Anda di halaman 1dari 8

PEOPLE VS TABOGA

FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which
reads that with intent to gain, and with violence against persons, entered the house
of one Francisca Tubon, and once inside, with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, assault, attacked and stabbed Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds which necessarily caused the death of said Tubon and took away several
personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was likewise indicted for Arson for
setting the victims house on fire.
After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao
confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her
house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman,
to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi,
a radio announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again,
Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the
crimes charged and interposed an alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was
maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his
admission to radio announcer Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held
inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present
and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution. Thus, he had to admit
the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both
crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a
private person, can be admitted as evidence against him.
HELD:
Yes.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the
police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is
there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer
was instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the
crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to
interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In
fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. The records
also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but to
several others.
Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim
that he was maltreated and compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not

present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they


failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence, on their bodies
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating the
voluntariness of the confession.
The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession.
Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to
police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The
record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain
that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating
him at the police station. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he
could have easily asked help from the newsman.

PEOPLE VS BALOLOY
FACTS:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening
of 3August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter
GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant
Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of
it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged
extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate
fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged
confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the alleged confession of
the accused-appellant to witnesses luzviminda ceniza and judge celestino dicon as
evidence against the accused.
RULING:
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions
made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead
the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[26In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of

the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily
narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the
ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

JESALVA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim
Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy
Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto
were also there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and
boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales, the group
proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank
two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the
evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged
down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner
who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front seat.
Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some
20 meters away from Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink
some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the stores were
already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied
her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the
former immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead
of towards 7th Street where Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo
Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon
petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys Village] OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a
flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1
Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of the wheel so
he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond,
immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is
directly opposite his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding
office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang.
While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked from the waist
down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her.
Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed
some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera
focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he

received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and
just come back to check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he
even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the
woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De
Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no
avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia
talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw
with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence.
He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next
day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with
the victim, a search for him was conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1) oclock in the
afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.13
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her
that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just
remain as friends because she was already married, and that she loved her handsome
husband.14 Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of
September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, 15 together with
other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using
his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner
immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which
was directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas
calls.16 Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his
first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he
voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of
his vehicle.17 At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together
with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which
petitioner identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains
thereat.18

After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before
the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC, Branch 51, denied in
its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge,
which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51,
voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case; hence, the
case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied
the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.
ISSUE:

THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN


RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE
ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE
POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY
HELD:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner
and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and
voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around
12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in
holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable
in the instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted
of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime
through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led
to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed,
when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the
culprit.

SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA
FACTS: On April 22, 1993, the marking of the documents to be testified on by the lone
prosecution witness, Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan of the Commission on Audit, who conducted
the audit examination, took place before the Deputy Clerk of Court of the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan. The marking of the exhibits was with the conformity of all of the
accused and their respective counsel.
Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution rested its case5
and formally offered its evidence on July 6, 1993. Among those offered as evidence were
the sworn statements made by all the accused, including that of petitioner, and previously
marked as exhibits "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", and "U-1" for the prosecution. Said exhibits were
offered as part of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan.

On August 19, 1993, all the accused (including petitioner) filed their "Joint Objections to
Formal Offer of Evidence" on the principal ground that the sworn statements were "hearsay"
evidence.
The Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution dated August 24, 1993, admitted said
evidence, thus:
Acting upon the "FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated July 5, 1993, of the Prosecution
and considering the "JOINT OBJECTIONS TO FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated
August 19, 1993, of accused, the Court RESOLVES the same as follows:
Exhibits A, B, and C are admitted, they being certified true copies of official documents;
Exhibits D up to U and U-1 inclusive of submarkings are admitted as part of the testimony of
Lilibeth Rugayan as examining auditor under the State Auditing Code (P.D. No. 1445).
Dissatisfied, the three accused, on September 13, 1993, jointly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the respondent court in its Resolution dated
September 27, 1993. It ruled that:
Considering that under the Order of this Court dated April 22, 1993 (p. 85) the exhibits "offcourt" was admitted by the accused through counsel, among which were exhibits "A", "B"
and "C", the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused Pada, Torres and Sebastian
with regard to the admission of said exhibits dated September 10, 1993 is denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in
evidence "as part of the testimony of the prosecution witness".
HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers.
Petitioner argues that the said issue should be resolved in the negative on the ground that
the subject sworn statements are hearsay evidence. Petitioner contends that he and his coaccused were never presented as witnesses, thus, they were not given the opportunity to
identify and authenticate their respective sworn statements and that Auditor Rugayan had
no personal knowledge of the contents thereof.
We disagree.
As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Thus, the rule explicitly provides that a
witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is,
which are derived from his own perceptions. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement

In the present case, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and co-accused were
offered not to prove the truth or falsity of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such
written statements were actually made and executed. As stated in the Resolution dated
August 24, 1993 of the respondent court, Exhibits "D" up to "U" and "U-1" were admitted
only as part of the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as Examining Auditor. Title II, Chapter I,
Section 55 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code provides that
"the auditor shall obtain through inspections, observation, inquiries, confirmation and other
techniques, sufficient competent evidential matter to afford himself a reasonable basis for
his opinions, judgments, conclusions and recommendations".
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
investigation." Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the
missing postage stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by a
Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal Service Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is
merely an administrative investigation.
While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued
v. Exevea that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
REMOLINA V CSC
FACTS:
Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in
Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District
Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a
rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was
campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board
examination for teachers. It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolons name did not
appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in
her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.Estelito
Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty.Salupadin in a
bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000pesos. Mr. America
however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating report,
so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exchange for the
appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988,America was able to receive 6 checks at
2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On
recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the

spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory
penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for
reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission
allegedly signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counsel.
HELD:
NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative
investigation.