AMITY LAW SCHOOL, NOIDA, AUUP

Environmental law
Project
Indo-US Nuke Deal and its Implications
Karanjot Singh
A3256113119
Ll.B 3 Years 2013-16
Section B
Faculty in charge Ms. Aditi Dalakoti

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Acknowledgement
At the wake of this study I would like to take moment to appreciate and thank the
efforts of all those who have been a pillar in the making of this project. First and the foremost
the institution of Amity University and ALS in particular for having me and giving me the
opportunity to be a part of it, then our dear director sir Maj. Neelendra Kumar, for being the
shining example for excellence and success, my teacher Ms. Aditi Dalakoti for her labour and
toils in the class which help us understand the subject not only in terms of the book but also in
terms of reality, and finally I would like to thank my peers for the healthy spirit of competition
and encouragement within the realms of the class to help me strive for the best.

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"It's an unprecedented deal for India. If you look at the three countries outside the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-Israel, India, and Pakistan-this stands to be
a unique deal."
-Charles D. Ferguson,
science and technology fellow at
Council on Foreign Relations.
"President Bush's bilateral deal correctly recognizes that it is far better for the
nonproliferation community if India works with it rather than against it,"
- Seema Gahlaut
University of Georgia's Center for
International Trade and Security
"India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities,
whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements."
-Manmohan Singh,
PM (former) India
"We are going to be sending, or allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India--including
yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium--that will free up Indian domestic sources of
fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise
have been able to make,"
-Henry Sokolski,
executive director
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Introduction
The Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 provided a roadmap for future strategic
partnership between India and the United States. The new cooperative framework
aimed at making India a global power has many facets including strategic, energy and
economic components. However, the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement which is
part of the overall energy dialogue attracted most attention due to its serious
implications for global non-proliferation regime and on the South Asian security
environment. The agreement would enable India to acquire civil nuclear technology

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from the US and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and accord
India, de facto status of a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS).1
The U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008, gave final approval to
an agreement facilitating nuclear cooperation between the United States and India.
The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to
international nonproliferation efforts, The deal lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium
on nuclear trade with India. It provides U.S. assistance to India's civilian nuclear
energy program, and expands U.S.-India cooperation in energy and satellite
technology. But critics in the United States say the deal fundamentally reverses half a
century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, undermines attempts to prevent states like
Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and potentially contributes to
a nuclear arms race in Asia.
In July 2009, New Delhi designated two sites for U.S. companies to build nuclear
reactors in India. But a nuclear liability law passed by the Indian parliament in
August 2010 is causing a rift with U.S. nuclear suppliers. Critics of the law contend
India's proposal to seek legal redress against nuclear suppliers is a sharp deviation
from the international liability regime which holds nuclear operators solely
responsible in case of an accident. India would also like the United States to relax
some of its restrictions on technology transfer to India.
The nuclear deal, if remain unchecked, could allow India to make qualitative and
quantitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal, triggering a possible nuclear arms
competition in the region, involving Pakistan, India and possibly China, thus
destabilizing the entire region. Similarly, the overall India-US strategic partnership at
the possible cost of regional instability could impinge security interests of other
regional players; forcing smaller countries to re-evaluate their security imperatives
and explore options such as strategic realignments, in order to better safeguard their
security interests. The emerging India-US relationship aimed at enhancing Indias
stature in the region, besides having possible negative implications for the South
1 While the Indo-US nuclear deal has been in clear recognition of Indias non-proliferation record, the lawmakers in the US
against the deal, have questioned Indias track record. Senator Barbara Boxer, California Democrat, for instance, was quick to
cite the September 18 The Washington Post story that highlighted leakage of sensitive nuclear blueprints by the Indian
Department of Atomic Energy. A report by the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), authored by David
Albright and Susan Basu questioned Indias illicit procurement activities with regard to its nuclear programmes. See, Aziz
Haniffa, Lawmakers Question Indias Non-proliferation Track Record, Rediff News, 19 September 2008,

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Asian stability does provide US with an opportunity to use its increased leverage with
India, and work towards regional stability by helping to resolve outstanding disputes
between India and Pakistan. The US could also work with these two non-NPT (Non
Proliferation Treaty) NWS to bring them into mainstream non-proliferation regime
through some kind of a regional arrangement, and under a treaty obligation, which
could alleviate proliferation concerns of the international community, arising mainly
due to non-NPT status of India and Pakistan. Such an option would bring the two
non-NPT NWS under a treaty obligation, which could then become a basis for civil
nuclear cooperation with other members of the NSG.
However the civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States is only one part
of the wide-ranging alliance that the UPA government sought to forge with the United
States. The strategic alliance with the United States as stated in the joint statement of
July 2005 by the Indian Prime Minister and the US President has four aspects. The
political, which involves India joining the US bandwagon of spreading democracy
around the world; the economic, involving a strategic partnership based on a
blueprint for US capital; the military, expressed through the Defense Framework
Agreement; and fourthly the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Prior to the joint
statement of July 2005, the UPA government signed a ten-year Defense Framework
Agreement with the United States. It is evident that without the defense agreement,
the Americans would not have agreed for the nuclear cooperation. This seems to be
part of a quid.2

History Of Indian Nuclear Program

In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear energy under the Atoms
for Peace program. The United States built a nuclear reactor for India, provided
nuclear fuel for a time, and allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear
laboratories. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming it was biased. In 1974,
India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could develop nuclear weapons with
technology transferred for peaceful purposes.3 As a result, the United States isolated
India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to convince other
2International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2012
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countries to do the same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build a
"strategic partnership" with India, increasing cooperation in fields including
spaceflight, satellite technology, and missile defense. 4

Nuclear Deal And What It Entails

The major argument advanced by the UPA government is that the nuclear agreement
is vital for India to end its nuclear isolation, without which it will not be possible to
meet the countrys energy requirements in the future. This ignores the very limited
contribution that nuclear power makes to our overall energy generation which is less
than 3 per cent. It cannot exceed 7 per cent even if the ambitious plans for expansion
to 20,000 MW are implemented by 2020. While talking about energy security, the
cost of nuclear power has to be factored in5. We should continue to develop nuclear
technology based on the three-phased program me. But the expansion of nuclear
power cannot become the central focus for energy security. The cost of power per unit
generated for imported nuclear reactor will be twice that of a coal-based plant. The
capital required to set up a plant with an imported reactor will be thrice that of a coalbased plant. So, what does it mean in terms of investment to set a target of 20,000
MW of nuclear power by 2020, or the more ambitious 40,000 MW target set out by
the Prime Minister? The government has not conducted any techno-economic study
on the feasibility and cost of nuclear power.
The implementation of the nuclear cooperation agreement will hamper the pursuit of
a self-reliant nuclear technology policy for peaceful purposes based on the threephase nuclear energy program me. There will be an unacceptable price to be paid. 6
While negotiating for the nuclear deal, the United States simultaneously opposed
3 Ibid,
4

Sridhar Krishna swami, Pranab, Rice dawdles on N-deal Again, Hindustan Times, March 24, 2008.

Mark Bucknam, Power to the People of India: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India, Strategic Insights VI, no. 1 (January
2007).

Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal, International Atomic Energy Agency Press Release 2006/05,
March 2, 2006.

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India going ahead with the Iran pipeline project. The strategic alliance with the US
will constrain India from accessing energy from Iran and working for an Asian energy
security grid which will link Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia. After the Hyde
Act was adopted in December 2006, the CPI(M) had stated that it contains provisions
which are contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament on
August 17, 2006. The CPI (M) had repeatedly asked the government not to proceed
with the bilateral negotiations for the 123 agreement, till this matter was cleared up.
But the government did not heed this advice too. The ten-year Defense Framework
Agreement was signed in June 2005. It was a precursor to the joint statement issued
in July, just three weeks later. Such a wide-ranging military collaboration agreement
has not been signed by India with any country since Independence. The agreement
provides for joint operations by the two armed forces in military operations outside
the auspices of the United Nations; the agreement aims interoperability of the
armed forces; the two sides will work for missile defense cooperation; sale of US
weapons to India and co-production is another feature. Under this pact, India has
agreed to work out a Logistics Support Agreement (otherwise known as the
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement) with the United States and a Maritime
Security Cooperation between the two navies.7 Regular joint exercises and military
training of Indian officers in the United States are already underway. This Defense
Framework Agreement alone is sufficient to change the entire security and strategic
orientation of India.8 Following the announcement of the bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreement in July 2007, Nicholas Burns, the Under Secretary of State,
who was responsible for negotiating the bilateral agreement, in the official briefing
after the 123 agreement was reached, said: And I think now that we have
consummated the civil nuclear trade between American us, if we look down the road
in the future, were going to see far greater defense cooperation between the United
State and India: training; exercises; we hope, defense sales of military technology to
the Indian armed forces.9
7 Kerr, Paul. "CRS: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress." Nov 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. Mar
2015.

Condoleezza Rice, Our Opportunity With India, Washington Post, March 13, 2006, A15.

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs On-The-Record Briefing on the Status of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative and the Text of the Bilateral Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement), U.S. State
Department. Washington, DC, July 27, 2007.

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Terms Of The Deal

The details of the deal include the following:

India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association
(IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear
program. By March 2006, India promised to place fourteen of its twenty-two power
reactors under IAEA safeguards permanently. Teresita Schaffer, director of the South
Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says these will
include domestically built plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before
now. India has promised that all future civilian thermal and breeder reactors shall be
placed under IAEA safeguards permanently. However, the Indian prime minister says
New Delhi "retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian." According to
him: "This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future
nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements."
Military facilities-and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to nowwill be exempt from inspections or safeguards.

India commits to signing an Additional Protocol (PDF)-which allows more intrusive

IAEA inspections-of its civilian facilities.

India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.

India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the
United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.India
agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states
that don't possess them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.

U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear
fuel for its civilian energy program. (An approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
lifting the ban on India has also cleared the way for other countries to make nuclear
fuel and technology sales to India.)

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Also India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including
materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess
plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also receive
imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.

Section (123) Agreement

Under existing law (Atomic Energy Act [AEA] of 1954, as amended; P.L. 95-242; 42
U.S.C. 2153 et seq.) 10 all significant U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries
requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Significant nuclear cooperation
includes the transfer of U.S.-origin special nuclear material subject to licensing for
commercial, medical, and industrial purposes. Such agreements, which are
congressional-executive agreements requiring congressional approval, do not
guarantee that cooperation will take place or that nuclear material will be transferred,
but rather set the terms of reference and authorize cooperation. The AEA includes
requirements for an agreements content, conditions for the President to exempt an
agreement from those requirements, presidential determinations and other
supporting information to be submitted to Congress, conditions affecting the
implementation of an agreement once it takes effect, and procedures for Congress to
consider and approve the agreement. Section 123 of the AEA requires that any
agreement for nuclear cooperation meet nine nonproliferation criteria and that the
President submit any such agreement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department of State is required to
provide the President an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
(NPAS), which the President is to submit, along with the agreement, to those two
committees. The State Department is also required to provide a classified annex to the
NPAS, prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. The NPAS
is meant to explain how the agreement meets the AEA nonproliferation requirements.
The President must also make a written determination that the performance of the
proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the
common defense and security.
10 Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006
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Feature Of The 123 Agreement

The Agreement could be a major contributor to our energy security. For India it is
critical that we maintain our current economic growth rate of 8 to 10 per cent per
annum if we are to achieve the goal of eradicating poverty. Inadequacy of energy
supply is one of the primary constraints on accelerating Indias growth rate. We are
trying to expand all forms of energy production in a manner which takes care of
concerns about environment. Nuclear energy is a logical choice in this context and
can make a larger contribution to our overall energy mix. At present its share is only
about 3%. We have an ambitious program me to increase our nuclear energy
generating capacity to 20,000 MWe by 2020 and double this by 2030. While our
domestic three stage programme continues, using our own uranium resources, this
Agreement, by adding additional capacity quickly, would help us to reach that target
soon.
The Agreement also opens the door for cooperation in civil nuclear energy with other
countries. We are already discussing with France and Russia similar bilateral
cooperation agreements on civil nuclear energy. Once the NSG adopts an exemption
to its Guidelines we hope to operationalise all these agreements.
The Agreement places India in a special category as a State possessing advanced
nuclear technology, like the United States, with both parties having the same
benefits and advantages.
The Agreement provides for full civil nuclear energy cooperation covering nuclear
reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment and
reprocessing.

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The Agreement provides for nuclear trade, transfer of nuclear material, equipment,
components, and related technologies and for cooperation in nuclear fuel cycle
activities.
The Agreement contains a full reflection of the March 2, 2006 supply assurances, its
linkage to safeguards in perpetuity and the provision for corrective measures in case
of disruption of fuel supply.
The Agreement provides for the development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to
guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of Indias reactors.
The Agreement provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to transferred
material and equipment. There is no provision that mandates scrutiny of our nuclear
weapons program me or any unsafeguarded nuclear facility.

Requirement Under The Atomic Energy Act

Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear
cooperation with another country. 11
Section 123(a) States that the proposed agreement is to include the terms, conditions,
duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that the agreement
must meet. It also contains provisions for the President to exempt an agreement from
any of several criteria described in that section and includes details on the kinds of
information the executive branch must provide to Congress.
Section 123(b) specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to
Congress.
Section 123(c) specifies how Congress approves cooperation agreements that are
limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or cover reactors larger than 5
MWe). This report does not discuss such agreements.
Section 123(d) specifies how Congress approves agreements that do cover significant
nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or reactors larger than 5 MWe),
including exempted agreements.
11 Supra 10
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Advantages of the Nuclear Deal to India and the United States

Under the new civil nuclear agreement, India has agreed to separate its civilian and
military programs and to put two-thirds of its existing reactors, and 65 percent of its
generating power, under permanent safeguards with international verification, and in
return the United States would be under commitment to supply nuclear fuel and
technology to India.
This is very vital for India, because one of the biggest constraints for the continuing
success of its fast-growing economy is the electricity shortage. Nuclear energy, which
at present accounts for only about 3 percent of Indias total electricity generation, is
an attractive alternative to coal and expensive imported oil and gas. The fourteen
nuclear power plants India has agreed to put under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards exemplify approximately
3,000 megawatts or 3 gigawatts of generating capacity. By 2020, India plans to add
another 12-16 gigawatts of nuclear generating capacity to increase its current
capacity.12 As presently nuclear power plays a very marginal role in Indias growth,
therefore in some quarters it is also being felt that even by 2020, nuclear power will
contribute only about seven percent of Indias total generating capacity and thus
would make only a very marginal difference in Indias electricity scene.
It is also being argued that though the nuclear power could help India in addressing
its energy problems to some extent, but it would not make a major difference in the
energy sector and also contribute a little to satisfy the needs of its transportation
sector. But on the other hand it is being believed by the supporters of nuclear energy
that in the future, nuclear power might play an even bigger role. In view of the various
problems associated with the other sources of energy and to satisfy Indias huge
populations growing energy needs, projected to increase four-fold within 25 years,
this group believes that without aggravating its dependence on oil from the Middle
East or excessively contributing to pollution and global warming, the growing energy
needs could be fulfilled by using the nuclear energy.13
12 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, 74.
13 Ashton B. Carter, Americas New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July/August2006), 40.

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Unfortunately, though, 17 percent of the worlds population resides in India but it has
a very trivial portion of the worlds oil and gas reserves. Therefore in the absence of a
reliable source of electricity, industries and households mostly are dependent on
scarce and costly energy sources like petroleum, natural gas and coal to produce
electricity to meet its requirements.14 In view of Indias dependence on imported oil,
gas and coal to produce electricity which is not a very practical alternative for meeting
Indias rapidly increasing electricity and energy needs, it is being opined that these
limited sources, besides hampering Indias growth and development, would also add
to Indias mounting pollution problems. They also argue that though coal would
continue to be a major source of fuel for generating electricity, that the increasing
prices of petroleum and natural gas and the need to control and manage the problem
of pollution would push India like other countries to adopt cleaner means of
generating electricity. In fact the worries about growing pollution levels have also
forced as many as thirty countries in the world to restart their nuclear power plants.
Presently the United States is the biggest producer of nuclear energy, with 103
nuclear power plants and 27 percent of the global nuclear generating capacity, and
rising natural gas prices have contributed to extensions of nuclear plant licenses in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. China, with just nine nuclear
power plants also intends to build thirty new nuclear plants by 2020.15
In view of the scarcity of alternative sources of electricity generation and Indias
mounting energy needs to match its economic progress India has perceived this
agreement as a means of fulfilling its energy needs. The United States, on the other,
hand has been viewing it as a tool to bring India under the control and obligations of
the nuclear regimes. In view of Indias energy-related problems, this agreement
appears to have transformed their relationship by fulfilling the objectives of both the
countries. As on the one hand, it would end Indias isolation, help it acquire high-

14 Rahul Tongia, The Political Economy of Indian Power Sector Reforms, Working Paper, no. 4(Revised),
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, December
2003.

15 Mark Bucknam, Power to the People of India: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India, StrategicInsights VI, no.
1 (January 2007).

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technology, and reduce its dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf; and on the other,
it would bring India under the IAEA inspection and control system, and prove
economically beneficial for the United States, too.16 Due to this fact the deal was
welcomed by Mohamed El Baradei, Director of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. In his opinion the nuclear deal would bring India closer as an important
partner in the non-proliferation regime and which would be a milestone, timely for
ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism
and strengthen nuclear safety. The forty-five nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
such as France, Russia and the United Kingdom, also did not take much time in
expressing their support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal but on the other hand Canada
and China, both NSG members, expressed their reservations about this deal.
The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice17 while arguing in favor of the Indo-U.S.
strategic partnership and the civil nuclear deal, stressed that India has a record of
thirty years of responsible behavior on proliferation matters, and the agreement
would make the world, and the future of India and the United States, safe. While
naming the agreement as unique, Rice also emphasized that Indias uniqueness as a
country, as a democracy with an accountable and transparent government
encouraged the United States to move forward for this agreement. In her view point
other countries like North Korea and Iran that had also been seeking to develop their
programs on the basis of this agreement do not fall in this category, because Iran is a
state that promotes terrorism, and North Korea is the least transparent state,
threatens its neighbors, and proliferates weapons. She also felt that by satisfying
Indias energy needs, it would end its dependence on fossil fuels and ease the
environmental impact of Indias vibrant economic growth; and, on the other hand, it
would also help the U.S. economy and enhance the employment and job prospects for
the American people also. The nuclear deal grants India the facility of reprocessing
the nuclear fuel acquired from the external sources, a concession the United States
has presently given only to Japan and European countries. In accordance to the deal
the United States would also help India to find fuel if the United States cuts off the
16 Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal,International Atomic
Energy Agency Press Release 2006/05, March 2, 2006.

17 Ibid, 8.
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supply for any reason particularly if India tests a nuclear weapon. In the viewpoint of
several scholars, the reason for the U.S. willingness to take these steps lies in the fact
that lately it has started to recognize India as an important strategic bulwark and an
answer against a growing Chinese power and highly unstable and unpredictable
Pakistan. India s million-man army, the worlds fourth largest, and its blue-water
navy make it a natural buffer as well as a sentinel on the trade route between East
Asia and the Middle East. The United States believes that a demographically and
economically vibrant India could serve as a counterweight to expanding Chinese
influence in Southeast Asia as well as Beijings great-power ambitions around the
globe. 18 U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford has also accepted that the United
States by adopting such policy moves towards India has succeeded to a large extent in
de-hyphenating its relationship with India and Pakistan. 19
Interestingly, now the United States has also tacitly acknowledged India as a
responsible state with advanced nuclear know-how, but it has very diplomatically
avoided accepting India as the sixth nuclear weapons state. The U.S. stand also makes
the nuclear deal noteworthy. It clearly shows that America has agreed to help India
acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states with nuclear weapons. India
would also be granted full civil nuclear energy co-operation, fuel supplies and the
transfer of technology, etc., but the United States would not like to undermine the
conditions of the NPT by recognizing India as a sixth nuclear state. In some quarters
it is believed that the present U.S. policy, like the NPT which created two classes of
states, the nuclear haves and the have-nots, would once again create two classes of the
non- NPT signatories, "responsible" non-nuclear states such as Japan and the EU
countries which are allowed to conduct plutonium reprocessing and uranium
enrichment for their civilian programs, and other countries like Iran which are denied
this right because of the feeling that they may use their potential to acquire nuclear
weapons. 20 In view of this duplicity, it can be said that a country can not be assured of
18 Sadanand Dhume, Is India an ally?, Commentary 125, no. 1 (January 2008).
19 Amit Baruah, Waiting for India to process nuke deal, U.S., Hindustan Times, January 30,2008.

20 . T.V. Paul, The U.S.-India nuclear accord: implications for the nonproliferation regime,International Journal
62, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 854.

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obtaining full fuel cycle facilities by just signing the NPT or the IAEA safeguards
system but its political system and proximity to the western countries would also
matter in deciding its suitability for access to the dual use potential sensitive
technologies.
However some other scholars have opined that the July 18, 2005 agreement for a civil
nuclear deal with the United States has heralded Indias strategic liberalization, and
has also ensured substantial gains such as the import of nuclear fuel, etc. They feel
that an enabled India, free of technology denial restraints and of the category of the
strategic outcast, would not only emerge as an important state in the twenty-first
century but also help multi-polarity to become a reality at the global level. 21
Problems
However, despite the benefits for India and the United States by the nuclear deal it is
also being felt that the nuclear deal with India not only threatens to demolish the
global nuclear regimes but would also encourage other countries to go for their
nuclear programs as India is one of the countries which have not signed the NPT. The
U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act also aims to prevent proliferation by denying
access of nuclear technology and nuclear materials for the states that have refused to
sign the NPT. To strengthen controls on export of the nuclear technology and
materials to such countries the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the mid-1970s was
established by the United States. And it is also true that despite creating two classes of
states and being a highly discriminatory treaty, the NPT has survived because no
major power has remained outside of it to defy it. Actually the P-5 have shown very
little interest in linking the vertical and horizontal proliferation with the result the
NPT has become a purely horizontal nonproliferation instrument. 22
Though there is no denying the fact that NPT has also remained unsuccessful in
controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons as both signatory and non signatory
countries have violated the norms of the treaty. China and France, signatories to the
21 C. Uday Bhasker, N-Deal Enters Choppy Waters: the Implications, Rediff India Abroad,August 19, 2007.

22 Karthika Sasikumar, Indias Emergence as a responsible nuclear power, InternationalJournal 62, no. 4
(Autumn 2007): 825 (20).

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NPT, have helped Israel and Pakistan, non-signatories of the NPT, to carry forward
their nuclear program as well as to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Likewise
Iran and North Korea which have signed the NPT have used nuclear technology,
equipment and fuel meant for civilian nuclear power programs to expand the nuclear
weapons programs.
It is ironic that despite the failure of the NPT in controlling the proliferation of the
nuclear weapons and technology, it is being argued that rewarding India through this
deal for not signing the NPT would encourage other states also to follow suit, and also
set a precedent for future proliferators to develop their nuclear programs without
worrying about sanctions. However, to counter this argument it is also being alleged
that though India did not sign the NPT but it has always presented an example of
responsible nuclear state by never helping proliferation of nuclear weapons or
providing the technology to the rogue states like Libya or Iran despite lucrative energy
deals in return for such help. Therefore, India cannot be put in the bracket of the
rogue states for denying the technology or imposing the sanctions.
T he U.S. stand towards the nuclear deal with India in the opinion of some scholars
presents a good case of the double standard, however U.S. policymakers have not only
rejected this argument but also said "We treat India, a democratic, peaceful friend,
differently than we treat Iran and North Korea and we're very happy to say that. India
is inviting the IAEA in, Iran is pushing the IAEA out. India is playing by the rules.
Iran is not. If thats a system of double standards, we're very proud to establish that
double standard on behalf of a democratic friend." 23
Actually the U.S. move is driven by both strategic and economic considerations.
Strategically, Washington perceives India as a potential counterweight to China, and
by improving the nuclear relationship it aspires to bring changes in political relations
between the two states. In economic terms, the United States would like to help India
build a number of nuclear power reactors to fulfill the energy needs of its fast-growing
economy and cut the dependence on pollution-creating hydrocarbon fuels. As India is
expected to order several nuclear power reactors, therefore ultimately U.S. companies
would earn benefits from such sales to India.
23 David Ruppe, U.S. acknowledges double standard on Indian deal, Global SecurityNewswire, April 12, 2006.

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In fact over the last thirty years, India and the United States both have paid the price
of not having a good relationship with each other. India has paid a heavier price than
the United States for not joining the NPT in 1968, and also for its nuclear tests
conducted in 1974 and 1998 by way of attracting various kinds of sanctions imposed
by the international community. However, initially the sanctions did not create much
problem as Indias nuclear program was in its infancy, but as India has developed its
nuclear program further and has succeeded in developing a workable nuclear
deterrent, it is believed that the additional restrictions on nuclear cooperation would
adversely affect Indias civilian energy program and economic progress than its
nuclear weapons programs. At present, India has a good understanding of the nuclear
fuel cycle; techniques for using thorium as fuel; produced an arsenal of nuclear
weapons; and also developed civilian nuclear power program. For further
advancement now India wants access to enriched uranium and also the right to
reprocess the spent fuel, but without any conditions on its nuclear weapons program.
The United States feels that the U.S.-India nuclear deal, would on the one hand help
India to fulfill its energy related needs and on the other would also bind India through
international agreements to continue its responsible nonproliferation policies and
thus help meet international non-proliferation goals. 24
In India though all the opposition parties have shown their displeasure towards the
Indo-U.S. deal but the Congress Party of India and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
have been vigorously arguing in the favor of the nuclear deal by emphasizing that this
deal is meant to end Indias isolation in the field of nuclear technology and all the
nuclear scientists have also favored it as a historic agreement. The Nuclear Suppliers
Group has also agreed to supply nuclear material to India on account of this
agreement. The Congress Party also feels that to meet its growing energy demands,
electricity production through nuclear energy has become a necessity for India,
therefore, India needs this agreement urgently to move with other countries, like
France, which gets 78 percent, Germany 30 percent and the United States 20 percent
of its electricity from nuclear energy.25It is also being argued by the Congress Party
leadership that this would not only help in electricity generation but also in medical
24 R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs On-The-Record Briefing on the Statusof the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative and the Text of the Bilateral Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement), U.S. State Department. Washington, DC, July
27, 2007.

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and scientific research, and high-technology. It would also allow more investment in
other areas by U.S. firms and in case of failure India would revert back to the
primitive stage or to the status prior to 1974, and all the growth and development
would be stunned. Some scholars have also argued that despite many claims, Indias
energy needs have not been met either by hydro-electric potential or coal for the last
50 years and in order to meet Indias full potential there is a need to provide
unhindered access to technology, investment, markets and higher education. This
need could only be fulfilled by the nuclear energy, therefore, this deal is a must for
Indias progress and development.

Controversial Issues of the Deal

Following the U.S. Presidents visit to India in March 2006, the U.S. Congress also
took up the agreement and formally made it into legislation after the committee level
deliberations and conciliations in terms of words by both the House and the Senate.
The Congress made substantive modifications to the agreement by adding conditions
such as limiting the reprocessing rights of India over spent fuel as well as restraints
on its ability to conduct nuclear testing. The legislation also required the President to
issue an annual certification to Congress stating that India is abiding by the clauses of
the agreement. President Bush signed the bill on 18 December 2006, making it a legal
instrument. On 1 August 2007, U.S. and Indian negotiators concluded a separate
technical agreement under section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which spells out
the precise terms, conditions, responsibilities, obligations and promises that each
party undertakes.
Through this legislation in the form of the Hyde Actfor the first time in history the
United States, it has ratified nuclear cooperation with India and opened the way for
giving India access to American nuclear technology with limited safeguards to
discourage possible proliferation. While it was passed by the United States, the
ratification by the Senate and the approval of the forty-five nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group that control exports of nuclear materials is also required for any further
25 Steven Mufson, Nuclear Power Primed for Comeback Demand, Subsidies Spur U.S.Utilities, Washington
Post, October 8, 2007, A01.

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movement.26 As the legislation, known as Hyde Act, has imposed restrictions on how
India could utilize U.S. nuclear supplies, therefore the implementation of the
agreement has received a setback because of the opposition by the Communist parties
that support Indias present UPA government from outside. Actually the leaders of
almost all the political parties of India have categorically expressed their dislike and
apprehensions for provisions that provide for cutting off aid if India conducts any
future nuclear tests and the return of the all nuclear material or equipment provided
by U.S. suppliers.
The opposition parties have also been demanding that the clause that prohibits India
from reprocessing any fuel provided for power plants be removed from the text. They
have also expressed dislike towards the clause that requires the U.S. President to
annually certify that India is complying with the rules as they believe that this would
allow for U.S. meddling in its nuclear program and also violate the sovereignty of
India. Taking note of objections by India and the delay in working on the modalities
of the deal, U.S. officials have opined that despite Indias reservations the United
States would make no such concessions to India that would run counter to the Hyde
Act as the ball was in Indian court. "We will honor every aspect of the Hyde Act. A
collapse of the talks, would seriously undercut our hopes for the relationship... The
process has been held hostage to political crosswinds in Congress and the Indian
parliament." The U.S. approach has given another reason for the opposition parties as
well as the allies to rally together to oppose the deal.
On account of the prevailing circumstances it is being felt that it would be difficult for
the United States to fulfill its obligations and similarly in a coalition government
without the approval of the coalition partners, India would also not be able to move
forward with this deal. In view of the problems Indias Prime Minister is facing to
develop consensus and approval of the coalition partners the future of the deal looks
bleak as the UPA allies, the left parties, are adamant on not supporting the deal. They
have threatened to withdraw support from the government even at the cost of pushing
the country to mid-term poll. In the United States apprehensions have also already
started to find their expression among Congressmen, many of whom think that this
26 James Gersten Zang, Congress OKs Nuclear Pact with India: The Deal, a Major Policy Shift,Provides Access
to American Technology, L.A. Times, December 9, 2006.

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deal is more in Indias interest as India would be able to conduct the nuclear test and
also develop its military program without any problems. They have argued that
Indias prototype fast breeder reactors, which can produce significant amounts of
weapons-grade plutonium, have been kept out of this agreement, and there would not
be any problem for Indias weapon program.27 A group of U.S. non-proliferation
specialists expressing their apprehensions and concerns about the deal wrote to
members of Congress urging them to reject any pact that falls short of American
domestic laws. They feel that the result of such pacts could be reduced accountability,
increased Indian nuclear weapons production capacity and damage to the credibility
of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Unlike 177 other states, India has so far refused to
sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and is, under no legal obligation not to test.
They urged the Congress to ensure that, 'the agreement for nuclear cooperation must
explicitly state that renewed nuclear testing by India would lead to the termination of
U.S. nuclear assistance.'28
Though, in view of Indias unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing it is being felt that
these requirements would pose no problem, however, on the other hand, it is also
being argued that Indias insistence on assurances that commercial nuclear contracts
should continue even in case of nuclear testing would breach the agreement. Indias
relationship with Iran is also a matter of concern for U.S. Senators and think tanks.
On account of Indias relations with Iran the Senators have also expressed their
apprehensions about the deal. They feel that in view of Indias activities like agreeing
to military-to-military working groups and joint training exercises with Iran, Indian
companies selling Iran precursor chemicals for rocket fuel and chemical weapons,
passing nuclear secrets to Tehran, entering into agreements with Iran to develop oil
and gas resources and helping Iran to develop more effective batteries for Irans
submarine fleet, there is an urgent need to reconsider the nuclear deal. 29
27 Neil King, Jr., U.S.-India Talks On Nuclear Pact Enter Endgame, Congress Likely to Balk AtNew Delhis
Terms; Businesses Want a Deal, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2007, A1.

28Glenn Kessler, Nunn Urges Congress to Set Conditions on U.S.-India Nuclear Pact,Washington Post. March
19, 2006, A9.

29 Sridhar Krishnaswami, Reject N-deal if it falls short of domestic laws, Rediff India Abroad,May 17, 2007
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Issues of Concerns in India and the United States

There is no denying that this agreement has opened new vistas of cooperation
between India and the United States, but it cannot be denied that despite the hoopla,
the pin-pricks and pressure politics are still present. U.S. objections regarding the
supply of nuclear fuel by Russia to Indias Tarapur nuclear reactor are a cause of
concern. As within three weeks of the March 2006 announcement of the deal, Russia
agreed to supply uranium to refuel two reactors at Indias Tarapur nuclear site but the
United States feels that any action should be taken only after India fulfills its
obligations under the historic Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, which India has not yet done.
Interestingly, low-enriched uranium for Tarapurs reactors has been supplied by NSG
member states since these reactors came in to being in 1969. Under the present deal
also if the United States fails to go ahead with the deal, the other NSG countries will
seek to replace the United States in cooperating with India and the United States
would hardly be in a position to object to the cooperation that it had first proposed.
India, on the issue of the fuel supplies for the Tarapur plant by Russia also made it
clear that nuclear fuel was required urgently to prevent shutting down the Tarapur
plant, and that it did not violate any NSG guidelines or international law. India also
clarified that it had requested the United States to supply nuclear fuel, but as this was
not possible under U.S. law, it requested this of Russia, which agreedand that this
issue was separate from the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. 30 In view of this, it seems
that in order to pursue its civil nuclear-related interests, India would have to
accommodate the United States pressures, and without the United States consent, it
would be difficult for India to get such supplies from other nuclear powers.
Proliferation Concerns
Many critics of this agreement, both in the United States and India, have expressed
their apprehensions about it. They feel that India may not have signed the NPT, but
that the United Statesby signing the NPThad also promised not to help other
countries, and only those countries who have signed it could benefit from trade in

30 Russian Fuel for Tarapur within NSG guidelines: India, Hindustan Times, March 15, 2006.
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civilian nuclear technology, and that allowing nuclear trade with India is bound to
break this rule.31 It is also being felt in some quarters in America that this agreement
is more favorable to India and its military program than to the United States, as this
deal allows India enough fissile material for producing nuclear weapons.
They feel that this would be against Americas worldwide nuclear non-proliferation
agenda. In some segments of India as well, there is a feeling that the UPA
government, in its enthusiasm to develop good relations and a nuclear deal with the
United States, has compromised Indias interests.
Although India has been able to keep its military option open, it will now be under the
constant pressures and vigilance of the international agencies and in view of the past
record of the United States with regard to such supplies, India would have to work
with utmost caution. Ashton B. Carter has opined that Bushs historic concession to
India could create a serious blow to the international non-proliferation regime and
could set a dangerous precedent for rogue countries like Iran, North Korea and other
aspiring nuclear powers. He also feels that the United States in order to win the
support and cooperation of India in confronting the challenge that a threatening Iran,
a turbulent Pakistan and an unpredictable China may pose in the future gave away
something on the nuclear front to gain much more on other fronts. He has also
argued that the deal is clear about what the United States would concede but it is not
clear as what India would give in return and such imbalance would leave the United
States at the mercy of Indias future behavior. The deal has also given a message that
forgiveness comes to proliferators who wait long enough, and that the nuclear
aspirants could bypass the NPT if they waited long enough.
In view of this it is being apprehended that the deal would encourage other countries
to develop their nuclear programs, and this would harm the United States vital
interest of preventing nuclear proliferation, lead to the spread of weapons-grade
nuclear material, and also unleash a regional arms race in which China and Russia
could be expected to do the same for Pakistan and Iran as the United States would do
for India. In such an atmosphere, it would be difficult for the United States to get
support for sanctions against the countries known as nuclear rebels, such as Iran and
North Korea. It is also being feared that it would be difficult for the United States to
31 Nuclear Proliferation: Dr. Strangedeal, The Economist, March 9, 2006.
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convince the forty-five nation NSG, and particularly China and Japan, to change their
policies to exempt India from nuclear export controls.
U.S. objections to Indias search for alternative energies are also noteworthy, as the
United States wants to restrict Indias attempts to develop the India-Pakistan-Iran
gas pipeline. The United States believes that the nuclear deal will end Indias
dependence on the oil from Persian Gulf; however, despite being the pioneer in a field
of nuclear energy, the United States is equally interested in maintaining a continued
and unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf for satisfying its own needs, which
means the United States is free to look after its interests, but that Indias hands would
be tied. In view of this, it can be said that though the integration of India in the field
of nuclear energy is a welcome move, but India needs to tread cautiously to protect its
interests.

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