Demetrio vs Alba

Facts: Petitioners are the members of the National Assembly/Batasan

Pambansa.
They are assailing the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section
44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. The section states that, The President shall
have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.

Issue:
Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of PD No.
1177 is constitutional.

Held: YES. The Constitution provides that, Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for
the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.
transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item
in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends

the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, assails the validity

of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to

enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such
power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.

Executive Order No. 475 reduced the rate of additional duty on

all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad
valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad
valorem.

Executive Order No. 478 levied (in addition to the

aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and
all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported
oil products.
Issue:Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Held: YES. under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the
enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills
is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President,
that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to

fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to

authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions is
[Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . .

ABAKADA vs Ermita
Facts: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA
GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005.
They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of

services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions

contain
a
uniform proviso authorizing
the
President,
upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to
12%, effective January 1, 2006.
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix
the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power
which violates Article 6 Section 28(2) of the Constitution.
Held: NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of
the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that
is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate
to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply
execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a
manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task
being to interpret the law.
Pimentel vs. Congress
Fact: Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null
and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following
the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition
corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11,
2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ...
terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress
serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence."

Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings

terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he
relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out]
by the rules of both Houses of Congress.
Petitioners claim that his arguments are buttressed by
legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the
rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section
42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an
incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the
Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary
or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in
accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not the Joint Committee canvassing even Congress
session has been terminated is constitutional.
Held: NO. Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is
fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, the term of the present Twelfth
Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine
die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does
not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative
sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its
next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a
special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that
"[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the
same Article provides that "the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to
the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to
which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed
out of legal existence."

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to

a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11,
2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that
of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public
session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and
cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed
its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change,
but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its
purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative
duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and
Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as
well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary
tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has
not become functus officio.