The Oslo Accord

Author(s): Avi Shlaim

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring, 1994), pp. 24-40
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537958 .
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S
THE OSLO ACCORD
AVISHLAIM

theDeclarationofPrincipleson
and ambiguities,
Despiteall itslimitations
(DOP) forPalestiniansin the Gaza
Arrangements
InterimSelf-Governing
in thecentury-old
Stripand Jerichomarkedthemotherof all breakthroughs
conflictbetweenArabsand Jewsin Palestine.' Futuregenerationswill look
back on Monday,13 September1993-the day the DOP was signedon the
SouthLawn of theWhiteHouse and sealed withthehistorichandshakebetweenIsraeliPrimeMinisterYitzhakRabinand PalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO) ChairmanYasirArafat-as one of themostmomentousevents
historyof the Middle East. In one stunningmove,
in the twentieth-century
the two leadersredrewthegeopoliticalmap of the entireregion.
AlthoughtheDOP was signedin Washington,withPresidentBill Clinton
actingas masterof ceremonies,it had been negotiatedin Oslo and initialed
a morefitting
name for
therein late August. The "Oslo accord" is therefore
thehistoricdocumentthanthe"Washingtonaccord." The accordin facthas
twoparts,bothofwhichweretheproductof secretdiplomacyin theNorwebetweenIsrael and the
gian capital. The firstpartwas mutualrecognition
on plain paper and withoutletterheads,
PLO. It tooktheformoftwoletters,
dated9 Septemberbut signedby ChairmanArafatand PrimeMinisterRabin
on 9 and 10 September.The second part,the Declarationof
respectively
in
on Palestinianself-government
Principles,set an agenda fornegotiations
all
the
withGaza and Jericho.Nearly
beginnnning
the occupiedterritories,

relationsand a Fellow of St Antony's

Avi Shlaim is a readerin international
AcrosstheJordan(1988) and
of
Collusion
is
author
College,Oxford. He the
Peace in theMiddleEast. A
War
and
His
Partition
The Politicsof
(1990).
will
be
American
by
published Vikingin June.
Policy
of
Critique
Joumal of PalestineStudies XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 24-40.

THE OSLO ACCORD

25

publicityfocusedon thesigningoftheDOP, butwithouttheprioragreement

on mutualrecognitiontherecould have been no meaningfulagreementon
Palestinianself-government.
In his letterto Rabin,ArafatobservedthatthesigningoftheDOP marked
the PLO's
a new era in the historyof the Middle East. He thenconfirmed
to accept
commitment
to recognizeIsrael'srightto livein peace and security,
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil Resolutions242 and 338, to renouncethe
use of terrorism
and otheracts ofviolence,and to changethosepartsof the
withthesecommitments.
PalestineNationalCharterwhich are inconsistent
thatin thelightof
In his terse,one-sentencereplyto Arafat,
Rabinconfirmed
of Israel had decided to recognizethe
thesecommitments,
the government
ofthePalestinianpeople and to commencenegotiPLO as therepresentative
ationswiththe PLO withinthe Middle East peace process.2
in a
Rabin was only slightlymore expansive,but stillfarfromeffusive,
statement
he made at the signingof the letterto Arafat.He notedthatthis
was thefirstagreement
betweenthePalestiniansand Israelsincethecreation
of the Stateof Israel. "It's an historicmoment,"he said, "whichhopefully
will bringabout an end to 100 years of bloodshed, misery,between the
Palestiniansand Jews,betweenPalestiniansand Israel."3
Taken together,
the two partsof the Oslo
accord fullymerit the overworkedepithet
"historic" because they reconcile the two The Oslo accordis "historic
principalpartiesto the Arab-Israeliconflict because it reconcilesthe two
This conflicthas two dimensions:one is the principalpartiesto theArabinterstateconflictbetween Israel and the Israeliconflict.
neighboring
Arabstates,theotheris theclash
betweenJewishand Palestiniannationalism.The latterhas alwaysbeen the
Jewish
heartand core of theArab-Israeliconflict.Bothnationalmovements,
and Palestinian,deniedtheothertherightto self-determination
in Palestine.
Theirhistory
is one ofmutualdenial and mutualrejection.PalestinianrejectionofIsrael'slegitimacy
is enshrinedin the 1968 PalestineNationalCharter.
Israel's rejectionof Palestiniannationalrightswas pithilysummedup by
Golda Meir'sremarkthatthereis no such thingas a Palestinianpeople.4
Israel not only
Now mutualdenial has made way formutualrecognition.
recbutformally
recognizedthePalestiniansas a people withpoliticalrights,
The handshakebetweenYitzhakRaognizedthePLO as its representative.
bin and YasirArafatat the signingceremony,
despitethe former'sawkward
between
bodylanguage,was a powerfulsymbolof thehistoricreconciliation
the two nations. The old Israeli war-horsewas deeply uneasy about the
mammothstepof openingrelationswiththe PLO, whichonlyweeks earlier
he had been callinga "terrorist
organization."To his aides he confidedthat
in his stomach." Yethe managedto overcomehis doubts
he had "butterflies
and reservations
and he took his giganticstep,knowingfullwell thatthere
was no turningback.

26

JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

The historicreconciliation
was based on a historiccompromise:acceptance of the principleof the partitionof Palestine. At the same time,both
sides acceptedthe principleof territorial
compromiseas the basis forthe
settlement
of theirlong and bitterconflict,as the basis forpeacefulcoexistencebetweenthemselves.Partition
is not,ofcourse,a new idea. It was first
proposedby thePeel Commissionin 1937 and again by theUnitedNations
in 1947, but it was rejectedon both occasions by the Palestinians,who insistedon a unitarystateoverthewhole of Palestine. Theyinsistedon all or
nothingand endedup withnothing.Norweretheyquickto learnfromtheir
mistakes.Article2 of the PalestineNationalCharterstatesthat"Palestine,
withinthefrontiers
thatexistedduringtheBritishMandate,is an indivisible
territorial
unit."5BythetimethePalestineNationalCouncil(PNC) endorsed
the principleof partitionand a two-statesolutionin 1988, Israel,undera
Likudgovernment,
rejectedtheidea, layingclaimto thewhole ofthebiblical
Land of Israel,including"Judeaand Samaria" (the West Bank).
Bysimultaneously
acceptingtheprincipleofpartition,
thetwosides abandonedtheideologicaldisputeas to who is therightful
ownerofPalestineand
turnedto findinga practicalsolutionto theproblemof sharingthecramped
livingspace betweentheJordanRiverand theMediterranean
Sea. Each side
resigneditselfto partingwith territory
thatit had previouslyregardednot
onlyas itspatrimony
butas a vitalpartofitsnationalidentity.Each side was
drivento thishistoriccompromiseby therecognition
thatitlackedthepower
to impose its own vision on the otherside. That the idea of partitionwas
finallyacceptedby thetwosides would seem to supportAbba Eban's observationthatmen and nationsoftenbehavewiselyonce theyhaveexhaustedall
the otheralternatives.6
The Israeli-Palestinian
has far-reaching
reconciliation
implicationsforthe
otherdimensionof the Arab-Israeliconflict.Originally,
the Arab statesgot
involvedin thePalestineconflictoutofa sense ofsolidarity
withthePalestinian ArabsagainsttheZionistintruders.Continuingcommitment
to the Palestiniancause has precludedthe Arab states,withthe notableexceptionof
Egypt,fromextendingrecognition
to theJewishstate. One ofthemainfunctionsof theLeague of ArabStates,establishedin Alexandriain 1945, was to
assist the Palestiniansin the struggleforPalestine. After1948, the Arab
Leaguebecame a forumforcoordinating
military
policyand forwagingpolitical, economic,and ideologicalwarfareagainsttheJewishstate. In 1974, the
of the
Arab League recognizedthe PLO as the sole legitimate
representative
Palestinianpeople. Now thatthePLO has formally
recognizedIsrael,thereis
no longeranycompellingreasonfortheArab
statesto continuetheirrejection.
taboo has been broPLO recognitionof Israel
Clearly,an important
the
ofIsraellegitimizes
ken. PLO recognition
legitimizes the normalization
of relationsbetweentherestof
normalization
of relations between the rest
theArabworldand Israel. It is an important
of the Arab world and Israel.
landmarkalong the road to Arab recognition

THE OSLO ACCORD

27

to taketheplungebackin thelate 1970s,

ofIsrael.Egypt,
whichwas first
it helpedto bringabout.
feelsvindicated
and elatedby thebreakthrough
attending
thesigning
WhenRabinstoppedin Rabaton hiswayhomeafter
head of
in Washington,
he was receivedlike anyothervisiting
ceremony
allowedIsraelitelevision
government
byKingHassanII ofMorocco.Jordan
fromAmman.A
the first-ever
live reportby one of its correspondents
thinking
numberofArabstates,suchas Tunisiaand SaudiArabia,started
relations
withIsrael. And
of diplomatic
seriously
abouttheestablishment
of theeconomicboycott
theArabLeaguebegandiscussions
on thelifting
is quitethesamein
whichhasbeenin forcesinceIsrael'screation.Nothing
oftheIsrael-PLOaccord.Therulesofthegamein
theArabworldas a result
theentireMiddleEasthaveradically
changed.
in Israel'sapproachtoherArabopponents.
Thechangeis no lessmarked
that
Zionistpolicy,beforeand after1948,proceededon the assumption
on thepartition
ofPalestine
wouldbe easierto achievewiththe
agreement
rulers
oftheneighboring
Arabs.Israel's
ArabstatesthanwiththePalestinian
Arableaders,suchas KingHusseinofJordanand
courting
ofconservative
to bypassthelocal Arabs
was an attempt
President
AnwarSadatofEgypt,
bythe
andavoidhavingtoaddressthecoreissueoftheconflict.
Recognition
without
theconflict
Arabstates,
itwashoped,wouldenableIsraeltoalleviate
Now
to thePalestinians.
ofnationalself-determination
conceding
theright
of Israelis exthisstrategy
has been stoodon itshead. PLO recognition
by theArabstatesfromthe
pectedto pave thewayto widerrecognition
to
thishopewhensigningtheletter
Atlantic
to theGulf.Rabinexpressed
thePLO. "I believe,"he said,"thatthereis
Arafat
inwhichIsraelrecognized
ofchanging
a greatopportunity
notonlytherelations
betweenthePalestinioftheconflict
betweenIsrael
ans and Israel,buttoextenditto thesolution
and theArabcountries
and otherArabpeoples."7
deadlockin theAmerican-sponThe agreement
endedthetwo-year-old
in OctosoredMiddleEastpeacetalkswhichbeganattheMadridconference
in
of
Arab
radicalism
ber1991. Thecollapseofcommunism
andthedefeat
to resolve
the Gulfwar providedthe backdropto thisrenewedattempt
theArab-Israeli
dispute.In the bilateraltalksthatfollowedthe Madrid
therewere in essence separatetracks:Israeli-Palestinian,
conference,
The basis of all the
and Israeli-Lebanese.
Israeli-Syrian,
Israeli-Jordanian,
of
242 and theprinciple
CouncilResolution
negotiations
was UN Security
was notacceptedbyYitzhak
landforpeace. Butthisprinciple
exchanging
atthetime.As AvishaiMarLikudleaderandIsraeliprimeminister
Shamir,
"Shamiris nota bargainer.Shamiris a two-diobserved,
galitpresciently
is thelengthof the Land of Israel,the
mensionalman. One dimension
in inches,he
visionis measured
historical
second,itswidth.SinceShamir's
won'tgivean inch."8
theJune
ofYitzhakRabin,fought
undertheleadership
The Laborparty,
on a program
ofmoving
beyondpeacetalkstopeace1992generalelection
to thePalestinian
and itwona decisivevictory.
withpriority
track,
making,

28

JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

thatifelectedhe wouldtryto
Rabinpromised
campaign
Duringtheelection
sixtoninemonths.Butthe
within
autonomy
on Palestinian
reachagreement
in
breakthrough
in Israeldidnotyieldthelonged-for
changeofgovernment
as the
Likud'sEliakimRubinstein
Retaining
thetalkswiththePalestinians.
was a bad
to thetalkswiththePalestinians
head oftheIsraelidelegation
hadbeentokeepall
govemment
undertheprevious
brief
omen.Rubinstein's
annexathatofeventual
open,including
optionsin theoccupiedterritories
atthe
presented
autonomy,
ofPalestinian
tionbyIsrael.Rabin'sinitialoffer
didnotdiffer
talksin Washington,
openingofthesixthroundoftheofficial
to shunthe
Rabinalso continued
fromthatof his predecessor.
markedly
PLO andtopinhishopeson thelocalleadersfromtheoccupiedterritories,
as
He saw Arafat
andmorepragmatic.
moremoderate
whomhe considered
him.
an archenemy,
and did hisbestto marginalize
on
situation
thesecurity
slowly,
Whilethepeacetalksweregoingnowhere
hawk,
as a security
rapidly.Trueto his reputation
thegrounddeteriorated
theabmeasures.In December1992,following
Rabinresorted
todraconian
thedeporRabinordered
policeman,
ofan Israeliborder
duction
andmurder
tationto Lebanon of over 400 activistsfromthe Islamic resistance
opposedto any
Hamas. Hamas,beingvehemently
movements,
principally
againstPalestinian
state,hadbeencampaigning
withtheJewish
compromise
downon theIslamist
talks. By cracking
in theWashington
participation
in the
to tiltthebalancein favorofthemoderates
groups,Rabinintended
however,
oftheactivists,
camp.Hisillegalandbrutaldeportation
Palestinian
in theoccupiedterritories
forthemovement
popularsupport
onlyincreased
at theexpenseofthePLO.
Rabinwas inclinedto ditchthe
Ata fairly
earlystagein thenegotiations,
on
a dealwithSyria.Havingembarked
andto strike
altogether
Palestinians
to
a
convert
"Syriaa
he became
position,
thepeacetalkswitha"Syria-last"
talksbetweenSyriaand Israelin Washington
position.The bilateral
first"
was
of radicalPan-Arabism,
revealedthatSyria,once thestandard-bearer
from
the
withdrawal
in
for
total
Israeli
with
Israel
return
for
total
peace
ready
hadtochoosebetweena dealwithSyriaenRabintherefore
GolanHeights.
on the
settlements
ofJewish
withdrawal
andthedismantling
complete
tailing
fora
self-government
GolanHeightsand a deal withthePLO on interim
and no diswithdrawal
territorial
onlylimited
periodoffiveyearsentailing
ofJewishsettlements.
He chosethelatter.
mantling
in
a revolution
ThedecisiontoholddirecttalkswiththePLO constituted
thatpavedthewayto theOslo accord.
Israeliforeign
policy,a revolution
for
wereprimarily
responsible
oftheLaborparty,
Threemen,all members
as wellas primeminisminister
thisdecision:Yitzhak
Rabin,whois defense
and politicalrival;and Yossi
minister
ter;ShimonPeres,Rabin'sforeign
chiefofstaff,
minister.
Rabin,a former
foreign
deputy
Beilin,theyouthful
had alwaysbelongedto the hawkishwingof the Laborparty.For him
overpeace withtheArabneighbors.On
takesprecedence
Israel'ssecurity

THE OSL-OACCORD

29

beingelected,he assumedpersonalchargeof thebilateraltalksand leftonly

the much less-important
multilateral
talksto his foreignminister.
Peres himselfhad graduallymovedfromthe hawkishwing to the dovish
wing of the party. Inspiredby a visionof a new Middle East based on the
EuropeanUnion model,he was indefatigable
in his searchfornew and unconventionalavenuesof communication
withIsrael'sopponents. Beilinhad
alwaysbelongedto the extremedovishwing of the party.He had overthe
last twenty
yearsconsistently
maintainedthatthe Palestinian-Israeli
conflict
couldbe settledon thebasis ofmutualrecognition.Beilinwas therealarchitectbehindtheIsraelirecognition
ofthePLO. Peresbackedhim all theway,
and thetwo of themsucceededin carrying
theirhesitantand suspiciousseniorcolleaguewiththem.
Rabinhad repeatedon countlessoccasionsthathe would nevertalkto the
PLO. He shared in the conventionalwisdom thatheld thatan agreement
withthe PLO was unattainablebecause it represented
the Palestiniandiaspora and therightof returnofthe 1948 refugees.He saw YasirArafatas the
main obstacleto reachingan agreement
withthe local leadershipon autonomyin theWest Bank and Gaza. When he heardaboutthecrashlandingof
Arafat'splane in the Libyandesert,he muttered"It's a pityhe survived."9
He preferred
to deal with Palestinianleaders fromthe occupied territories
like Faisal Husseini. YitzhakShamirhad vetoedFaisal Husseini'sparticipationin thebilateraltalkson thegroundsthathe is a residentof East Jerusalem and EastJerusalem
is partoftheStateofIsrael. Rabinliftedthevetoand
allowedHusseinito participate
in thetalks,hopinghe would carrythePalestiniandelegationtowarda joint declarationof principleswithIsrael. When
thishope was dashed, Rabin describedHusseini as a mere "mailbox" for
transmitting
ordersfromTunis to the Palestiniandelegation.
Much againsthis will, Rabin was forcedto recognizethathe could not
bypass the PLO and that,if he wanted a deal, a directchannel to Tunis
wouldbe necessaryand thathe would have to addresshimselfto his archenemy,Yasir Arafat.Peres,on the otherhand, believedthatthe conventional
wisdomhad been wrongand thatwithoutthePLO therecould be no settlementof anykind. He even said once thatexpectingthe PLO to enable the
local leadersto reachan agreement
withIsraelwas like expectingtheturkey
to help in preparingtheThanksgiving
dinner.'0 Beilinwas even morecatein
his
to
the
PLO
was a necessaryconditionforan
gorical
view thattalking
with
the
Palestinians.
agreement
Peresand Beilinnotonlyrecognizedtheneed to talkto thePLO buthad a
clearand coherentlong-term
fordirecting
thetalks. Theyrealizedat
strategy
the outsetthatto achieve a peace settlement
with the Palestinians,Israel
would have to pay a highprice: a returnto thepre-June1967 borderswith
an independentPalestinianstate,thedismantling
onlyminormodifications,
conofJewishsettlements,
to thePalestiniansof functional
and thegranting
1" Rabin,on theotherhand,had no clearidea ofthe
troloverEastJerusalem.
finalshape of thesettlement
was largely
withthe Palestinians.His thinking

30

JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

conditioned
bytheAllonPlan,bytheJordanian
option,and bytheidea of
territorial
compromise
overtheWestBank. Nordid Rabinappearto have
anycoherent
long-term
strategy.
In thepast,especially
during
hisfirst
term
as primeminister
from1974to 1977,Rabin'sonlystrategy
in thepeacetalks
withtheArabswas to playfortime.Now,agedseventy-one,
in his second
andprobably
lasttermas primeminister,
he seemedanxioustoenterhistory
as a peacemaker
butwithout
incurring
theopprobrium
involved
in dismantlingsettlements.
Hencetheattraction
oftheideaofPalestinian
self-rule
for
an interim
periodoffiveyearsduringwhichthesettlements
wouldstayin
place. Itwasthispolicyvacuumat theheartofthegovernment
thatenabled
Beilintotakethelead,toexertan influence
thatwas outofall proportion
to
his juniorposition.12

Thesecrettalksin Oslogotunderwayin lateJanuary

1993withtheactive
encouragement
ofYossiBeilin,whokeptShimonPeresfully
informed.
Altogether,
fourteen
sessionsoftalkswereheldoveran eight-month
period,all
behinda thickveil of secrecy.Norwegian
ForeignAffairs
Minister
Johan
J5rgen
Holstand socialscientist
TerjeRodLarsenactedas generous
hosts
andgentlemediators.
Dr. Yair
The keyplayers
weretwoIsraeliacademics,
Hirschfeld
and Dr. Ron Pundak,and PLO treasurer
AhmadQurai',better
knownas AbuAla'. Awayfrom
theglareofpublicity
andpolitical
pressures,
thesethreemenworkedimaginatively
andindefatigably
thecontoestablish
ceptualframework
oftheIsrael-PLOaccord.Theirdiscussions
ranparallel
tothebilateral
talksin Washington,
buttheyproceeded
without
theknowledgeoftheofficial
Israeliand Palestinian
negotiators.
butquickly
The unofficial
talksinitially
dealtwitheconomiccooperation
intoa dialogueabouta jointdeclaration
Attheend
broadened
ofprinciples.
ofMarch,thetalkswereplungedintoa crisisbyeventson thegroundback
home.Following
a brutalwaveofmurders,
theclosureofthe
Rabinordered
occupiedterritories
to protect
Israelilives. Prompted
byshort-term
security
considerations,
thisdecisionhad unanticipated
long-term
consequences.It
resurrected
the"GreenLine" or pre-1967border,whichpreviousgovernmentshad workedto obliterate
in theirpursuitof GreaterIsrael,and it
theprocessofeconomic
communities
started
between
thewarring
separation
on thetwosidesofthisline.
In thewakeoftheclosure,
in Israelon theproa publicdebatereopened
withdrawal
fromtheGaza Strip.ManyIsraelissupposal fora unilateral
theproposal,
Gazaas a millstone
aroundtheirnecks.In May,
ported
viewing
decision:
amidgloomand doomon all sides,Perestooka highly
significant
of
andJoel
he orderedUriSavir,thedirector-general
theForeignMinistry,
Pundak
the
his
to
Hirschfeld
and
on
weekend
Singer, legaladviser, join
trips
toOslo. Itwas apparently
informed
Rabinofthe
atthispointthatPeresfirst
in thischannel
backchannel.Atfirst
Norwegian
Rabinshowedlittleinterest
but raisedno objectionto continuing
theexplorations
either.Gradually,
he becamemoreinvolved
in thedetailsandassumedan activerole
however,
in directing
thetalksalongsidePeres.

THE OSLO ACCORD

31

most
oftheaccordwasoneofArafat's
AtthePLO end,themainarchitect
Mahmud'Abbas(AbuMazen).Theroleplayedby'Abbasin
senioradvisers,
conclusion
thetalkstowarda successful
andsteering
difficulties
overcoming
similarto thatplayedby ShimonPeres. SinceAbu Ala' rewas strikingly
had
lineofcommunication
and 'Abbas,an indirect
toArafat
porteddirectly
in Tunis.
and thePLO headquarters
Jerusalem
between
beenestablished
ofthetenth
ofthetalkswas thefailure
in theprogress
Another
landmark
Peres
in Washington.
negotiations
Israeli-Palestinian
roundof theofficial
andangersteadily
andhisfrustration
ofEliakimRubinstein,
readthereports
Paltoestablish
mounted.He didnotliketheIsraeliapproachwhichstrove
in a waythatwouldleaveall optionsopenforthepermaestinian
autonomy
and wantedto change
He was tiredoftacticalmaneuvers
nentsettlement.
onceandforall therootcauseof
bytackling
history
thecourseoftheregion's
betweenIsraeland thePalestinians.'3
conflict
theideaof"Gaza
Peresfloated
tomoveforward,
thePalestinians
To tempt
to
achievement
fora concrete
was desperate
first."He believedthatArafat
and thatGaza wouldprovidehimwith
politicalfortunes
his sagging
bolster
Peresalso knewthatan Israeli
toeholdin theoccupiedterritories.
his first
amongthegreat
withsighsofrelief
fromGaza wouldbe greeted
withdrawal
didnotswallowthebait,susArafat,
however,
ofhiscountrymen.
majority
to
independence
thedreamofPalestinian
an Israeliplanto confine
pecting
fromGaza Cityto Rafah.'4The idea
stretching
stripofterritory
thenarrow
of theGaza
theinhabitants
especially
to somePalestinians,
was attractive
thanrejecttheIsraelioffer
in Tunis. Rather
butnotto thepoliticians
Strip,
ofhisown: Gaza and
cameup witha counteroffer
outofhand,YasirArafat
first.His choiceof thesmalland sleepyWestBanktownseemed
Jericho
ofhisclaimtothewholeofthe
sightbutitservedas a symbol
atfirst
quirky
WestBank.'5
the
All alonghe had supported
Rabindid notbalk at thecounteroffer.
rulewhile
to Jordanian
handingoverJericho
AllonPlan,whichenvisaged
keepingtheJordanValleyin Israelihands.Buthe had one condition:the
foothold
on theWestBankwouldbe an islandinsideIsraeliPalestinian
in Israelihands.
Bridgealso remaining
withtheAllenby
controlled
territory
at theother
Israelto thePalestinians
too,preferred
It seemedthatJordan,
therefore
had tosettlefortheIsraeliversionofthe
endofthebridge.Arafat
"Gaza andJericho
first"
plan.'6
byfour
totheideaofa dealwiththePLO wasclinched
Rabin'sconversion
theendofMayandJuly.Firstwasthe
thatreachedhimbetween
evaluations
to thetalks
thehead oftheIsraelidelegation
adviceofItamarRabinovich,
butonlyatthecostof
withSyriawas attainable,
thata settlement
withSyria,
fromtheGolanHeights.SecondwerethereIsraeliwithdrawal
complete
had been
leadership
thatthelocal Palestinian
portsfromvariousquarters
oftheIsraeliDefenseForces's
neutralized.
Thirdwas theassessment
finally
and possiblyimmidiresituation,
thatArafat's
chiefofmilitary
intelligence
forIsraelat that
interlocutor
nentcollapse,madehimthemostconvenient

32

JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

particular
juncture.Fourthwere the reportsof the impressive
progress
achieved
through
theOslo channel.Otherreports
thatreachedRabinduring
thisperiodpointed
toan alarming
growth
in thepopularfollowing
ofHamas
and IslamicJihadin theoccupiedterritories.
Boththearmychiefsand the
internal
security
chiefsrepeatedly
stressed
to himtheurgency
offinding
a
political
solution
tothecrisisin therelations
betweenIsraelandtheinhabitantsoftheoccupiedterritories.'7
Rabintherefore
gavethegreenlighttothe
Israeliteam,and thesecretdiplomacy
in Oslo movedintohighergear.
Rabinand Peresalso believedthatprogress
towarda settlement
withthe
Palestinians
wouldlowerthepriceof a settlement
withSyriaby reducing
thelatter's
bargaining
power.Peresreducedthelinkbetweenthetwosetsof
negotiations
to whathe called "thebicycle
principle":whenone presseson one pedal,
was directed theotherpedalmovesbyitself.His formula
Peres'sformula
atreaching
a separate
towarda wasnotdirected
agreeat gradualmovement
mentwiththe Palestinians
but at gradual
settlement
withthe
Palestinians,
theSyrians,
and movementtowarda settlement
with the
theJordanians.
Palestinians, the Syrians, and the
Jordanians.'8

Rabincarefully
scrutinized
every
wordin theDOP, whichJoelSingertook
in the
theleadin drafting.
Singer'sapproachwas eclectic.He incorporated
articles
draft
He
some
from
declaration
elements
different
sources. adopted
from
thepapersubmitted
in June,a paperrejected
bytheAmericans
bythe
he
Palestinians
becauseit had Israelifingerprints
all overit. Otherarticles
from
the"Framework
forPeacein theMiddleEast"agreedbetween
derived
Menachem
BeginandAnwarSadatat CampDavidin September
1978. The
ideaofan earlytransfer
ofauthority
was takenoutofproposalspresented
by
in Washington.
EliakimRubinstein
Themodelof"Gaza andJericho
first,"
of"construchowever,
wasentirely
new. IfMenachem
Beginhadbeenguilty
tiveambiguity"
at CampDavid,Yitzhak
ofwhattwoIsraeli
Rabinwasguilty
journalists
termed"creativerecalcitrance,"
examining
everywordwitha
whichtherewasno turning
magnifying
glassandrefusing
anyproposalfrom
back. Yet,despitehiscaution,
Rabinmoveda verylongwayin a veryshort
in August
he
time.In Junehe didnottaketheOslo channelatall seriously;
wantedtogo all theway. In theend,bothhe andPeresputall theirweight
behindtheOslo negotiations.'19
wouldbe
timethat"there
Rabinstatedpublicly
On 23 August,
forthefirst
on theprice
no escapefrom
he elaborated
thePLO." In private,
recognizing
the
In hisestimate,
thatIsraelcouldextract
in exchange
forthisrecognition.
PLO was "on theropes"and itwas therefore
highly
probablethatthePLO
Acwoulddropsomeofitssacredprinciples
to secureIsraelirecognition.
in
thejointDOP on Palestinian
whileendorsing
cordingly,
self-government
and mutualrecognition
betweenIsraeland thePLO, he
Gaza and Jericho
as partofthepackage
on changesto thePalestine
NationalCharter
insisted
deal.20

THE OSLO ACCORD

33

met
tourof Scandinavia,
ordinary
Peres,in thecourseof an ostensibly
on 24 Augustandputhisseal on the
withAbuAla' in Oslo airport
secretly
the
beencompleted,
ofthejointDOP hadalready
accord.Sincethedrafting
andthePLO offiminister
theIsraeliforeign
between
face-to-face
discussion
recognition.
As
oftheaccord-mutual
vitalelement
on theother
cialfocused
Peresflewto
abouthis secretmeeting,
beganto circulate
rumors
numerous
ofStateWarrenChristoto explaintheaccordto U.S. Secretary
California
bythescopeoftheaccordandbytheunorwassurprised
pher.Christopher
assumedthat
thodoxmethodbywhichit had beenachieved.He naturally
overthepeaceprocess.His aidesin theStateDehad a monopoly
America
hadcometobe called"thepeaceprocessors."Nowtheirfeathers
partment
bytheNorwegiupstaged
becausetheyhadbeenso thoroughly
wereruffled
in theOslo backchannel,on theotherhand,had the
ans. Theparticipants
ofknowing
thattheyhad reachedtheaccordon theirownwithsatisfaction
outanyhelpfromtheStateDepartment.
to the
and RonPundakwas critical
ofYairHirschfeld
The participation
"Theyare,in a
successoftheOslo channel.As UriSaviracknowledged:
manner
in whichinternational
diplofromthecustomary
sense,so removed
Thevery
macyis shaped,thatthisis whatenabledthemtobe so successful.
ofoursuccess.",21
natureoftheirmissionwas a basicelement
unorthodox
the
broketheicebetween
himself,
whenaskedwhateventually
Hirschfeld
four
twosides,repliedthatone couldnevertell. Yethe wenton to identify
whichin his opinioncontributed
to thesuccessofthenegotiations:
factors
proconditions
working
theexcellent
of absolutesecrecy,
thepreservation
betweentheindividuhosts,thepersonalchemistry
videdbytheNorwegian
thetalks.Thelastpoint
als involved,
andthesenseofrealismthatpervaded
and Pundakhad beenmoreintent
Hirschfeld
was also themostimportant.
thanon seekinga
on putting
acrosstheirpointofviewto thePalestinians
a senseofthe
solution.Aboveall theywantedtoconveytothePalestinians
ofwhatwaspossibleandnottogiverisetoanyillusions.Theymadeit
limits
setwouldnotbe includedin theinterim
clear,forexample,thatJerusalem
ofall theoccuwouldnotbe givencontrol
tlement
andthatthePalestinians
had to be organizedaroundthe principleof
pied territories.
Everything
gradualism.22

bya tight
governed
an agendafornegotiations,
The DOP was essentially
that
laid
down
Thedocument
thana full-blown
agreement.
timetable,
rather
military
on
Israel's
agreement
signing
ceremony
of
the
two
months
within
fromGaza and Jerichoshouldbe reached,and withinfour
withdrawal
policeforce,
shouldbe completed.A Palestinian
monthsthewithdrawal
to
was to be imported
fighters,
Palestinian
madeup mostlyof pro-Arafat
overall
withIsraelretaining
in Gaza andJericho,
maintain
internal
security
Atthesametime,elseaffairs.
andforeign
forexternal
security
responsibility
powerto "authorized
to transfer
wherein theWestBank,Israelundertook
and culture,
in fivespheres:education
health,socialwelfare,
Palestinians"
in the
thePalestinians
Withinninemonths,
directtaxation,
and tourism.

34

JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

Counciltotake
fora Palestinian
WestBankandGazaweretoholdelections
exceptdefunctions
formostgovemment
office
and assumeresponsibility
agreedto commence
affairs.Israeland thePalestinians
fenseand foreign
withintwoyears,andat the
on thefinalstatusoftheterritories
negotiations
is to comeintoforce.
settlement
endoffiveyearsthepermanent
is
The shape of the permanentsettlement

intheDOP butis lefttonegotianotspecified

thesecsilent tionsbetweenthetwopartiesduring
The DOP is completely
ond stage.The DOP is completely
silenton
onital issues such as the
vitalissuessuchas theright
ofreturn
ofthe
borders,
rightof return,
Palestinian
of
the
and Jerusalem.
theborders
settlements,
1948refugees,
oftheJewishsettlements
in
thefuture
entity,
The reasonforthis
theWestBankand Gaza,and thestatusofJerusalem.
there
iftheseissueshadbeenaddressed,
silenceis nothardto understand:
thata
risk,realizing
wouldhavebeenno accord.Bothsidestooka calculated
in Palestinian
self-govgreatdealwoulddependon thewaytheexperiment
opposedto an inernment
workedout in practice.Rabinwas strongly
an eventual
Jordanian-Palestinian
Palestinian
statebuthe favored
dependent
committed
to an independent
Arafat
was evenmorestrongly
confederation.
as itscapital,buthe did notruleout
state,withEastJerusalem
Palestinian
withJordan.
theidea ofa confederation
dealprodivide,theRabin-Arafat
On bothsidesoftheIsraeli-Palestinian
Both
on thepartofthehard-liners.
opposition
vokedstrong
andvociferous
anda sell-out.LeadersoftheLikudandof
leaderswereaccusedofa betrayal
Rabinforhis abrupt
to therightattacked
partiesfurther
thenationalistic
withthePLO,
to negotiate
fromthebipartisan
policyofrefusing
departure
in theoccupiedterrithe120,000settlers
himwithabandoning
andcharged
plan theydeThe Gaza-Jericho
toriesto thetendermerciesof terrorists.
oftheend
stateandthebeginning
to a Palestinian
nouncedas a bridgehead
indicatedconsiderable
popular
of Greater
Israel. A Galluppoll,however,
said
Ofthe1,000Israelispolled,65 percent
fortheprimeminister.
support
themtheyapprovedofthepeace accord,withonly13 percentdescribing
selvesas "verymuchagainst."23
theaccord,at theendofa debatewhichstretched
The Knessetapproved
votesfor,fifty
overthreedays,by sixty-one
against,and nineabstentions.
dividedon thepeace
Duringthedebate,therightappearedmoreseriously
whichwasbackedbyfiveArabmembers
coalition,
issuethanthecenter-left
was a
muchgreater
thanexpected,
oftheKnesset.The marginofvictory,
to
he
attached
the
boostto Rabinand his peacepolicy.Given importance
the
fact
reassured
was
by
for
his
he
greatly
policy,
majority"
havinga "Jewish
votedforthanagainst.Thevotegavehima clear
thatmoreJewish
members
oftheGaza-Jericho
plan.
mandateto proceedwiththeimplementation
loud but,at
camp,theaccordalso encountered
WithinthePalestinian
was split,withtheradiineffective
leastinitially,
opposition.ThePLO itself
to grabpower.
principles
cal nationalists
accusingArafatof abandoning

THE OSLO ACCORD

35

ofPalPopularFrontfortheLiberation
TheseincludedtheDamascus-based
FrontfortheLiberestine(PFLP)ledbyGeorgeHabash,andtheDemocratic
ationof Palestine(DFLP) led by NayifNawatmah.Arafatsucceededin
majority
in favorofthedealon thePLO's eighteenmustering
thenecessary
battleandtheresigbutonlyafter
a bruising
member
Executive
Committee,
nationoffourofhiscolleagues.OutsidethePLO, thedeal arousedtheimHamas and Islamic
resistance
movements
placablewrathof themilitant
withtheJewishstateas anathema.
Jihad,
whichregardanycompromise
whether
secularor relito thedeal fromrejectionist
quarters,
Opposition
ofmainwastheopposition
gious,wasonlytobe expected.Moredisturbing
and
streamfigureslike Faruq Qaddumi,the PLO "foreignminister,"
likeProfessor
EdwardSaid and thepoetMahmud
prominent
intellectuals
autocratic,
idiosyncratic,
relatedto Arafat's
Darwish.Someofthecriticisms
of the
Othersrelatedto thesubstance
and secretive
styleofmanagement.
didnot
deal. Themostbasiccriticism
was thatthedealnegotiated
byArafat
Palestinian
state.
thepromise,
ofan independent
carry
letalonea guarantee,
Thiscriticism
tookvariousforms.FaruqQaddumiarguedthatthedeal
peopleas wellas the
rights
ofthePalestinian
compromised
thebasicnational
for
individual
rights
of the 1948 refugees.EdwardSaid lambastedArafat
hismoveswiththe
forfailing
tocoordinate
unilaterally
canceling
theintifada,
withintheranksof the
appallingdisarray
Arabstates,and forprovoking
froma nationalliberaitself
PLO. "ThePLO,"wroteSaid,"hastransformed
tionmovement
withthesamehandful
government,
intoa kindofsmall-town
butscorn.
ofpeoplestillin command."Forthedealitself,
Saidhadnothing
"Allsecretdealsbetweena verystrong
necessarily
and a veryweakpartner
he wrote."The
bythelatter,"
involve
concessions
hiddenin embarrassment
exhaustion
"smacksofthePLO leadership's
dealbeforeus," he continued,
. . . and
first
andisolation,
of
Israel's
shrewdness."24
"Gaza
and
Jericho
and
on thedeal.25
last"was MahmudDarwish'sdamning
verdict
mixed.Arafat
Arabreactions
totheIsraeli-Palestinian
accordwererather
of the
ministers
fromthenineteenforeign
gota politebutcool reception
in Washceremony
ArabLeaguewhometin Cairoa weekafter
thesigning
andLebJordan,
Syria,
statesoftheleague,especially
ington.Somemember
whichviolated
solodiplomacy
anon,weredismayed
bythePLO chairman's
his
Arafat
defended
Arabpledgesto coordinate
theirnegotiating
strategy.
it as thefirst
decisionto signtheaccordbypresenting
steptowarda more
he said,is
agreement,
comprehensive
peacein theMiddleEast. Theinterim
andof
ofthePalestinian
a finalsettlement
problem
onlythefirst
steptoward
fromall the
conflict
whichwouldinvolveIsraeliwithdrawal
theArab-Israeli
his
He soughtto justify
including
"HolyJerusalem."
occupiedterritories,
thatthealmosttwoyearsof public
resortto a secretchannelby arguing
had reacheda dead end. Someofthe
negotiations
underU.S. sponsorship
thattheaccordwas an
ministers
agreedwiththePLO chairman
Arabforeign
important
first
step,eveniftheywerenotall agreedon thenextstepor the
finaldestination.

36

JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

bytheIsrael-PLOaccord.A
affected
mostdirectly
Jordanis thecountry
to theworld,in a much-more-modest
day aftertheaccordwas presented
ofJordanand Israel
therepresentatives
at'the'StateDepartment,
ceremony
aimedata comprehensive
negotiations
agendafordetailed
signeda common
borethepersonalstampof KingHussein,a
peace treaty.Thisdocument
regional
crises
numerous
through
his country
notedrealistwhohas steered
overto
forty
yearsago. In 1988thekingturned
thethrone
sinceascending
claimto theWestBank,whichJordanhad lostto
thePLO theterritorial
conIsraelin theJune1967 war. In 1991,whentheMadridconference
intothepeace talksas partofa
negotiators
vened,he tookthePalestinian
in Ocagendawasreadyforsignature
TheJordanian-Israeli
jointdelegation.
had been made
to waituntilprogress
tober1992,but thekingpreferred
washisangerwhenhe
Great,therefore,
IsraelandthePalestinians.
between
had kepthimin thedarkabouthissecret
foundoutthatthePLO chairman
withIsrael.
negotiations
Evenafterthekinghad studiedtheIsrael-PLOaccordand givenit his
On the
ambivalent.
somewhat
his attitude
remained
publicendorsement,
havingarguedall alongthattheArabswould
one hand,he feltvindicated,
withIsrael.On theotherhand,thenewunholyallihavetocometoterms
traditional
position
Jordan's
ancebetween
thePLO andIsraelcouldthreaten
beentity
as "thebestofenemies"withIsrael.IfIsraeland thePalestinian
and unemploytheresultcouldbe inflation
camecloseeconomicpartners,
Morethanhalfof
menton theEast Bank,leadingto politicalinstability.
reason,thereis
If,forwhatever
3.9 millionpeoplearePalestinian.
Jordan's
fromtheWestBanktotheEastBank,thepressure
ofPalestinians
an influx
ofJordan
intotheRepublic
Kingdom
theHashemite
willgrowto transform
in itspresentformcouldbe
of Palestine.In short,Jordan's
verysurvival
calledintoquestion.
toward
progress
forJordan's
The Israel-PLOaccordalsohadimplications
1989
ofNovember
democracy.
Thisprocessgotunderwaywiththeelections
oftheIslamicfundaanswertothechallenge
andprovides
themosteffective
1993. Arafat's
for8 November
mentalists.
electionwas scheduled
Another
couldend up votingfortwo
meantthatsomePalestinians
deal,however,
expert
one in Ammanand one in Jericho.As constitutional
legislatures,
"These
are
extremely
journalist:
explainedto a foreign
Mustafa
Hamarnah
did notpulla rabbitoutofhis
timesforJordan.YasserArafat
challenging
camel,it mightbe added,is nota
hat,but a damnedcamel."26Arafat's
buta Bactrian
camelbredforridingand racing,
a one-humped
dromedary,
Thissplitin theareaofPalestincamelwithtwohumps-GazaandJericho.
incomplication
intotwocenters
involves
an additional
ian self-government
links
asmuchas Jordanhas close political,economic,and administrative
withtheWestBank,butonlytenuouslinkswithGaza.
Undertheinitialshockof theIsrael-PLOaccord,KingHusseingavea
nationalelections.Isto postponeNovember's
clearsignalofhisintention
appeartoliebehindthesubsequent
raeliassurances
givenata secretmeeting

THE OSLO ACCORD

37

had alwaysplayeda
decisionto go aheadas planned.Personaldiplomacy
andIsrael.Countless
between
Jordan
ofrelations
crucialpartin theconduct
had takenplaceacrossthebattlelinesbetweenthe"pluckylittle
meetings
king,"as Husseinusedto be called,and Israel'sLaborleadersafter1967.
thatthekinghad clockedup overa hundredmanOne sourceestimates
includes
presumably
withLaborleaders.Thisfigure
hoursin conversations
thetimehe spentwithGolda Meir,who had gainedfameby hertripto
toperas an Arabwomanin a vainattempt
Ammanin May1948disguised
nottojoinin theArabinvasion
Hussein'sgrandfather,
suadeKingAbdullah,
state.
Jewish
ofthesoon-to-be-born
meeting
probably
fora high-level
This time,too,thepoliticaloverture
recamefromtheIsraeliside. The IsraelidailyMa'aiv quotedintelligence
overthe accord.
portssayingthatthekingfelt"cheatedand neglected"
worldhas collapsedaroundhimandthemostdi"KingHussein'spolitical
was
to calmhimdown,"theIsraeliprimeminister
rectmeansarerequired
Rabin
withJordan,
ofcooperation
advocate
advised.A long-time
reportedly
heededthisadvice.He spentseveralhoursaboardtheroyalyachtin theRed
withthekingand
conferring
ofAqabaon Sunday,
26 September,
Sea resort
his advisers.Rabinwas said to haveassuredthekingthatIsraelremained
wouldbe
interests
thatJordanian
hisregime,
toupholding
committed
firmly
peacestrategy
issue,andthatfuture
in dealingwiththePalestinian
protected
withJordan.27
wouldbe closelycoordinated
elecmultiparty
1993,thefirst
Thegeneralelectionheldon 8 November
hopedfor:a strengthentionsince1957,yieldedwhatKingHusseinclearly
blocs,and a resounding
tribal,and independent
ing of theconservative,
was opposition
platform
whoseprincipal
totheIslamicActionFront,
rebuff
to thepeacetalkswithIsrael.ThisresultgaveHusseina popularmandate
It alsogaveriseto
withthetaskofArab-Israeli
peacemaking.
forproceeding
ofa Jordanian-Israeli
peace accordwas immithatthesigning
speculation
a
to runtheriskofconsummating
was unwilling
nent.Hussein,however,
in thestalled
towaitforprogress
withIsrael,preferring
separateagreement
negotiations.
Syrian-Israeli
Hafizal-AsadofSyria,
greeted
leader,President
Theotherkey"front-line"
on
andgavefreerein
accordwitha coolnessverging hostility,
theIsrael-PLO
Palestinian
groupsbasedin Damascustoattackit. President
tothedissident
oftheMiddleEast. His
theBismarck
a
cold
and
calculating
realist,
Asadis
to regainthe Golan
the
desire
dominated
career
has
been
by
political
ofdefense
in 1967,
was
minister
when
he
to
Israel
which
lost
Syria
Heights,
in theregion.
withIsraelformastery
contest
and bythewidergeopolitical
atMadridbutinsisted
in thepeaceprocessstarted
Asadagreedtoparticipate
Formostof
Arabfront
peacetreaties.
all alongon a unified
leadingtorelated
Syriawas upstaged
1993itlookedas ifSyriawouldleadtheway. Suddenly,
bythePLO.
a sepaon hisownandstriking
AsadfeltthatArafat,
bygoingoffsecretly
to deal withthe
ratedeal,had playedintothehandsofRabin,whoprefers

38

JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

Arafat's
and notas a bloc. Asadevencompared
individually
Arabpartners
actionsto thoseof AnwarSadat,whoseseparatedeal withIsraelled to
a decade.Israel
intheArabworldfornearly
andvilification
Egypt's
isolation
that
fromthenewdeal,claimedAsad. He suspected
alonestoodtobenefit
nextintoits
Israelmadethisdealwitha weakPLO in ordertodrawJordan
He
hegemony.28
itsownregional
orbit,to isolateSyria,and to consolidate
in the
Syria'sparticipation
reactedto the Israel-PLOdeal by suspending
Washington
forum.
in limbo,Israeland thePLO enforum
remained
WhiletheWashington
oftheOslo accordin
on theimplementation
negotiations
teredintointensive
Thesenegotialocations.
and
in
other
in
Cairo,
of
Taba,
theRedSea resort
Israeli-Palestinian
face-to-face
official,
full-scale,
tionswerebilledas thefirst
talks,becauseboth
Buttheywerereallyback-to-back
peacetalksin history.
theireyeslooksidesspentmostoftheirtimewiththeirbackstoeachother,
thatcouldgettheminto
taking
greatcarenottosayanything
inghomeward,
constituencies.
withtheirdomestic
trouble
on thetwosides,thereweretheinconstraints
Apartfromthedomestic
so manyambioftheOslo accorditself.The accordcontains
defects
herent
interpretations.
thatit is opentowidelydiffering
guitiesand contradictions
arforan interim
theaccordmakesprovision
For theIsraeligovernment
forthepermawhichcarriesonlythemostgeneralimplications
rangement
step
ofterritory
or power.ForthePLO, theaccordis thefirst
nenttransfer
betogether
towardfullstatehood.The twosidescouldnotmarchforward
directions.
in different
on marching
causetheywereintent
oftheOslo accord
overtheimplementation
Deadlockin thenegotiations
betweenthevarioustracksofthe
reopenedthequestionoftherelationship
toconcenMiddleEastpeaceprocess.The questionforIsraelwas whether
or onlyon one trackat a time,and ifthelatter,
trateon all simultaneously
whichone? Israel'sleadersweredividedon thisquestion.Rabinwas an
advocateofone peace at a time,whereasPereswas an advocateofwaging
in
meeting
homefromthehistoric
peace on all fronts.Upon his return
inorderto
front
toslowdownon theSyrian
Rabinwasinclined
Washington,
in theirrelaa chanceto digestthesuddenturnabout
givehis countrymen
alongthe
tionswiththePalestinians.Pereswas inclinedto moveswiftly
inordertowidentheaccordwiththePLO intoa
tracks
andJordanian
Syrian
peacein theMiddleEast.
comprehensive
The real problemwithRabin'sidea of
muis thatitgenerates
peacebyinstallments
tualsuspicions
thatundermine
thepeaceproIsraelposes the same
cess. Israel,forexample,poses the same
questionsto Syriathatit
to
refusesto answerwhen asked questionsto SyriathatIsraelitselfrefuses
answerwhen asked by the Palestinians.
by thePalestinians.
to sayhowmuchlandit would
Israelrefuses
in Damascus
untiltheregime
Golan
on the
Heights
be willingto relinquish
In
full
other
it
means
what
words,Israeldeby
peace.
spellsoutprecisely

THE OSLO ACCORD

39

mandstoknowtheendresultofthepeaceprocessbeforeitwillenterinto
demandofIsraelis
detailednegotiations
withSyria.WhatthePalestinians
settlement
will
strikingly
similar.Theywantto knowwhatthepermanent
butIsraelrefuses
to anlooklikebefore
intointerim
arrangements,
entering
swerthem.
harborsimilarsuspicions.Israelis
Consequently,
IsraelisandPalestinians
theentire
Golan
thatAsadplanstorecover
suspecta Syrian
trap.Theyworry
in return
agreement
thatwouldleavetheconflict
fora merenonbelligerency
fearan Israelitrap. TheyworrythatIsrael
unresolved.
The Palestinians
ofpowerand a
planstoleavethemin thelurchwithonlya partialtransfer
theoccupiedterofIsraelitroopsfrom
redeployment
rather
thanwithdrawal
the
ritories.
Rabinplayshiscardsveryclosetohischestinordertominimize
letalonedefined,
its
hasnotdiscussed,
riskofleaks.TheIsraeligovernment
aimsin thetalkswitheitherthePalestinians
or theSyrians.And in the
to
absenceofclearlydefinedgoals,it is difficult
fortheIsraelinegotiators
on anytrackof theMiddleEast peace
engagein purposeful
negotiations

process.29

A broadviewofthepeacepolicyoftheLaborgovernment
sinceitcameto
of strategy
and tacticspowerin 1992 thusrevealsan odd combination
aimedat a comprehenPeres'sstrategy
and Rabin'stactics.Peres'sstrategy
whileRabin'stacticsaimedat
sivesettlement
of theArab-Israeli
conflict,
on
in orderto reducethepressure
playing
theArabsoffone againstanother
Israelto makeconcessions.Whenthesetacticsendedin deadlockon all
ofdirect
strategy
Rabinwas forcedtogo alongwiththeBeilin-Peres
fronts,
theOslo
negotiations
withthePLO. The resultwas theOslo accord.After
tohiscustomary
ofdivideandrule.
tactics
accordwassigned,Rabinreverted
Thistacticis sensibleenoughwhenwagingwaragainstseveralenemies;itis
muchmoreproblematic
whenwagingpeace. To attaincomprehensive
peace
in theMiddleEast,theArabworldneedsto be unitedrather
thandivided.
peacewhereasRato promote
comprehensive
Peres'sstrategy
is calculated
sooneror
it. Rabinis boundto discover
bin'stacticsareliableto frustrate
minister's
strategy.
onlyhalfofhis foreign
laterthathe cannotimplement
at
front
ThechoiceforIsraelis between
goingforward
atfullspeedon every
on everyfront
at thesametime.The
thesametime,andlosingmomentum
of theArab-Israeli
a comprehensive
settlement
choiceis betweenforging
to
rivalries
inter-Arab
conflict
on theanviloftheOslo accord,and allowing
thishistoric
Andthechoicefortheseventy-one-yearbreakthrough.
nullify
as a greatsoldier
old Rabinis between
merely
goingdownin Israel'shistory
or also as a greatstatesman
and peacemaker.

40

JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

NOTES
1. "Israeli-PLODeclaration
ofPrinciples,
Washington,
D.C., 13 September1993,"JPS 23, no. 1 (Autumn
1993), pp. 115-21.
2. "PLO and IsraeliLetters
ofMutualRecognition,
Tunis and Jerusalem,
9 September1993,"JPS 23, no. 1
(Autumn1993),pp. 114-15.
3. Israeliprimeminister's
statement,
Intemnational
Herald Tribune,
11-12 September
1993.
4. Meir'sfamousstatement
was "It was notas though
therewas a Palestinian
peopleand in Palestineconsideringitselfas a Palestinianpeople and we came and
threwthemoutand tooktheircountry
awayfromthem.
Theydid notexist." SundayTimes(London),15 June
1969,as quotedin David Hirst,TheGunand theOlive
Branch:TheRootsofViolence
intheMiddleEast(London:
Faberand Faber,1977),p. 264.
5. Textofthecharter
is in ZuhairDiab (ed.), InternationalDocuments
onPalestine,
1968 (Beirut:Institute
for
PalestineStudies,1971),pp. 393-95.
6. Abba Eban, "BuildingBridges,Not Walls," The
Guardian,10 September1993.
7. Israeliprimeminister's
Intenational
Herstatement,
ald Tribune,
11-12 September1993.
8. Avishai Margalit,"The Violent Life of Yitzhak
Review
Shamir,"TheNewYork
ofBooks,14 May1992,p.
24.
9. Yoel Marcus,"The Revolution
and theGravePit,"
HaAretz,15 September1993.
10. Khami Shalev,"The Package Deal and Arafat's
Honor,"HaAretz,27 August1993.
11. AvrahamTal, "Thereis No ReturnfromtheTemporary,"
HaAretz,19 September1993.
12. Yoel Marcus,"ThreeComments
on theSituation,"
HaAretz,19 September1993.

13. Uzi Benziman,weeklycolumnin HaAretz,3 September1993.

"The Norwe14. NahumBameaand ShimonSchiffer,
Aharonot,
3 September1993.
gianConnection,"Yediot
15. DerekBrown,"NorwegianLeads WaryFoes along
ShortCut to Success," The Guardian,13 September
1993.
Yediot
Aharonot,
3 September
16. Bamea and Schiffer,
1993.
17. Marcus,HaAretz,15 September1993.
Yediot
Aharonot,
3 September
18. Bamea and Schiffer,
1993.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. JerroldKessel, "ProfessorsClinch Deal," The
Guardian,18 September1993.
withYosefAlgazi,Ha'Aretz,
3 September
22. Interview
1993.
23. TheGuardian,16 September1993.
TheGuardian,
24. EdwardSaid,"The LostLiberation,"
9 September1993.
4 September1993.
25. TheEconomist,
"KingHusseinFearsProspectsfor
26. NoraBoustany,
InternaHope in Jordan,"
PeaceCouldRaisePremature
18-19 September1993.
tionalHeraldTribune,
27. JerroldKessel, "Rabin Soothes King at Secret
Meeting,"TheGuardian,29 September1993.
28. Patrick
Seale,"Israel'sVisionFadeson theRoadto
on Sunday,19 September
Damascus,"TheIndependent
1993.
29. Ze'ev Schiff,"Mutual Suspicions,"HaAretz, 11
June1993.