and
they declared the lot in the name of Bulan for Tax Declaration purposes and obtained
the continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until
November 4, 1972 when heirs of Simeon Borlado forcibly entered and wrested
physical possession from them.

November 23, 1972: Spouses filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment

MTC: in favor of the spouses. The heirs were ordered to vacated the lot and pay 100
cavans of palay annually from 1972 until they vacate the premises and P5K for attorneys
fees and cost of suit

RTC: dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision

CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
W/N the 100 cavans of palay is an acceptable form of damages
HELD:
NO. Affirm with modification. Deleting the 100 cavans of palay for lack of basis.

Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

KINDS OF DAMAGES
Actual Compensatory
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,

liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages,

except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered,
but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
Algarra vs. Sandejas
(Plaintiff, a commission agent, received personal injuries as a result of defendant's negligent act
and was incapacitated for labor for two months, only 4 out of 20 customers remained upon his
recovery): Under both the Spanish Civil Code and American law of damages, actual damages
for a negligent act or omission are confined to those which "were foreseen or might have been
foreseen," or those which were "the natural and probable consequences" or "the direct and
immediate consequences" of the act or omission. In this jurisdiction the author of a negligent act
or omission which causes damage to another is obliged to repair the damage done. This is
practically equivalent to compensatory or actual damages as those terms are used in American
law. Loss of profits of an established business which was yielding fairly steady returns at the
time of its interruption by defendant's wrongful act is not so speculative or contingent that a
court of justice may refuse to allow the plaintiff any damages at all. When the evidence shows
the previous average income of the plaintiff's business and the reduced receipts therefrom
during or immediately after the interruption, there can be no doubt that a loss of profits has
resulted. The fact that such a loss cannot be determined with exactitude is no reason for
refusing to allow them at all. In such a case damages should be allowed for the diminution in
profits from the time of the interruption until the business has resumed its normal proportions,
based upon the time it has taken or will take the owner to rebuild it by the exercise of proper
diligence.
PNOC V. CA (1998)
FACTS:

September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided withthe
vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)

Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro

found Petroparcel to be at fault

Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for
an award of P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorneys fees
and later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance
and unrealized profits and lost business opportunities

During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to
be substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel

Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishingboat with
interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit

CA: affirmed in toto

ISSUE:
W/N the damage was adequately proven
HELD:
YES. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor. P2M nominal damages instead.

in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or

incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on
doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court.
If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel
to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements
If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of
profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters
actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the
light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus
assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to
fulfill.
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific
facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne
proven through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers
to the question of whether or not it proves an issue
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is
`entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has
been invaded.
damages in name only and not in fact
amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and
purpose of such damages
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value ofthe
vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is
causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under
the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower courts
jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment

DBP V. CA (1998)
FACTS:

Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government

Cuba obtained loans from DBP stated under promissory notes dated September 6,
1974; August 11, 1975; and April 4, 1977 executing 2 Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold
Rights as security

Upon failure to pay, without foreclosure proceedings it was appropriated and DBP
executed in turn a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in her favor

Her offer to repurchase was accepted and a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in her favor alone excluding her husband

Failing to pay her amortizations, she entered into a temporary agreement with DBP

Soon, she was sent a Notice of Rescission and DBP took possession of the Leasehold
Rights of the fishpond

After the public bidding, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant
Agripina Caperal

Cuba filed against DBP since no foreclosure proceedings was done thus, contrary
to Article 2088 of the Civil Code
RTC: favored Cuba, it being a pactum commissorium
return leasehold rights to Cuba
entitling P1,067,500 actual damages, P100,000 moral and P50,000 exemplary
damages and P100,000 attorneys fees
CA: leasehold rights to Caperal as valid but same damages

ISSUE:
W/N Cuba should be awarded with actual and compensatory damages
HELD:
NO. CA reversed except the P50,000 as moral damages. REMANDED to the trial court for the
reception of the income statement of DBP, as well as the statement of the account of Lydia P.
Cuba, and for the determination of each partys financial obligation to one another

assignment of leasehold rights was a mortgage contract (Article 2087)

not novated, cession (Article 1255 of the Civil Code), dation in payment
(Article1245 of the civil Code), pactum commissorium

condition no. 12 did not provide that CUBAs default would operate to vest in DBP
ownership of the said rights

The fact that CUBA offered and agreed to repurchase her leasehold rights from DBP did
not estop her from questioning DBPs act of appropriation.

estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or against public
policy

alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear
evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the
existence of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. Neither was a
single receipt or record of acquisition presented.

dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included losses of property as among the damages
resulting from DBPs take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when
her son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to
know of the alleged loss of several articles

bangus which died also not duly proved nor was it expressed in her later 7 months after
DBP took over

The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient
basis

Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded

by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary
damages, attorneys fees are also recoverable
Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center
GRN 141994 January 17, 2005
FACTS:
Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner of
the Medical & Educational center, subject of the radio program Expose. AMEC claimed that
the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC claimed for damages. The
complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed
expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations and as such, destroyed
plaintiffs reputation. FBNI was included as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The trial court found Rimas
statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech and ruled that the broadcast was
libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral damages fall under item
7 of Art 2219 of the NCC.

This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or
juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel
or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is
libelous per se, the law implied damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the
want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this
case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However,
we find the award P500,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though
the broadcasts were libelous, per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material
damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages to P150k.
JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advice countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, as who approve of it
after it is done, for its benefit.