What the hell just happened

in Yemen, explained
Updated by Zack Beauchamp on January 21, 2015, 12:07 p.m. ET @zackbeauchamp zack@vox.com
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Houthi rebels outside of Yemeni Government TV offices in Sana'a.(Mohammed
Hamoud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
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After about two days of fighting in Yemen's capital, Sana'a, members of a Yemeni
militant group took control of the presidential palace on Tuesday. Though the
Houthi rebels insist they haven't overthrown President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi,
the fact that they've got guards stationed outside his house makes it pretty clear
that they've taken charge.
What's more, the Houthis aren't even the only rebels in Yemen. There's a whole
other rebellion in Yemen's south, which is led by a particularly dangerous alQaeda affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Here's a brief guide
to Yemen's crisis, what happened, and why.

An insurgent movement called the Houthis

stormed the capital

Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen in 2010. Dark red means Houthi-controlled, red is Houthi-contested, light red
means some Houthi forces were present in the area. (Kermanshahi)

The chaos in Sana'a didn't come out of nowhere. The Houthis have been active
in the country for years, and had been fighting against elements of the national
military for several days before occupying huge chunks of Sana'a. They've grown
in strength since 2011, and that explains why they're strong enough to
overwhelm the government in its own capital.
The Houthis take their name from a man named Hussein al-Houthi, who
founded a small group that would eventually morph into the Houthis in the earlyto-mid 90s. But the group is better understood by looking at the sectarian and
political problems that animate it. The Houthi movement is aligned with a branch
of Islam known as Zaydi a Yemeni Shia sect. Zaydis are a minority group in
majority-Sunni Yemen, and the Houthi movement militarized at least in partas a
response to oppression of Zaydis.
The Houthis have fought the government on-and-off since 2004, and were big
supporters of the 2011 Arab Spring uprising against then-President Ali Abdullah
Saleh, a dictator who ruled for 20 years (he's since stepped down). But, as
Towson University's Charles Schmitz explains, the 2011 American-backed deal
that replaced Saleh with Hadi (who is nominally leading a transitional government
on the way to democratic elections) didn't satisfy the Houthis.
The Houthis "had no representation in the transitional government," Schmitz
writes, so they "regard the transitional government as no different from the old
regime that conducted wars against them in other words, a body that cannot
be trusted."
The Houthi rebellion continued culminating in the Houthis seizing the
presidential palace on Tuesday.

The failures of Yemen's government are part

of how the crisis went on so long and got so
bad
Houthi militants on guard in Sanaa. (Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

Unlike many rebels, the Houthis haven't historically wanted to topple the Yemeni
government or secede from Yemen. The military campaign in Sana'a has had at
least three immediate objectives. First, they want to install Houthis and Houthi
sympathizers in top government offices. Second, they want to cancel cuts in fuel
subsidies that hurt Houthi constituents in northern Yemen. Third, Yemen's
constitution is currently being drafted, and the Houthis want to use military
pressure to ensure that the final document ends up being favorable to their
interests.
So how did these relatively modest demands end up leading to a rebel takeover
of parts of the capital? To understand that, you have to understand the Yemeni
government's failures.
Yemen's government isn't just Sunni-dominated: it's also astonishingly weak and
ineffective. The poverty rate hit 54.5 percent in 2012, and 45 percent of Yemenis
have trouble getting enough food. The Yemeni government is the 10th most
corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. The country is host
to a large number of militant groups, owing in part to insecurity and weak
governance, and some members of its military are more loyal to militias than to
the actual government.
The Yemeni government's feeble attempts to fix this insecurity have merely
fueled the Houthi uprising. From March 2013 to January 2014, the Yemeni
government held a meeting called the National Dialogue Council (NDC) as a first
step toward building a new government that would satisfy everyone and end the
violence. But the NDC barely represented Houthis and basically just extended
the current government's terms.

"If the NDC had not handpicked selected Houthis as interlocutors...and had
instead pursued a genuine democratic, peace settlement," Yemeni analyst Farea
al-Muslimi writes in Foreign Affairs, "the insurgency would be weaker today."
The Houthis responded in mid-late 2014 by demonstrating against the current
cabinet and the government's policy on fuel subsidies. The protests escalated
into fighting, which spread to Sana'a by September 18.
Houthi troops defeated the Yemeni army and killed military officers with ties to
Sunni militias; some Yemeni troops simply defected. Since September, the New
York Times reports, the Houthi movement "has consolidated its control in the
capital."
In the most recent escalation, Houthi fighters handily defeated Yemeni
government forces in Sana'a. According to Houthi leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi,
the military moves are designed to put pressure on President Hadi to implement
the Houthis' preferred constitutional policies and government reforms. Al-Houthi
said that they weren't looking to depose Hadi, but added that "all necessary
measures will be open" if Hadi doesn't comply with their demands.
In other words, it looks like the Houthis are willing to use as much force as they
deem necessary to get the political outcomes they want.

There's a separate al-Qaeda rebellion in the

south
Yemen soldiers engage al-Qaeda forces during a May offensive. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

As if the Houthi movement wasn't enough, southern Yemen plays host to an

entirely separate Sunni Islamist rebellion. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) is the driving force here, along with Ansar al-Sharia, a group that's either
simply an extension of AQAP or affiliated with it.
The weakness of the Yemeni government and broad national insecurity, as
discussed above, has allowed AQAP to fester here. While Yemeni government
offensives and a US bombing campaign have pushed AQAP out the most
populated areas in southern Yemen, the group still has a hold a lot of territory in

the rural areas of the region. The US National Counterterrorism Center has
called AQAP the terrorist group "most likely to attempt transnational attacks
against the United States."
The two rebellions are not directly linked, but the Yemeni government's inability to
fight informs its failures against the other, and the weaker that the government
gets, the easier it will be for both groups to grow unchecked.

The Yemen Crisis Explained

BY MANUEL LANGENDORF AND FERNANDO CARVAJAL

NOVEMBER 4, 2014

What does the current turmoil in Yemen mean for the future of the country?
Yemen, often in the headlines for US drone strikes and al-Qaedas most active franchise,
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has received heightened media attention for
a different reason, a successful military advance by northern Houthi rebels. Houthis are
a Zaydi Shia group mostly residing in northern Yemen, led by Abdul-Malek al-Houthi. The
group has taken many by surprise when it took control of the capital Sanaa on
September 21, exacerbating Yemens already fragile security and political situation.
Houthis have often criticized the central government for discriminating against their
community and have led an insurgency against Sanaa since 2004. Historically, a Zaydi
Mutawakkalite Kingdom existed in Yemen from 1918-1962, ending with the brief reign of
Mohammed al-Badr. The Houthi takeover of the capital this September has introduced a
new dynamic into Yemens power constellation, with Houthi forces remaining in control
of Sanaa. Their advance did not stop in the capital and there are ongoing reports about
clashes between Houthis, rival tribes and AQAP fighters in several provinces, including
Ibb, where theyattacked the headquarters of their main chal, the Sunni Islamist alIslah party.
In recent developments, Prime Minister Khaled Bahah has been mandated by 13 main
political factions including the Houthis to form a new government in consultation
with PresidentAbdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
To make sense of the situation in Yemen, Fair Observers Manuel Langendorf speaks to
Fernando Carvajal, a Yemen specialist with over 14 years of experience conducting

fieldwork in Yemen. Langendorf and Carvajal talk about the Houthis political and
military strategy, the current political situation and relations between the Houthis and
the southern secessionist movement.
Carvajal notes on the political situation: Forming a new government in the current
situation will prove a monumental task for President Hadi.
Manuel Langendorf: Shia Houthi rebels took control of Sanaa in September
after a several months-long advance from northern Yemen. Later on, a UNbrokered peace deal was signed between the Houthis and the Yemeni
government under President Hadi. What is the situation now like in the
capital as fighting continues? Has there been progress toward forming a new
government?
Fernando Carvajal: The signing of the peace and national partnership agreement
(PNPA) on September 21 after the siege of Sanaa can be regarded as a major military
and political victory for Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi rebels. The
agreement gives Houthis national and international recognition and places this nonstate actor, a rebel group, at the center of a new balance of power, shouldering a new
responsibility to fill the security vacuum in northern and now central Yemen.
The PNPA also represents a first step toward invalidating the political order established
by the GCC initiative signed in November 2011. The Houthis did not sign the agreement
that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh and always considered it a corrupt process
imposed by foreign interference. The PNPA signed by the Houthis aimed to upset the
composition of the current coalition government, which was only composed of members
of Saleh General Peoples Congress (GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties under the
leadership of the Sunni Islamist al-Islah party.
During the signing ceremony of the PNPA, the Group of Ten embassies (G10) was only
represented by UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar, since Houthis mostly boycott any
meeting or ceremony attended by Western diplomats. The document made no mention
of the G10, and the Houthi leader stated in a recent speech that the rebels would not
stand for further interference by foreign powers. Abdul-Malek al-Houthi took another
step to marginalize the G10 on October 25 when he called for a meeting among
Yemens political elite to address the current crisis. The outcome of the meeting, held on
October 31 in Sanaa without the presence of any member of the international
community, delivered a direct ultimatum to President Hadi: Form a new government in
ten days or Houthis would escalate activities against the government. The following
day, Benomar witnessed the signing of a new agreement between thirteen political
factions to expedite the selection process for new ministers.
Regarding the government makeover, Khaled Bahah, previously Yemens UN envoy,
remains prime minister-designate and negotiations are ongoing to begin announcing
new ministers to the 35-member cabinet. The Houthis insist the new government must
represent all political forces, as opposed to the GCC initiative mandate. This new

development has upset the JMP, in particular al-Islah, both of which published
statements declining to participate in the new government if changes were made to the
current agreement.

The relationship between Houthis and Hirak will

become another source of political tension in
Yemen, as Houthi activity expands to the eastern
province of Hadhramawt, undoubtedly
exacerbating images of Houthi ambitions to control
all of Yemen.

The Houthis recently stated they are not willing to participate in the government either
and that they would grant any cabinet posts to representatives of the southern
movement. The Houthis decision to decline seats in the new government is a strategic
one, aiming to preserve their public image and avoid any blame for government failures
in the near future.
Forming a new government in the current situation will prove a monumental task for
President Hadi. Yemen is experiencing an unprecedented degree of unpredictability with
the Houthi rebels aiming to eliminate threats from AQAP militants and their tribal allies,
as well as marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Islah to weaken its alliances
within government institutions, especially in the armed forces and security agencies like
the National Security Bureau and the Political Office.
Langendorf: There are reports about clashes between Houthis and Sunni
tribesman backed by AQAP in Bayda governorate. Should we see the fighting
and the overall situation mainly through the lens of sectarianism and
tribalism, or is there more at stake?
Carvajal: Houthi expansion in the north, and the ease with which Houthis have gained
tremendous political power in Sanaa, threatens Sunni tribal forces in central Yemen,
reminding them of the years under the Zaydi Imamate that ended in 1962. The
population in al-Bayda province, for example, is mixed with pockets of Zaydi adherents,
small numbers of Sayyid families (descendants of the Prophet) and Sunni Shafais that
have been influenced by relatives working in Saudi Arabia since the oil boom in the
1970s, some of which became adherents to Saudi Arabias Wahhabi brand of Islam. This

has played into the hands of AAS and AQAP leaders breeding a sectarian fight, rather
than a mere political conflict.
As Houthis today are seen as sponsored by Iran, and the narrative has focused more on
their Shia identity than on their Zaydi identity, it will be inevitable for the conflict in the
central region of Yemen (al-Bayda, Taiz, Ibb and al-Dhale) to become a sectarian
conflict, especially if the fighting continues, thus allowing AQAP to present its
operations as targeting Shia apostates.
The reality of the conflict involves a unique strategy employed by the Houthi leaders.
They have created alliances with local tribes, many of whom are Sunnis, and loyalists of
former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to fight terrorists. The main problem, however,
brewing as result of conflict, fought by neighboring tribes, is that the conflict may
outlive the Houthi-AQAP fight and losing tribes will aim to avenge their casualties in the
traditional tribal form. This scenario is what has led a number of observers to warn of an
impending civil war, but the fact is that a low-intensity civil war has been ongoing
since March 2011.
The Houthis are fighting against multiple enemies in al-Bayda. This is related to the fact
that al-Bayda is the place of origin for a number of leaders from the Salafist al-Rashad
party, a base for many members of the al-Islah party, and host to the al-Dhahab family
whose members include AQAP sympathizers that have offered AQAP a safe haven.
Langendorf: What impact has the Houthi advance on the separatist movement
in the south, Hirak? There have been large rallies calling for secession.
Carvajal: Abdul-Malek al-Houthi and the rest of the groups leaders have announced
their opposition to any secession claims by al-Hirak. At the same time, the southern
separatists launched a new phase of protests for self-determination in the port city of
Aden on October 14, commemorating the rebellion against Britain that later led to the
establishment of the socialist Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (South).

Houthis have often criticized the central

government for discriminating against their
community and have led an insurgency against
Sanaa since 2004.

Houthi relations with Hirak extend as far back as 2007, when the former PDRY President
Ali Salem al-Baydh joined protests organized by retired military officers in southern
provinces. Al-Baydh, also the first vice president of the Republic of Yemen (1990-1994),
has lived in exile in Beirut for nearly seven years. His relations to
Lebanons Hezbollah and its al-Manar TV channel have fueled speculation about Irans
role in uniting Houthis and Hirak in recent years in order to create a dual-front conflict
for the government in Sanaa.
Houthis benefited from Hiraks distraction as the rebels consolidated power in Sadah,
bordering Saudi Arabia, while a faction of Hirak under al-Baydh benefited from political
and material support from his base in Beirut. The Houthis never saw Hiraks ambitions
beyond the pursuit of justice for northern aggression and looting of land and
resources as legitimate.
While having stated their opposition to southern secession, the Houthis are also trying
to appease southerners by refusing to take part in the new cabinet under Prime Minister
Khaled Bahah and granting their quota of government posts to southern elements. Hirak
has yet to accept this offer and elements in the movement have also attacked Houthis
in public statements and threaten to defend the south against Houthi expansion or
attempts to impose rule from Sanaa.
The relationship between Houthis and Hirak will become another source of political
tension in Yemen, as Houthi activity expands to the eastern province of Hadhramawt,
undoubtedly exacerbating images of Houthi ambitions to control all of Yemen

Yemen explained: Is the fight for Aden

about to become the new international
war by proxy?
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Rebels in Yemen have seized an air base outside the critical southern port city of Aden a development
which spells disaster for those loyal to President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.
But as the country descends into further chaos, the civil war is increasingly drawing in parties from across
the entire region, and the battles lines, allegiances and even which countries are involved is becoming
increasingly hard to understand.

Who are the rebels?

Well organised and powerful, the rebels are a group of Shia Muslims from the Zaidi sect known as the
Houthis.
Last month they drove President Hadi out of the Yemeni capital Sanaa, and while they now have a strong
presence in the countrys north they are week and heavily opposed by many Sunni tribes across the
rest of the country.
Who is in government?
President Hadi came to power in elections after anti-government protests saw his now Houthi-backed
predecessor President Ali Abdullah Saleh step down in 2011.
That transition was overseen by a host of neighbouring countries, and his rule is backed by the UN.
Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, President of YemenThe Sunni government and neighbouring Sunni

countries reject the Houthi rebels move into Sanaa in September 2014 as a military coup.
What other groups are involved within Yemen?
Al-Qaeda is well-embedded in Yemens south and south-east, and during the civil war has staged repeated
deadly attacks under the guise of its local affiliate al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
AQAPs involvement cannot be described as sectarian, however the militant group opposes both
President Hadis government and the Houthi rebels.
Houthi Shiite mourners attend the funeral procession of victims who were killed from a triple
suicide bombing attack on mosques in Sanaa, YemenAnd the picture has been confused further by

the rise in late 2014 of a Yemeni branch of Isis. Though still small, it wishes to oppose its extreme version
of Sunni Islam and opposes the government, the Houthis and AQAP.
Isis is accused of carrying out a mass suicide bombing on Shia mosques in Sana'a last week that killed at
least 137 people.
And other countries?
The greatest danger with the situation in Yemen, Jon Altman of US-based Centre for Strategic &
International Studies told BBC News, is that it becomes a proxy war between the Gulf Co-operation
Council states and Iran.
That league of Arab states includes Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia among others backs President
Hadis government. The Saudi leadership, in particular, does not want to see a Shia Muslim country
established on its southern border.
People carry a man injured during a gunfire at an army base in Yemen's southern port city of
AdenOn Wednesday afternoon Saudi military officials confirmed that heavy weapons including artillery

had been moved to bolster areas near its Yemeni border but insisted this is only to defend the country.

Iran, meanwhile, is reported to have begun supporting the Houthi rebels militarily. While rebels officially
deny this, there are unconfirmed reports of trained Iranian pilots flying Yemeni planes and senior Houthi
figures sighted in Iran.
How likely is an international conflict?
On Tuesday, President Hadi asked the UN Security Council to authorise a military intervention by the
Gulf Cooperation Council to protect Yemen and to deter the Houthi aggression.
The US and UK have evacuated their diplomatic staff from the country and even a small US military
base was recently disbanded after AQAP took over a town nearby.
Yemeni honor guards carry the coffins of victims, who were killed last week from triple suicide
bombing attacks that hit a pair of mosques, during their funeral procession in Sanaa, Yemen But

at the moment it remains internationally at least a war of words. Saudi Arabia said today that if the
Houthi coup does not end peacefully, we will take the necessary measures for this crisis to protect the
region, still leaving open the possibility of a de-escalation.
Security analyst Aimen Deen from the think tank Five Dimensions said: The pressing question is whether
the Royal Saudi Air Force will intervene to prevent Aden from falling to the Houthis. All indications are
that the Saudis are preparing militarily to answer this question, but the political decision is not yet taken.
So whats the latest on the ground?
Yemeni officials have confirmed that forces allied with the Shia rebels have taken over the Aden airport.
President Hadi has fled his palace home in the city for an undisclosed location, suggesting the government
expects the Houthi advance to continue. Officials said he was still coordinating his forces response.
The takeover of Aden, the country's economic hub, would mark the collapse of what is left of President
Hadi's grip on power, according to the Associated Press.
Also on Wednesday, senior government figures including defence minister Maj Gen Mahmoud al-Subaihi
and his top aide were taken by rebels and transferred to Sanaa.
What might happen next?
It seems likely the Houthi rebels will focus on attempts to return President Hadi to house arrest, though
reports are emerging that he may already have fled the country.
Rebels already control Yemens state TV station, which has issued extraordinarily a public appeal for
President Hadis capture and offered a bounty of nearly $100,000 (67,000).
If the Houthis continue to establish a tighter grip on power, the Arab countries currently backing
President Hadi will face a tough decision. As opposed as they are to the idea of the government falling, an
all-out war in Yemen would have no certain outcome, no clear exit strategy and no simple solution.