PEOPLE VS ASUNCION

LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE

18 SCRA 616DIZON, October 29, 1966
NATURE
Petition for review on Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
-Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez andAurora Mejia Villasor)
and other heirs of spousesM a n u e l M e i j i a
a n d G l o r i a L a z a t i n e n t e r e d i n t o a contract with respondent
Trinidad Lazatin for thedevelopment and subdivision of 3 parcels
of landbelonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferredhis rights to Terra Devt
Co (TDC).-Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC forrescission of said
contract with Lazatin for allegedgross and willful violation of its terms.Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with
FiscalsO f f i c e o f C i t y o f A n g e l e s a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t petitioners for
violation of A172 in relation
to A171,par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted.Fiscal filed with
Court in Angeles City informationcharging petitioners with
crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and
Angelinam a d e i t a p p e a r t h a t t h e y w e r e t h e g u a r d i a n s o f minors
George and Alexander Meijia (sons of thespouses?) when they werent the
guardians at thedate of the execution of the document, a certain Carolina M. de
Castro was the judicial guardian of thesaid minors).-Petitioners asked for a
reinvestigation. Angeles CityFiscal reinvestigated to give
them opportunity topresent exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation,parties
charged moved for the dismissal of the case
mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had
no jurisdiction over the offensebecause the private document
that containedthe alleged false statement of fact was signedby
them outside the territorial limits of said city
(One in Makati, the other one in QC).-However, the resolution of their motion to
dismisswas delayed and the City Court already set
theircriminal case for arraignment. Petitioners securedseveral postponements of
the arraignment. But sinceCity Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion todismiss,
petitioners filed a motion to quash
instead,o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t c o u r t h a d n o j u r i s d i c t i o n . Respondents
(with conformity of City Fiscal) filed anopposition to the motion to quash. Respondent
judged e n i e d m o t i o n t o q u a s h , s e t a r r a i g n m e n t . S o petitioners filed
present action.
ISSUE
1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction
tot r y a n d d e c i d e t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e f o r a l l e g e d falsification of a private
document allegedly done byt h e p a r t i e s n a m e d i n t h e i n f o e v e n i f t h e a c t s
o f falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC,and thus outside the
jurisdiction of said court

Other procedural issues

2 . W O N t h e m o t i o n t o q u a s h w a s i m p r o p e r, a n d should not be allowed since
by filing the said motion,the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of theallegation
of the information to the effect that
theo f f e n s e w a s c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l jurisdiction of Angeles
City3 . W O N t h e p r a y e r f o r w r i t s o f c e r t i o r a r i a n d prohibition is proper
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio.
The place where the criminal offensewas committed not only
determines the venueof the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction
Reasoning.
Petitioners are charged with havingfalsified a private document, not using
a falsifieddocument, so it is essential to determine when
andw h e r e t h e o f f e n s e o f f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f a p r i v a t e document is deemed co
nsummated or committed. The crime of falsification of a private document
isc o n s u m m a t e d w h e n s u c h d o c u m e n t i s a c t u a l l y falsified with the intent
to prejudice a 3
rd
person,whether such falsified document is or is not put touse illegally.
The improper and illegal use of thedocument is not material or essential element of
thecrime of falsification of a private document [US vs. Infante, US vs. Barreto]2.
NO
Ratio.
The motion to quash now provided for in Rule117 of the Rules of Court is
manifestly broader ins c o p e t h a n t h e d e m u r r e r, a s i t i s
n o t l i m i t e d t o defects apparent upon the face of the complaint
ori n f o r m a t i o n b u t e x t e n d s t o i s s u e s a r i s i n g o u t o f extraneous facts, as
shown by the circumstance that,among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2of
said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal,extinction of criminal action or
liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questionsof fact in
the determination of which a preliminarytrial is required.
Reasoning.
The argument of the respondents referto the now obsolete demurrer to an information.3.
YES
Ratio.
The general rule is that a court of equity willnot issue a writ of certiorari to annul
an order of alower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue
aw r i t o f p r o h i b i t i o n t o p r e v e n t s a i d c o u r t f r o m proceeding with the
case after such denial, it beingthe rule that upon such denial the defendant
shoulde n t e r h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y a n d g o t o t r i a l a n d , i f convicted, raise on
appeal the same legal questionscovered by his motion to quash. In this as well as
inother jurisdictions, however, this is no longer thehard and fast rule.-

T h e w r i t s o f c e r t i o r a r i a n d p r o h i b i t i o n , a s extraordinary legal
remedies, are, in the ultimateanalysis, intended to annul
void proceedings; toprevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legala u t h o r i t y
a n d t o p r o v i d e f o r a f a i r a n d o r d e r l y administration of justice.
Reasoning.
In several cases, the court already tookcognizance of said writs, overlooking the flaw in
thep r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f a m o r e e n l i g h t e n e d a n d s
u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . T h e l a c k o f jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles is patent
andit would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners
tou n d e r g o t r i a l i n s a i d c o u r t a n d s u f f e r a l l t h e embarrassment and
mental anguish that go with it.
Dispositive
W H E R E F O R E , j u d g m e n t i s h e r e b y rendered declaring that the offense
charged in theinformation filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of
theC i t y C o u r t o f A n g e l e s C i t y i s n o t w i t h i n t h e jurisdiction
of said court and that, therefore,
saidc o u r t i s h e r e b y r e s t r a i n e d a n d p r o h i b i t e d f r o m further proceedings
therein. Costs against the privaterespondents.
UyvsCourtofAppeals
GR119000July28,1997
Nature:Jurisdiction
FACTS:
WhileRosaUywashelpingherhusbandmanagetheirlumberbusiness,sheanda
friend,Consolacionagreentoformapartnershipwhereinthelatterwillcontribute
additionalcapitalasindustrialpartnerfortheexpansionofRosaslumberbusiness.
VarioussumsamountingtoP500,000wereclaimedtohavebeengivenby
Consolacionforthebusiness,butnoreceiptwaseverissued.Thefriendshipofthe
twoturnedsour,thus,Consolaciondemandedthereturnofherinvestmentbutthe
checksissuedbyRosawerealldishonouredforinsufficiencyoffunds.Consolacion
filedacomplaintforEstafaandforviolationofBP22.TheManilaRTCacquittedthe
petitionerofEstafabutconvictedherofthechargesunderBP22.Petitioner
contentsthatthetrialcourtneveracquiredjurisdictionovertheoffensesunderBP
22andassumingarguendothatsheraisedthematterofjurisdictiononlyupon
appeal,shecannotbeestoppedfromquestioningthejurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WhetherornottheRTCofManilaacquiredjurisdictionovertheviolationofthe
Bouncingcheckslaw.
RULING:
Territorialjurisdictionincriminalcasesistheterritorywherethecourthas
jurisidictiontotakecognizanceortotrytheoffenseallegedlycommittedthereinby
theaccused.Thisitcannottakejurisdictionoverapersonchargedwithanoffense
allegedlycommittedoutsidethatofthatlimitedterritory.Jurisdictionofthecourt
overacriminalcaseisdeterminedbytheallegationsinthecomplainorinformation.
Onceitisshown,thecourtmayvalidlytakecognizanceofthecase.However,ifthe
evidenceadducedduringthetrialshowsthattheoffensewascommitted

somewhereelse,thecourtshoulddismisstheactionforwantofjurisdiction.Inthe
caseatbar,thecrimesofEstafaandviolationofBP22aretwodifferentelements
andnecessarily,forthecourttoacquirejurisdiction,eachoftheessential
ingredientsofeachcrimehastobesatisfied.Therespondentcourtiswrongto
concludethatinasmuchastheRTCofManilaacquiredjurisdictionovertheEstafa
casethenitalsoacquiredjurisdictionovertheviolationofBP22.Noproofhasbeen
offeredthatthecheckswereissued,delivered,dishonouredorknowledgeof
insufficiencyoffundsoccurredinManila,whichareessentialelementsnecessary
fortheManilacourttoacquirejurisdiction.BP22ontheotherhand,asacontinuing
offense,maybetriedinanyjurisdictionwheretheoffensewasinpartcommittee.
Petitioneralsotimelyquestionedthejurisdictionofthecourt.
Asprovidedbyjurisprudence,wecanseethatevenifapartyfailstofileamotionto
quash,hemaystillquestionthejurisdictionofthecourtlateron.Thegeneralruleis
thatthejurisdictionofacourtoverasubjectmatteroftheactionisamatteroflaw
andmaynotbeconferredbyconsentoragreementoftheparties.Thelackof
jurisdictionofacourtmayberaisedatanystageoftheproceeding,evenonappeal.
HowevermthisruleshasbeenqualifiedinthecaseofTijanvs.Sibanghanoy
whereinthedefenseoflackofjurisdictionofthecourtcanbeheldtobebarredby
laches.Thiscasehowevercannotbeappliedinthecaseatbarsincetheaccusedis
notguiltyoflaches.RTCofManilahasnojurisdictionoverthecase.
PEOPLEVSNAVARRO
MANANTAN VS. CA
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an
automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing
said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide
through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the
civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not
recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable
doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to
determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.

This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action
for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different
purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in
evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both
actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are
not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from
his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed
by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as
Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned
him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the
truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11
to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day
period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners'
motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a retrial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former
Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stagemanaged in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of

handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up
with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his
military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in
power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all
that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The
partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted
all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its
decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias
and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial
process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More
so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and
the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for

having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of
by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's,
comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan
should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest
grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial
for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize
that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Galmanvs.Pamaran[GRs7120809,30August1985],alsoPeoplevs.Sandiganbayan[GRs
7121213]
EnBanc,Cuevas(J):1concur,1onleave,8filedseparateconcurringopinions,3filedseparate
dissentingopinion,1votedtodismiss(thusconcur)beforeleavingforabroad
Facts:on21August1983,formerSenatorBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.wasgunneddowntodeath
insidethepremisesoftheManilaInternationalAirport(MIA)inPasayCity.Todeterminethe
factsandcircumstancessurroundingthekillingandtoallowafree,unlimitedandexhaustive
investigationofallaspectsofthetragedy,PD1886waspromulgatedcreatinganadhocFact
FindingBoardwhichlaterbecamemorepopularlyknownastheAgravaBoard.Pursuanttothe
powersvestedinitbyPD1886,theBoardconductedpublichearingswhereinvariouswitnesses
appearedandtestifiedand/orproduceddocumentaryandotherevidenceeitherinobediencetoa
subpoenaorinresponsetoaninvitationissuedbytheBoard.Amongthewitnesseswho
appeared,testifiedandproducedevidencebeforetheBoardwereGeneralFabianC.Ver,Major
GeneralProsperoOlivas,Sgt.PabloMartinez,Sgt.TomasFernandez,Sgt.LeonardoMojica,
Sgt.PepitoTorio,Sgt.ProsperoBonaandAICAnicetoAcupido.Uponterminationofthe
investigation,2reportsweresubmittedtoPresidentFerdinandE.Marcos.One,byitsChairman,
theHon.JusticeCorazonJuliano
one,jointlyauthoredbytheothermembersoftheBoardnamely:Hon.LucianoSalazar,Hon.

AmadoDizon,Hon.DanteSantosandHon.ErnestoHerrera.Thereportswerethereafterreferred
andturnedovertotheTanodbayanforappropriateaction.Afterconductingthenecessary
preliminaryinvestigation,theTanodbayanfiledwiththeSandiganbayan2Informationsfor
murderoneforthekillingofSen.BenignoS.Aquino(CriminalCase10010)andanotherfor
thekillingofRolandoGalman(CriminalCase10011),whowasfounddeadontheairporttarmac
notfarfromtheprostratebodyofSen.Aquinoonthatsamefatefulday.Inbothcriminalcases,
Ver,et.al.werechargedasaccessories,alongwithseveralprincipals,andoneaccomplice.Upon
arraignment,alltheaccusedpleadednotguilty.Inthecourseofthejointtrial,theprosecution
representedbytheOfficeoftheTanodbayan,markedandthereafterofferedaspartofits
evidence,theindividualtestimoniesofVer,et.al.beforetheAgravaBoard.Ver,et.al.,through
theirrespectivecounselobjectedtotheadmissionofsaidexhibits.Gen.Verfiledaformal
"MotiontoExcludeTestimoniesofGen.FabianC.VerbeforetheFactFindingBoardas
Evidenceagainsthimintheabovecases"contendingthatitsadmissionwillbeinderogationof
hisconstitutionalrightagainstselfincriminationandviolativeoftheimmunitygrantedbyPD
1886,andthusprayedthathistestimonyberejectedasevidencefortheprosecution.MajorGen.
Olivasandtherestoftheotheraccusedlikewisefiledseparatemotionstoexcludetheir
respectiveindividualtestimoniesinvokingthesameground.TheTanodbayanopposedsaid
motionscontendingthattheimmunityrelieduponbyVer,et.al.insupportoftheirmotionsto
excludetheirrespectivetestimonies,wasnotavailabletothembecauseoftheirfailuretoinvoke
theirrightagainstselfincriminationbeforetheadhocFactFindingBoard.On30May1985,
TheTanodbayanhavingnofurtherwitnessestopresentandhavingbeenrequiredtomakeits
offerofevidenceinwriting,theSandiganbayan,withoutthependingmotionsforexclusion
beingresolved,issuedaResolutiondirectingthatbyagreementoftheparties,thepending
motionsforexclusionandtheoppositionthereto,togetherwiththememoranduminsupport
thereof,aswellasthelegalissuesandarguments,raisedthereinaretobeconsideredjointlyin
theCourt'sResolutionontheprosecution'sformalofferofexhibitsandotherdocumentary
evidences.On3June1985,theprosecutionmadeawritten"FormalOfferofEvidence"which
includes,amongothers,thetestimoniesofVer,et.al.andotherevidencesproducedbythem
beforetheBoard,allofwhichhavebeenpreviouslymarkedinthecourseofthetrial.Ver,et.al.
objectedtotheprosecution'sformalofferofevidenceonthesamegroundrelieduponbythemin
theirrespectivemotionforexclusion.On13June1985,TheSandiganbayanissuedaResolution,
admittingalltheevidencesofferedbytheprosecutionexceptthetestimoniesand/orother
evidenceproducedbyVer,et.al.inviewoftheimmunitygrantedbyPD1886.TheTanodbayan,
alongwithSaturninaandReynaldoGalmanmovedforthereconsiderationofthesaid
Resolution,butweredenied.TheyfiledtwoseparatepetitionsforcertioraribeforetheSupreme
Court.
Issue:Whethertherightagainstselfincriminationortonottowitnessagainstoneselfapplies
alsointheproceedingbeforetheAgravaBoard.
Held:AlthoughreferredtoanddesignatedasamereFactFindingBoard,theBoardisintruth
andinfact,andtoalllegalintentsandpurposes,anentitycharged,notonlywiththefunctionof
determiningthefactsandcircumstancessurroundingthekilling,butmoreimportantly,the
determinationofthepersonorpersonscriminallyresponsiblethereforsothattheymaybe
broughtbeforethebarofjustice.Theinvestigationthereforisalsogeared,asanyothersimilar

investigationofitssort,totheascertainmentand/ordeterminationoftheculpritorculprits,their
consequentprosecutionandultimately,theirconviction.Andassafeguard,thePresidential
Decreeguarantees"anypersoncalledtotestifybeforetheBoardtherighttocounselatanystage
oftheproceedings."Consideringtheforegoingenvironmentalsettings,itcannotbedeniedthatin
thecourseofreceivingevidence,personssummonedtotestifywillincludenotmerelyplain
witnessesbutalsothosesuspectedasauthorsandcoparticipantsinthetragickilling.Andwhen
suspectsaresummonedandcalledtotestifyand/orproduceevidence,thesituationisonewhere
thepersontestifyingorproducingevidenceisundergoinginvestigationforthecommissionofan
offenseandnotmerelyinordertoshedlightonthefactsandsurroundingcircumstancesofthe
assassination,butmoreimportantly,todeterminethecharacterandextentofhisparticipation
therein.Amongthisclassofwitnessesweretherespondents,suspectsinthesaidassassination,
allofwhomexceptGeneralsVerandOlivas,weredetained(undertechnicalarrest)atthetime
theyweresummonedandgavetheirtestimoniesbeforetheAgravaBoard.Thisnotwithstanding,
PD1886deniedthemtherighttoremainsilent.Theywerecompelledtotestifyorbewitnesses
againstthemselves.Section5ofPD1886leavethemnochoice.Theyhavetotakethewitness
stand,testifyorproduceevidence,underpainofcontemptiftheyfailedorrefusedtodoso,The
jeopardyofbeingplacedbehindprisonbarsevenbeforeconvictiondangledbeforetheirvery
eyes.Similarly,theycannotinvoketherightnottobeawitnessagainstthemselves,bothof
whicharesacrosantlyenshrinedandprotectedbyourfundamentallaw.Boththeseconstitutional
rightstoremainsilentandnottobecompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimselfwererightaway
totallyforeclosedbyPD1886.Whentheysotestifiedandproducedevidenceasordered,they
werenotimmunefromprosecutionbyreasonofthetestimonygivenbythem.Itmustbenoted
thatinitiallytheprovisioninourorganiclawsweresimilartotheConstitutionoftheUnited
Statesandwasasfollows"Thatnopersonshallbecompelledinacriminalcasetobeawitness
againsthimself."Asnowworded,Section20ofArticleIVreads:"Nopersonshallbecompelled
tobeawitnessagainsthimself."Thedeletionofthephrase"inacriminalcase"connotesno
otherimportexcepttomakesaidprovisionalsoapplicabletocasesotherthancriminal.
Decidedlythen,theright"nottobecompelledtotestifyagainsthimself"appliestoVer,et.al.
notwithstandingthattheproceedingsbeforetheAgravaBoardisnot,initsstrictestsense,a
criminalcase.Nodoubt,Ver,et.al.werenotmerelydeniedthesaidsacredconstitutionalrights,
butalsotherightto"dueprocess"whichisfundamentalfairness.Thereviewofthepleadings
andtheirannexes,togetherwiththeoralarguments,manifestationsandadmissionsofboth
counsel,failedtorevealadherencetoandcompliancewithdueprocess.Themannerinwhichthe
testimoniesweretakenfromVer,et.al.fallshortoftheconstitutionalstandardsbothunderthe
"dueprocessclause"andunderthe"exclusionaryrule"inSection20,ArticleIV.Inthefaceof
suchgraveconstitutionalinfirmities,theindividualtestimoniesofVer,et.al.cannotbeadmitted
againsttheminanycriminalproceeding.Thisistrueregardlessofabsenceofclaimof
constitutionalprivilegeorofthepresenceofagrantofimmunitybylaw.
Issue(2):Whethertherightagainstselfincriminationneedtobeinvokedbeforetheboardin
ordertopreventuseofanygivenstatementagainstthetestifyingwitnessinasubsequent
criminalprosecution.
Held(2):Immunitystatutesmaybegenerallyclassifiedintotwo:one,whichgrants"use

immunity";andtheother,whichgrantswhatisknownas"transactionalimmunity."The
distinctionbetweenthetwoisasfollows:"Useimmunity"prohibitsuseofwitness'compelled
testimonyanditsfruitsinanymannerinconnectionwiththecriminalprosecutionofthewitness.
Ontheotherhand,"transactionalimmunity"grantsimmunitytothewitnessfromprosecutionfor
anoffensetowhichhiscompelledtestimonyrelates.PresidentialDecree1886,morespecifically
Section5thereof,belongstothefirsttypeofimmunitystatutes.Itgrantsmerelyimmunityfrom
useofanystatementgivenbeforetheBoard,butnotimmunityfromprosecutionbyreasonoron
thebasisthereof.Merelytestifyingand/orproducingevidencedonotrenderthewitness
immunedfromprosecutionnotwithstandinghisinvocationoftherightagainstselfincrimination.
Heismerelysavedfromtheuseagainsthimofsuchstatementandnothingmore.Stated
otherwise,hestillrunstheriskofbeingprosecutedevenifhesetsuphisrightagainstself
incrimination.Thedictatesoffairplay,whichisthehallmarkofdueprocess,demandsthatVer,
et.al.shouldhavebeeninformedoftheirrightstoremainsilentandwarnedthatanyandall
statementstobegivenbythemmaybeusedagainstthem.This,theyweredenied,underthe
pretensethattheyarenotentitledtoitandthattheBoardhasnoobligationtosoinformthem.
Hence,therightagainstselfincriminationneednotbeinvokedbeforetheBoardinorderto
preventuseofanygivenstatementagainstthetestifyingwitnessinasubsequentcriminal
prosecution.AliteralinterpretationisrepugnanttoArticleIV,Section20oftheConstitution,
whichisthefirsttestofadmissibility.Saidprovisionrendersinadmissibleanyconfession
obtainedinviolationthereof.Thisexclusionaryruleappliesnotonlytoconfessionsbutalsoto
admissions,whethermadebyawitnessinanyproceedingorbyanaccusedinacriminal
proceedingoranypersonunderinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense.Infine,inview
ofthepotentsanctionsimposedontherefusaltotestifyortoanswerquestionsunderSec.4of
PD1886,thetestimoniescompelledtherebyaredeemedimmunizedunderSection5ofthesame
law.TheapplicabilityoftheimmunitygrantedbyPD1886cannotbemadetodependonaclaim
oftheprivilegeagainstselfincriminationwhichthesamelawpracticallystripsawayfromthe
witness.
SAMSON VS CA
STA RITA VS CA

Peoplevs.Degamo
Facts:
ComplainantEllenVertudazoandherchildrenwerelivinginarentedapartmentatBarangay
Punta,
OrmocCity.Shewasnotpersonallyacquaintedwiththeappellantandonlycametoknowhim
through
herbrotherinlawwhostayedwithherforaperiodoftime.
AtoneoclockinthemorningonOctober1,
1994,complainantheardsomeonecallinghername.Thinkingthatherbrotherinlawhad
returned,she
unwittinglyopenedthedoor.Appellantthenforcedhiswayinsidethehouseandpokedaknifeat
complainantsneck.
Hethenlaidherontheconcretefloorandsucceededinhavingcarnalknowledgeof
her.Appellantwasholdingtheknifewhilehavingsexualintercoursewithcomplainant.He

warnedhernot
totellanyoneabouttheincidentandafterthatheleft.Overwhelmedwithfear,complainantwent
upstairs
andjustcried.Inthemorningofthesameday,complainantreportedtheincidenttotheBarangay
Captain
andtothepolice.OnOctober4,1994,acomplaintwasfiledbeforethetrialcourtcharging
appellantwith
thecrimeofrapetowhich,uponarraignment,pleadednotguilty.OnJanuary17,1995,beforethe
startof
thetrialproper,thecourta
quo
allowedthecomplainttobeamendedtoincludetheallegationthatby
reasonoftheincidentofrape,thevictimhasbecomeinsane
.
Thetrialcourtthenfoundcomplainantguilty
beyondreasonabledoubtandimposedapunishmentofdeathpenaltyuponhim.
Issue:Whetherornotthequalifyingcircumstanceofinsanityofthevictimbyreasonoron
occasion
oftherapecommittedagainstcomplainantshouldlikewisebeconsideredintheimpositionofthe
proper
penalty
Held:
Yes.
Althoughthetrialcourtobservesthatthereisnojurisprudenceyetwhichconstruedthe
provisionhasbecomeinsane,
itisahornbookdoctrineinstatutoryconstructionthatitisthedutyof
thecourtinconstruingalawtodeterminelegislativeintentionfromitslanguage.
Thehistoryofevents
thattranspiredduringtheprocessofenactingalaw,fromitsintroductioninthelegislaturetoits
final
validationhasgenerallybeenthefirstextrinsicaidtowhichcourtsturntoconstrueanambiguous
act.
RepublicActNo.2632isthefirstlawthatintroducedthequalifyingcircumstanceofinsanityby
reasonoronoccasionofrape,amendingArticle335oftheRevisedPenalCode.Anexamination
ofthe
deliberationofthelawmakersinenactingR.A.No.2632,convincesusthatthedegreeof
insanity,
whetherpermanentortemporary,isnotrelevantinconsideringthesameasaqualifying
circumstance
foraslongasthevictimhasbecomeinsanebyreasonoronoccasionoftherape

alazarvsPeople
G.R.No.151931

23September2003CallejoSr.,J.
Doctrine:Ifthetrialcourtissuesanorderorrendersjudgmentnotonly
grantingthedemurrertoevidenceoftheaccusedandacquittinghimbutalso
onthecivilliability,thejudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewouldbea
nullityasitviolatestheconstitutionalrighttodueprocess.
Facts:
In1997,petitionerAnmerSalazarandNenaJaucianTimariowerecharged
withestafabeforetheLegazpiCityRegionalTrialCourt.Theestafacase
allegedly
stemmedfromthepaymentofacheckworthP214,000toprivaterespondent
J.Y.BrothersMarketingCorporation(JYBMC)throughJersonYaoforthe
purchaseof300bagsofrice.ThecheckwasdishonoredbydraweePrudential
Bankasitisdrawnagainstaclosedaccount.Salazarreplacedsaidcheckwith
anewone,thistimedrawnagainstSolidBank.Itisagaindishonoredfor
beingdrawnagainstuncollecteddeposit(DAUD).
TheDAUDmeansthattheaccounttowhichthecheckwasdrawnhad
sufficientfunds.However,thefundcannotbeusedbecauseitwascollected
againstadepositedcheckwhichisyettobecleared.
Trialensued.Aftertheprosecutionpresenteditsevidence,Salazarfileda
demurrertoevidencewithleaveofcourt,whichthetrialcourtgranted.
In2002,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentacquittingSalazar,butorderedher
toremittoJYBMCP214,000.Thetrialcourtruledthattheevidenceofthe
prosecutionfailedtoestablishtheexistenceofconspiracybeyondreasonable
doubtbetweenthepetitionerandtheissuerofthecheck,Timario.Asamere
endorserofthecheck,Salazar'sbreachofwarrantywasagoodoneanddid
notamounttoestafaunderArticle315(2)(d)oftheRevisedPenalCode.
Timarioremainedatlarge.
Asaresult,Salazarfiledamotionforreconsiderationonthecivilaspectof
thedecisionwithapleatobeallowedtopresentevidence.Thetrialcourt
deniedthemotion.Becauseofthedenialofthemotion,shefiledpetitionfor

reviewoncertioraribeforethe
SupremeCourtallegingshewasdenieddueprocessasthetrialcourtdidnot
givehertheopportunitytoadduceevidencetocontroverthercivilliability.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotSalazarwasdenieddueprocess.
HELD:
Salazarshouldhavebeengivenbythetrialcourtthechancetopresenther
evidenceasregardsthecivilaspectofthecase.
Theacquittaloftheaccuseddoesnotpreventajudgmentagainsthimonthe
civilaspectofthecasewhere(a)theacquittalisbasedonreasonabledoubtas
onlypreponderanceofevidenceisrequired;(b)wherethecourtdeclaredthat
theliabilityoftheaccusedisonlycivil;(c)wherethecivilliabilityofthe
accuseddoesnotarisefromorisnotbaseduponthecrimeofwhichthe
accusedwasacquitted.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedonthedelictis
extinguishedifthereisafindinginthefinaljudgmentinthecriminalaction
thattheactoromissionfromwhichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexist
orwheretheaccuseddidnotcommittheactsoromissionimputedtohim.
Iftheaccusedisacquittedonreasonabledoubtbutthecourtrenders
judgmentonthecivilaspectofthecriminalcase,theprosecutioncannot
appealfromthejudgmentofacquittalasitwouldplacetheaccusedindouble
jeopardy.However,
theaggrievedparty,theoffendedpartyortheaccusedorbothmayappeal
fromthejudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewithintheperiodtherefor.
UndertheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure,theCourtexplainedthe
demurrertoevidencepartakesofamotiontodismissthecaseforthefailure
oftheprosecutiontoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Inacase
wheretheaccusedfilesademurrertoevidencewithoutleaveofcourt,
therebywaiveshisrighttopresentevidenceandsubmitsthecasefordecision
onthebasisoftheprosecution'sevidencehehastherighttoadduceevidence
notonlyonthecriminalaspect,butalsoonthecivilaspectofthecaseofthe
demurrerisdeniedbythecourt.

Inaddition,theCourtsaidifthedemurrerisgrantedandtheaccusedis
acquittedbythecourt,theaccusedhastherighttoadduceevidenceonthe
civilaspectofthecaseunlessthecourtalsodeclaresthattheactoromission
fromwhichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexist.
Ifthetrialcourtissuesanorderorrendersjudgmentnotonlygrantingthe
demurrertoevidenceoftheaccusedandacquittinghimbutalsoonthecivil
liability,thejudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewouldbeanullityasit
violatestheconstitutionalrighttodueprocess.
PEOPLEVSLACSON2002
FACTS: Soon after the announcement on May 18, 1995 that the Kuratong
Baleleng gang had been slain in a shootout with the police, two witnesses
surfaced providing the testimony that the said slaying was a rub-out. On June 1,
1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director or Investigation, filed
murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97)
officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof- kin of the slain KBG members
also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.
On November 2, 1995, after two resolutions, the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 11 informations of murder against the defendant and 25
policemen as principals. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were
remanded to the Ombudsman and in a re-investigation, the informations were
amended downgrading the principal into an accessory. With the downgrading of
charges, the case was later transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC not
due to jurisdictional questions over the suspects but due to the failure to indicate
that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge
of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. Before
the arraignment, the witnesses of the
prosecution recanted their statements while the seven (7) private complainants
submitted their affidavits of desistance. All 26 suspects filed individual motions to
(1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants,
and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The
cases were dismissed.
It was on March 27, 2001 when PNP director Mendoza indorsed to the
Department of Justice new affidavits of new witnesses which it began to
investigate and to file with the RTC. The
respondent, invoking among others, their right against double jeopardy, then filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition stating that Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the 2000

Rules on Criminal Procedure

bans the revival of the murder cases against him; a petition the Court of Appeals
denied. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing
of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The new Informations charged as principals
thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25)
other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The
defendant filed for determination of probable cause and an outright dismissal in
the RTC. The CA considered the original cases to be provisionally dismissed and
the new cases as mere revivals. Under Section 8 rule 117 of RRCP of 2000, the
cases were dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11)
informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.
RULING: Remanded to the RTC to determine if they complied with rule and case
should be dismissed. There is no question that the new rule can be given
retroactive effect given article 22 of the RPC. There can be no ruling, however,
due to the lack of sufficient factual bases to support such a ruling. There is need
of proof to show the following facts:
(1) provisional dismissal of the case had the express consent of the accused
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after giving notice to the offended party
(3) whether the two (2) year period to revive the case has already elapsed
(4) whether there is justification for filing of the cases beyond the 2 year period.
The respondent expressed consent, however, the records do not reveal whether
the notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were
provisionally dismissed. Only the right to double Jeopardy by the defendant was
tackled by the litigants. The records are also inconclusive with regards to the 2year bar, if within or without. Because of this, both prosecution and defendant
must be given ample time to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the
adduced evidence.

PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003

FACTS: Before the court is the petitioners motion of reconsideration of the
resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the
cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent
was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court

confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of

the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also
ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are
attendant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to
the heirs of the victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its
applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or
both of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified,
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is
the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through
counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent
dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims.
2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or
retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be
applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would
involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do
so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the
case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would
only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At
that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not
be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance;
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in
the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice
of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice.
Held: Motion granted