No. 140774
Filed April 10, 2015
CLARKE COUNTY RESERVOIR COMMISSION,
Appellee,
vs.
LINDA SUE ABBOTT, et al.,
Defendants,
EDWIN D. & DELORIS A. ROBINS REVOCABLE TRUST (SHEILA A.
HARNED, LANNY ROBINS, DOUGLAS E. ROBINS) AND KYLE ROBINS,
Appellants.
Appeal
from
the
Iowa
District
Court
for
Clarke
County,
Ivan T. Webber of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal presents two interrelated questions of first impression.
The first question is whether a joint public-private commission organized
under Iowa Code chapter 28E (2013) may exercise eminent domain
powers.
public use under Iowa Code section 6A.24(2) obtained by such an entity
may be affirmed on mootness grounds after the private members
withdrew from the commission during the appeal.
Clarke
County
Reservoir
Commission
(the
Commission)
filed
was
to
be
condemned
for
the
Landowners whose
project
challenged
the
The district
The
Commission argues the appeal was rendered moot when the private
members withdrew.
The sovereign power to take private property from citizens without
their consent is limited by our State and Federal Constitutions and
legislative enactments. Property owners are entitled to strict compliance
with legal requirements when a government entity wields the power of
eminent domain. These legal requirements help protect against abuse of
the eminent domain power. We strictly construe statutes delegating the
power of eminent domain and note the absence of a clear legislative
authorization for a joint public-private entity to condemn private
property.
3
For the reasons elaborated below, we hold a 28E commission with
members lacking the power of eminent domain cannot itself exercise the
power of eminent domain or serve as an acquiring agency seeking a
declaratory judgment under section 6A.24(2).
We determine the
1A
4
The agreement also gave the Commission the power and responsibility to
acquire funds for the new reservoir, pay any necessary expenses, and
manage the new reservoir after its creation.
The
Commission
requested
report
from
H.R.
Green,
5
its own name or the Commission may request a Sponsor
having the power of eminent domain to bring an eminent
domain action to acquire real property on behalf of or for the
use of the Commission, which the Sponsor shall do,
provided, however, the Commission shall fully reimburse the
Sponsor for all costs of acquisition including not only
damages paid to the property owner but also all other
administrative and related costs incurred by the Sponsor to
complete acquisition through use of eminent domain.
The amendment further created section XI(a) of the agreement, which
states:
The Commission shall acquire all necessary real, personal,
and intangible property necessary for the public purposes
set forth in this Intergovernmental Agreement, which shall
be held in the name of the Clarke County Reservoir
Commission.
Such property may be acquired by sale,
exchange, or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain
as provided above.
H.R. Green updated its study in 2010 and again in 2014 to
address regulatory changes that downgraded West Lakes rated capacity
to .9 mgd and adjust for expected development that had not occurred.
The updated studies concluded that Clarke Countys water needs would
remain approximately 3 mgd by 2037.
December
6,
2012,
the
Commission
adopted
Resolution
6
public improvement under Iowa Code section 6A.24(2). The Commission
served notice on the owners of fifty-four tracts of land required to
complete the project.
On March 27, defendant, Edwin D. & Deloris A. Robins Revocable
Trust (Robins Trust), owner of one of the parcels of land to be
condemned, filed an answer to the petition. 2 The Robins Trust filed an
amended and substituted answer on May 22.
alleged eleven affirmative defenses, including that the [p]laintiff does not
have the legal authority to initiate this condemnation proceeding under
Iowa Code Section 6A.4.
landowners filed answers to the initial petition. Only the Robins Trust
and Kyle Robins are parties to this appeal. We refer to the appellants collectively as the
Robins Trust.
7
called four witnesses. Duben testified about the report he prepared with
H.R. Green verifying the water needs of the Clarke County area.
He
testified that the site was selected to provide the greatest capacity while
keeping adequate distance from a confined animal feeding operation and
a prairie remnant located in the watershed.
manager
for
the
Commission,
testified
regarding
the
Commissions attempts to notify all landowners and plans to pay for the
reservoir. The landowners called no witnesses. On April 8, the district
court ruled for the Commission, concluding the project qualified as a
public use within the meaning of Iowa Code section 6A.22(2).
The Robins Trust filed its notice of appeal on May 6 and its
appellate proof brief on July 24. The sole issue raised on appeal was
that the district court erred by ruling the Commission with private
members had eminent domain powers. On August 22, the Commission
filed a motion to supplement the record and dismiss the appeal as moot.
Attached to the motion is the Amended and Restated Intergovernmental
Agreement filed with the Secretary of State on August 18 showing that
the Clarke County Conservation Board, the Clarke County Development
Corporation, and the Clarke County Soil and Water Conservation District
8
had withdrawn as members of the Commission. 3
Based on this
Id.
court.
3Normally on appeal we cannot consider matters outside the trial court record.
There is an exception to this general rule for mootness issues. Matters that are
technically outside the record may be submitted in order to establish or counter a claim
of mootness. In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1992)).
9
argues that allowing a private entity to exercise the public power of
eminent domain jointly with public entities violates chapter 28E of the
Iowa Code, the Federal and State Constitutions, and our caselaw and
that the remedy is to vacate the declaratory judgment. The Commission
argues that the issue is moot because all members of the Commission
lacking the power of eminent domain withdrew from the Commission
during the pendency of this appeal.
domain.
Next,
we
address
whether
the
Commissions
Because we
conclude the issue is not moot, we then turn to the question of whether a
28E entity with both public and private members can validly exercise the
power of eminent domain. We answer that question no.
A. Eminent Domain.
10
and just compensation are designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole . . . . Perkins v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 6970 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554,
1561 (1960)). Justice OConnor underscored the constitutional necessity
that any taking be for a public use with just compensation:
These two limitations serve to protect the security of
Property, which Alexander Hamilton described to the
Philadelphia Convention as one of the great obj[ects] of
Gov[ernment].
Together they ensure stable property
ownership by providing safeguards against excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the governments eminent
domain powerparticularly against those owners who, for
whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in
the political process against the majoritys will.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2672,
162 L. Ed. 2d 439, 462 (2005) (OConnor, J., dissenting) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
prevent abuse of the power for the benefit of private parties. See id. at
50405, 125 S. Ct. at 267677, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 467.
Accordingly, we have long recognized the importance of strict
compliance with statutory requirements for the exercise of eminent
domain:
Thus, where the right of eminent domain is invoked, the
provisions of the law granting the right must be complied
with. In some instances the statute or franchise authorizing
the construction of the work prescribes a special procedure
to facilitate acquiring property by condemnation; where such
is not the case, condemnors are bound, of course, to proceed
according to the provisions of the general laws. In any case,
the extent to which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication
of the statute in which the grant is contained. Where,
therefore, the state, a municipality, or other agent in charge
of a public use, seeks to acquire, against the consent of the
owner, private property for public use, the provisions of the
11
authorizing law must be strictly complied with, and this
must appear on the face of the proceedings for taking the
land. In other words, the statutory procedure must be
followed.
Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630, 63334 (Iowa 1969)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
This provision
permits an acquiring agency to petition the court for a ruling that the
proposed taking of private property is for a public use, public purpose,
or public improvement:
An acquiring agency that proposes to acquire property
by eminent domain may file a petition in district court
seeking a determination and declaration that its finding of
public use, public purpose, or public improvement necessary
to support the taking meets the definition of those terms.
Id. 6A.24(2) (emphasis added). Chapter 6B, entitled Procedure Under
Eminent Domain, defines acquiring agency as the state of Iowa and
any person or entity conferred the right by statute to condemn private
12
property or to otherwise exercise the power of eminent domain.
Id.
6B.1(2).
The Commission filed its petition under section 6A.24(2) and
sought a judicial declaration that the proposed reservoir met the publicuse requirement for eminent domain. The Robins Trust, by motion for
summary judgment, raised a threshold challenge in district court,
arguing the Commission was not a proper acquiring agency because it
included private members that lacked eminent domain authority.
The
district court denied that motion and ruled the Commission was a proper
party.
The landowners also litigated and lost the issue whether the
Paradoxically, we
13
An appeal is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because [the contested issue] has become
academic or nonexistent. The test is whether the courts
opinion would be of force or effect in the underlying
controversy. As a general rule, we will dismiss an appeal
when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect
upon the existing controversy.
In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 71011 (Iowa 2014)
(quoting In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 2001)). Mootness is not
a question of power but rather one of restraint.
703
Id. at 184.
14
N.W. 332, 333 (Iowa 1929)). Similarly, the proposed reservoir challenged
by the landowners in this case has not been built, nor has the property
been acquired by the Commission through eminent domain. It is not too
late to decide the issue presented in this appeal.
All of the current members of the Commission have the power of
eminent domain by statute. 4
The
15
constituted in district court had the power of eminent domainis now a
merely academic issue, the resolution of which would have no effect on
the underlying dispute. See In re Trust No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d
474, 482 (Iowa 2013) (rejecting mootness challenge in appeal from failure
to provide accounting, even though belated accounting was completed
before submission of appeal, because resolution of right to accounting
affected claim for recovery of attorney fees).
We conclude that the appeal is not moot and proceed to address
the merits of the issue raised by the Robins Trust.
D. Whether a 28E Entity with Both Public and Private
Members Can Properly Bring an Action Under Iowa Code Section
6A.24(2). Generally, a 28E agreement
purports to authorize any political subdivision of the State of
Iowa and certain agencies of the state or federal government
to join together to perform certain public services and by
agreement create a separate legal or administrative entity to
render that service.
Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449,
453 (Iowa 1970). The statute allows for the joint exercise of powers:
Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised
or capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be
exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of
this state having such power or powers, privilege or
authority, and jointly with any public agency of any other
state or of the United States to the extent that laws of such
other state or of the United States permit such joint exercise
or enjoyment. Any agency of the state government when
acting jointly with any public agency may exercise and enjoy
all of the powers, privileges and authority conferred by this
chapter upon a public agency.
Iowa Code 28E.3.
16
address whether or how private entities may participate in a 28E
agreement exercising a public power that the private entity lacks.
The Robins Trust relies on two cases to support its contention that
the Commission with private members cannot exercise the power of
eminent domain. The first is Goreham, a case considering whether a 28E
agency composed entirely of public members could issue revenue bonds.
179 N.W.2d at 451. After examining the nature of 28E agreements and
noting the constitutional avoidance doctrine, we concluded that
this legislation must be interpreted with reference to the
power or powers which the contracting governmental units
already have. The pre-existing powers contain their own
guidelines. The legal creation of a new body corporate and
politic to jointly exercise and perform the powers and
responsibilities of the cooperating governmental unit would
not be unconstitutional so long as the new body politic is
doing only what its cooperating members already have the
power to do.
Id. at 455. In Barnes v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
we answered a question certified to us by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa regarding the approval
requirements for regional housing authorities established under chapter
28E. 341 N.W.2d 766, 76667 (Iowa 1983). We noted that [c]hapter
28E . . . does not confer any additional powers on the cooperating
agencies; it merely provides for their joint exercise.
Id. at 767.
We
17
We recently reiterated that only proper parties may exercise
eminent domain powers. In Hawkeye Land Co., the Iowa Utilities Board
(IUB) allowed an independent transmission company, ITC Midwest, to
utilize a statutory pay-and-go procedure to run electrical transmission
lines across a railroad over a property owners objectiona form of
eminent domain. 847 N.W.2d at 201. The owner of the railroad-crossing
easement
appealed,
determination.
Id.
and
the
district
court
affirmed
the
IUBs
476.27 was only available to a public utility. Id. at 213. We held that
ITC Midwest did not meet the definition of a public utility and, therefore,
was the wrong party to use the eminent domain statute. Id. at 219. Our
conclusion led us to reverse the district court and remand for an order
vacating the IUBs decision.
Id.
We concluded
that the city acted properly, condemning the land by its own power of
eminent domain and after having done so, was free to transfer the
property to the 28E entity. Id. Although Weiss remains good law, the
case is inapposite because here the Commission itself filed the action
seeking the declaration of public use, rather than having one of its public
members do so.
The Commission argues that the 28E agreement itself grants the
Commission the power of eminent domain.
We disagree.
Only the
18
legislature has the authority to delegate the power of eminent domain,
and the members of the Commission cannot grant or delegate their own
powers of eminent domain to the Commission but, rather, may only
exercise their individual powers jointly.
The legislatures
whether private entities may exercise eminent domain powers jointly with
public entities in a 28E agreement. We will not infer such powers when
chapter 28E is silent on that point. See Hawkeye Land, 847 N.W.2d at
208, 219 (strictly construing statutes delegating the power of eminent
domain and holding only parties expressly authorized by the legislature
could utilize statutory procedure to acquire property over owners
objection). We may not read new powers into chapter 28E in the guise of
interpretation.
Delegating
19
to private entity, but concluding Amtrak is a government entity for
purposes of developing standards for use of private railroad tracks). If
the legislature wanted to grant eminent domain powers to 28E entities
that include private members, it could have said so explicitly.
Policy
arguments in favor of granting eminent domain powers to joint privatepublic entities should be directed to the legislature.
No statute expressly allows a private entity to exercise the power of
eminent domain jointly through a 28E agreement. As we concluded in
Goreham and Barnes, a 28E agreement confers no new powers on the
entities involved, but only allows for the joint exercise of existing powers.
Barnes, 341 N.W.2d at 768; Goreham, 179 N.W.2d at 455. We hold that
a 28E entity with private members lacks the power of eminent domain.
Therefore, we conclude that the Commission did not have the power of
eminent domain at the time the district court entered its declaratory
judgment. Accordingly, it was not a proper acquiring agency under Iowa
Code section 6A.24(2).
20
courts decree to declare void resolutions of city council invalidated by
votes of disqualified council member).
We reject the Commissions argument that the appeal should be
dismissed because the withdrawal of its private members removes any
question that the Commission, as reorganized now, has eminent domain
powers. Dismissal of the appeal would leave in place the district courts
existing declaratory judgment.
ongoing significance.
21
issue under the doctrine of issue preclusion or claim preclusion in future
proceedings. We disagree. Issue preclusion, a form of res judicata, is
based on a prior judgment. See Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d
92, 10304 (Iowa 2011). So, too, is claim preclusion. See Fennelly v. A-1
Mach. & Tool Co., 728 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Iowa 2007). A judgment, once
reversed or vacated, no longer has preclusive effect. Id. (noting reversal
of prior judgment defeated its preclusive effect). Nor does the law-of-thecase doctrine apply to preclude the parties from relitigating the publicuse issue or require them to do so on remand.
The law-of-the-case
We are
The Robins
Trust in this appeal did not otherwise challenge the district courts
public-use determination, and we do not reach that issue.
IV. Disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the declaratory judgment of
the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents.
5We
are not dealing here with the law-of-the-case implications of a district court
ruling that was not appealed. See, e.g., Nutting v. Zieser, 482 N.W.2d 424, 42526 (Iowa
1992) (noting how decision interpreting dram statute was saddled with the law of the
case implications of the district courts unappealed ruling). Rather, the Robins Trust
appealed the declaratory judgment, which we reverse on this appeal.
22
#140774, Clarke Cnty. Reservoir Commn v. Robins Revocable Trust
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the majoritys analysis of our eminent domain law, but
disagree with the courts resolution. The majoritys mootness analysis is
unnecessary because this case does not implicate the mootness doctrine.
The majority is correct in its conclusion that when the Clarke
County Reservoir Commission began its condemnation proceeding it did
not have the authority under Iowa law to do so because it was not a
properly constituted acquiring agency under Iowa Code section 6A.24(2)
(2013). I also agree with the majoritys analysis stating that we have
long recognized the importance of strict compliance with statutory
requirements for the exercise of eminent domain.
However, in its
I would simply
reverse the decision without remanding the case back to the district
court on the ground the condemnation proceeding was flawed from the
beginning.
The Code provides: The procedure for the condemnation of private
property for works of internal improvement, and for other public projects,
uses, or purposes, unless and except as otherwise provided by law, shall
be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
6B.1A.
Iowa Code
condemnation proceeding:
An acquiring agency shall provide written notice of a public
hearing to each owner and any contract purchaser of record
of agricultural land that may be the subject of
condemnation. The authority under this chapter is not
conferred and condemnation proceedings shall not begin
unless a good faith effort is made to mail and publish the
23
notice as provided in this section on the owner and any
contract purchaser of record of the property subject to
condemnation.
Id. 6B.2A(1) (emphasis added).
When the Commission began the condemnation by mailing the
notice of public hearing it was not an acquiring agency.
Thus, an
acquiring agency did not send a notice of public hearing under section
6B.2A. Therefore, any action by the Commission after the flawed notice
is invalid.