Report title:
Costumer:
Project title:
45/609
10027
Project start:
October 1, 2006
Project end:
Subproject:
Package B
Applicable codes/standards:
Workpackage:
WP2.11
Task:
Date of completion:
Additional
contract info:
Participants in the activity:
Participants /
Distribution:
Doc. Nr.:
Document
data:
Distribution (list):
Pages:
Status:
Keywords:
193
Version:
06
Annexes:
29
Confidentiality:
NIS, petroleum industry, risk management, API 581, risk based inspection,
reliability centered maintenance, Seveso, Safety report
Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies GmbH, Willi-Bleicher-Str. 19, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Table of Contents
List of Figures ................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................... viii
1
Introduction ................................. 2
2.1.2
2.1.2.1
Activities ........................................... 3
2.1.2.2
2.1.2.3
NIS in numbers.................................. 4
2.1.3
2.1.3.1
2.1.3.2
2.1.3.3
2.1.3.4
2.1.4
2.1.4.1
2.1.4.2
Location description.......................... 27
2.1.4.3
2.1.4.4
2.1.4.5
2.1.5
2.1.5.1
2.1.5.2
Location description.......................... 40
2.1.5.3
2.1.5.4
General ..................................... 50
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
page ii
2.2.8
2.2.9
HAZOP ...................................... 60
2.3.2
Executive summary..................... 64
2.6.2
Introduction ............................... 66
2.6.2.1
Objective ........................................ 66
2.6.2.2
Scope ............................................. 66
2.6.2.3
Deliverables .................................... 67
2.6.3
Methodology .............................. 67
2.6.4
2.6.5
2.6.6
2.6.6.1
2.6.6.2
2.6.6.3
2.6.6.4
2.6.6.5
2.6.6.6
2.6.7
General ........................................... 83
2.7.1.2
Implementation of Seveso
requirements ................................... 83
2.7.2
2.7.2.1
2.7.2.2
Location of Establishment.................. 84
2.7.2.3
2.7.2.4
2.7.2.5
2.7.2.6
2.7.2.7
2.7.3
page iii
Introduction ............................... 83
2.7.3.1
2.7.3.2
2.7.3.3
Flow charts...................................... 95
2.7.3.4
2.7.3.5
2.7.3.6
2.7.4
2.7.4.1
2.7.4.2
2.7.4.3
2.7.4.4
2.7.4.5
2.7.4.6
2.7.4.7
2.7.4.8
2.7.5
2.7.5.1
2.7.5.2
2.7.6
Conclusions ..............................118
Annex 1
Annex 2
Annex 3
Annex 4
Annex 5
Annex 6
Annex 7
Annex 8
Annex 9
Annex 10
Annex 11
Annex 12
Annex 13
Annex 14
page iv
Annex 16
Annex 17
Annex 18
Annex 19
Annex 20
Annex 21
Annex 22
Annex 23
Annex 24
page v
List of Figures
Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work ............. 2
Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D. .................................... 3
Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d. ...................... 5
Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia ....... 6
Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia .................... 7
Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo ........................... 10
Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of
Refinery .................................................. 10
Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo ................................ 16
Figure 9: Years of construction................................... 20
Figure 10: Second phase of expansion ........................ 21
Figure 11: Bombing 1999 .......................................... 22
Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad .............................. 27
Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad .................................. 28
Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery ...................... 28
Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia ................... 41
Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir ................. 41
Figure 17: Map of roads ............................................ 42
Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per
year (%) ................................................. 45
Figure 19: Seismic activities ...................................... 46
Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery ................................... 46
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the
overall management system ....................... 51
Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI . 52
Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix........... 55
Figure 24: NIS risk matrix ......................................... 55
Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process ....................... 62
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component
based applied on RGE equipment ................ 65
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis
Component based applied on selected RGE
equipment ............................................... 65
Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir
Refinery .................................................. 66
Figure 29: Project web site Tools and analysis ........... 68
Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3 ...... 72
Figure 31: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 2 of 3 ...... 73
page vi
page vii
List of Tables
Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery ..................... 8
Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the
precipitation quantity ( mm) in Panevo ....... 14
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in
Panevo reduced recording to the data for
Belgrade .................................................. 14
Table 4:
page viii
page x
page 1
Introduction
Package B within the project RiskNIS Risk management and use of risk-based approaches in
inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. pl ants was ordered by the end of
August 2008. The aim of Package B is to additionally provide the guided / supported
implementation of the technology and tools already provided in the basic Package A to
approximately 20% of all equipment in NIS a.d. production units (the assumed most critical
equipment) ca. 5100 equipment. The scope of work in Package B is presented on the
Figure 1
Aopt. Optional CMMS
Full CMMS System containing:
Asset management
Preventive maintenance
Master plans
Reports
A Basic package
C Full coverage
package
A. Basic package:
C. * Full coverage
(all identified equipment)
Feasibility study
Project Management
20 components analyzed by
RCM
10 components analyzed by
RCFA
Order of refineries to be treated with analysis has been agreed as RGE, RNS, RNP, according
to availability of experts to collected / verify data.
Data collection started by the end of December 2008 with Refinery Elemir and for other two
refineries in the first quarter of 2009. First preliminary RBI report prepared for RGE and
delivered in March 2009.
Several meetings were held in order to review the work progress (May 4, June 12, December
12, 2009) and to present plan for the further work. Two workshops were held as well in
Stuttgart (April 2010) with the aim to verify input data and to agree the type and contents of
the reports expected by NIS management.
Analysis have been done as required by the contract for Package B; based on their results
recommendation for improvement / optimization of inspection, maintenance and HSE
practice have been given.
Training, education and certification of NIS a.d. employees started in November 2008 and
finished in January 2010. Training has included both, theoretical courses in the field of risk
management and on-the job training in German companies.
2.1.2
2.1.2.1 Activities
NIS is the largest oil company in Southeast Europe. It is joint stock company and fifty one
percent of NIS shares is held by the Russian company Gazprom Neft. Corporate
headquarters are located in Novi Sad and Belgrade and production facilities are located
across the whole territory of Serbia. NIS is the only Serbian company which possesses an
integrated and well balanced system of production, refining and trade of crude oil and
petroleum products, as well as natural gas exploitation and which plays a significant role in
stability and security of energy supply.
The company deals with crude refining, sales of petroleum products, and exploitation of
hydrocarbons in Serbia and Angola. Annual NIS crude oil production totals ca. 1 million tons.
NIS owns two oil refineries (Figure 2), Panevo Oil Refinery and Novi Sad Oil Refinery, with
total refining capacity of ca. 7.3 million tons per year. There is an LPG production facility, so
called Elemir LPG refinery.
Oilfield services business deals with geophysical exploration, drilling and well testing , hydro
probing, transportation, workover and civil construction services. In addition to its retail
network (480 petrol stations), NIS also owns oil depots all over Serbia.
page 3
page 4
In 2007 NIS had a profit of approximately 9 billion RSD (US$ 170 million) and 262 billion
RSD (US$ 5 billion) of revenues. In 2008 total revenues was USD 4.7 billion.
2.1.3
page 5
the crude oil and dispatching the derivatives by barges. Crude oil and its derivatives can also
be loaded and unloaded at the Refinery's own railway transport facilities. There are also
tank-truck loading & unloading facilities.
Head office of the refinery is in Pancevo, Spoljnostarcevacka b.b and legally it is a part of the
joint-stock company NIS - Petroleum industry of Serbia owned Serbia and JSC Gazprom
Neft. Total number of employees is 2300.
Some of planned development projects are:
page 6
Description
Block I
Headquarter
Mashing workshop
Storage and garage
Technical security center
Trafo F
Entrance gate 2
Block II
Central wardrobe
Restaurant
Laboratory
Sample house
Trafo C
Block III
Block IV
Flare I and II
Storage tanks for slop and oil water
API separator
Pumpe house PK-4 with annex
Vessels with hydrogen and nitrogen
Block V
Block VI
Block VII
Block VIII
Block IX
page 8
No
Description
Pumps for fire fighting water
Block X
Block XI
Block XII
Block XIII
Block XIV
Block XV
Block XVI
Block XVII
Block XVIII
Block XIX
Block XX
Block XXI
Block XXII
Block XXIII
Trafo ST-35/6
Gate 1
Block XXIV
Railway building
Garage for locomotives
Loading installation for derivate
Unloading installation for crude oil and semi-products
Oil terminal with the building
Wagon
Sludge sediment
page 9
page 10
Entrance 1
o K-1 for the delivery of equipment investment
o K-1A for the workers and the fire exit and entrance
Entrance 2, K-2 entry for workers and materials for technical good stores
Entrance 3, K-3 input trailers for shipping products manufacturing
Industrial rail for transport of raw materials and shipping of products to the
production station Suburb
Docks on the River Danube on the right side of the road Pancevo - Starcevo.
Natural area named Pancevacki rit, between old and new road to Panevo
is very interesting wetland area. It is old type of environment, such used to exist
around all big lowland rivers in the past. This area is important for bird nesting. These
locations are in procedure for protection within international project Important Bird
Areas. This bog-land are also very interesting and important as place where could be
found different animal species which life circle and activities are closely connected with
nearness of water and bog-lends. It is important to notice that flora of this area has
not yet been investigated. Hence, there is a possibility to find there endangered water
plants.
Danube River islands (Forkontumac, Stefanac, Cakljanac, Brestovacka Ada,
Ivankovacka Ada) and natural, wooded area on the river banks of Danube and Tamis
river are natural areas important in many aspects of environmental point of view, but
without any level of protection. Like Pancevacki rit, this sites suppose to be under
protection as natural heritage and sites of potentially high biodiversity. These locations
are important for nesting a great number of birds; for example, one of them is
Haliaeetus albicilla, species considered as vulnerable according to IUCN ategorization.
It is important to notice that some fish species spawn on riversides and island sides.
River islands flora and fauna of the river banks, similarly to Pancevacki rit, have not
yet been investigated, so it can be expected to find there some endangered and
protected species. Jabucki rit and Glogonjski rit are remaining parts of marshes in the
lower reaches of the Tamis River, located northeastern of Panevo. These natural
areas are out of PTA of SZIC, but they are also important for protection of flora and
fauna biodiversity of this region. The importance of the residual wetland areas of
Panevo is also recognised at international level. According to the National Report
prepared for the 7th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) - 1995 marshlands around Panevo
are designated for inclusion in the Ramsar List in 2010.
page 11
Fauna of Fauna of the area comprises more than 280 species approximately. Some of these
species are threatened, according to IUCN categorization.
Population
According to the census in 2002. in the municipality of Pancevo lived 127,162 people and 23
different nationality, which speaks of a turbulent history and demographic situation of the
people in this region. About 8,000 reside in the Vojlovica and Topola quarters in the close
vicinity of Pancevo Refinery.
Geological and other characteristics
Geomorphology
Panevo is located in a flat area of fluvial deposits along the eastern banks of the Danube
River. The municipal territory is part of the Pannonian Basin. In a morphological sense, the
Danube river divides the region into 2 different units:
The region located in the north of the Danube river is part of the Pannonian Plate, with
altitude increasing from southwest (around 68 masl) to northeast. The city of Panevo
belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45 masl (2). Panevo
is placed on the edge of Banat loess terrace, on the ontact of two big morphological units
Banat loess terrace and alluvial plains of Danube and Tamis rivers. Alluvial plains extend
along Danube and Tamis rivers, in the direction of their flows, with an average elevation of
70-71 masl. The Banat loess terrace is mainly flat with relics of Tamis old flow in the form of
local depressions and an average altitude of 70 to 85 masl. Both, terrace and plains, are
protected from Tamis and Danube high waters by embankments along the rivers banks. The
city of Panevo belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45
masl.
Hydrology of the Panevo area
The region is characterized by a well developed hydrographic network by two typical lowland
rivers, Danube and Tamis, with numerous branches, meanders, old flow streams and
channels. The hydro graphic and hydrological characteristics of this region are of special
significance for determining the general water balance as well as the quantity of water lost to
Danube.
The largest and by far the most important surface water body is the Danube River, flowing
west-southwest of the investigated area. The area from the left river bank to the river
terrace on the east is flat and its called alluvial plain. In the recent past it was an area
regularly flooded by high waters of the Danube. In the last century the flood plain of the
Danube was protected from floods to become agricultural land. Amelioration of the area
included digging of a dense canal network, construction of an embankment along the whole
riverbank, drilling a few groups of abstraction wells and installation of many pump-stations
for (ground) water pumping from canals to the river.
In addition, Danube water level rised around 2-3 m by construction of Djerdap dam in
1980s. The result of all the above-mentioned works is that the Danube water level often
surpasses the ground level of its alluvial plain around Panevo, and almost constantly
surpasses the water level in drainage network. Another important factor of flow regime is
also the regime of Djerdap dam exploitation, making it very hard to determine flow regime
in more detail. On the Panevo monitoring station the mean water level of the Danube river
for year 2002 was 70,84mas, with minimal 70.06 masl and maximum 71.94 masl.
As for hydrological characteristics, maximal flows of Danube occur beginning of spring,
usually in April when it is around 7400 m3/s, minimal is in September with 3200 m3/s.
Based on hydrological data for the period 1997 - 2000 on water measuring profile-Panevo,
mean Danube flow in this region is 5.326 m3/s (3) . Maximal flow is a consequence of spring
time rainfalls and snow melting throughout the Danube watershed. Strong rains combined
with soil saturated by water from snow melting enable fast water run off that affect river
flow.
Upstream of Panevo, Tamis and Sibnica Rivers flows into the Danube. Tamis River flows
from northwest to southeast. It is regulated in its lower
part, near its mouth, and therefore it is much deeper here than upstream. Its regime is
directly dependent on the Danube regime. During the Danube maximal water levels, Danube
page 12
can not receive all the water from Tamis, thus creating backwater at Tamis that floods the
surrounding area. At minimal water level in its upstream parts at some points it almost dries
completely. West of the Tamis river there is the Sibnica River and a network of natural and
artificial canals, which are all directly dependent on the Danube regime.
The narrow area of Panevo, South Industrial Zone of Pancevo, next to the flood plain, and
the SZIC were built on backfilled material, by which the ground level was raised to an
altitude of around 75 masl. This had to be done because of the high groundwater level
especially during the maximum water level in Danube and the influence of Djerdap dam.
This caused the creation of an artificial aquifer under the zone (Azotara and Petrohemija) in
its inner parts practically independent from the Danube River, which was the purpose of
these amelioration works. Between the city of Panevo and the South Zone Industrial
Complex two parallel open canals have been constructed for industrial purposes. The
northern wider canal connects the fertilizer plant to the Danube. This is a navigable canal,
used by ships to carry bulk of raw materials and products, and is itself used as a raw water
source by the fertilizer and the petrochemical industries.
The southern canal is a wastewater canal that is used for discharging industrial effluent. Both
canals are approximately 2 km long. They are divided and surrounded by embankments all
the way from the plants to the Danube. The two canals both originate from the fertilizer
plant HIP Azotara. Those two canals are of great importance for the hydrology and
hydrogeology of SZIC. One the main purposes of canals is to drain the backfilled area, the
shallow aquifer, of the Industrial Complex making a local underground (hydro geological) sub
watershed. At the same time, the canal waters infiltrate the lower alluvial deposits of the
Danube, which means that those canals connect the artificial shallow aquifer with the main
alluvial aquifer.
Geology and Hydrogeology
The wider region around Panevo is composed entirely of significantly thick quaternary
deposits settled on older Neocene sediments, which are found
only in deep research boreholes. Geology of South Zone Industrial Complex area can be
divided into:
The Oil Refinery region belongs to the Banat loess terrace, southeast from Petrohemija. The
altitude of this first terrace from loessoide silt is higher then alluvial plain so there was no
need for backfilling as in case of Petrohemija and Azotara. There was just backfilling with the
purpose of levelling of original ground, which was slightly uneven. Oil refinery was
constructed on backfill heterogeneous material. Regarding the grain size analyses of this
heterogeneous material it is similar with sediments found beneath. The thickness of
backfilled material vary from 0 to 3,5 m. The altitude of Oil Refinery after backfilling is
around 74,21-76,93 masl, with slope from north to south. Sediments found beneath are
mostly presented by loessoide silt, since Refinery was built on Banat loess terrace made of
loess and loessoide silt. Thickness of this sediments, together with backfilled material, goes
from 4,5-12,5m, usually around 7-9m. Under this sediments starts the main aquifer made of
alluvial sands. Altitude of main aquifer overlying is on 61,72-70,94 m.a.s.l
Hydrogeology of Oil Refinery region do not have any specific characteristics comparing with
data given in chapter Hydrogeology of Panevo area. As it is mention before, backfilling of
this terrain has been done only to level the previous surface of the ground. There is two
underground waters with different hydrodynamic characteristics: aquifer with free water level
(formed in loessial loam) and confined aquifer formed in Quaternary and Neocene sediments.
Hydraulic conductivity of loessial loam is around 2x10-6 cm/s, and for main aquifer around
1,5x10-2 cm/s [RADUS doo, 2004]. Underground water level, for the period September
2001-August 2002, vary from 70,1-72,1 m.a.s.l. General direction of groundwater flow is
from north to south.
Terrain Tectonics
From geotectonic aspect, the investigation area of Panevo belongs to the south part of
Banat depression on the very border (Danube river) with the Zone of Uncover Neocene. The
oldest sedimentary rocks of Cretaceous age are folded and faulted during the Laramian
stage, between Senonian and Paleogene. During this period the basic tectonic framework
was formed. The tectonic movements in Neocene are weaker.
page 13
Ann.
Mean
value
38.2
35
42.2
53.1
62.2
84.6
60
50.7
54.7
41.2
48.8
51.8
662.5
Maximum
103
189
164.4
89.8
146.4 927.8
Year of
max.
value
Minimum
Year of
min. value
195
227.7 259.7
1987
1978
1981
2001
1987
1969
1999
1975
2001
1974
1980
1969
1999
2.2
3.4
2.2
14.4
12.9
7.6
4.2
0.3
334.5
1990
1987
1972
1968
1988
2000
1989
1992
1986
1965
1986
1972
2000
Lightning is high frequency event in summer. The level of underground water is about one
meter deep. The surface is brick earth covered with concrete.
Air Temperature
Data on medium monthly and annual air temperatures for the period 1961 - 2002 is shown
in Table 3. Mean long-term air temperature value for the period 1962-2002 is 11.3 C.
Analysis of the average monthly air temperature shows that January is the coldest month
with an average of 0.4 C while July is the hottest month with an average of +21.8 C.
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in Panevo reduced recording to the
data for Belgrade
J
Ann.
Mean
value
-0.4
2.0
6.3
11.7
17.1
20.2
21.8
21.5
17.2
11.7
6.0
1.2
11.3
Maximum
3.7
7.3
10.7
15.5
171.5
19.7
22.8
24.8
26.4
21.2
16.31
1.3
5.0
13.4
Year of
max.
value
1983
2002
2001
2000
2002
2000
1988
1992
1994
1966
1963
1985
2000
Minimum
-6.7
-4.0
0.6
0.6
7.5
18.1
19.3
17.7
13.6
8.5
0.8
-3.0
10.2
Year of
min. value
1964
1985
1987
1997
1991
1974
1979
1976
1996
1974
1988
2001
1978
page 14
High temperatures during the hot period of the year cause turbulences in the atmosphere
and strong vertical circulation that can favourably effect the dilution of emitted pollutants. It
is known that at a relative humidity higher that 55% and a temperature higher than 25C,
photochemical smog is formed.
In Panevo, these conditions are met on a couple of days of July and August. During the
winter period low temperatures and poor turbulences in the atmosphere enable temperature
inversions in Panevo. Under these conditions dispersion of polluting substances is poor and
concentration of polluting substances in the lower part of the atmosphere occurs. During this
period, therefore immission measurements can detect pollutants concentrations higher than
the law limit values.
Wind
Wind has an important and significant influence on Panevo climatic characteristcs and air
quality condition, since it could effect the transport and dilution of polluting substance.
Moreover, in specific climatic conditions, it could affect also the city of Belgrade. Wind profile
in the lowest layers of the atmosphere is greatly influenced by local topography, distribution
of water bodies and land ect.
The wind profile in the non-urbane part of Panevo is under the influence of relatively
smooth terrain. In case of break-through of large atmospheric systems cyclones, the
movement above Panevo is in accordance with the circulation in the system of synoptic
scales. At such times a medium to strong wind usually blows. In the urbane part of Panevo
we have increased ruggedness of urbane units that lead to modifications in wind speed and
wind direction. Meteorological station in Panevo doesnt have anemograph, so all the data
about wind are given from the Belgrade observatory. Frequency of winds from various
directions for Panevo wind rose - is given in
Figure 8.
page 15
Mean value
Maximum
Ann.
88.1
84.3
76.1
72.0
71.4
73.0
72.7
72.7
75.6
78.1
84.3
88.0
78.0
98
94
93
81
83
86
84
86
85
91
94
97
85.5
Year of max. value 1971 1971 1962 1966 1961 2002 2002 1975 1975 1975 1975 1970 1970
Minimum
Year of min. value
81
75
62
65
61
56
61
56
63
66
71
79
71.2
1985 1998 1972 1968 1992 2000 2000 2000 1986 1961 1963 1989 2000
page 16
With the processing capacity of 4.8 million tons per year, it is the biggest factory of this type
in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of
exporting 20% of its production.
Pancevo Refinery has several development projects (to be realized in next three years) in
order to reach the level of modern European refineries t three years to complete the
following development program:
MHC / HDT - Hydro treatment of FCC batch and diesel which allows reaching the
European specifications for gasoline and diesel fuel, increasing diesel production at the
expense of motor gasoline and increasing utilization by reducing fuel oil
Sour water stripper, Amine washing and Claus - supporting plants where extracted
sulfur is hydro treated and sent to be sale as elementary sulphur
On Line blending - which allows optimal mixing and shortens the time needed for
mixing and lower the number of tank
Modernization of facilities for receiving and shipping oil from tanks which includes
installation of modern measuring and control equipment and application of technical
solutions that enable the reduction of losses and the strict European emission
standards.
List of commercial products of Pancevo Refinery is given in Table 5 and storage capacities in
Table 6.
Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
page 17
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
Gases
Propane
PN
SRPS B.H2.130
Butane
BN
SRPS B.H2.132
Isobutene
IBN
PS RNP 36/99
PBS
SRPS B.H2.134
Propylene
PLN
PS RNP 26/99
Motor gasoline
Premium
MB 95
SRPS B.H2.220
BMB 95
PS RNP 2/99
Unleaded gasoline
Premium
Special gasoline
Special gasoline 35/105
SB 35/105
SRPS B.H2.267
SB 60/80
PS RNP 35/99
SB 65/95
SRPS B.H2.267
SB 65/105
SRPS B.H2.262
SBM
SB 75/130
SRPS B.H2.268
SB 80/120
SRPS B.H2.268
SB 140/200
SRPS B.H2.271
Ph.Jug.III
Aromatics
Benzene
BZ
SRPS B.H2.001
Toluene
TL
SRPS B.H2.002
Gasoline components
Primary gasoline for petrochemical plant
PB-PHK
PS RNP 37/99
PO GM
SRPS B.H2.310
GM
SRPS B.H2.331
Diesel fuel D1
D1
SRPS B.H2.410/1
Diesel fuel D2
D2
SRPS B.H2.410/1
NSD
SRPS B.H2.410/1
Petroleum
Lighting petroleum
Jet fuel
EKO EL
Diesel
Euro diesel
EKO 3 diesel
Fuel oil
Fuel oil extra light
EL
PS RNP 3/99
PS RNP 7/99
Bitumen
Bitumen for road BIT 200
Bitumen for road BIT 60
Polymer bitumen
BIT 200
SRPS U.M3.010
BIT 60
SRPS U.M3.010
PMB 50/90
Other products
page 18
Commercial
Standard
Code
Product
Liquid sulfur
TS
PS RNP 29/99
m3
Crude oil
200000
YUNA terminal
40000
LPG
5000
Naphtha
100000
Middle distillates
220000
Fuel oil
240000
page 19
Upon completion of the first phase of expansion and increase in primary processing in the
Refinery, it became necessary to build secondary units that provide deeper crude oil
processing, i.e. better crude oil yield.
Construction of the secondary units was implemented as the second phase of Refinery
expansion. However, before that, in 1982, Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen Units were
completed and commissioned. Design and equipment for both units were made in USSR.
Equipment and material for Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen were financed bythe guarantees
of banks from the loan of ex USSR to the Government of SFRY, and the funds in dinars were
provided by the Refinery.
page 21
By the end of nineties, it was already possible to compare the Refinery with the modern
world refineries. The built Refinery units enabled production structure in the ration 80% of
white, highly valuable products, to 20 % of black products.
Sanctions
Security Council introduced at the end of May 1992 sanctions to FR Yugoslavia. Embargo had
very serious consequences for the entire Petroleum Industry of Serbia, and thereby for the
Refinery as well. Direct damages from embargo are estimated to several billion dollars, and
indirect damages, in the form of delayed development, lost profit, and the like, can only be
assumed.
The last barges with the imported crude oil arrived in Refinery on 18 June 1992, and from
that moment on, Refinery was only processing domestic crude oil. Only about one sixth of
the available primary processing units were in operation, under the conditions of dinar and
foreign currency insolvency, multiple limitations in terms of procurement of spare parts and
chemicals, and the like.
At the time of embargo, S-100 was in operation, a small primary processing unit, and the
average processing capacity was 2.400 tons per day. This unit, before the sanctions, was
almost discarded it was used for occasional processing of slop as well as a spare unit. In
1991, this unit was revitalized and put on stand-by. It proved that the Refinery would not
have been able to operate without it during the sanctions. Namely, there was not enough
crude oil for the operation of big Atmospheric Distillation Unit. All through the sanctions, S100 operated without major shut-downs. During embargo, Platforming, Gas Concentration
and Udex with auxiliary units were in function, in addition to S-100.
Even in these conditions, continuity of crude oil processing was preserved, while the
development was not entirely neglected either. This time was used for reparation of process
equipment that had not been in operation, for the preparation of investment and
development projects, professional training and education of personnel, development of
information system.
Because of that, Refinery was ready when the sanctions were lifted: Primary processing units
were ready as early as November 1995. Immediately upon the arrival of greater quantities of
crude oil, the processing capacity was increased to 8.000 tons per day.
In 1996 and 1997, revitalization of all the Refinery units was carried out, and these were
successively being put into operation. This is without precedent that a refinery was
successfully restarted, after most of its units have been out of operation for almost 4 years.
Bombing and reconstruction
In the course of seventy-seven days of NATO bombing of Serbia, the Refinery was bombed
seven times. The first time it was bombed on 4 April 1999, when the Refinery Power Plant
was hit with two missiles. The following attacks took place on 12 April (twice), 13 April, 16
April, 18 April and 7 June. About 60 percent of Refinery units was destroyed, and almost all
of the units and facilities were damaged, to a greater or smaller extent. Direct damages from
the bombing were estimated to more than 400 million dollars, but considerable indirect
damages should be added to the final sum.
page 22
Refinery, with its own resources and means, with the employment of domestic contracting
companies, started reconstructing the damaged parts right away.
In the first phase of reconstruction, in less than three months, overhaul and reparation of the
damaged equipment on the major primary processing unit (AD-1) and on some of the units
in Block 5 were completed. In Handling Department and Power Plant, units and facilities
necessary for the operation of process units, acceptance of crude oil and dispatch of finished
products were made operational again. Derivative production was restarted as early as 26
September 1999.
The second phase, which implied a future modernization, was commenced right away.
Bitumen Production and Vacuum Distillation Units were reconstructed and commissioned. By
commissioning Boiler 1 in the Power Plant, Refinery repaired the unit that had been almost
completely destroyed. This resulted in the renewal of the Refinery's own generation of
steam.
The most complex and significant unit for a better crude oil yield in the Refinery, Fluid
Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCC), started operation on 1 September 2000.
In parallel with the reparation, reconstruction and modernization of many units also took
place. Some of the most important are as follows: replacement of the old control systems on
almost all units with the new ones that are used in EU countries, reconstruction of Vacuum
Distillation Unit in accordance with the design by Greek company Asprofos, for the purpose
of increasing the yield, improving the bitumen feed quality, more reliable operation and
easier unit management. FCC was modernized for the purpose of improving yield, and more
reliable and longer operation.
Refinery today
Panevo Oil Refinery is significant organizational part of and the biggest oil processing
company in NIS-Petrol, which is the biggest branch of shareholding company - Petroleum
Industry of Serbia. That is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffinic and aromatic
solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur. Primary and secondary units
for crude oil processing were constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of
various types of crude. With the processing capacity of 4,8 million tons per year, it is the
biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil
derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production.
Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge,
and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge.
Refinery is situated at exceptionally favourable location - 14 kilometers from Belgrade, the
biggest consumer center in Serbia. It has its own Jetty on the Danube and pipeline that
connects them, also truck loading facilities and railway station with the facilities for
derivative dispatch and crude oil acceptance.
Top priority for all employees in Panevo Oil Refinery is crude oil processing and production
of sufficient quantities of oil derivatives according to the European standards for domestic
requirements and creation of conditions for export, at the same time meeting all
environmental standards. That is achieved by constant upgrading of operation process
quality, better crude oil yield, power optimization and reduction in production costs, and for
that purpose, it has been planned to implement development projects defined in cooperation
with the foreign engineering companies (JGC, SHELL, ABB).
Particular attention is paid to environmental protection. During units reconstruction from
1999 to 2001, by investing into modernization and overhaul of the existing units,
reconstruction and construction of storage tanks and facilities, as well as the preparation of
basic designs for the future modernization, environmental component was integrated into the
entire production cycle: starting from crude oil storing, derivative production, to derivative
dispatch into transport means. Implementation of the planned development technological
projects is of common interest both for industrial zone and for Panevo town as a whole.
These projects aim at reaching European standards by restricting and controlling detrimental
substance emission into the air, soil and water.
2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant
Management system
Pancevo Refinery has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO
9001:2000 standard, for all its operations. The system is certified by Lloyds Registrar
page 23
Quality Assurance. Internal audits and management reviews are conducted once in a year in
accordance with written procedures.
Top management has establish policy of improving the quality of products, services and
environmental protection, which is achieved in the following manner:
introduces the environmental protection policy, programs and practice into every
activity, as an important element of managing all business operations.
Identifies all environmental aspects and puts under control the important ones.
Operates in accordance with the environmental protection laws and regulations.
Pursues permanent improvement in environmental protection.
Systematically reduces detrimental substance emission into the surroundings (air,
water, soil), saves resources and energy, minimizes use of detrimental substances
and the quantity of dangerous waste.
Minimizes the possibility of detrimental effect on the environment by preventive
measures and the measures to be taken in case of an accident.
Increases employees awareness of environmental protection significance, by
constant education and professional training, as well as by providing information in a
timely and proper manner.
Develops cooperation with the institutions of local and communal self-government,
responsible for environmental protection, as well as with all other interested parties.
Procures products not having or having minimum effect on the environment, and
induces suppliers to actively apply all the environmental protection measures,
including application of ISO 14001 in their business activities.
Safety Management System is a part of quality and environment management system and
includes some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for Health, Safety
and Environment issues is Risk Management division.
Critical situations, preparation for emergency situations
The Pancevo Refinery has for many years a fire protection plan, made according to the
requirements of fire protection regulation in Serbia. Existing plan prescribes in details the
behavior of workers in the event of fire and have been made for the following cases:
In 2009 Pancevo Refinery has developed a risk assessment of chemical accidents separately
for all relevant production and technological units. Based on this, protection plan in the case
page 24
of chemical accidents was developed on the level of production units as well as for the whole
plant. Elements of the plan are:
Qualification
PhD
MSc
BSc
202
College
68
Highly skilled
201
High-school
953
Skilled
137
Elementary school
Semiskilled
Unskilled
56
Occasional
work in
field
Permanent
work in
field
Office work
Production
404
254
50
100
Power plant
108
88
10
10
Manipulation
218
Maintenance
286
286
Laboratory
124
10
Unit / Section
Research and
investment
65
HSE
114
ICT
33
Other (headquarter,
finance, commercial
affairs)
237
page 25
114
65
273
Total:
1625
Location
Headquarter
441
Mashing workshop
227
Block V building
69
29
FCC building
82
S-3600 building
17
S-0250 building
18
57
Laboratory
126
HSE building
35
page 26
The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the
pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU
regulations.
It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk
Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An
explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the
Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive
will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented.
The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP
and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.
No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are
underground.
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About
10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has
been addressed by lightning.
The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the
protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance
and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task
is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an
external party.
Internal communication will be done by phone, radio and mobile phone.
2.1.4
page 27
page 28
not active, except in the Ribnjak neighborhood (between Sremska Kamenica and
Petrovaradin.
Refinery Novi Sad (NIS-RNS) is located in the economic zone of the city of Novi Sad - North
4. This zone is foreseen for building large commercial facilities and covers area of 1735
hectares. Refinery itself covers about 256 hectares of industrial space. The site is in northeastern part of the city of Novi Sad, south the site flows channel Danube-Tisa-Danube, while
on the north side is the street Put ajkakog odreda, the road for settlement Shanghai
(distance about 2 km). On the west side of the refinery are main storage are of NIS
NAFTAGAS-TRAFFIC with installations for filling oil and petroleum products.
On the south side are the production plants and warehouses, factories for the production of
artificial fertilizers "AGROHEM.
On the north-west side is located filling stations with storage tanks for liquid petroleum gas.
Distance from the bottling and storage space is about 250 meters. Along the east side lie the
pipeline installation.
This site has convenient traffic conditions. On the north side of the refinery site is a highway
E-7 (Belgrade - Novi Sad - Subotica) while on the west side is the main road M-7 (Backa
Palanka - Novi Sad - Zrenjanin). On the south side are lying waterways, the river Danube
and Novi Sad channel Savino Selo.
Micro location
Novi Sad Refinery is a complex of process and auxiliary facilities for processing crude oil,
storage facilities, transportation and manipulation utilities, research and laboratory space
and other supporting facilities. In the north part of the refinery there are pipeline
installations.
Refinery is fenced and secured, and the only access is possible from the street Put ajkakog
odreda where entrance gates are locating enabling access to the refinery from the road.
Inside the area of Novi Sad Refinery are located 13 production, manipulation and storage
units, including necessary infrastructure. General plan of the refinery is given on Annex and
list of units in Table 10. There are two main production lines in RNS:
Unit ID
Specification
page 29
Half-industrial unit
Unit
Unit ID
Specification
02-0100
0200
HPV
Water preparation
Cooling towers
65
30
53
KRB-400
U-2100
U-2200
Vacuum distillation
U-2300>
U-2400
U-2500
U-2600
Unibon unit-Desulphurization
U-2700
Supporting systems
Flare
Fuel - secondary
U-5800
U-4500
U-100
Atmospheric distillation
U-200
Vacuum distillation
HF-400
Hydro finishing
HFH-400
KR-500
U-550
U-300
Lube oil 1
Lube oil 2
Bitumene production
Novolin
Oil blending with piping and pump stations
Tanks area of profit centre Novolin
Meteorological, geological and other data
Climate
page 30
Novi Sad has a moderate continental climate, with four seasons. Autumn is longer than
spring, with long sunny and warm periods. Winter is not so severe, with an average of 22
days of sub-zero temperature. January is the coldest month, with an average temperature of
-1.9 C. Spring is usually short and rainy, while summer arrives abruptly. The coldest
temperature ever recorded in Novi Sad was -30.7C (-19.3F) on January 24, 1963; and the
hottest temperature ever recorded was 41.5C (110.7F) on July 6, 1950. Average
temperatures are given inTable 11.
The southeast-east wind Koava, which blows from the Carpathians and brings clear and dry
weather, is characteristic of the local climate. It mostly blows in autumn and winter, in 2-3
days intervals. The average speed of Koava is 25-43 km per hour but certain strokes can
reach up to 130 km/h. In winter time, followed by a snow storm, it can cause snowdrifts.
Also it can cause temperatures to drop to around -30C.
Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia)
Month
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Year
Avg.
high C
(F)
2.5
(36)
5.7
(46)
11.5
(57)
17.2
(67)
22.5
(76)
25.2
(81)
27.2
(85)
27.2
(85)
23.7
(77)
18
(68)
10.3
(54)
4.5
(44)
16.3
(65)
Avg low
C (F)
-4.4
(29)
-2.3
(32)
1.2
(38)
5.8
(46)
10.6
(55)
13.6
(60)
14.7
(62)
14.2
(62)
11.2
(56)
6.3
(47)
2.2
(40)
-1.9
(33)
5.9
(47)
Rainfall
mm
(in.)
38
(1.5)
35
(1.4)
41
(1.6)
47
(1.8)
57
(2.2)
82
(3.2)
61
(2.4)
55
(2.2)
36
(1.4)
35
(1.4)
46
(1.8)
44
577
(1.7) (22.7
)
Winds
The presence of winds opposites directions is characteristic of this region (Figure 14). Most
dominant winds are from two different directions; south-east (18.2%) and north-west
direction (17%). The third kind of wind is western and the least one which can be seen on
this area is Sothern wind. These winds are characterizing the whole Pannonia Basin.
The dominant south-east wind KOSAVA is blowing from December to March, in winter part of
the year. North-west wind is dominating from June to September, in summer part of the
year. The calm weather without the wind is mostly presented in June, July, August and
September. Strength of the wind is between 0,81 1,31 m/s.
page 31
F
7.8
6.2 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.7 7.1 7.7
Ann.
5.7
page 32
On the loess terrace the level of the underground water rises from October to April.
Oscillations are within 1 to 1.5 m, while the deepness is mostly more then 4 m.
Freatske water are high polluted. Not treated waste water go to the open sewage line, cricks
from the mountain Fruska Gora and drain to the underground, to the not deep water layers
which are use for individual or public water supply. All human facilities in Backa and partly
Novi Sad are drained using open channels.
Areas of seismic activities
In the region seismic activities are possible with intensity 6 - 8 MCS. On location of Novi Sad
Refinery possible earthquake with intensity of 7 MCS.
Geological and hydrological characteristiques
Environment of Novi Sad is characterized by presence of two different morphological units:
Fruska Gora mountain and the Pannonian basin. Their genesis is related to strong orogenic
movements with the participation of deflection. Fruska Gora is an area of erosion, and the
Pannonian plain area reservoirs (lake sediments, les, sand) and erosion (alluvial plain).
Novi Sad Refinery lies on the oldest alluvial carbonate coat that is sandy clay and to some
extent consolidated. In the area of Novi Sad shallow groundwater and deeper ones, up to
300m are of the great importance. The water level in alluvial area is directly related to the
water level of the Danube. High groundwater show significant amplitude, in contrast to the
deep groundwater, which show greater stability.
Wastewater is directly discharged in an open canal network, creeks of Fruska Gora and
further drained in underground, in the shallow water-bearing layers, which are used for
individual and public water supply.
The entire area is Refinery fill-reflux sand thickness from 1:50-2.00m.
Flora, fauna and protected natural and cultural properties
Natural advantages for plant species in the area of Novi Sad and surrounding are not the
same. They are primarily caused by differences in relief, the differences in the amount of
underground water, in geological and pedological soil composition, anthropogenic influence
and other factors.
Biographical characteristics of the area corresponding to the rim of the Pannonia regions.
Observing the physical and geographical distribution of fauna, flora observed the following
characteristic areas:
public storage.
Characteristics of key units in the refinery are given Table 14. Novi Sad Refinery produces up
to 2.5 million tons of crude per year. There are two main production lines in the refinery:
Unit
License
Capacity
(t/year)
Constructe
d
Pritchard
500.000
1968
USSR
2.000.000
1985
USSR
1.200.000
1985
UOP (TPL)
560.000
1985
Platforming U-2400
UOP (TPL)
430.000
1985
UOP (TPL)
60.000
1985
UOP (TPL)
240.000
1985
Badger
500.000
1974
Badger
550.000
1974
Bitumen
Badger
200.000
1974
Texaco
240.000
1981
Texaco
89.000
1985
Texaco
56.000
1981
development of production of all types of lube oils and bitumen (program ''Lube Oil
Plant'' which was effectuated through phases Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II)
and
fuel production development (''Fuel Plants'' program). Lube oil and bitumen
production was effectuated through phases (Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II).
page 34
First phase of Lube Oil Plant I program in 1973 involved construction of the following
production units:
In 1975 realization of the most elaborate RNS program, called Fuel II Plant was started
parallel with the commencement of Yugoslav pipeline construction, the founder of which,
amongst others, was RNS.
Fuel II Plant Process Units involved construction of following production units:
1.
2.
In 1976 Atmospheric Distillation Unit, Vacuum Distillation Unit and Bitumen Production Unit
(Lube Oil Plant I program) were commissioned.
Second phase of Lube Oil Plant II program involved construction of the following production
units:
1979 Fuel II Plant process units construction was started and 1980 Lube Oil Blending Plant
was constructed and started up. 1981 Start-up of Hydrofinishing Unit and other
accompanying units. 1984 Fuel II Plant program Primary Process Units were started up with
the delivery of the first quantity of imported crude oil via Yugoslav pipeline 1986 Fuel II Plant
program Secondary Process Units were started up.
2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant
Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards
Preventive measures
There is no major maintenance period as the different establishment is only running between
20% and 50% or their normal capacity (missing feed).
The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the
pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU
regulations.
Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year. Gas
installations will also be inspected if the duration of the shut down period is more than one
month.
Preventive constructional measures
No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are
underground.
Preventive technical measures
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to some initial fires (each time fire
on the top of a column). This part is also protected by earthing. In general the normal
protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection
measure earthing is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and
continuity will be done.
Additional measures
Internal communication will be done by radio, phone and mobile phone.
Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident
page 35
The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. Evacuation training has
been only done for parts of the establishment. Rescue and emergency plans has been
establishment now. Sub contractors have to pass training (fire protection and workplace
safety) and to do an exam.
There is only one drainage system for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The fire
water retention (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) will be done by hydrants
connected to basins.
Fire extinguishing by foam can be down by fire brigade.
An automatic gas detection system does not exist. A fire detection will be done by optical
control. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not exist. A system for automatic
cooling of the tanks.
Fires will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for
gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed last year.
An alarm plan in the establishment exist. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will
be informed by radio to leave the establishment.
Operating Fire fighting unit within the Fire protection Service is located on two locations on
refinery territory. Staffing of the unit, 82 persons, is designed by the Plan of Fire protection
of OD RNS, and approved by MUP of Serbia. Actually there are 69 persons working in this
unit, as shown in Table 1.
Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of Novi Sad refinery
Position taken
Working position
Planned
Workers of
the refinery
Workers of
subcontractors
Total
number
Manager of operating
unit of fire brigade
Shift leader of
operating unit of fire
brigade
10
Fireman, department
leader
16
13
13
Driver, fireman
16
10
10
20
Fireman, operator
25
16
UKUPNO
69
39
19
58
Vehicles
Motor pumps
Type
Capacity
Mercedes VP 33/43
6000/6000
4000/5000/1000
4000/5000/1000
FAP S 2x2000
4000
Rosenbauer
3 pcs
Ziegler
1pc
Honda
5 pcs
2 pcs
page 36
Mobile equipment
Type
Capacity
2 pcs
stabile
14 pcs
Mobile
4 pcs
Beside the above mentioned mobile equipment, operating firefighting brigade has the
following multipurpose equipment:
-
water/foam nozzles
manifolds / collectors
vatrogasne armature
insulation facilities
personal protection equipment (suits for fire approaching, suits for entering
into fire, fire helmets
Stara vatrogasnica
MIX-stanica
Terminal JP Transnafta
Meaona Goriva II
Capacity
Available
75.000 liters
Powder Monex
15.125 kg
10.000 liters
10.000 liters
Almost all tanks are provided with stabile firefighting and cooling systems.
Fire protection of Lube oil I and Lube oil II units
These units are provided with ring hydrant net, stable and mobile monitors, as well as with
numerous fire fighting devices of different types. A fire on process units segments is
extinguished from station MIX-stanica, with additional water pressure provision from
station Stara vatrogasnica (and if necessary from Meaone - Goriva II). Station MIXstanica is equipped with two tanks with extracte for fire extinguish, each with capacity of 16
m3, pumps and devices for extracted mixture, as well as with the piping for emulsion
distribution for fire extinguish on of process unit segments and related storage area.
The whole refinery is connected with Fire alarms system, with 24 hours service on both
locations.
2.1.4.5 Description of processes
Main units in Lube oil part of Novi Sad refinery are:
For the analysis within the project, units U 100 and U 200 are considered.
Atmospheric distillation unit, U 100
U-100 processes domestic crude oil Velebit and Kelebija, with capacity of 1500 t/day. Both
crude oil are naphtha origin.
Atmospheric distillation unit consists of following connected section:
desalter section
heating section
Gasolin
Kerosene
Atmospheric gas oi
Light residue.
Environment
effect
Crude oil
Cancerous
Water organism
Crude gasoline
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
2.200
Kerosene
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
16.000
Gas oil
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
41.200
Atmospheric residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
140.600
Name
Name
Raw
material
Product
By-product
Physical
properties
Quantity (t)
200.000
page 38
Name
Effect to the
health
Environment
effect
Physical
properties
Irritant
No data
available
corrosive
Deemulgator
Irritant,
Potential
cancerous
stable
Anticorrosion
inhibitor
Irritant,
Dangerous to
drink
Harmful for
water organism
corrosive
Ammonium
hydroxide
Toxic, Irritant
Toxic
Name
Chemicals
Sodium hydroxide
Quantity (t)
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present: H2S in waste
gas, SO2 in flue gas
Vacuum distillation unit, U 200
Vacuum distillation unit U 200 treats atmospheric residue of crude oil Velebit, Kelebija and
imported crude oil. Products are:
VD-1
VD-2
VD-3
VD-4
paraffins slop,
heavy residue.
Heating section,
Distillation section,
Vacuum group,
Production:
Power plant
Laboratory
Maintenance.
page 39
Product
Name
Effect to the
health
Environment
effect
Physical
properties
Quantity
(t)
Atmospheric residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
160.000
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
12.000
VD1
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
13.000
VD2
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
VD3
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
VD4
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
20.000
Paraffins slop
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
15.000
Vacuum residue
Cancerous
Water organism
Flammable
liquid
60.000
Anticorrosion
inhibitor
Irritant,
dangerous to
drink
Harmful for
water organism
corrosive
By-product
Chemical
Neutralizer
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present H2S in waste
gas and SO2 given in U 100 while they have the common chimney.
2.1.5
Propane, 45 t/day
n-Butane, 34 t/day
isobutene, 38 t/day
Debutanizer gasoline, 60 t/day
Process oil, 5 t/day and
Gasoline, Gt 4,2 t/day.
page 40
page 41
Legend:
1. Process unit
4. Separator
7. Control room
2. Process furnace
5. Workshop
8. Boiler
3. Compressor unit
6. Generator building
9. Storage area
page 42
19 Earth laguna
16. Laboratory
FEB
MAR
APR
MAJ
JUN
JUL
AVG
SEP
OKT
NOV
DEC
0.3
3.3
2.0
6.6
6.5
12.2
11.7
17.3
17.5
23.4
20.8
26.7
22.3
28.3
22.3
28.9
16.8
23.1
11.9
17.7
6.3
10.3
0.8
3.8
Tn()
ApsTx()
-2.5
17.7
-2.0
20.2
1.7
27.7
6.4
30.1
11.4
33.5
14.7
38.0
16.0
38.7
16.1
38.7
11.6
34.2
7.3
30.0
3.0
23.6
-1.9
14.9
ApsTn()
b.d.mraz
-6.7
2.2
-0.2
0.1
6.0
0.0
6.5
0.0
7.2
0.0
2.2
0.0
-8.6
2.7
-10.5 -23.1
8.2
19.1
0.1
66
1.9
63
7.4
65
11.8
65
12.6
64
1.8
71
0.1
75
Tsr()
Tx()
b.d.trops.
U(%)
SS(h)
b.d.vedrih
0.0
84
0.0
76
0.0
67
0.0
80
65.9 120.6 164.3 187.4 251.4 285.4 287.3 284.4 204.0 158.1 89.1
0.0
85
58.6
2.9
5.9
5.4
4.2
5.6
6.5
9.1
11.9
6.0
6.2
4.1
2.8
b.d.tmurnih
14.7
8.4
7.6
8.9
6.4
4.3
4.1
3.8
5.6
6.9
12.0
16.0
RR(mm)
34.3
24.1
26.1
45.9
51.0
81.9
66.5
39.3
62.2
51.5
52.8
50.4
maxRR(mm) 30.7
20.4
22.9
30.4
52.5
62.5
72.3
49.1
60.0
45.9
47.5
44.2
rr>0.1(mm)
10.9
8.7
8.8
11.4
11.4
11.7
10.2
7.7
11.0
8.9
10.8
11.8
rr>10(mm)
1.1
0.3
0.7
1.3
1.0
2.5
1.7
1.2
2.0
1.1
1.8
1.3
b.d.sneg
5.0
5.3
2.1
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
1.9
5.1
b.d.s.p.
11.3
7.6
1.5
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.9
8.4
b.d.grad
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather parameters for Zrenjanin region
GOD
PRO
LET
JES
ZIM
VEG
Tsr()
11.6
11.9
21.8
11.7
1.0
17.6
Tx()
16.8
17.6
28.0
17.0
4.6
23.6
Tn()
6.8
6.5
15.6
7.3
-2.1
11.9
ApsTx()
38.7
ApsTn()
-24.6
page 43
b.d.mraz
82.0
13.5
0.0
10.9
57.6
5.0
b.d.trops.
35.7
2.0
31.8
1.9
0.0
35.7
U(%)
72
65
65
75
82
67
SS(h)
2156.5
603.1
857.1
451.2
245.1
1658.0
b.d.vedrih
70.6
15.2
27.5
16.3
11.6
49.5
b.d.tmurnih
98.7
22.9
12.2
24.5
39.1
40.0
586.0
123.0
187.7
166.5
108.8
398.3
RR(mm)
maxRR(mm)
72.3
rr>0.1(mm)
123.3
31.6
29.6
30.7
31.4
72.3
rr>10(mm)
16.0
3.0
5.4
4.9
2.7
10.8
b.d.sneg
19.9
2.5
0.0
2.0
15.4
0.5
b.d.s.p.
31.8
1.6
0.0
2.9
27.3
0.1
b.d.grad
1.1
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.9
Legend:
Tsr ()
Tx ()
Tn ()
ApsTx ()
ApsTn ()
b.d.mraz
b.d.trops.
U (%)
SS (h)
b.d. vedrih
b.d. tmurnih
RR (mm)
maxRR(mm)
rr>0.1(mm)
rr>10(mm)
b.d.sneg
b.d.s.p.
b.d.grad
The average yearly air humidity value in the Zrenjanin region is 78.5%; the lowest monthly
value of daily relative air humidity in July is 69% and the highest in December 85%.
Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July
TSv (oC)
Tmv (C)
R (%)
14>
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
18,1
25,4
19,1
20,5
16,0
18,1
16,4
16,7
80
50
77
69
Tmv (C)
R (%)
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
14
21
Aver.
-2,5
1,0
-1,4
-3,0
-3,0
0,0
-1,9
-1,8
85
90
76
85
Air pressure
In Zrenjanin and wider surroundings the air pressure decreases in the period January April,
and increases. The average value of the air pressure in a year is about 1006 mbar, the
highest is in January, 1010 mbar and lowest in April, 1003 mbar. In October this value is
about 1008 mbar (81 m of see-height).
Precipitation
Average frequency of days with strong precipitation (9.5 mm) is 16,4 days per year, e.g.
13,1% of total number of days with precipitation, what is very law value.
The most of those days appear in May, average 2.2 days, with probability of 7%, and the
lowest number of those days is in October. The highest value was recorded in July. In
summers it happens that one day precipitation is higher then in winter period or in transition
seasons.
Wind
Frequency (%o) and velocity of wind (m/s) are given in Table 24. Weather with no wind
appears mostly in July (91%o), and the lowest freqancy is in February (63%o). The Figure
18 shows wind rose for Zrenjanin and this applies for Elemir as well.
Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind
N
NE
SE
SW
NW
Frequency
97
57
80
205
125
77
157
138
Velocity
2.4
1.4
1.9
2.9
2.8
2.1
2.6
2.8
page 46
Safety problem
There are no safety problems if no electricity will be
delivered. Within less than 5 minutes the internal
generator system will take over the supply of
electricity.
Electricity
Fuel gas
Nitrogen
Qualification
RGE
PhD
M.Sc.
B.Sc.
10
College
Naftagas
Highly skilled
High-school
43
Skilled
14
Elementary school
Semiskilled
Unskilled
Total
45
77
46
Responsible for safety aspects in the whole NIS a.d. is the central HSE department of NIS
a.d. and NIS Naftagas Safety department (Department for systematic support - EMS, Safety,
QMS, IMS) and this department is delegating one person to the RGE for HSE duties.
Nevertheless safety is one of the major points of the philosophy of the company.
Management systems are certified and scope of certification is shown in Table 27. Policy
established by top management withing integrated management system is presented in
Annex 12.
Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of certification
Organizational part
Evrocert certificates
IQ Net certificates
Issue date
Number
Issue date
Number
04.12.2003
1081/00
22.12.2003
AT-2808/0
Geophysical Institute
07.12.2003
1052/01
22.12.2003
Drilling
04.12.2003
1055/01
22.12.2003
AT-2840/0
Special works
06.12.2003
1047/01
22.12.2003
AT-3338/0
Maintenance
10.12.2003
1049/01
22.12.2003
AT-2448/0
12.12.2003
1058/01
22.12.2003
AT-3120/0
page 47
Organizational part
Evrocert certificates
IQ Net certificates
Issue date
Number
Issue date
Number
Hidrosonda
05.12.2003
1059/01
22.12.2003
AT-3121/0
18.08.2006
18.08.2006
1226/00
1023/00
28.09.2006
28.09.2006
AT-00085/0
AT-05400/0
page 48
Description
3
1.
1100 m
2.
2 m3 of foam
3.
30
4.
10
5.
6.
10
7.
10 t raw gasoline
Propane 45 t/day
n-Butan 34 t/day
izo-Butan 38 t/day
Verry toxic
1)
Quantity (t)
5
2)
31.
Toxic
32.
Oxidizing
3)
10
Explosive
4)
10
33.
34.
Eco toxic
10
5)
10
page 49
35.
Flamable gases
36.
7)
Slef flamable
6)
10
50
8)
37.
Solid flamable
38.
39.
40.
Flamable liquids
50
9)
10)
50
1000
5000
General
It is commonly accepted that some inspection on the equipment and piping is necessary to
validate the expected condition of the items as well as to assure the integrity of the plant.
However it is difficult to determine exactly how much inspection effort is required. An RBI
analysis assists to determine the required effort by providing three key parameters, the
likelihood of failure of the item, the consequence of failure of the item and the risk from the
combination of likelihood and consequence of failure.
The purpose of a RBI analysis is to focus inspection activities on those pieces of equipment
where failure risks associated with an active damage mechanism are highest.
It should be noted that releases have two main causes, one is failure due to material
degradation, which can be inspected for and the other is a system error, e.g. an operator
error where inspection cannot assist.
Risk based inspection planning is a methodology which prioritizes inspection activities on the
basis of the actual risk reduction associated with each specific activity. It does this through
the following steps:
identify the main active damage mechanisms and possible scenaria HAZOP analysis
Calculate the likelihood of failure for each piece of equipment as function of the
different damage mechanisms, the rate of degradation and time in service
Combine the likelihood and the consequence numbers to calculate the risk associated
with each piece of equipment and rank the equipment according to the risk results
Develop the inspection program based on the inspection costs versus the inspection
benefits.
2.2.2
The summaries of process description and PFDs for each plant were first reviewed to obtain a
preliminary understanding of the process and the equipment functions. The equipment and
piping items were identified from the PFDs.
Each item was entered in the master workspace in process order. This database was
supported by piping specifications, equipment data sheets, process stream compositions,
operating conditions and other relevant documents. The preparation of this database was an
extensive process.
The datasheets in Excel format were used to gather the data. The key data are also marked
on the PFDs for easy reference.
page 50
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system
page 51
2.2.3
The damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time, gradually
weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure is predicted. These
damage mechanisms include internal corrosion and external damage under insulation.
Damage mechanisms for the process units were identified based on supplied data, interviews
with the staff, standard industry process knowledge and using the API documents, together
with R-Tech material and corrosion expertise.
The following inspectable active or potentially active damage mechanisms have been
identified and the corrosion circuits are also developed.
The potential damage mechanisms include:
2.2.4
The likelihood of failure of a piece of equipment or pipe is a direct function of the nature and
rate of the degradation mechanisms to which it is subjected. The essential steps are to:
page 52
Consider the age (Note - in this study a (5) years look ahead was made to give a risk profile
for June 2012), this is to identify equipment with risk that could exceed the inspection
targets between the upcoming and the following plant shut down.
When the likelihood of failure is being assessed, the calculation routine is based on the
simple premise that unexpected catastrophic failures occur when degradation happens faster
than expected. The routine therefore looks at the what if scenarios of the corrosion rate
being either twice or even four times the predicted rate and calculates the likelihood of
failure compared with the operational conditions.
It also takes into account the current confidence in the condition based on the nature of the
inspections previously performed and their ability to characterize the extent and rate of the
different damage mechanisms.
These factors are combined by the software to produce a value for the likelihood of failure for
each damage mechanism. This is expressed as a Likelihood Factor, which is a number to be
applied to the generic failure frequency of the particular item. If no damage mechanisms
have been identified, the Likelihood Factor may be 0.5 indicating that the component is 50%
less likely to fail than the industry average for such components. If a severe damage
mechanism is found and the item has not been thoroughly inspected for some time the
Likelihood Factor may be in the thousands indicating that the component may be much more
likely to fail than the industry average and that an inspection is needed urgently.
The general approach is to address those items in the order of the decreasing Likelihood
Factor, as indicated in Table 30.
Table 30: Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor
Likelihood Factor
Value
Likelihood Factor
>1000
100<Likelihood
Factor<1000
10<Likelihood
Factor<100
1<Likelihood
Factor<10
2.2.5
Action
Immediate action should be taken, prioritised by risk. Select
the highest risk item with a value in this range and perform
appropriate action. A first step should always be careful
checking of the input data for errors. If this does not resolve
the problem, a highly effective inspection appropriate to the
damage mechanism should be performed.
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Address these items last. Since values in this range indicate
a potential, but not necessarily severe, problem. Action on
these items may be delayed until all other items have been
addressed or until a convenient time, such as a scheduled
shutdown within the time frame considered in the RBI
analysis.
Based on the process flow diagrams (PFDs) and discussion with the risk & process engineers,
each item of equipment was assigned to an inventory group. This group represents the fluid
that could escape in the event of a leak at any one of the items in the group. Each
equipment item is then associated with two inventories, its own and the group inventory.
The consequences are calculated taking into account the nature and amount of the fluid
released. The amount and rate of fluid released depends upon factors such as the size of the
hole, the fluid viscosity and density and the operating pressure. The rupture of a large
diameter high-pressure pipe or vessel obviously has a different consequence than a pinhole
leak at a small diameter low-pressure pipe and this method quantifies that difference.
Each piece of equipment or piping has a certain generic (industry average) probability of
failing either by a pinhole type leak, a medium size hole, a large hole or a rupture. The
page 53
consequence of each type of failure is calculated and combined with the probability for that
failure; to calculate the overall risk associated with each piece of equipment.
2.2.6
There are many costs associated with any failure of equipment in a process plant. These
include, but are not limited to:
The approach used in API RBI is to consider all of these costs on both an equipment specific
basis and an affected area basis. Thus, any failure (loss of containment) has costs associated
with it, even when the release of the hazardous material does not result in damage to other
equipment in the unit or serious injury to personnel. Recognizing and using this fact presents
a more realistic value of the consequences associated with a failure. Since the costs include
more than just business interruption, the approach used for quantitative API RBI analysis is
called the financial consequence approach.
The financial consequence of a loss of containment and subsequent release of hazardous
materials can be determined by adding up the individual costs discussed above:
FC=FC
cmd+FC
affa+FC prod+FCinj+FCenviron
The basic method of risk analysis as presented in API RBI is not changed for the financial risk
analysis. The risk is still calculated as the consequence of failure (now expressed as cost in
dollars) times the probability of failure.
For a rigorous and flexible analysis, the consequences (costs) are evaluated at the hole size
level. Risk is also evaluated at the release hole size level by using the probability of failure
associated with each release hole size. The total risk is calculated as the sum of the risks of
each release hole size.
2.2.7
This is now a very simple step, where the risk associated with each piece of equipment is
essentially given by the formula:
RISK = Likelihood of Failure x Consequence of Failure
The risk is the combination of two key terms:
Consequence of failure
Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk as
an inspection prioritization tool.
The consequences are calculated based on fluid properties, temperatures, pressures and
inventory.
The likelihood is based on generic or average failure frequency data.
An analysis is then performed considering important failure mechanisms for each piece of
equipment to determine if it is more, or less likely to fail than average. The result is then
used to modify the likelihood of failure in this study. The consequence and the likelihood are
then combined to give a risk value for each piece of equipment.
A high-risk item may be high risk due to either a high likelihood of failure or a low
consequence of failure or conversely a high consequence of failure and a low likelihood of
failure.
An inspection program can only influence the value of the likelihood of failure, not the
consequence. No matter how much inspection is performed the consequence is unchanged.
Therefore, where a high-risk item is driven by the consequence value, other actions such as
more precise analysis such as Quantitative Risk Assessment and upgrading of mitigation
system may be considered.
page 54
The overall ranking is then done according to the RIMAP risk matrix, shown in the Figure 23.
Alternatively, the risk can be represented in the NIS risk matrix, as shown in Figure 24.
2.2.8
The remaining life for the equipment and piping items based on the hoop stress was
performed according to the recommendations given in the API 581 BRD, and Steinbes R-
page 55
Tech Software iRIS-Petrol has been used for the analysis. It accounts for both internal
thinning and external corrosion rates. The remaining life is calculated as follows:
1.
2.
in which,
Whereby
State i = 1, is when the thinning rate is as given by the user
State i = 2, is when the thinning rate is 2 times the given rate
State i = 3, is when the thinning rate is 4 times the given rate
Pi is the probability of state i.
(Nominal Remaining Life)i is the remaining life calculated for state i.
A more complex equation is used when external thinning is included or where liner is
involved.
2.2.9
The key piece of data for the development of an inspection plan is the Likelihood Factor. The
Likelihood Factor for each piece of equipment is a composite i.e.
Likelihood Factor (LF) = LFThinning + LFCUI(ClSCC) +
page 56
Since an inspection needs to be tailored to fit the particular type of damage expected at a
particular piece of equipment, the key considerations are:
As agreed with NIS, inspection planning targets are adopted for this inspection planning. For
each equipment item, the driving damage mechanism is identified for inspection. Based on
the inspection planning targets the Likelihood Factor for the relevant driving damage
mechanism is then reduced by assigning appropriate number and effectiveness of inspection.
This is generated by software as inspection.
The actual inspection scope to satisfy the assigned effectiveness is then developed based on
API inspection guideline for each relevant damage mechanisms, as given in the tables below.
Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Intrusive Inspection
Non-intrusive Inspection
A
Highly Effective
B
Usually Effective
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
No inspection
E
Ineffective
Intrusive Inspection
Non-intrusive Inspection
A
Highly Effective
B
Usually Effective
page 57
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
Intrusive Inspection
Non-intrusive Inspection
No inspection
No inspection
Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Insulation
Removed
Insulation Not
Removed
AND
B
Usually Effective
AND
C
Fairly Effective
page 58
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Insulation
Removed
Poorly Effective
Insulation Not
Removed
>95% external visual inspection
prior to removal of
insulation
AND
AND
E
Ineffective
No inspection or ineffective
inspection technique or <95%
visual inspection
OR
no inspection or ineffective
inspection technique
Intrusive
Inspection
Non-intrusive
Inspection
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
>
OR
>60% radiographic testing
Inspection
Visual inspection of >95% of the exposed surface area with
follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
page 59
B
Usually Effective
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Inspection
A
Highly Effective
B
Usually Effective
C
Fairly Effective
D
Poorly Effective
E
Ineffective
Visual
2.2.10
Software used
Software used for analysis, R-Tech iRIS-Petro RBI, is fully based on API methodology and
recommendadtion contained in the document API RP 581 Risk Based Inspection Technology,
Second edition (see references [1]).
The software is used for assessment of the risk on equipment/subequipment level and for
developing and evaluating inspection plan and strategies.
Software is described in Chapter 3, together with instructions for the users.
HAZOP
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) technique provides a means of systematically reviewing
the design and operation of a system to identify the potential occurrence of hazardous
events (impacts on people, property, or the environment), or operability problems (impacts
on process efficiency or productivity). It is based on the premise that a hazard is not realized
if the process is always operated within its design intent.
The HAZOP technique involves structured brainstorming to look for deviations from the
design intent. Structure is provided by the use of a set of guidewords. The guidewords are
applied to various aspects of the design intent, i.e. process parameters, to develop
deviations. The team determines if the deviation could realistically occur and, if there are
realistic causes, evaluates whether the consequences are significant, as defined by the scope
of the study.
The team may then evaluate whether existing safeguards are adequate considering the
causes and consequences of the deviation. The safeguards may be either in the form of
hardware or procedures. In some cases, the team may make recommendations for corrective
action, for study to determine an optimal solution, or for additional investigation to
determine whether a problem exists that warrants action.
The primary objective of the classical form of HAZOP study is the identification of problems
or possible accident scenarios. This information alone is not sufficient to make decisions on
page 60
what should be done. It is useful if a simple risk estimate can be provided for each problem
in order to provide a basis for deciding on the best allocation of resources to address key
problems. Consequently HAZOP-PC provides a means for qualitatively estimating the
likelihood and severity of each problem identified in order to develop a risk estimate.
HAZOP studies can be performed for new plants where the design is nearly firm and
documented, or for existing plants where a significant redesign is planned, or where no
previous study has been performed. HAZOP studies can be conducted not just for processes
but also for storage, transportation, and other systems.
While the HAZOP technique is the most comprehensive hazard analysis method of those
available, it cannot provide complete assurance that all hazards have been identified.
HAZOP Team
HAZOP team members need to be knowledgeable of the process and its operation, at least
some of the team should come from the operating facility. A typical team may consist of the
following members:
Team Leader
Process Engineer
Operations Supervisor
Safety Engineer
Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor
Facilities/Mechanical Engineer
HAZOP Process
Typical HAZOP process is illustrated on the Figure 25.
page 61
2.3.2
Seveso II Directive
The Seveso II Directive is based on Article 174 (ex-Article 130s) of the EC Treaty. It is
important to mention that, according to Article 176 (ex-Article 130t) of the EC Treaty,
Member States can maintain or adopt stricter measures than those contained in the Seveso
II Directive.
The aim of the Seveso II Directive is two-fold. Firstly, the Directive aims at the prevention of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Secondly, as accidents do continue
to occur, the Directive aims at the limitation of the consequences of such accidents not only
for man (safety and health aspects) but also for the environment (environmental aspect).
Both aims should be followed with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the
Community in a consistent and effective manner.
The scope of the Seveso II Directive is solely to the presence of dangerous substances in
establishments. It covers both, industrial "activities" as well as the storage of dangerous
chemicals. The Directive can be viewed as inherently providing for three levels of
proportionate controls in practice, where larger quantities mean more controls.
A company who holds a quantity of dangerous substance less than the lower threshold levels
given in the Directive is not covered by this legislation but will be proportionately controlled
by general provisions on health, safety and the environment provided by other legislation
which is not specific to major-accident hazards. Companies who hold a larger quantity of
dangerous substance, above the lower threshold contained in the Directive, will be covered
by the lower tier requirements. Companies who hold even larger quantities of dangerous
substance (upper tier establishments), above the upper threshold contained in the Directive,
will be covered by all the requirements contained within the Directive.
The Directive was amended again in December 2003.
The key elements of preparation of a Seveso assessment are described in the Table 37.
Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study
Item
Section heading
No.
Summary
Comments
Executive
summary
Introduction and
overview
Methodology the
Outline of the approach taken by
This section describes the
hazards and
the assessment team to
assessment methodology
effects
illustrate a rigorous approach
undertaken.
management
and use of appropriate data.
process
page 62
Item
Section heading
No.
Hazard checklist
Summary
Comments
Safety-critical
elements
Setting of
performance
standards
Qualitative risk
assessment
Risk tolerability
Demonstration of
major hazards
management
Escape,
evacuation and
rescue
10
11
page 63
List of components
2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad Refinery
2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir Refinery
2.6.1
Executive summary
The overall proposed inspection plan for the equipment based on screening results (Table 10
API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009), shows overall reduction of
almost 50% of equipment to be inspected pro year in next 3 years.
On the other hand, about 10% of equipment has to be inspected more intensively with more
adequate methods and scope than it was practiced so far.
page 64
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment
L
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E
L
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O
O
D
0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 ED-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T110 T-5
9
E-1A/B E-2 T-4
T-6 T-8
18 - 72%
D-27A T-1
2 - 8%
D-300
T-101 T-2
D-102 T-3
5 - 20%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
5 - 20%
14 - 56%
6 - 24%
0 - 0%
25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on
selected RGE equipment
page 65
2.6.2
Introduction
2.6.2.1 Objective
The objective of the study was to assess the risk profile of the RGE equipment through the
application of the Risk based inspection methodology and to prioritize equipment for
inspection. Moreover, the goal was to demonstrate the applicability of the overall approach
to the NIS units.
2.6.2.2 Scope
The scope of the RBI study covered all the equipment items and related piping as originally
agreed prior to the project.
Number of
items
Component type
Pressure vessel
41
Condenser, Shell
17
13
Column Top
10
Filter
Other Equipment
2.
Preparation of Simplified Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with all data essential to
the RBI analysis of the equipment items.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
2.6.2.3 Deliverables
The deliverables of the RBI project include:
1)
2)
Six (6) sets of process flow diagrams showing the basic information used in the
analysis.
Inspection plan guidelines for selected high risk items based on a plan period
agreed with RGE. This consist of tables and reports indicating the overall risk,
likelihood and consequence factors, the recommended inspection methods and
coverage for each equipment item and the active or potential damage
mechanisms identified per equipment item.
The assumptions and conclusions of the RBI analysis.
b)
c)
2.6.3
Methodology
General details on applied RBI / RCM methodology and HAZOP are presented in Chapter 2.2
of this report.
A HAZOP study is performed by a HAZOP team, consisting of experienced engineers and
operating personnel from appropriate disciplines, facilitated by an independent chairman
experienced in the use of the HAZOP methodology. The team may include representation
from both the design contractor and from their client who is to operate and maintain the
facility. Typically the team may include process engineers, project engineers, electrical &
instrument engineers, maintenance engineers and senior operating personnel. Other
specialists may be drafted in to the meeting when appropriate.
The HAZOP review is normally based on P&IDs of the planned facility, while PFDs, Cause and
Effect Diagrams, Hazardous Area Classification drawings and Layout Drawings may also be
used to provide additional information. During a HAZOP, the P&IDs will be broken down in to
logical sub-systems (nodes), which may be a vessel, a line interconnecting equipments, or
some other logical sub-system.
The HAZOP technique involves the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all the guide-words have been applied and discussed and
the team is satisfied that all meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then
goes back to Step 1 and repeats the process for the next section or node. Figure 3illustrates
the normal workflow of a HAZOP study.
When a recommendation was proposed, the risk was ranked based on consequences and
frequency, using the COMPANY Risk Ranking Matrix.
2.6.4
Performed activities
In order to be able to perform the given analysis, the following activities have taken place:
1. Training in RBI methodology and presentation of qualitative methods during the
Training RBI from October 30 to November 3 2006
2. First Certification RBI on November 27, 2006
page 67
October 2008
b.
December 2008
2.6.5
page 68
Change of the working fluid instead of the proprietary oil, refining-generated oil is
used
History of incidents:
page 69
Propane leakage on the compressor, and auto-ignition of the fluid. Apart from
material damage, there was no other damage to the people or environment mainly
due to an early detection of the incident and fast fire extinguishing
Leakage of propane, butane and gasoline from the underground lines due to the
corrosion of the underground lines. Consequences propane and butane was easily
spotted, and quickly fixed. Gasoline leakage was discovered at a relatively late stage,
due to the fact that it did not evaporate. Soil remediation has been done by pumping
up the gasoline from the soil, the whole operation lasted 2,5 months
Problems at the furnace firing the firing process is manual and can in some cases
lead to the explosive concentrations inside the furnace and consequent injury of the
person performing firing. So far no serious injuries have happened.
Safety and relief valves: the process is inherently clean, there is a potential for some
corrosion mainly from the outside. No significant fouling of the RV has been registered,
however, in the general process of control, some of the valves have been found not to be
functioning.
Fluid information:
Present fluid in the system are:
Natural and refined gas - 3,8-17,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition
temperature 640-645C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in
higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12,
information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Approx. fluid composition: methane ~ 93%, ethane ~ 2,50%, propane ~ 0,30%,
butane ~0,03%, other carbon and nitrogen maximum 3,50%,mostly containing
fractions C1-C4, daily throughput of 1200000 m3 per day (or 500t)
Butane - 1,5-8,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 365C, gas
with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause
suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks
S9,S16,S36/37/39
Present quantities on site:
o
page 70
2.6.6
Results of analysis
page 72
page 73
Guide
Word
Cause
Consequence Description
Safe Guards
Safe Guard
Independent
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Flow
Less
FALSE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Flow
No
No safety problem
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Pressure
Lower
Less Supply
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Composition
Higher
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Composition
Less
TRUE
Feed
entrance to
D-300
Pressure
Higher
TRUE
ID
Node
page 74
page 75
Discussion: There was only a general discussion on the hammer effect on the lines where the
liquid phase is in. A more detailed discussion was about the pressure wave which took place
when the gaseous line will be reopened. As the heat exchanger is not really working at the
moment based on pollution with dust particles the questions raised up what can happen
furthermore in other parts of the plant.
It has been proposed not to concentrate on the possible damages and instead to concentrate
of a mitigation of the pressure wave. At the moment a valve in a 12 inch line with a 3 inch
pipepass will be opened, It has been proposed to include another valve in a 6 inch line with a
2 inch bypass to reduce the pressure wave.
The following proposals have not been discussed in this meeting.
The typical scenarios for the origin of pressure surges are fast closing valves triggered by the
breakdown of auxiliary power and fast acting control devices. The fast deceleration of the
liquid results in high pressure surges upstream the valve, because kinetic energy is
transformed into potential energy. This effect is called water hammer that is explained by the
following example. In a horizontally installed 500 m long pipeline of the size DN 200 which
transports water with a velocity of 3 m/s at ambient temperature, the pressure increases by
a fast closing valve from a stationary pressure of 6 bar up to 40 bar. Hereby the forces
induced to pipe supports exceed the design criteria from 1-5 kN to 125 kN. Due to liquid
inertia, the transported liquid continues to flow downstream the valve with the initial speed,
the pressure decreases and a large expanding vapour bubble is formed directly downstream
the valve. The pressure falls up to saturation pressure of the liquid and is thus lower than the
pressure in the system. Thereby the liquid stream is decelerated and finally accelerated
towards the closed valve (back flow). As a result of fast re-condensation of the vapour
bubble, the liquid flows against the closed valve and is stopped rapidly. The resulting
pressure surge is referred to as cavitational hammer. The amplitude of the first cavitational
hammer downstream the valve is nearly as high as the amplitude of the first water hammer
upstream the valve.
Well-known methods for the prevention of water hammer in pipeline systems are e.g. the
application of air vessels, surge shafts, bladder accumulators, as well as the prolongation of
closing and opening times of valves. The latter is the easiest and the most favourable
method. Due to technical and legal requirements for pipeline operation within the chemical
industries and power plants it is not always possible to decelerate the closing process
undefined.
Air vessels, surge shafts or bladder accumulators are used if the pipeline system is not
designed on the same level. These applications are installed upstream the closing valve in its
immediate proximity. When shutting off the medium flows in to the loft and is braked by
this.
Another possibility is the expansion of valve gears with facilities which decelerate the closure
as soon as the last third of the flow cross section is nearly reached. These can be dampers
(often used with swing check valves) or programmable positioners..
Technical problem 4
There is a leakage in the product lines C3 and C4 to the tanks. As the lines are underground
the leakage and the size of the leakage can not be detected. There is no leak detection
system installed.
Discussion: Leakage is visible by bubbles on the ground if it is raining and by parts of non
growing grass.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. As the amount of gas is
unknown there is the hazard of an explosion. The only possible solution is to repair or to
exchange the lines or to build new lines on the ground and to close the old ones.
Technical problem 5
There is a compressor in use where gaseous Propane will be compressed from 1.7 to 13-15
bars. There are two problems. The first problem is in the case of a leakage in the compressor
(Jet fire, explosion). Hot surfaces near by have a temperature of 500 0C. The volume of the
compressor is about 0.5 cbm. The second problem may occur if liquid propane flows into the
page 76
compressor. This will normally be mitigated by a measurement of gaseous and liquid phase
in the separator before. If this is not working an explosion is possible.
Discussion: This has not been discussed during the meeting.
Technical solution: There will be possibilities by using quick closing valves. This will mitigate
the flow of liquid Propane to the compressor. Further technical specification possible but not
done.
2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation
According to the API 581, Management system evaluation (self-assessment) has been
performed. After this, an audit of the results has been performed in order to revise the
scores achieved.
The results are given in the table below and shown on Figure 34.
Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments
Id
1.
Section Title
Leadership and
Administration
Maximal
Points
Actual
Score
Audit
results
Audit comments
70
43
40
2.
Process Safety
Information
80
72
65
3.
Process Hazard
Analysis
100
49
45
40
4.
Management of
Change
80
58
5.
Operating Procedures
80
57
50
6.
85
72
70
75
90
7.
8.
Training
Mechanical Integrity
100
120
82
111
page 77
Id
9.
10.
11.
Section Title
Pre-Startup Safety
Review
Emergency Response
Maximal
Points
60
Actual
Score
58
65
51
Audit
results
45
40
Incident Investigation
75
65
40
Contractors
45
42
25
Assessments
40
20
20
12.
13.
Audit comments
Total
1000
780
645
page 78
Size of the refinery it is rather small compared with other refineries or other units
that are supposed to be benchmarked by the same methodology
2.
3.
On the other hand, the process fluids (natural gas, propane, butane, gasoline) are
both explosive and flammable, therefore giving the C consequence class
4. The age of the equipment and the history of damage mechanisms result in the
likelihood ranking of 3.
L
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D
RGE-1 Procesno
postrojenje
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix
2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis (component based)
According to API 581, edition 1998, the qualitative analysis has been performed for 99
components, without connecting piping and rotating machinery. The work for this equipment
is still in progress.
Risk matrix for qualitative analysis is shown on Figure 36. The risk assessment results are
shown in Annex 24.
According to the ranking in the risk matrix, the inspection plan can be constructed, for next
two years. According to the risk assessment, the equipment having high and medium high
risk should be inspected at least once a year. Furthermore, for items with high risk, it is
recommended to increase the inspection efficiency from class D (spot testing) to class C, in
order to have better risk control.
For the equipment that has annual maintenance tasks (heat exchangers cleaning, filters,
condensers), the same inspection interval has been maintained (i.e. each year), although
according to the risk ranking this interval might be increased. This is in line of maximization
of the effort invested, i.e. to use the opportunity to inspect the equipment when normal
maintenance tasks are done.
page 79
The corresponding inspection plan (Annex 25) results in increase of inspection on equipment
identified as critical (6 pieces of equipment), while decreasing the number of equipment to
be inspected each year (i.e. in 2009 from 99 to 51).
0 - 0%
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O
D
D-101
D-102
D-300 T-9
2 - 2%
14 - 14%
83 - 84%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
15 - 15%
40 - 40%
36 - 36%
8 - 8%
99
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009
page 80
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D
0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 ED-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T110 T-5
9
E-1A/B E-2 T-4
T-6 T-8
18 - 72%
D-27A T-1
2 - 8%
D-300
T-101 T-2
D-102 T-3
5 - 20%
0 - 0%
0 - 0%
5 - 20%
14 - 56%
6 - 24%
0 - 0%
25
CONSEQUENCES
2.6.7
Presented results so far have DRAFT status; further refinement is planned for the level of
detailed analysis in order to obtain results that are acceptable for plant personnel.
The proper identification of damage mechanisms and inclusion of rotating equipment and
piping is planned for the next cycle of data update.
The preliminary analysis of potential savings in inspection costs is given in Figure 38. The
overview of financial risk for the whole unit is given in Figure 39.
THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version.
page 81
Comparisonofcostsperinspection
strategy
6,000,000Din.
CostsRSD
5,000,000Din.
4,000,000Din.
3,000,000Din.
Currentpractice
2,000,000Din.
1,000,000Din.
RBIoptimized
0Din.
2009
2010
2011
Inspectionyear
Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies
3,500,000
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
T7
D2
T9
T4
D4
T8
D7
D6
T6
T5
D1
T1
E1A/B
E101/B
E2
D5
E101/A
E110
E102
T3
D27A
D27B
D27C
D27D
D27E
D27F
D28A
D28B
D28C
D28D
D28E
D28F
D29A
D29B
D29C
T2
D102
T101
HP1
HP2
JI1
JI2
SP1
D300
C1A/B(potis)
C1A/B(usis)
C2A/B(potis)
C2A/B(usis)
page 82
Introduction
2.7.1.1 General
Law on changes of the Law on Environmental Protection adopted by the Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia May 2009 contains some of the requirements of Seveso II Directive
(96/82/EC). Between other, Seveso plant is defined as a facility in which activities are carried
out and in which one or more dangerous substances are present in quantities equal or
greater than prescribed. Further obligations of Seveso plants operators are defined, who
must submit information, or to develop a policy to prevent accidents and report safety and
accident protection plan.
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Republic of Serbia has identified facilities
that are subjected to Seveso II Directive and published a preliminary list (14 May 2009).
Refinery Pancevo has been preliminary identified as upper-tier "Seveso" plant.
Corresponding sub-lows which will allow full implementation of the Directive are currently in
preparation. Full implementation of this regulation will provide prevention, preparedness and
rapid response to a chemical accident.
This chapter of Detailed Technical report presents Safety report for a part of Pancevo
refinery, FCC complex (Fluidized Catalytic Cracking) following the requirements of the
Directive and on the base of Safety report for Pancevo Refinery done within the Package A.
Some of general data needed for the report are contained in Volume I of the Detailed
Technical report.
For easier understanding and reading, Cross-reference table is prepared (Table 1) showing
relation between part of reports and requirements from Article 9 of the report.
2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso requirements
Table 40 shows relation between requirements of Seveso II directive and individual parts of
Detailed Technical report.
Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements
Minimum data and information to be included in
the safety report referred to in Article 9
II
III
page 83
Corresponding
paragraph of the
Safety report
1.
2.
3.
This Safety Report is updating the Safety report prepared in May 2008. It therefore
incorporates the organizational changes and technological changes occurring in plant and
refinery from that date.
2.7.2
Foster Wheeler
North - Block 5 with units for oil production built in the first phase of Refinery
construction,
South - Block 21 with Sulfolan unit,
Est - Block 9 with power production units.
Block 3 is located on the West side of FCC complex with following buildings: control room for
FCC complex, buildings of fire protection brigade and investment and development unit.
Monastery Volovica with a church is also located west of the Block 6.
Access to the FCC complex (Figure 41) is possible by internal roads - from the East, Street
No. 3, from the West Street No. 2, from North Avenue C and from the South Avenue D.
page 84
page 85
Some accidents took place in the past. 1986 there was a fire in a pressure vessel and a
separator of fuel gas. In 1989 an accident caused by abrasion occurred. The result has been
a small steam leak in a reactor. In 2003 a slide valve was closed caused by a cut cable. The
pressure inside the regenerator increased and cyclones were damaged.
2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing
RNP has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO 9001:2000
standard, for all RNP's operations. Details are given in chapter 2.1.4..
List of RNP QMS and EMS documentation is given in Annex 15.
2.7.2.4 Safety management system
Safety Management System is a part of RNP quality and environment management system
including some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for HSE issues is
Risk Management division.
2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials
FCC ensures deep conversion of vacuum gas oils into gases, gasoline components, diesel
components and fuel oil. Catalytic cracking process breaks or cracks long chain hydrocarbons
into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to increase gasoline and
diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30% distillate and 30%
butanes and lighter.
Accordingly, hazardous materials in RNP FCC are:
Propane
Butane
Gasoline
light cracked gas oil
H2S and
for internal use fuel gas.
The complete list of hazardous materials is given inError! Reference source not found..
2.7.2.6 Meteorological data
Chapter 2.1.3.2 of this report contains data related to
Meteorology
Hydrology
Geology
Seismology.
2.7.3
S-2300:
S-2500:
S-2550:
S-2600:
S-2750:
S-2850:
S-2900:
S-2450:
Detail description
page 86
powdered zeolite catalyst that is kept in suspension in the reactor by the incoming oil feed
from the bottom of the reactor. Upon contact with the hot catalyst, the oil vaporizes and is
cracked into smaller molecules. Vapors from the reactor are separated from the entrained
catalyst and fed into a fractionator, where the desired products are removed and heavier
fractions are returned to the reactor. The catalyst is deactivated by thermal degradation and
through contact with heavy metals in the feed, necessitating regeneration or replacement.
FCC is used in processing of vacuum heavy gas oil which is pumped into the pipe reactor
RISER where the actual reaction of cracking is taking place. Unit area is 90 x 100=9000
m2, construction is open and mainly made of concrete. It incorporates also a concrete
chimney with 150m in height and 13m diameter base. This process breaks or cracks long
chain hydrocarbons into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to
increase gasoline and diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30%
distillate and 30% butanes and lighter. If you do the math you will see that the volume of
products is greater than the volume of the feed.
Capacity of the unit
FCC unit is designed to manufacture 3000t/dan (1.000.000t/year) of heavy vacuum gas oil
that is derived from crude oil Kirkuk. The Pancevo Refinery is mostly processing crude oil of
"REB" and "Kikinda" and processing capacity depends on the availability of supplies and the
market requirements for final products. Flow chart is shown in Figure 42.
Description
Process flow Diagrams Flow through the Unit is shown schematically on the following Process
flow Diagrams:
Drawing No.
Title
2231-0-50-2331
2231-0-50-2332
2231-0-50-2333
2231-0-50-2334
2231 -0-50-2531
Compression Section
2231-0-50-2532
Absorption/Deethaniser Section
2231-0-50-2533
Debutanizer Section
2231-0-50-2534
2231-0-50-2535
2231-0-50-2536
Depropanizer Section
2231-0-50-2537
C3 Drier Section
2231-0-50-2538
Feed for the unit is heavy vacuum gas oil from the unit S-2200, Vacuum distillation. Block
diagram of Pancevo refinery is given in
page 87
page 88
instantaneously raises the burning temperature. The "secondary combustion" stage occurs
simultaneously as the CO burns with oxygen to form C02. Combustion of the coke to carbon
dioxide is almost complete at the temperature in the Regenerator. Duri ng start-up the Ai r
Preheater, BC-2301, is used to heat up the Regenerator.
The Air Blower is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the
Surface Condenser, EC-2510. Condensate from the condenser is collected in the Condensate
Drum, FA-2520,and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate
Pump,GA-2520/S,via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2520. The Inter/After Condenser
condenses the'vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate
formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporised in the Reevaporatbr, EA-2522.
Hot gases produced by the combustion of coke leave the dense phase of the Regenerator
and enter the dilute phase where entrained catalyst is removed in three twostage
Regenerator Cyclones, FC-2302 A/F and returned to the Regenerator catalyst dense phase
via the cyclone diplegs. The hot regenerated catalyst leaves the Regenerator via the Fresh
Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe and the Recycle Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe
and passes through the slide valves to the FF and RF Risers.
The hot gases leaving the Regenerator Cyclones pass through the Flue Gas Pressure Control
Valve, PA-2305, the Ori fi ce Chamber, PA-2307,and the Fl ue Gas Diverter Valve, PA2306,to the CO Boiler, BF-2301,before exhausting to atmosphere via the Stack. CA-230l.
The CO Boiler produces HP steam (44.1 bar g) by recovering sensible heat, and the heat of
combustion of CO when operating with non promoted catalyst, from the Regenerator flue
gas. The CO Boiler is supplementary fired with fuel oil or fuel gas to provide sufficient steam
to meed the demand of the FCC complex. Boi1er feed water enters the CO Boiler under flow
control and passes through a preheater and economiser to improve the overall efficiency of
steam generation. The steam and water mixture produced in the convection bank is
separated in the steam drum and the steam is then passed through a two-stage superheater.
The steam temperature is controlled by taking a slip stream of steam from the fi rst stage of
the superheater and passing it through an attemperator. The attemperator and preheater are
located inside the steam drum.
Fresh catalyst is fed to the Regenerator from the Fresh Catalyst Hopper, FE-230Z, using the
Continuous Catalyst Addition Device, GB-2302. Equilibrium catalyst for start-up is stored in
the Equilibrium Catalyst Hopper, FE-2301.
Main Fractionator Section
Superheated Reactor vapours from the Reactor, OC-230l, enter the bottom section of the
Main Fractionator, DA-230l. The Reactor vapours are desuperheated by contact with a large
circulating stream of cooled fractionator bottoms over six disc and donut trays. The
fractionator bottoms is circulated by the Fractionator Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, and cooled
in the following four parallel heat exchanger circuits:
A. The Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers,EA-2303 A/B
B. The LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304.
C. The Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505, in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. The Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B.
Controlling the rate and return temperature of this coolant affects the rate of reflux required
higher in the tower. The down flowing coolant for desuperheating the vapour feed also
serves as a scrubbing medium which collects catalyst entrained in the vapours. Catalyst
concentration is reduced to a satisfactory amount by withdrawal of a fractionator bottoms
product at the appropriate rate.
The fractionator bottoms product is drawn off downstream of the Fractionator Bottoms
Steam Generators and cooled in the Fractionator Bottoms Product Cooler, EC-230l, before
being pumped to tankage by the Fractionator Bottoms Product Pump, GA-2304/S. Facilities
exist for the return of fractionator bottoms to the RF Riser should this operation be dictated
by mechanical problems or special product requirements.
lntermedi ate Cycle Gas Oi 1, 1CGO, is withdrawn from a total draw-off tray in the Main
Fractionator. Part is circulated by the lCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S,under flow control, and
page 89
is cooled in the following four parallel heat exchanger ci rcuits before returning to the
colurnn:
A. Feed/ICGO Refl ux Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B.
B. Deethaniser Reboiler,EA-2502,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
C. Naphtha Splitter Reboiler,EA-2507,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. 1CGO Reflux Steam Generator,EA-2307.
The main part of this ICGO Reflux Stream is returned to the Fractionator above the draw off
tray. The remainder is returned to the bubble cap trays below the draw off pan in order to
scrub out any entrained catalyst remaining in the vapour from the baffled section, and also
to provide additional cooling of the vapour.
The balance of the ICGO from the total draw off tray passes to the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302.
The ICGO Stripper is reboiled by circulating ICGO Recycle through the ICGO Recycle Reboiler
Pump, GA-2j07/S, to the ICGO Recycle Stripper Reboiler, BA-2302, under flow control. The fi
red heated serves the dual purpose of stripping and preheating the Recycle Feed. Recycle
feed is pumped from the ICGO Stripper by the ICGO Recycle Pump, GA-2306/S, under flow
control to the RF Riser. The ICGO stripper vapour is returned to the Main Fractionator.
Light Cycle Gas Oil, LCGO, is removed from a partial draw off tray in the Main Fractionator.
Part is circulated by the LCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2308/S, under flow control and is cooled
initially by preheating boiler feed water in the LCGO/BFW Exchanger, EA-230S, and
preheating the Debutani ser Feed in the Debutaniser Feed Preheater, EA-2S03. These
combined streams are then cooled by passing some of the LCGO Reflux through the Lean
Sponge Oil Cooler. EC-2305, before returninq to the Main Fractionator. Some of the LCGO
Reflux from the outlet of the Lean Sponge Oil Cooler is pumped by the Lean Sponge Oil
Pump, GA-2309/S, to the Sponge Oil Absorber, DA-2501, in the Gas Concentration Unit
before returning to the Main Fractionator, and some ;s passed to the Gland and Flushing Oil
Surge Drum, FA-2307, to be used as gland and flushing oil.
The remaining LCGO from the Main Fractionator passes to the LCGO Stripper, DA-2303t
where light ends are stripped from the light cycle gas oil with heat supplied by fractionator
bottoms in the LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304. The stripped vapours are returned to the
Main Fractionator. The LCGO product is pumped by the LCGO Product Pum~ GA-2310/S,
through the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-2301 A/~ to the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit
(Unit 2400) or to storage via the LCGO Product Cooler, EC-2303.
A naphtha sidestream is withdrawn from the Main Fractionator between the LCGO draw-off
and the column overheads. Thi s stream is ci rcul ated under f1 ow control by the Top
Pumparound Reflux Pump, GA-23l1/S,to the Propylene Splitter Reboi1er, EA-2515,in the Gas
Concentration Unit before being returned to the Main Fractionator.
Fractionator overheads are cooled and partially condensed in the Fractionator Overhead
Condenser, EC-2306. Water soluble corrosion inhibitor is injected upstream of the
Fractionator Overhead Condenser using the Fractionator Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump,
GA-2514, to prevent hydrogen blistering. Unstabilised gasoline and vapours are separated in
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304, with the vapours flowing to the GCU Gas
Compressor, GB-2501. Unstabilised gasoline is pumped under level control by the
Fractionator Overhead Pump,GA-2312/S,to the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-2501, in the Gas
Concentration Unit and is also used as pumpback ref1 ux to the Main Fractionator to control
overhead temperature. The condensed water phase and sour water passed into the boot of
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator from other Units is pumped by the Sour Water Pump,
GA-2313/S,to the Sour Water Stripper Unit (Unit 2900).
Process Steam Generation and Blowdown
Boiler feed water from offsite is preheated in the LCGOI BFW Exchanger, EA-2305,and
passed to Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B,and the ICGO Steam
Generator, EA-2307,for generation of medium pressure steam. Steam generated in these
exchangers is superheated in the superheat coil of the ICGO Stripper Reboi1er, BA-2302,
and passed to the M.P. Steam Header.
Continuous and intermittent b10wdown from the Steam Generators and the CO Boiler, BF2301,are passed to the M.P. B1owdown Drum, FA-2521,where L.P. steam generated passes
to the L.P. Steam Header. The b1owdown passes under level control to the Atmospheric
page 90
B1owdown Drum, FA-2522, where it is quenched with raw water before passing to the oily
water sewer.
Slide Valve Air System
Dry plant air, with a water dew point of -40 C, is provided to supply the power to actuate
the automatic slide valves. The air supplied to each valve passes to an air motor operated
power unit which directs the air supply to drive the valve in either direction, depending on
the signal being received from the automatic controller. Alternatively, the slide valve can be
moved by the manual operation of a local 4-way valve which performs a similar function. The
Slide Valve Air Surge Drum, FA-230l, is provided to operate the valves during an emergency.
The drum is sized to hold sufficient air to close each operating valve once from the wide open
position without the reservoir pressure dropping below 4.1 bar g.
Spry Water System
In the event that any portion of the Regenerator exceeds 730 c for short periods, spray
water from the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302, should be injected into the Regenerator by the
Spray Water Pump, GA-2301 IS. Spry water should be removed from the Regenerator at the
first opportunity to prevent catalyst deactivation and .to regain optimum combustion air
control.
Gland and Flushing Oil System
Light Cycle Gas Oil is normally used as pump gland flush oil and flushing oil for instruments,
the supply being taken from downstream of the Lean Oil Cooler, EC-2305. An alternate diesel
supply is provided at start-up from offsite storage. The LCGO passes into the Gland and
Flushing Oil Surge Drum FA-230~and is continuously circulated around a ring header system
using the Gland and Flushing Oil Pump GA-23l4/S. This system is also used for flushing
equipment which can be taken out of service while the rest of the unit is in operation.
2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500
Gas Compression Section
Vapours from the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-230~ are compressed in the two
stage, turbi ne dri ven GCU Gas Compressor, GB-2501, after passing through the First Stage
Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2501. Liquid removed in the Compressor Suction Drum, flows
under gravity back to the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator. Off gas from the LCGO
Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) is also fed to the First Stage Compressor Suction Drum.
Flashed condensate is injected into the first stage discharge to protect the lines from
hydrogen blistering together with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the First Stage
Compressar Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-25l5. This stream is then cao1ed and partial1y
condensed by the First Stage Compressor Condenser, EC-2501, befare enteri ng the Second
Stage Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2502. The interstage liquid from this drum is pumped
by the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum Pump, GA-250l/S to the Deethaniser Feed
Coalescer, FA-2505. Sour water, separated from the hydrocarbon phase in FA-2502,is sent
under level control to the Fractionator FA-2502 are compressed in the second stage of the
GCU Gas Compressor and then injected with steam condensate together with corrosion
inhibitor from the Second Stage Compressor Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2S16, and routed
to the HP Separator Condenser, EC-2502.
The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporised in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521.
Absorption/Deethaniser Section
The vapours from the compressor second stage are combined w;th liquid from the Raw
Gasoline Absorber,DA-2501 ,and overhead vapours from the Deethaniser ,DA-2502, the C3
Drier Overhead Accumulator,FA-2513,and the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA2514,and passed to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,EC-2502. Flashed condensate
page 91
is injected into the inlet of the airfin to protect the exchanger from hydrogen blistering
together The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporized in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521, with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the
Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2516. The combined
stream is cooled and passed to the High Pressure Separator,FA-2504,where hydrocarbon
vapour, hydrocarbon liquid and water are separated. Water i s continuous 1y removed from
the boot and transferred to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,before
pass ing to the Sour Wate r Stripper.
The vapour stream from the Hi gh Pressure Separator, FA-2504,is introduced at the base of
the Sponge Oi1 Absorber/Raw Gaso1 i ne Absorber, DA-250l ,where i t i s scrubbed with raw
gasoline and then with 1ean sponge oil to remove C3's and heavier. The raw gasoline is fed
from the Maln Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,by the Fractionator Overhead
Pump,GA-23l2/S, via the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,to the Raw Gasoline Coalescer, FA2503. Water removed i s returned to FA-2304. The raw gasoline enters DA-2501 where it
contacts the vapours from the High Pressure Separator over slotted ring packing. Ouring
winter operation, debutaniser bottoms recycle from the Debutani Sf'r Bottoms Recyc1e
Pump,GA-2504/S, is pumped with the raw gasoline into the Raw Gasoline Absorber. This is
done to provide suffieient liquid loading both in the Raw Gas01ine Absorber and in the
Deethaniser to effect the desired C3 recovery. The raw gasoline leaves the bottom of the
ABsorber and is pumped by the Raw Gasoline Absorber Bottoms Pump,GA-2502/S,into the
inlet of the High Press ure Separator Ai rfan Cool er, EC-2502.
The vapours emerging from the Raw Gasoline Absorber pass up the co1umn through a
chimney tray and are contaeted with 1ean sponge oil aver slotted ring packing. The lean
sponge oil whieh is unstripped LCGO is pumped fram the FCCU by the Lean Sponge Oi1
Pump,GA-2309/S~and enters the top of the Sponge Oil Absorber,DA-2501, where it removes
a major part of the C315 and C4's from the vapour. The rieh spange oi1 1eaving the
Absorber passes to the Rich Sponge Oi1 Surge Drum, FA-2516. Any vapours whi eh di
sengage are returned to the Absorber be10w the top packed bed. Rieh sponge oil is returned
to the coo1ed LCGO reflux stream which passes to the Main Fractionator, DA-2301. Water
removed from the boot of FA-25l6 is returned to FA-2304.
The overhead gases from the Spange Oi1 Absorber,DA-2501, consisting mainly of hydrogen.
Cl's, C2'5 and hydrogen sulphide flow to the Fuel Gas Scrubber KO Drum,FA-2509, and on to
the base of the Fuel Gas Scrubber, DA-2505. where lean amine is used in the countercurrent
extraction of hydrogen sulphide.
Liquid hydrocarbons from the High Pressure Separator, FA-2504,are pumped by the
Deethaniser Feed Pump, GA-2503/S. together with interstage liquid from the Second Stage
Compressor Suction Drum Pump. GA-250l/S. to the Deethaniser Feed Coalescer, FA2505.before passing to the top tray, tray 21, of the Deethaniser.DA-2502. Water from the
coalescer boot is passed to FA-2304.
Light ends are stripped out in the Deethaniser, DA-2502, in order to control the C2 content
in the resulting C3 streams. The overheads from the column are returned to the High
Pressure Separator Airfin Cooler,EC-2502. The column is reboiled by circulating hot intermedi
ate cycle gas oil (ICGO) pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S, through the Deethani
ser Reboi1er. EA-2502. Reboiled vapours return to the column and the liquid product is fed
to the Debutaniser.DA-2503. The flow from the bottom of the Deethaniser represents the
total liquids recovery of the sys tem.
Any free water trapped in the Deethani ser i s removed in the Deethaniser Water Draw Off
Pot, FA-2506, which takes liquid from tray 15 of the co1umn.
Debutaniser Section
The Debutaniser DA-2503, is designed to separate C4'5 and 1ighter from C51S and heavier,
with the overhead having less than 0.3 wt.% pentanes and heavier and bottoms containing
less than 0.5 wt.% butanes and lighter. The feed to this tower is the Deethaniser bottoms
stream. This stream is preheated by circulating hot LCGO. pumped by the LCGO Re fl ux
Pump, GA-2303jS. through the Debutaniser Feed Preheater. EA-2503, and by Debutaniser
page 92
page 93
is then routed to the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) to remove mercaptans before being
pumped by the Depropaniser Charge Pump, GA-2552/S to the Depropaniser, DA-2508.
Depropaniser Section
C3-C4s from the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) together with C3-C4 recycle from the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) are fed, through the Oepropani ser Feed/Effl uent Exchanger, EA25G8, to the Depropani ser, DA-2507. The feed enters on tray 27 of this 53 tray column.
Reboil heat is suplied to the Depropaniser by the Debutaniser bottoms stream in the
Depropaniser Reboiler, EA-2509. The butane/butylene praduct from the bottom of the
Depropaniser is first cooled in the Depropaniser Feed/Effluent Exchanger, EA-2508) and then
by cooling water in the C4 Product Cooler, EA-25l0 , before being routed to the Alkylation
Unit (Unit 2600) or to offsite storage.
The overheads from the column are tota11y condensed in the Depropaniser Overhead
Condenser, EC-2504, and passed to the Depropaniser Overhead Accumulator, FA-25l0.
Water, separated_ out in the boot of this drum,is passed to the Main Fractionator Overhead
Accumulator, FA-2304. Part of the condensed hydrocarbon stream is pumped by the
Depropani ser Refl ux/Product Pump, GA-2509 IS, as refl ux to the Depropani sero The rema
inder i s routed to the (3 Drier, DA-2508.
C3 Drier Section
Water contained in the overhead product of the Depropaniser is separated fram the C315 in
the C3 Drier, DA-2508, in order to produce a propane cut with a dew pOlnt less than -30 c.
The feed to the C3 Orier t DA-2508 ,is cooled in the C3 Orier Feed Cool er, EA-2511, and
passed through the C3 Drier Feed Coa1escer t FA-2511 t to remove free water. The feed
enters the 30 tray column on tray 18. The tower overheads are partially condensed by the
C3 Drier Overhead Condenser t EA-2513 and fed to the C3 Drier Overhead Accumulator t FA2513. The liquid hydracarbon from the Accumu1ator i5 pumped back to the tower as reflux
by the C3 Drier Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2511/S, via the C3 Drier Reflux Coalescer, FA2512. Vapour from the Accumulator i5 recycled to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,
EC-2502, in the Absorption/Deethaniser Section.
Propylene Splitter Section
Dried C3s enter the Propylene Splitter t DA-2509 ton tray 41 of tne 101 tray column. The
co1umn overheads are partia11y condensed in the Propylene Splitter Overhead Condenser,
EC-2508 t and pass to the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator, FA-2514. The liquid
hydrocarbon from this drum is pumped back to the tower as reflux by Propylene Splitter
Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2513/S, while the vapour is recycled to the High Pressure
Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, in the Absorption/ Deethaniser Section.
Propylene product is withdrawn from tray 91 as a side draw and routed to storage offsite via
the Propylene Product Cooler, EA-2516.
Reboil heat to the co1umn is provided from two separate sources. The majority of the heat is
supplied by a top pump around reflux stream from the FCCU Main Fractionator t DA-2301,
and is circlated by the Top Pump around Reflux Pump,GA-2311/S through the Propylene
Splitter Reboiler/Top Pump around Refl ux Exchanger, EA-2515. The remaining heat is
supplied by the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA~25l4, which
uses high temperature steam condensate from the High Temperature Condensate Drum,FA2517, as the heating medium.
The propane product is taken from the bottom of the tower and is pumped by the Propane
Product Pump, GA-25l2/S, through the Propane Product Cooler, EA-2517, to offsite storage.
Condensate Collection System
Steam condensate from the Sour Water Stripper Reboiler, EA-2902, and the Amine
Regenerator Reboiler, EA-2952, together with condensate from the M.P. condensate header
is passed into the High Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2517.
Flashed steam is fed into the LP steam main. The hot condensate is primari1y used as a heat
source and is passed to the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA25l4, before entering the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518. Excess condensate
passes directly to the Low Temperature Condensate Drum. If insufficient condensate is
available for reboiling the'Propylene Splitter, boiler feed water is fed into the High
Temperature Condensate Drum.
page 94
Condensate from the LP condensate header is also fed into the Low Temperature Condensate
Drum, FA-25l 7. Flashed steam is exhausted to atmosphere. Flashed condensate is fed by
the Compressor Condensate Booster Pump, GA-25l8/S, to the First Stage Compressor
Condenser, EC-250l, to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, and to the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) to be used as water wash in the DP Water Wash Settler, FA-2509,
and the DIS Water Wash Settler, FA-26ll. Additional condensate is supplied by the Process
Condensate Pump, GA-2521/S, vi a the flashed condensate header to theCondensate Surge
Drum, FA-2404, in the Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400), to the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302,
in the FCCU, and to other intermittent users. The excess condensate fram this pump is
routed to the offsite deaeration facilities. If insufficient condensate is available, boiler feed
water is fed into the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518.
Corrasion Inhibitor System
In order to protect certain items of equipment fram corrosion and hydrogen blistering a
water soluble based corrosion inhibitor system has been provided. The corrosion inhibitor i5
mixed with turbine condensate in the Corrosion Inhibitor Drum, FA-2515. The solution is
mixed using fuel gas which is vented to the flare system. The following items of equipment
and its downstream piping are protected by injecting the material using the following pumps:
Injection Pump
Main
Equipment
GA-2514
EC-2304
GA-2515
EC-2501
GA-2516
EC-2502
GA-2517
EC-2504
GA-2524
DA-290l
High pressure steam (45 bar, 4129 C) 620 tons per day.
Medium pressure steam (16 bar, 3200 C) 410 tons per day
KIRKUK
REB
340 500
380 590
Gravi ty (oAPI)
25.4
o
0.9315
Pour Point ( C)
32
31
Sulphur (Wt%)
2.2
2.35
150
0.3
Characterization Factor
0.5
11. 85
Molecular Weight
360
KIRKUK
REB
C3 (Mol%)
1.99
1.5
IC4 (Mol%)
93.37
93.33
NC4 (Mol%)
4.59
5.11
IC5 (Mol%)
0.05
0.06
57.9
57.9
119.9
119.7
Molecular Weight
o
KIRKUK
REB
H2S (Mol%)
1.1
0,8
C2 (Mol%)
1.1
1.7
C3 (Mol%)
2.2
2.5
IC4 (Mol%)
1.1
0.8
NC4 (Mol%)
2.2
2.5
IC5 (Mol%)
3.4
2.5
NC5 (Mol%)
5.6
4.1
Naphtha (Mol%)
40.5
23.1
LCGO (Mol%)
42.8
62.0
Products of FCC
Wet gas
page 96
Regime 1
(%mas)
Regime 2
(% mas)
H2S
5.84
7,68
H2
0.15
0.38
2.24
5.63
C2 H6
2.17
6.66
C2 H4
1.72
2.76
C3 H8
4.86
10.61
Propylene
22.38
16.56
i-butane
24.78
22.23
n-butane
6.67
6.82
Butilene
29.19
20.67
Component
CH
Regime 2
(% mas)
9.41
100.8
65.9
58.7
IBP
2.24
5.63
10%
2.17
6.66
30%
1.72
2.76
50%
4.86
10.61
RON
22.38
16.56
MON
24.78
22.23
6.67
6.82
0.160
0.169
Component
Molecular weight
o
Distillation ASTM C
70%
90%
EP
Octane number
paraffin
PONA (%vol)
olefins
naphthens
aromats
Total sulfur
Safety data sheet
Safety data sheets for dangerous substances in FCC are given in Annex 21.
Main hazardous materials in FCC
Quantity of substances contained in FCC is given in Annex 19. Refinery is reporting to the
state authority on type and quantities of substances each year using defined form.
The list of potential explosion hazards is given in Annex 17 as determined in the document
Explosion hazardous zones in Block VI of NIS - Refinery Pancevo (Elaborat o zonama
opasnosti od eksplozije za Blok VI, u NIS Rafinerija nafte, Panevo, April Juni 2003.)
2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects
Major supplies
page 97
The major outside supplies for FCC and the connected safety problems are shown in Table
46.
The internal electrical distribution system is working now without any problems. In the year
2006. the transformer unit has been completely rebuilt.
Table 46: FCC supplies
Type of supply
Safety problem
Electricity
Fuel gas
No problems
Steam
Instrumental air
Nitrogen
No problems
Cooling water
Loss of electricity
One of the most important outside supplies for FCC is electricity. Hazard analysis has never
been done for this case. Loss of electricity could cause safety problem, even may lead to a
Domino effect if something else goes wrong simultaneously. Loss of electricity could affect
differently some types of equipment as shown in the following table.
Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity
Equipment/
installation
affected
Reactor
Regenerator
Column
Air coolers
Pressure vessel
Sensor/
Instrumentation
page 98
Computers
2.7.4
TOP1
TOP2
TOP3
TOP4
TOP5
The above cases allow to represent hazards related to the presence of both, flammable
materials and toxic materials, from vessels, columns and furnaces.
For the Propylene splitter section, including FA-2514, an HAZOP analysis has been done. This
section contains the largest inventory of hazardous material in the Unit, therefore an
assessment of the process deviations for this unit was conducted, to assess if there is any
specific process deviation that can contribute to leaks in this Section.
HAZOP analysis has been done using web based tool designed by R-Tech (Figure 43 - Figure
46) and following .
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514
In the loop, shown in Figure 47, a pressure vessel (FA 2514) and a condenser (EC 2508)
have been considered. The vessel is a part of the propanizer section; short description of this
section is given in subsection 3.1, simplified flow diagram is given in Annex 1.
The pressure vessel has a volume of 21 m3. The operational pressure is 19.9 bar and the
operational temperature 44 0 C. The pressure vessel contains propylene. The vessel is filled
by max. 10 12 m3. The stream is coming from the top of the column with 140 m/hour. The
intention is to recycle the condensed phase to increase the purity of the product. The stream
will be re-circulated in the column.
Sensors are measuring the level and the pressure and are responsible for the regulation.
External sensors are measuring the gas concentration outside the vessel.
The pressure vessel is protected by two safety valves acting by 22 bar. The vessel is design
for 22.5 bar and 52 0 C. The safety valves are designed as a redundant system as one valve
is able to protect the vessel. The design of the valves for one phase dispersion or two phase
dispersion is unknown. (Probably done for one phase dispersion which will not consider the
real situation.) Additional a sprinkler system is installed for cooling the vessel in the case of a
fire.
The whole flow is based on the pressure difference between column and vessel which is 400
mbar.
page 99
No flow to the vessel is possible if a valve is closed but will cause no safety problem.
page 100
page 101
For a shut down all lines will be cleaned with steam and for a start up all lines will be cleaned
with nitrogen,
page 102
page 103
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.
page 104
Event
Fonte
4,0 10-4
6,0 10-2
< 50
9,0 10-6
50 200
5,0 10-6
>200
3,0 10-6
Piping rupture
Frequency in /meter
of pipe/year)
diameter
(mm)
diameter
(mm)
< 50
9,0 10-7
50 200
3,0 10-7
>200
9,0 10-8
1, 10-5
1, 10-4
The data above are derived from experience up to the eighties; to date the availability of
tools and procedures specifically dedicated to the improving of safety like Safety
Management Systems, RBI etc makes it realistic to consider that the frequency of failure
should be lower than those experienced up to 20 years ago or more.
To take this into account, a factor of reduction of 0.1 is applied to the all the values given in
the Table 2.
The frequency of occurrence of the final scenario depends on the probability of ignition
(immediate or delayed). From technical literature, the following values for the probability of
ignition are considered:
Probability that the delayed ignition will cause an UVCE: the possibility that an UVCE
occurs depend on the amount of flammable material in the cloud. It is considered
that for a quantity of gas within the flammable limits lower than 1000 kg, the UVCE
can not occur, and only a flash fire is considered. For quantity of gas within the
flammable limits higher than 1000 kg, the probability of having UVCE following
ignition is considered to be 0.3.
page 105
Frequency
(events/year)
Probable
> 10-2
Unlikely
10-4 10-2
Very unlikely
10-6 10-4
Extremely unlikely
< 10-6
Hazardous
substance
Unpressurised leak
Pressuried
leak
Discharge
Gas
2-phase
Liquid
pool
Liquid
Jet
Jet fire
Explosion:
Condensed phase
Runaway
reaction
Dust
Physical
Evaporation
Dispersion
Fireball
Other
incident
Dense
Neutral
Flash fire
Toxic effect
VCE
Thermal effect
External
fire
Pool fire
Bleve
Explosion effect
blast and fragment
Outcome
Glass breakage.
page 107
7 kPa
14 kPa
21 kPa
35 kPa
70 kPa
(kPaa)
0.02
0.2
0.03
0.04
0.1
0.7
0.15
1.0
0.3
2.0
0.4
2.8
0.5 - 1.0
3.5 - 6.9
0.7
4.8
1.0
6.9
1-2
6.9 - 13.8
1.3
9.0
13.8
2-3
13.8 - 20.7
2.3
15.9
2.5
17.3
20.7
page 108
(kPaa)
3-4
20.7 - 27.6
27.6
34.5
5-7
34.5 - 48.3
48.3
7-8
48.3 - 55.2
62.1
10
69.0
300
2000
Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000)
are given in Table 51.
Consequence analysis modeling
The analysis of the consequences of the accidental scenarios has been done using computer
codes, with the process data and assumptions discussed in the preceding chapters. The
analysis has been done considering two meteorological conditions: low wind velocity
associated with stability class F (stable atmosphere) and medium wind velocity associated
with stability class D (neutral atmosphere).
In the following sections, the main results of the consequence analysis are given.
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of pressure vessel FA-2514
The analysis considers the full bore rupture of the 6 pipe at the outlet of the FA-2514
vessel.
The following tables summarizes the main characteristics of the scenarios associated to the
event.
Table 52: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, main characteristics
LEAK
EQUIPMENT
SUBSTANCE
Propylene
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW
SECTION
Not analyzed
152 mm
TEMPERATURE
Not analyzed
43.3C
PRESSURE
Not analyzed
19.9 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
Not analyzed
509 kg/s
page 109
LEAK
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE
DURATION
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table.
The analysis is done also if all scenarios have frequency of occurrence lower than 1E-7
events/year, practically not credible, to obtain an assessment of the damage distances
associated to a major release case.
Table 53: TOP1 Release from FA-2514, scenario
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
Flame height
29
37.5 kW/m2
20
42
12.5 kW/m
1.5F/ 5D
55
5 kW/m2
63
80
7 kW/m
3 kW/m
UVCE(1)
S2
Flammable mass
7000
0.3 bar
150
0.14 bar
260
0.07 bar
570
0.03 bar
1000
LFL
562
LFL/2
758
LFL
400
LFL/2
538
1.5F/5D
Flash Fire(1)
S3
1.5F
5D
((1)
The scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible.
Distances calculated to give assessment of a worst case scenario
page 110
MAJOR RUPTURE
LEAK
SUBSTANCE
MAJOR RUPTURE
DIAMETER OF OUTFLOW
SECTION
TEMPERATURE
PRESSURE
OUTFLOW RATE
191 C
191 C
12.7 barg
12.7 barg
13 kg/s
208 kg/s
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE DURATION
10 minutes
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
Table 55: TOP2 Release from DA-2503, scenario
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
1.5F/5D
Jet /Pool
Fire
S4
1.5F
UVCE
S5
5D
Release Size 4
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
Flame
length
14
Flame
length
20
37.5
kW/m2
37.5
kW/m2
12.5
kW/m2
15
12.5
kW/m2
16
7 kW/m2
20
7 kW/m2
25
25
28
5 kW/m
3 kW/m
Flammable
mass
5 kW/m
31
3 kW/m
37
660
Flammable
mass
3000
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
Flammable
mass
250
Flammable
mass
2600
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
page 111
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
0.03 bar
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
LFL
85
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
LFL
83
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
1.5F
Flash Fire
S6
Release Size 4
5D
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
SUBSTANCE
Propane
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW SECTION
62 C
62 C
PRESSURE
21 barg
21 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
2.8 kg/s
25 kg/s
TEMPERATURE
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE DURATION
> 1 hour
10 minutes (considering
shutdown activation)
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
table.
The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
Table 57: TOP3 Release from DA 2509, scenario
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
Jet Fire
S7
Release Size 3
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
1.5F/5D
Flame length
19
Flame
length
46
page 112
Release Size 1
SCENARIO
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
LEVEL
DAMAGE
DISTANCE
(m)
37.5 kW/m2
37.5
kW/m2
14
12.5 kW/m2
12.5
kW/m2
30
7 kW/m2
11
7 kW/m2
42
14
50
5 kW/m
3 kW/m
Flammable
mass
1.5F
UVCE
S8
1.5F
Flash Fire
S9
5D
5 kW/m
20
3 kW/m
60
100
Flammable
mass
3400
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1)
Flammable
mass
5D
Release Size 3
10
Flammable
mass
260
0.3 bar
(2)
0.3 bar
(1), (2)
0.14 bar
(2)
0.14 bar
(1), (2)
0.07 bar
(2)
0.07 bar
(1), (2)
0.03 bar
(2)
0.03 bar
(1), (2)
LFL
85
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
LFL
83
LFL
(1)
LFL/2
112
LFL/2
(1)
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
FA-2953
SUBSTANCE
H2S (90%)
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW
SECTION
50 mm
TEMPERATURE
77 C
PRESSURE
OUTFLOW RATE
SCENARIO
Not considered
5 barg
2.2 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
page 113
DEVELOPMENT
RELEASE
DURATION
dispersing jet.
15 minutes (considering shutdown activation)
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table.
The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
Table 59: Event 4 Release from FA-2953, scenario
Release size 100 mm
Scenario
WEATHER
CONDITION
1.5F
Toxic Dispersion
S10
5D
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
LC50
420
IDLH
1300
LC50
230
IDLH
720
MAJOR RUPTURE
EQUIPMENT
FA-2455
SUBSTANCE
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW SECTION
100 mm
TEMPERATURE
102 C
PRESSURE
1 barg
OUTFLOW RATE
SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
Not considered
2.9 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
dispersing jet.
RELEASE
DURATION
Approx 45 minutes
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table.
The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
The distances given in the table refer to the concentration of H2S, that is the main
component of the mixture.
Table 61: EVENT 5 Release from FA-2455, scenario
Release size 100 mm
Scenario
Toxic Dispersion
S11
WEATHER
CONDITION
1.5F
5D
page 114
LEVEL
DAMAGE DISTANCE
(m)
LC50
360
IDLH
1100
LC50
255
IDLH
670
Atmospheric
distillation
Scenario
probability (p)
Value
(milion )
500
0.0000015
%
Damage
5 - 10
Damage
(k)
1200
Description
Overpressure of 0.05bar
Damage of 90% glass
Instrumentation
damage
Command center
10
0.0
Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
Damage of structures of
Vacuum
distillation
1100
10
2400
Overpressure of 15 kPa
(0.15 bar)
destruction of structures
FCC
11000
30
9000
Glass and
instrumentation damaged
control equipment
damaged
The inner part of the
cooling tower damaged
Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
Structural damage of
Sulphurisation
700
10
70
Alkylation
Total
1000
100
14310
1000
13670
page 115
VAR (k )
20.505
initiating event
damage distances.
page 116
The exact starting point of the Bowtie Methodology has been lost in time but it is believed
that they were originally called Butterfly diagrams and evolved from the Cause
Consequence Diagram of the 1970s. It is then thought that David Gill of ICI plc developed
the methodology and called them bowties in the late 70s. It is generally accepted that the
earliest mention of the bowtie methodology appears in the ICI Hazan Course Notes 1979,
presented by The University of Queensland, Australia.
Bowtie diagrams for FCC have been created for selected top events which are to be
prevented by
No
Description
Content
Phase
Component
propylene
liquid
FA-2514
gasoline
liquid
DA-2503
propane
liquid
DA-2509
90% H2S,
gas
FA-2953
(mixture)
H2S, SO2,
Co2
gas
FA-2455
TOP2
TOP3
TOP4
TOP5
2.7.5
Risk assessment
The risk associated to the FCC operation is assessed through a Risk Matrix.
2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking
The frequency of occurrence of scenarios is assessed according to the classes given in table :
2.7.5.2 Damage severity
The severity of damages associated to each scenario is assessed according to the following
classes, where the severity is related to the maximum distance at which the damage levels
page 117
are experienced. It shall be noted that the definition of severity considers major hazards
having a potential impact on the population, as required by the Seveso II directive.
Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes
Frequency
(events/year)
Classification
PROBABLE
> 10-2
UNLIKELY
10-4 10-2
VERY UNLIKELY
10-6 10-4
Scenario
S10, S11
-6
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY
< 10
S1 S9
Effects limited to the plant personnel are therefore in this context considered as not defining
a major hazards. These are assessed and controlled by Occupational Health procedures and
analyzes.
Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes
Classification
Damage
Neligible
Significant
Serious
Major
On the basis of the above definition, the risk associated to each scenario can be assessed as
in the following Risk Matrix, where three levels of risk are sown: an High risk area (in red)
where prevention and protection measures shall be considered to reduce the risk, a Medium
Risk area (in yellow) where prevention and protection measures should be considered to
reduce the risk, a Low risk area (in green) where the risk can be considered to be tolerable
and no further measures are necessary.
Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios
Negligible
Significant
S1, S4, S7
Serious
S2
S11, S10
Extremely
unlikely
Very unlikely
Major
2.7.6
Conclusions
page 118
unlikely
Probable
Due to size and for easier use of the manual it is given as a separate book.
page 119
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
HSE RNP, Implementation of HSE in NIS a.d. Plants NIS RNP Safety report, May 2008
[5]
Understanding explosions (2003) By Daniel A. Crowl. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the
AIChE, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 16, Issue 5, Page 449
[6]
page 120
Annexes
page 121
page 122
page 123
page 124
page 125
Annex 5
page 126
Annex 6
Nr
Place in process
Raw
material
1.
Crude oil
2.
LPG
3.
Primary gasoline
4.
5.
Intermedi
ate
Byproduct
Final
product
Waste
Mas (t)
Transport
Transfer
Storage
Max.
daily
Av.
monthly
Av.
yearly
558527
847
27042
6957
20527
6.
Dizel
157221
7.
Fuel oil
11591
8.
Mazut
154034
9.
Bitumene
31320
10.
Oil distillate
55796
11.
HCl
2530
12.
NaOH
1791
13.
NH4OH
14.
Na OCl
x
x
page 127
Nr
Place in process
Mas (t)
15.
5,2
16.
NALCO 71601
1,1 t
17.
Na3PO4
0,3 t
page 128
Annex 7
Secretariat
Business Coord.
Department
Technical-Technological
Department
Information and
PR Service
Production
Center for MS
Manipulation
Maintenance
Laboratory
Development and
Investment
Risk Management
Finance and
Counting
Commercial
Business
Power Plant
ICTI Economics
Goods Management
page 129
Annex 8
A.8.1
Requirement
4.1
Function/job position
Comment
General requests
- determinig,
documenting,
RNS director,
implementation,
management representative management representative is
maintenance and constant
main responsible
improvement of QMS
effectiveness
- QMS implementation
top management,
management representative
4.2
4.2.1
General requests
4.2.2
Quality manual
management
management representative
4.2.3
Documentation
management
4.2.4
Records management
top management
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1
Management
responsibilities and
activities
Development, implementation
top management,
and improvement of QMS
management representative
effectiveness
5.2
Focus on user
Quality policy
- declaring quality policy
RNS director
- implementation and
maintenance of quality
policy
Communication and
top management,
interpretation of quality policy to
management representative
all people in the organization
top management,
management representative
5.3
5.4
5.4.1
Planning
Quality objectives
page 130
ISO 9001
Requirement
Function/job position
Comment
obligation
5.4.2
QMS planning
5.5
5.5.1
Responsibilities and
authorizations
5.5.2
Management
representative
Direktor RNS
Appointing management
representative
5.5.3
Internal communications
top management
Establishing appropriate
communication processes in the
organization
5.6
Review by management
top management,
QMS review in planned intervals
management representative
6.
RESOURSE MANAGEMENT
6.1
Provision of resources
- defining required
resources
organizational parts
managers
- provision of required
resources
RNS director
6.2
Human resources
6.2.1
6.2.2
- qualification, awareness
and training
top management
head of the Personnel
Section
Infrastructure
- defining required
infrastructure and its
maintenance
top management
Operations director
- establishment of the
required infrastructure
RNS director
6.4
Working environment
top management
7.
PRODUCTS REALIZATION
7.1
Planning of products
realization
top management
7.2
7.2.1
Determining requests
related to products
(services)
7.2.2
Revision of requests
related to products
(services)
Functions of participants in
the revision process
7.2.3
Communication with
customers
7.3
6.3
page 131
ISO 9001
Requirement
Function/job position
Comment
7.3.1
do
7.3.7
top management,
director of Department for
development and
investments
7.4
Supply
7.4.1
Supply process
7.4.2
Supply information
7.4.3
Verification of supplied
products
7.5
7.5.1
7.5.2
Validation of production
and servicing processes
7.5.3
Identification and
reproducibility
7.5.4
Users assets
7.5.5
Products perservation
Maintaining compliance of
products during the realization of
internal processes
7.6
8.
8.1
General provisions
8.2
top management
Determining management
method by monitoring and
measuring devices
8.2.1
Meeting customers
requirements
8.2.2
Internal audit
management
representative,
MSC manager
8.2.3
top management
8.2.4
8.3
Managing inconsistencies
in a product
page 132
ISO 9001
Requirement
8.4
Data analysis
8.5
Improvements
8.5.1
do
8.5.3
- Constant improvements
- Corrective actions
- Preventive actions
A.8.2
ISO
14001
Function/job position
Comment
top management
Function/job position
Comment
General requests
4.1
MS management representative
is main responsible
Announcement, development,
top management, MS
maintenance, communication to
management representative all employees; revision and
audit.
4.2
Environmental policy
4.3
Planning
4.3.1
Environmental aspects
top management,
MS management
representative
Identification of important
environmental aspects,revision
and constant updating.
top management,
MS management
representative,
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
manager)
Determining identification
procedures and approaches to
legal and other reqests that
relate to environmental aspects
and RNS activities, products or
services.
top management,
MS management
representative
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.4
4.4.1
Resources, objectives,
responsibilities and
authorizations
Director of RNS
4.4.2
Qualifications, training
and awareness
top management,
MS management
page 133
ISO
14001
4.4.3
4.4.4
4.4.5
4.4.6
Requirement
Function/job position
Comment
representative,
Head of the Personnel
Section
Education, professional
improvements and gaining
experience for competency
purpose.
Presenting EMS to staff and
creating awareness about
environment, motivation of
people.
top management,
MS management
representative
Documentation
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Documentation control
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Operations controls
Communication
4.4.7
Alertness to response in
emergency situations
4.5
Revision
top management,
other employees within the
defined competencies and
responsibilities.
Identification of potential
accidents and hazardous events,
response and prevention and
mitigation of their environmental
impact.
Periodic assessment, if required,
revision of responsiveness in
emergency situations as well as
examination of response
procedures.
4.5.1
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
manager)
MS management
representative,
4.5.2
Compliance evaluation
EMS coordinator
(Environmental Dept
page 134
ISO
14001
4.5.3
4.5.4
4.5.5
4.6
Requirement
Function/job position
Comment
manager)
MS management
representative,
MS management
representative,
Inconsistencies, corrective MSC manager,
other employees within the
and preventive actions
defined competencies and
responsibilities.
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Internal audits
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Revision by management
top management,
MS management
representative,
MSC manager
Records control
page 135
Annex 9
page 136
page 137
page 138
page 139
D-300
TROFAZNI
SEPARATOR
F-301
FILTER ZA
GASNI
KONDENZAT
D-101
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
T-1
DEHIDRATACIONA
KOLONA
E-110
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
T-9
KOLONA ZA
SUENJE
KONDENZATA
T-101
DEHIDRATACIONA
KOLONA
D-16
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
E-102
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-101 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-1 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-2
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-120
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-120
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
T-2
APSORBER
D-102
SEPARATOR
POSUDA
E-104
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-3
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-1
PRIHVATNI
SUD
E-5
D-104
IZMENJIVAC SEPARATOR
POSUDA
TOPLOTE
E-103
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
D-5
PRIHVATNI
SUD ZA
PROPAN
E-7
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
E-6 A/B
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
D-103
PRIHVATNI
SUD ZA PARE
PROPANA
D-4
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
PROPAN
D-121
E-15
SC-1
VODENI CENTRIFUGALNI SEPARATOR ZA
RABLJENO ULJE
HLADNJAK
SEPARATOR
E-116
VODENI
HLADNJAK
E-4
VODENI
HLADNJAK
C-1,2 A/B
C-102
KOMPRESOR
KOMPRESORI
WEIR KLARK COOPER-BESSEMER
D-122
F-1; F-201
KOALESCER
PEC
E-24 A/B
PROPANSKI
HLADNJAK
T-3
DEETANIZER
E-1A
HO
LCV
152A
T-9
TRC
151
LC
4
1
E-1B
200.2
E-104
E-24A
PREMA
D-9
TIC
204
D-120
C3
LC
1
LC
208
D-104
C3
FIQ
102
C-2A
C3
LC
153
E-21
RIBOJLER
E-23
KONDENZATOR
E-22
VODENI
HLADNJAK
D-8
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
IZO-BUTAN
F-302
FILTER ZA
SIROVI
GAZOLIN
CW
C-2A
C-1A
C-2B
TS
150
FRC
10
FRC
11
F-201
FRC
13
29
T-8
19
24
D-8
35
T-4
29
CW
PRC
8
T-7
PRC
7
13
25
FRC
7
E-4
E-5
TRC
10
T-6
HIC
150
TS
1
E-116
C-1B
LC
10
30
CW
D-2
F-1
D-7
D-6
35
TRC
5
35
CW
E-19
E-10
E-15
E-22
TRC
9
TRC
8
C3
D-103
E-20B
PRC
4
16
TIC
6
23
OD/PREMA
C3
LC
19
E-21
LC
8
13
E-101B
LC
20
GS ELEMIR
T-8
DEIZOBUTANIZER
E-23
FRC
9
E-110
19
C-1B
TRC
3
D-16
E-20 A/B
KONDENZATOR
E-18
15
E-9
18
od E-4
C3
LI
19
LCV
101
CW
LC
5
D-102
E-102
LS
157
D-1
LC
114
LC
129
LI
6
CW
LG
155
SC-1
LG
156
D-121
11
LC
7
D-4
SV
7
TRC
7
TRCAH
160
TSH
163
FS
8
FRC
5
PREMA E-2
TRC
128
LOIVI GAS
C-2B
PRC
152
C-1A/B
E-5
E-101A
LC
152
LC
3
C-1A
E-7
E-102
E-7
E-3
T-2
PCV
24
PREMA
LC
2
LC
101
D-7
PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA
SMEU N-BUTANA I
IZO-BUTANA
E-11
E-2
E-3
26
LC
154
UV
154
D-101
E-19
RIBOJLER
FRC
6
E-24B
TIC
4B
PC
6
od
LC
151
T-7
DEBUTANIZER
PRC
9
T-3
PC
5
E-3
E-7
301B
10
E-18
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
8
PRC
19
E-2
D-6
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA ZA
PROPAN
PREMA
E-6B
PCV
E-17
RIBOJLER
E-8
13
E-6A
E-2
PCV
301A
E-16
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
TIC
4A
LC
9
FI
TRC
152
E-12
KONDENZATOR
E-12
1
PREMA
T-5
200.1
T-101
T-1
D-2
PRIHVATNA
POSUDA
E-20A
II
FI
PIC
210
E-110
PC
301
T-4
DESTILATOR
HCV
150
C-102
I
D-5
KA T -3
E-10
RIBOJLER
PRC
3
PRC
151
E-120
LCV
2
E-11
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
E-103
LC
131
HO
E-9
IZMENJIVAC
TOPLOTE
PREMA E-3
FRC
14
P RCA
SV
6
160
FRC
8
PREMA E-7
PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA RABLJENO ULJE
C3
KA D -9
PRERAENI
GAS
ULAZNA AHTA
FIQ
103
KA T-4; T-6;
T-8
FIQ
03-01
ULAZ GASA
FIQ
100
FIQ
D-300
LAH
301
LAL
301
PREMA
GR-1/GR-102
OD E-25
P-120A/B
PS-4
P-1A/B/C
P-2A/B
LIC
301
FIQ
106
PCV
201
FIQ
104
FIQ
NORMALNI
BUTAN
IZOBUTAN
F-302
U PRELIVNI
AHT
FIQ
107
AS
150
D-122
LCV
101
P-4A/B/C
P-5A/B
OD
D-9
GAZOLIN
PROPAN
P-11
P-8A/B
P-7A/B
SMEA
PENTANA
P-9A/B
SMEA
BUTANA
P- 30
F-301
SIROVI GAZOLIN IZ
PROIZVODNIH
REZERVOARA
Legenda:
Propan
N-butan
U PRELIVNI
AHT
24.08. 2006
D-27A
Jain/Subotin
Izobutan
Gazolin
Prirodni gas
Preradeni gas
S.Josipovic
Apsorpciono ulje
Kondezat ugljovodonika
Toplo ulje
Rashladni propan
Bogato ulje
Rashladna voda
NIS Naftagas
TEG
Loivi gas
page 140
A.Ilic
page 141
A.14.2
page 142
File name
1.
2.
EP01.doc
3.
EP02.doc
4.
EP03.doc
5.
EP04.doc
6.
EP05.doc
7.
Communication in EMS
EP06.doc
8.
Waste management
EP07.doc
9.
EP08.doc
10.
Oil management
EP09.doc
11.
EPO10.dok
12.
EPO11.dok
13.
EPO12.dok
14.
Quality plan
PQ000.doc
15.
PQ002.doc
16.
QG45-01.doc
17.
QG46-09.doc
18.
Work order
QG55-01.doc
19.
QG55-02.doc
20.
Equipment control,
QG55-03.doc
21.
Quality Manual
22.
QP01.doc
23.
QP02.doc
24.
Standards and
QP03.doc
25.
Control of records
QP04.doc
26.
QP05.doc
27.
QP06.doc
28.
Job descriptions
QP08.doc
EMS_Poslovnik.doc
QMS_Poslovnik.doc
page 143
No
29.
Management review
QP10.doc
30.
QP11.doc
31.
QP12.doc
32.
Personnel evidence
QP13.doc
33.
Maintenance
QP16.doc
34.
Maintenance planning
QP17.doc
35.
QP18.doc
36.
QP19.doc
37.
Hardware
QP20.doc
38.
Security
QP21.doc
39.
Sales
QP23.doc
40.
QP24.doc
41.
QP25.doc
42.
Product development
QP26.doc
43.
QP27.doc
44.
Facilities construction
QP29.doc
45.
QP33.doc
46.
Software
QP35.doc
47.
QP36.doc
48.
Purchasing
QP38.doc
49.
QP39.doc
50.
Production
QP44.doc
51.
QP45.doc
52.
Manipulation
QP46.doc
53.
Finalization
QP47.doc
54.
QP48.doc
55.
Power plant
QP50.doc
56.
QP51.doc
57.
QP52.doc
58.
QP53.doc
59.
QP55.doc
60.
Product servicing
QP56.doc
61.
QP58.doc
62.
QP59.doc
63.
Library of RNP
QP60.doc
64.
QP61.doc
page 144
File name
No
65.
66.
QP63.doc
67.
QP65.doc
68.
QP66.doc
69.
QP67.doc
70.
Internal audits
QP68.doc
71.
QP69.doc
72.
Control plans
QP70.doc
73.
QP71.doc
74.
Customers complains
QP72.doc
75.
QP74.doc
page 145
File name
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
Standard symbols
Foster
Wheeler
(FW)
2231-0-50-2300.B
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2301.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2302.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2303.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2304.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2305.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2306.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2307.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2308.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2309.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2310.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2311.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2312.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2313.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2314.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2321.B
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2401.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2402.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2403.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2404.G
LO 03A18A
page 146
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
FW
2231-0-50-2405.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2406.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2407.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2408.A
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2451.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2452.B
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2501.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2502.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2503.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2504.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2505.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2506.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2507.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2508.H
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2509.G
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2510.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2511.F
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
complex
page 147
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
FW
2231-0-50-2512.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2513.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2514.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2515.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2516.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2517.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2518.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2519.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2520.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2521.B
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2522.B
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2523.C
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2524.C
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2525.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2551.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2552.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2601.D
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2602.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2603.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2604.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2605.D
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
page 148
Design
Drawing designation
Oznaka NISRNP
FW
2231-0-50-2606.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2607.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2608.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2609.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2610.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2611.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2612.C
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2751.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2851.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2852.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2853.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2901.E
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2951.F
LO 03A18A
FW
2231-0-50-2952.F
LO 03A18A
Drawing Title
water wash. FCC complex
page 149
Annex 17
Sign
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
G/F
Vrh
350oC
Dno
560oC
3,2/
3,5
89,5
m3/h
Vrh
390oC
Dno
430oC
3,5
61
m3/h
3,5
123,8
m3/h
Class
Columns in FCC
Sirovi benzin
DA-2301
V=600
H=42
D= 4,5
Fractionation column
DA-2302
V=60m3
H=10
D=2,2m
Striper ICGO
Meuciklino plinsko ulje
Striper LCGO
(lako ciklino plinsko ulje)
Vrh
270oC
Dno
300oC
DC-2301
V=350m3,
Reaktor - striper
512
2,52
138,8
m3/h
DC-2302
V=700m3,
Reaktor regenerator
katalizatora
S/G
590730
1,7
FE-2301,
FE-2302
V=250m3,
Katalizator vazduh
400
DA-2303
V=35m3,
H/D=8m/1,5m
page 150
Sign
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
300/240 20/24
300/240
20/24
340/290 12/24
340/290
12/24
330/380 24/11
330/380
24/11
Flow
(t/h)
Class
138,8
m3/h
Heat exchangers
EA- plinsko ulje
2301A/B
EA2302A/B
EA2303A/B
EA-2304
EA-2305
EA-2306
EA-2307
Plat izmenjivaa
Plat izmenjivaa
Vakuum
plinsko ulje
Refluks
Plat izmenjivaa
Plat izmenjivaa
Cevni snop izmenjivaa
Plat izmenjivaa
Cevni snop izmenjivaa
300
380
F
250
Plat izmenjivaa
235
Para
380
Plat izmenjivaa
Para
235
5/11
330
16
330
20/11
340
20/12
340
340
Pumps
GA2301/S
Pumpa za vodu
Voda
100
11
18m3/h
GA2302/S
Vakuum plinsko
ulje
190
15
168m3/h
355
50
90
13
GA2303/S
GA2304 /S
Pumpa dna
frakcionatora
DA-2301
gotov
proizvod
Ugljovodonici
+360oC
page 151
Sign
GA2 305/S
GA2 306/S
GA2 307/S
GA2308/S
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
310
370
400
170
390
450
Class
ICGO
(Meuciklino
plinsko ulje)
LCGO (Lako
ciklino plinsko
ulje)
210
10
320
GA2309/S
Benzin
45
20
70
GA-2310/S
LSGO (Lako
ciklino plinsko ulje)
250
13
80
GA2311/S
Pumpa za refluks
frakcionatora DA-2301
benzin
140
165
GA2312/S
benzin
50
20
150
GA2313/S
Voda+ugljovodonici
45
12
GA2314/S
LCGO (Lako
cikl. plins. ulje)
15
25
GA2315/S
Kisela voda
217
3,87
50m3/h
FA 2304
Benzin, loivi
gas
G/f
74
3,52
40
FA 2307
74
5,3
10
FA 2305
Rezervoar za smeu
gasovaloivi
Loivi gas
72
7,03
page 152
Sign
Medium
Phase
Temperature
(oC)
Pressure
(bar)
Flow
(t/h)
Class
gas
FA - 2308
T 345
8,5
FA - 2310
Posuda za TNG
TNG
72
8,8
50
Furnaces
BA 2301
Pe postrojenja S-2300
Vakuum plinsko
ulje
420
20
138
m3/h
BA-2302
Rebojler ICGO
420
24
340
BF-2301
CO bojler
CO, CO2
450
14
BC-2301
Pe za grejanje vazduha
Lo ulje
G/F
420
420 10
page 153
page 154
page 155
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Total
Quantity
(t)
Stored
Annex I, Part 1
Ammonium nitrate
Ammonium nitrate
2500
5000
0,1
Bromine
100
Chlorine
25
Ethyleneimine
20
Fluorine
20
Formaldehyde (concentration
90 %)
50
1 This applies to ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate compounds in which the nitrogen content
as a result of the ammonium nitrate is more than 28 % by weight (compounds other than those
referred to in Note 2) and to aqueous ammonium nitrate solutions in which the concentration of
ammonium nitrate is more than 90 % by weight.
This applies to simple ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers which comply with Directive 80/876/EEC
and to composite fertilizers in which the nitrogen content as a result of the ammonium nitrate is
more than 28% in weight (a composite fertilizer contains ammonium nitrate with phosphate and/or
potash).
page 156
Substance
Hydrogen
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Total
Quantity
(t)
50
5.72
All units
Hydrogen chloride (liquefied
gas)
Lead alkyls
250
50
200
Acetylene
50
Ethylene oxide
50
Propylene oxide
50
Methanol
5000
0.01
Methylisocyanate
0.15
Oxygen
2000
Gaseous oxygen
100
64.8
64.8
0.75
Phosphorus trihydride
(phosphine)
Sulphur dichloride
Sulphur trioxide
/
/
Toluen
Carbonyl dichloride (phosgene)
In process
33.3
2109.1
Toluene diisocyanate
75
page 157
Stored
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
Polychlorodibenzofurans and
polychlorodibenzodioxins
(including TCDD), calculated in
TCDD equivalent
0.001
0.001
Benzen
Total
Quantity
(t)
84.9
50000
1232.2
7955.9
Virgin Naphtha
Gazoline
99.6
Other gasoline
9597.31
Annex I Part 2
1. Very toxic
20
0.62
2. Toxic
200
422.2
3. Oxidizing
200
200
50
50000
17.1
page 158
Stored
Substance
Limit
according
to Seveso
II
directive
(t)
200
50000
Total
Quantity
(t)
137.5
8. Extremly flammable (where
the substance or preparation falls
within the definition given in Note 3
(c))
50
147.8
9a- DANGEROUS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT (R50)
500
7121.41
2000
1.08
500
200
page 159
Stored
Annex 20
A.20.1
Flow diagrams
page 160
Annex 21
page 161
page 162
Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from
CPS 2000)
Overpressure
psi
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
10
12
14
16
18
20
bar
0.0
34
0.0
69
0.1
03
0.1
38
0.1
72
0.2
07
0.2
41
0.2
76
0.3
10
0.3
45
0.3
79
0.4
14
0.4
48
0.4
83
0.5
17
0.5
52
0.5
86
0.6
21
0.6
55
0.6
90
0.8
28
0.9
66
1.1
03
1.2
41
1.3
79
Control House
Concrete Roof
Cooling Tower
Equipment
N
D
K
A
LM
Fire heater
Reactor: chemical
Filter Filter
T
I
Regenerator
V
IP
Pine supports
D
I
SO
Q
page 163
T
U
Reactor: cracking
Overpressure
Equipment
psi
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
10
12
14
16
18
20
bar
0.0
34
0.0
69
0.1
03
0.1
38
0.1
72
0.2
07
0.2
41
0.2
76
0.3
10
0.3
45
0.3
79
0.4
14
0.4
48
0.4
83
0.5
17
0.5
52
0.5
86
0.6
21
0.6
55
0.6
90
0.8
28
0.9
66
1.1
03
1.2
41
1.3
79
Utilities: electronic
transformer
Electric motor
Blower Duvaljke
Fractionation colum
I
T
R
Pressure vessel:
horizontal
T
PI
Extraction column
MQ
I
Steam Turbine
Heat exchanger
Tank sphere
T
M
T
I
Pressure vessel:
vertical
Pump
Legend:
A - Windows and gauges broken
G - Brick cracks
S - Piping breaks
O - Frame collapses
D - Roof collapses
J - Bracing falls
P - Frame deforms
R - Frame cracks
Q - Case is damaged
page 164
Annex 23
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
1. Pool fire
(immediate ignition)
TOP1
5E-7
Substance:
Propylene
leak: 6"
2. VCE
(delayed ignition)
Occurrence
frequency
5E-8
2E-9
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
4E-9
37.5
20
0.3
LC50
42
0.14
IDLH
55
0.07
LFL
63
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
150
LC50
12.5
0.14
260
IDLH
0.07
570
LFL
562
0.03
1000
1/2 LFL
758
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
0.07
LFL
TOP2
1E-5
Substance:
gasoline
leak: 1"
4. Jet fire
(immediate ignition)
page 165
3E-8
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
12.5
37.5
3. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
15
0.14
IDLH
20
0.07
LFL
25
0.03
1/2 LFL
Consequences
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
Occurrence
frequency
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
37.5
5. VCE
(delayed ignition)
6. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
TOP3
5E-7
Substance:
Gasoline
leak: 4"
7. Jet fire
(immediate ignition)
TOP4
1E-5
1E-7
1E-7
12.5
37.5
Mass in flammable
condition
< 1000 kg.
VCE is not credible.
0.3
LC50
IDLH
LFL
1/2 LFL
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
0.07
LFL
85
0.03
1/2 LFL
112
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
16
0.14
IDLH
25
0.07
LFL
28
0.03
1/2 LFL
8. VCE
(delayed ignition)
9. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
5E-9
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
11. VCE
(delayed ignition)
page 166
3E-6
1E-7
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
11
0.07
LFL
14
0.03
1/2 LFL
LC50
IDLH
LFL
37.5
12.5
Mass in flammable
condition
< 1000 kg.
VCE is not credible.
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
0.14
IDLH
Consequences
Nr.
Event
Frequency
of the
event
Data
Accident Scenario
Occurrence
frequency
Damage distance
(m)
Fire heat radiation
(kW/m2)
7
TOP5
5E-7
Substance:
Gasoline
leak: 3"
14. VCE
(delayed ignition)
15. Flash fire
(delayed ignition)
TOP6
TOP7
1E-7
1E-5
Substance:
H2S (90%)
leak: 50
mm
Release
height: 3 m
Substance:
H2S + CO2 +
SO2
leak: 100
mm
Release
height: 1 m
1E-7
page 167
5E-9
Dispersion Toxic/
Flammable
threshold
Explosion
overpressure
(bar)
0.07
LFL
85
0.03
1/2 LFL
112
37.5
0.3
LC50
12.5
16
0.14
IDLH
25
0.07
LFL
28
0.03
1/2 LFL
1E-5
1E-5
37.5
0.3
LC50
1300
(1.5F)
12.5
0.14
IDLH
420
(1.5F)
0.07
LFL
0.03
1/2 LFL
37.5
0.3
LC50
1100
(1.5F)
12.5
0.14
IDLH
360
(1.5F)
0.07
LFL
0.03
1/2 LFL
Annex 24
A.24.1
A.24.2
A.24.3
A.24.4
A.24.5
page 168
page 169
Training
Other
Any other
Functional /
Functional
related
problems
Impact on other
equipment
Other
incident
page 170
Shutdown system
Gas detection
Person hit by
jet flow
Thermal
effects
Emergency planning
Procedures
Proactive
protection system
Fire,
explosion
and similar
PPE
Acces control
Mistake in
transport /
loading
Environment
effects
Flash
VCE
Man made
disturbance
s
Mistake in
maintenance
Domino effect
Leakage from
DA-2509
VCE
Liquid
pool
Pool fire
Acces control
Mistake in
process
Discharge
Liquid
Shield-ing
Sabotage
Pool
explosion
SMS
Repair / errors
Pressurized
leak
Acces control
Manufacturing
errors
Change
management
Disturbances in
the process
Shielding
Other
structural
damage
mechanism
Jet
dispersion
Thermal
effects
Jet fire
Fire detection
Error in material /
design
Material /
Structural
related
problems
Shutdown system
Error in material /
design
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Discharge
2-phase
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Shielding
Overloadin
g
Fire detection
Maintenance
Fatigue,
thermal
fatigue
Vibration
monitoring
Corrosion
fatigue
Fire jet
Disturbances
in the process
Inspection
General
corrosion
Maintenance
Error in
discovering
defects
Inspection
Error in material /
design
Environment
effects
Thermal
effects
Training
Other
Any other
Functional /
Functional
related
problems
Impact on other
equipment
Other
incident
page 171
Shutdown system
Gas detection
Person hit by
jet flow
Thermal
effects
Emergency planning
Procedures
Proactive
protection system
Fire,
explosion
and similar
PPE
Acces control
Mistake in
transport /
loading
Environment
effects
Flash
VCE
Man made
disturbance
s
Mistake in
maintenance
Domino effect
Leakage from
DA2503
VCE
Liquid
pool
Pool fire
Acces control
Mistake in
process
Discharge
Liquid
Shield-ing
Sabotage
Pool
explosion
SMS
Repair / errors
Pressurized
leak
Acces control
Manufacturing
errors
Change
management
Disturbances in
the process
Shielding
Other
structural
damage
mechanism
Jet
dispersion
Thermal
effects
Jet fire
Fire detection
Error in material /
design
Material /
Structural
related
problems
Shutdown system
Error in material /
design
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Discharge
2-phase
SMS
Disturbances
in the process
Shielding
Overloadin
g
Fire detection
Maintenance
Fatigue,
thermal
fatigue
Vibration
monitoring
Corrosion
fatigue
Fire jet
Disturbances
in the process
Inspection
General
corrosion
Maintenance
Error in
discovering
defects
Inspection
Error in material /
design
Environment
effects
Thermal
effects
page 172
page 173
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2903
C1A/B (potis)
Medium
2902
C1A/B (usis)
Medium
2905
C2A/B (potis)
Medium
2904
C2A/B (usis)
Medium
2845
D-1
Medium High
2855
D-101
Medium High
2856
D-102
High
2857
D-103
Medium
2858
D-104
Medium
2853
D-11
Medium
2859
D-111
Medium
2860
D-112
Medium
2861
D-12
Medium
2862
D-120
Medium
2863
D-121
Medium
2864
D-122
Medium
2854
D-16
Medium
2846
D-2
Medium
2906
D-27A
Medium
2907
D-27B
Medium
2908
D-27C
Medium
2917
D-27D
Medium
2918
D-27E
Medium
2919
D-27F
Medium
2909
D-28A
Medium
2910
D-28B
Medium
2911
D-28C
Medium
2912
D-28D
Medium
2913
D-28E
Medium
2920
D-28F
Medium
2921
D-28G
Medium
2914
D-29A
Medium
page 174
ID
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2915
D-29B
Medium
2916
D-29C
Medium
2865
D-300
Medium High
2847
D-4
Medium
2848
D-5
Medium
2849
D-6
Medium
2850
D-7
Medium
2851
D-8
Medium
2852
D-9
Medium
2875
E-10
Medium
2893
E-101/A
Low
2894
E-101/B
Low
2895
E-102
Medium
2896
E-103
Medium
2897
E-104
Medium
2876
E-11
Medium
2898
E-110
Medium
2899
E-113
Medium
2900
E-116
Medium
2877
E-12
Medium
2901
E-120
Medium
2878
E-13
Medium
2879
E-14
Medium
2880
E-15
Medium
2881
E-16
Medium
2882
E-17
Medium
2883
E-18
Medium
2884
E-19
Medium
2866
E-1A/B
Low
2867
E-2
Medium
2885
E-20A
Low
2886
E-20B
Medium
2887
E-21
Medium
2888
E-22
Medium
2889
E-23
Medium
2890
E-24/A
Medium
2891
E-24/B
Medium
2892
E-25
Medium
2868
E-3
Medium
2869
E-4
Medium
page 175
ID
Name
Likelihood
Consequence
Risk
2870
E-5
Medium
2871
E-6A/B
Medium
2872
E-7
Medium
2873
E-8
Medium
2874
E-9
Medium
2931
FT-103A
Low
2932
FT-103B
Low
2933
FT-104
Low
2923
FT-301
Medium
2922
FT-302
Low
2925
HP-1
Low
2926
HP-2
Low
2927
JI-1
Low
2928
JI-2
Low
2929
PF-1
Low
2930
PF-2
Low
2924
SP-1
Low
2835
T-1
High
2844
T-101
High
2836
T-2
High
2837
T-3
Medium High
2838
T-4
Medium High
2839
T-5
High
2840
T-6
Medium High
2841
T-7
High
2842
T-8
Medium High
2843
T-9
Medium High
page 176
Annex 25
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1969
2009
High
0.5
T-1
ulazni separator
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-101
kolona za suenje
gasa
Column
1988
2009
High
0.5
T-2
apsorpciona kolona
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-5
preista posnog
ulja
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
T-7
deetanizer
Column
1962
2009
High
0.5
D-101
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium High
D-1
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium High
D-300
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
2000
2009
Medium High
T-3
deetanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
Column
1963
2009
Medium High
Name
Description
D-102
T-4
T-6
depropanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
T-8
deizobutanizer
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
page 177
Name
Description
T-9
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Column
1962
2009
Medium High
C1A/B
(potis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C1A/B
(usis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C2A/B
(potis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
C2A/B
(usis)
KOMPRESORSKE
BOCE
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-103
meusakuplja
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-104
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-11
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-111
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-112
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-12
posuda
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-120
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-121
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-122
separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-16
trofazni separator
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-2
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
page 178
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
Name
Description
D-27A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1963
2009
Medium
D-27D
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27F
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28D
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28E
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28F
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-28G
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29A
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-29C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-4
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-5
ispariva
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-6
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
1962
2009
Medium
page 179
2009
2010
2011
Name
Description
Component
Type
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
Medium
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
1962
2009
2010
2011
vessel
D-7
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
D-8
sakuplja refluksa
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-9
prihvatni sud
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
FT-301
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Medium
D-27B
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27C
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
D-27E
rezervoar
Pressure
vessel
1962
2009
Medium
E-10
rebojler
1962
2009
Medium
E-102
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-103
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-104
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
E-11
predgreja
E-110
izmenjiva
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-113
izmenjiva
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-116
izmenjiva
Heat
1962
2009
Medium
page 180
Name
Description
E-12
kondenzator para
Component
Type
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Condenser
1962
Heat
Exchanger
Exchanger
E-120
E-13
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-14
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-15
kondenzator
propana
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-16
predgreja
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-17
rebojler
1962
2009
Medium
E-18
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-19
rebojler
1962
2009
Medium
E-2
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-20B
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
E-21
rebojler
E-22
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-23
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-24/A
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-24/B
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
page 181
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Name
Description
E-25
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-3
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-4
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-5
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-6A/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Medium
E-7
propanski hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
E-8
vodeni hladnjak
Condenser
1962
2009
Medium
1962
2009
Medium
E-9
meubojler
E-101/A
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1963
2009
Low
10
E-101/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1963
2009
Low
10
E-1A/B
izmenjiva lote
Heat
Exchanger
1962
2009
Low
10
E-20A
kondenzator para
Condenser
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-103A
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-103B
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-104
Filter sa aktivnim
ugljem
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
FT-302
Filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
HP-1
Hidroforska posuda
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
HP-2
Hidroforska posuda
Other
1962
2009
Low
10
page 182
Name
Description
Component
Type
Service Start
Date
Evaluation
Date
Risk
Recommended
Inspection Interval
(Class A inspection
type)
Recommended
Inspection
Interval (Class D
inspection type)
2009
2010
2011
Equipment
JI-1
Jono izmenjiva
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
JI-2
Jono izmenjiva
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
PF-1
Peani filter
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
PF-2
Peani filter-bona
filtrac.
Filter
1962
2009
Low
10
SP-1
Posuda za so
Other
Equipment
1962
2009
Low
10
Total to be inspected:
1
51
page 183
94
56