SWEET LINES VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner at the latters office in
Cebu City. They were to board M/V Sweet Grace bound for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of
departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 am of July 9,
1972 only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there on the same day at about 4:00
pm. The vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around 8:00 am. Instead of docking at Catbalogan
(the first port of call), the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban. Private respondents had no recourse but to
disembark and board a ferry boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a fortuitous event which would exempt the
carrier from liability.
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no fortuitous event or force
majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking the private respondents to
Catbalogan. In the first place, mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that
exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting arguendo that the engine
failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for the delay of departure. When the vessel finally left the
port, there was no longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: Delay after commencement of voyage for failure to observe extraordinary diligence holds the
common carrier liable for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits which the passenger may have suffered
because of the delay. This however, assumes that he stayed on the vessel and was with it when it
thereafter resumed its voyage.
Facts: Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from Trans-Asia Shipping lines, Inc. for the
voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro from Cebu City. Upon boarding, he noticed that
the engine of the vessel was being repaired. Regardless, he boarded the same. The vessel departed on
time with one engine running. Then, its engine conked out. The vessel then stopped near Kawit Island
and dropped its anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness, the passengers, who already were suffering
from mental distress, demanded that they be brought back to their port of origin. Upon arrival at Cebu
City, the passengers who wished to disembark were allowed 10 minutes to do so. Atty. Arroyo
disembarked. After which, the vessel continued its voyage to Cagayan de Oro and Atty. Arroyo boarded
another vessel, also of Trans-Asia. Due to the failure of the common carrier to transport him to his
destination, Atty. Arroyo filed a case.
Issue: Whether Trans-Asia is liable to Atty. Renato Arroyo considering that the delay occurred during the
voyage.
Held: Yes, according to the Supreme Court, Trans-Asia is liable to Atty. Arroyo for pecuniary loss.
Although, there was no delay in the commencement of the contracted voyage a delay was incurred after
the commencement specifically when the voyage was interrupted when the only functioning engine
conked out. As to the rights and duties of the parties strictly arising out of such delay, the Civil Code is
silent. However Article 698 of the Code of Commerce specifically provides for such a situation. It reads: In
case a voyage already begun should be interrupted, the passengers shall be obliged to pay the fare in
proportion to the distance covered, without right to recover for losses and damages if the interruption is
due to fortuitous event or force majeure, but with a right to indemnity if the interruption should have been
caused by the captain exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the disability of the vessel and a
passenger should agree to await the repairs, he may not be required to pay any increased price of
passage, but his living expenses during the stay shall be for his own account. This article applies
suppletorily pursuant to Article 1766 of the Civil Code. Of course, this does not suffice for a resolution of
the case at bench for, as earlier stated, the cause of the delay or interruption was the petitioner's failure to

observe extraordinary diligence. Article 698 must then be read together with Articles 2199, 2200, 2201,
and 2208in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. So read, it means that the Trans-Asia is liable for any
pecuniary loss or loss of profits which Atty. Arroyo may have suffered by reason thereof. For the
passenger, such would be the loss of income if unable to report to his office on the day he was supposed
to arrive were it not for the delay. This, however, assumes that he stayed on the vessel and was with it
when it thereafter resumed its voyage; but he did not. As he and some passengers resolved not to
complete the voyage, the vessel had to return to its port of origin and allow them to disembark. The
passenger then took the Trans-Asiaother vessel the following day, using the ticket he had purchased for
the previous day's voyage. Any further delay then in the
Atty. Arroyos arrival at the port of destination was caused by his decision to disembark. Had he remained
on the first vessel, he would have reached his destination at noon of 13 November 1991, thus been able
to report to his office in the afternoon. He, therefore, would have lost only the salary for half of a day. But
actual or compensatory damages must be proved, 30 which the private respondent failed to do. There is
no convincing evidence that he did not receive his salary for 13 November 1991nor his absence was not
excused. Other than pecuniary damages, the Supreme Court also ruled that moral damages and
exemplary damages may be awarded. This is because there is breach of contract of carriage. The vessel
was not seaworthy. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved
in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC

Nature: For the recovery of the value of cargo insurance, arose from the same incident, the sinking of the M/S ASIATICA when it
caught fire, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo.
Facts: On June, 1977 M/S ASIATICA, a Vessel operated by Eastern Shipping Lines was bound for Manila
from Kobe, Japan. It loaded, 5,000 pieces of colorized lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00
consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92,361.75,
consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc. Both were insured from marine risks with Development Insurance
and Surety Corp.It also took 128 cartoons of garment fabrics and accessories in 2 containers consigned
to Mariveles Apparel Corp and 2 Cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and
General Merchandise. The shipments were insured with DOWA Fire and Marine Insurance Co. and
Nisshin Fire and marine Insurance Co. respectably. En Route from Kobe to Manila the vessel caught fire
and sank losing all its shipment. The insurance companies paid for the insurance of the above mentioned
shipments. They Then instituted a case to redeem the insurance that they paid to the various companies
against Eastern Shipping Lines. They contend that Eastern should not be exempted from liability because
it was not able to exercise due diligence in preventing the occurrence of the fire as well as its
unseaworthiness. Eastern Shipping invoked the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as a defense wherein it is
said to be exempt from the said liability. The Fire was said to be one of the exempting circumstance under
the act. It also contended that it the fire occurred as a fortuitous event such as a natural disaster or
calamity which leads them to conclude that they should not be made liable.
Issues: Which law should govern the case is it the Civil Code provisions or the specific law which is the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? Who has the burden of proof to show the negligence of the carrier?
Held: It is the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported which shall apply in this case
(philippinelaw). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act will be supplementary to the Civil Code provision.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence when transporting goods. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless it is due to the ff
events: flood, storm,

Ang vs. American Steamship Agencies(19 SCRA 631)

Facts: Yau Yue Commercial Bank of Hongkong agreed to sell 140 packages of galvanized
steel durzinc sheets to Herminio Teves for $32,458.26. Said agreement was subject to the
following terms: the purchase price should be covered by a bank draft which should be paid by Teves in
exchange for the delivery to him of the bill of lading to be deposited with honking and Shanghai Bank of
Manila; that Teves would present said bill of lading to carriers agent, American Steamship Agencies
which would then issue the permit to deliver imported articles to be presented to the Bureau of customs
to obtain the release of the articles. Yau Yue shipped the articles aboard S.S. Tensai Maru owned by
Nissho Shipping Co., of which the American Shipping is the agent in the Philippines. When the Articles
arrived in manila, Hongkong Shanghais Bank notified Teves of the arrival of the goods and requested for
the payment of the demand draft. Teves, however, failed to pay the demand draft. So, the bank returned
the bill of lading and the demand draft to Yau Yuewhich endorsed the bill of lading to Domingo Ang.
Despite his non-payment, Teves was able to obtain a bank guarantee in favor of the American Steamship
Agencies, the carriers agent. Thus, Teves succeeded in securing a permit to deliver
imported articles from the carrier s agent, which he presented to the Bureau of Customs,
that released the said articles to him. Subsequently, Domingo Ang claimed the articles from American
Steamship, by presenting the indorsed bill of lading, but he was informed that it had delivered the articles
to Teves. Ang filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against American shipping
agencies, for having wrongfully delivered the goods. The American Steamship filed for a motion to
dismiss, citing the carriage of Goods by Sea Act, section 3 paragraph 4, which states: in anyevent, the
carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect to loss or damage unless suit is brought
within one year, after delivery of goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. Thus, the
lower court dismissed the action, on the ground of prescription.
Issue: Whether or not the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act Section 3, Paragraph 4, applies to the case at
bar?
Held: The provision of the law speaks of loss or damage. But there was no damage caused to the
goods which were delivered intact to Herminio Teves. As defined by the Civil Code and as applied to
section 3, paragraph 4, of the Carriage of Goods by sea Act, loss contemplates a situation where no
delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of
commerce, or disappeared that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered. It does not
include a situation where there was indeed delivery, but delivery to the wrong person. The applicable rule
on prescription is that found in the Civil Code, either: ten years for breach of contract or four years for
quasi-delict. In either case, the plaintiffs cause of action has not yet prescribed. Thus, the case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

F.H. Stevens v. Norddeuscher Lloyd

FACTS:
Stevens shipped from Hamburg, Germany to Manila, aboard the M/S Schwabenstein, a vessel of
Lloyd, 2,000 pieces of prismatical thermometers valued at $650. Upon examination of the case
containing the goods, it turned out that 1,154 pieces of said thermometers valued at $342.74,
were missing and/or destroyed.
May 21, 1959 notice of the delivery was given to Stevens by the master of the vessel
April 27, 1960 Stevens instituted an action in the MTC of Manila against the carrier , Lloyd to
recover damages
June 13, 1960 action in the MTC was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, being an admiralty case
June 24, 1960 action in the CFI of Manila was commenced

 Lloyd moved to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, the action having been filed more
than one year from May 21, 1959 when goods were, or ought to be, delivered.
Stevens contended that the period of prescription was suspended by the commencement of the
first action in the MTC, the running of said period resumed or continued on June 13, 1960, and
that excluding the period from April 27 June 13, 1960 less than one (1) year has elapsed
ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed?
HELD/RATIO: NO. Prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court (Art. 1155
NCC). Also Section 49 of Act No. 190 provides that if, in an action commenced in due time, the plaintiff
fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at
the date of such failure, expired, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year after such date.
The action commenced by the plaintiff in the MTC of Manila, on April 27, 1960, was dismissed on
June 13, 1960, or over twenty (20) days after the expiration of the period of one (1) year,
beginning from May 21, 1959, within which plaintiffs action could be brought, pursuant to CA 65,
in relation to the COGSA. Under said section 49nof Act No. 190, the period within which plaintiff
could initiate the present case was renewed, therefore, for another year, beginning from June 24,
1960.

Augusto Benedicto Santos III vs. Northwest Orient AirlinesG.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
Facts
The petitioner, a minor and a resident of the Philippines, purchased from private
respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA), a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and l i c e n s e d t o d o b u s i n e s s a n d m a i n t a i n a b r a n c h o f f i c e i n t h e
P h i l i p p i n e s , a r o u n d - t r i p t i c k e t i n S a n Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San
Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was
December 20, 1986 and no date was specif ied for his return to San Francisco. Petitioner
checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila.
However, despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. Petitioner then sued
NOA for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
invoking Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
Respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place
of business. Neither was the petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but
San Francisco in the United States. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
However, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioner then
came to Supreme Court, raising the same issues it submitted in the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is constitutional?
Held: Yes, Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is constitutional. T h e W a r s a w C o n v e n t i o n i s a t r e a t y
c o m m i t m e n t v o l u n t a r i l y a s s u m e d b y t h e P h i l i p p i n e government and, as such, has the
force and effect of law in this country. According to the Supreme Court, The treaty which is the

subject matter of this petition was a joint legislative-executive act. The presumption is that it was
first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law
in this country. The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption.
Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient
forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished
from all other places.
At any rate, we agree with the respondent court that this case can be decided on other
grounds without the necessity of resolving the constitutional issue. More over, It is well-settled that
courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites
of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party; and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. Courts generally avoid having to
decide a constitutional question. This attitude is based on the doctrine of separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for each other's
acts.

Northwest Airlines V. CuencaG.R. L-22425 August 31, 1965

FACTS: When his contract of carriage was violated by the petitioner, respondent held the office of
Commissioner of Public Highways of the Republic of the Philippines. Having boarded petitioner's plane in
Manila with a first class ticket to Tokyo, he was, upon arrival at Okinawa, transferred to the tourist class
compartment. Although he revealed that he was traveling in his official capacity as official delegate of the
Republic to a conference in Tokyo, an agent of petitioner rudely compelled him in the presence of other
passengers to move, over his objection, to the tourist class, under threat of otherwise leaving him in
Okinawa. In order to reach the conference on time, respondent had no choice but to obey.
This is an action for damages for alleged breach of contract. After appropriate proceedings the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in which the case was originally filed, rendered judgment sentencing defendant
Northwest Airlines, Inc.

hereinafter referred to as petitioner

to pay to plaintiff Cuenca

hereinafter referred to as respondent

the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, together with the sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with
legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of complaint," December 12, 1959, "until fully paid, plus
the further sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation." On appeal taken by petitioner,
said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to theP5,000.00 exemplary damages,
which was eliminated, and theP20,000.00 award for moral damages, which was converted into nominal
damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS: Whether or not the court erred in awarding nominal damage?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI : No. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages."
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals has adjudicated no such compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages to respondent herein. There are special reasons why the P20,000.00 award in favor of
respondent herein is justified, even if said award were characterized as nominal damages. It is true that
said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was not called thereto. Much less was he
advised that "W/L" meant "waitlisted." Upon the other hand, having paid the first class fare in full
andhaving been given first class accommodation as he took petitioner's plane in Manila, respondent was

entitled to believe that this was a confirmation of his first class reservation and that he would keep the
same until his ultimate destination, Tokyo. Then, too, petitioner has not tried to explain or even alleged
that the person to whom respondent's first class seat was given had a better right thereto. In other words,
since the offense had been committed with full knowledge of the fact that respondent was an official
representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P20,000 awarded as damages may well be
considered as merely nominal. At any rate, considering that petitioner's agent had acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner, said award may also be considered as one for exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

ALITALIA vs. IAC

Facts: Dr. Felipa Pablo, a professor from UP was invited to attend a meeting by the United Nations in
Ispra, Italy. She was to read a paper regarding foreign substances in food and the agriculture environment
which she had specialized knowledge of. She booked a flight to Italy with Alitalia airlines, petitioner herein.
She had arrived in Milan the day before the meeting however her luggage did not arrive with her. The
airline informed her that her luggage was delayed because it was placed in one of the succeeding flights
to Italy. She never got her luggage.
When she got back to Manila she demanded that Alitalia compensate her for the damages that she
suffered. Petitioner herein offered free airline tickets in order to compensate for the alleged damages,
however she rejected this offer and instead filed a case. Subsequently it was found out that the luggages
of Dr. Pablo were not placed in the succeeding flights. She received her luggage 11 months after and
after she had already instituted a case against Alitalia.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dr. Pablo and ordered plaintiff to pay damages. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and even increased the amount of damages to be
awarded to Dr. Pablo. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Alitalia is liable for damages incurred by Dr. Pablo.
Held: The Court held that Alitalia is liable to pay Dr. Pablo for nominal damages. The Warsaw Convention
provides that an air carrier is made liable for damages when: (1) the death, wounding or other bodily
injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or in the course of its
operations of embarking or disembarking; (2) the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered
luggage or goods, if the occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air"; and (3) delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods. However, the claim for damages may be brought
subject to limitations provided in the said convention.
In this case, Dr. Pablo did not suffer any other injury other than not being able to read her paper in Italy.
This was due to the fact that Alitalia misplaced her luggage. There was no bad faith or malice on the part
of Alitalia in the said delay in the arrival of her luggage. Dr. Pablo received all her things which were
returned to her in good condition although 11 months late. Therefore she shall receive nominal damages
for the special injury caused.

LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS

G.R. No. 171092.
March 15, 2010.
FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against
respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuous conduct by
the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages, allegedly

transpired when petitioner boarded respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy.
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent
alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the
complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides: An action
for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of
the place of destination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to the provision of the Warsaw
Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous
conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of the
Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was
concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government
on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On
September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence
thereto, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in
good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof. The Convention is thus a treaty
commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this
country.

Philippine Airlines v. Savillo

Facts:

Savillo was a judge of the RTC of Iloilo

He was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf Tournament in Jakarta
Indonesia.
So, in order to take part in such event, he purchased a ticket from PAL with the following itinerary:
Manila-Singapore-Jakarta-Singapore-Manila.
PAL would take them from Manila to Signapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from
Singapore to Jakarta.
When they arrived in Singapore, Singapore Airlines rejected the tickets of Savillo because they
were not endorsed by PAL. It was explained that if Singapore Airlines honoured the tickets
without PALS endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage.
Savillo demanded compensation from both PAL and Singapore Airlines, but his efforts were futile.
He then sued PAL after 3 years, demanding moral damages.
PAL , in its MTD, claimed that the cause of action has already prescribed invoking the Warsaw
Convention (providing for a 2 year prescriptive period). Both RTC and CA ruled against PAL.

Issues:
What is the applicable law, the Civil Code or the Warsaw Convention? Has the action prescribed?

Held:

The Civil Code is applicable. Therefore the action has not yet prescribed for the prescription period is 4
years.
If cause of action claims moral damages, not covered by Warsaw Convention. Article 19 of the
Warsaw Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier for damages occasioned by delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods. Article 24 excludes other remedies by further
providing that (1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded,
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention. Therefore, a claim
covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statue of limitations
of two years has elapsed.
Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes
that the Warsaw Convention does not exclusively regulate the relationship between passenger and
carrier on an international flight.
In U.S. v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passengers baggage and (2)
humiliation he suffered at the hands of the airlines employees. The First cause of action was covered by
the Warsaw Convention which prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the provisions of
the Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four years.
In Mahaney v. Air France (US case), the court therein ruled that if the plaintiff were to claim damages
based solely on the delay she experienced- for instance, the costs of renting a van, which she had to
arrange on her own as a consequence of the delay the complaint would be barred by the twoyear statute
of limitations. However, where the plaintiff alleged that the airlines subjected her to unjust discrimination
or undue or unreasonable preference or disadvantage, an act punishable under the US law, then the
plaintiff may claim purely nominal compensatory damages for humiliation and hurt feelings, which are not
provided for by the Warsaw Convention.
In the Petition at bar, Savillos Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross
negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, fear and distress therefore this case is not covered by the Warsaw Convention.
When the negligence happened before the performance of the contract of carriage, not covered by
the Warsaw Convention. Also, this case is comparable to Lathigra v. British Airways. In that case, it was
held that the airlines negligent act of reconfirming the passengers reservation days before departure and
failing to inform the latter that the flight had already been discontinued is not among the acts covered by
the Warsaw Convention, since the alleged negligence did not occur during the performance of the
contract of carriage but, rather, days before the scheduled flight.
In the case at hand, Singapore Airlines barred Savillo from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because
PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PALs
assurances to Savillo that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still
needs to heard and established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations
will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the party of PAL did not
occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days before the scheduled flight. Thus, the
present action cannot be dismissed based on the Statue of Limitations provided under Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention.

UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY G.R. No. 127768, November 19,1999

F a c t s : On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United Airlines, checked in
together with his luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his
utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum
weight allowance per bag and that he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a
loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repair his things and
transfer some of them to the light ones. Respondent acceded but his luggage was still
overweight. Petitioner billed him overweight charges but its employee reused to honor the miscellaneous
charges under MCD which he offered to pay with. Not wanting to leave without his luggage, he paid with
his credit card. Upon arrival in manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its
contents stolen. In a letter dated October 16, 1989, he notified petitioner of his loss and requested
reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss based on the maximum liability per pound.
Respondent considered the amount grossly inadequate. He sent two more letters to petition but to no
avail. On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Airline. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention. Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of Article 29, the method of calculating
the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Issues: 1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent
laws? 2) Has the respondents cause of action prescribed?
Held: 1) No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored,
depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions do not regulate or
exclude liabilities for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees,
or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary type of damage. Neither may the
Convention be invoked to justif y the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
passenger and preclude recovery therefore3beyond the limits et by said convention. Likewise, we have
held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It
does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers
employees is found or established.2) No. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising
from theft or damage to property or goods) is well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st
cause of action (an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the
violation of respondents rights as passengers)clearly is not. The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of
the Warsaw Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling
provisions of the laws of the forum, forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of
prescriptive periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was indented only to let local laws determine
whether an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.) Since, it
is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr time frame his 2nd cause of
action must be barred. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an
action because petitioner gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands.
True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when petitioner denied his
claims but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he
cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an
action for damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule
shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airlines
itself. Thus, respondents 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.