Donovan Ives,

September 26, 2013

On Habermas
In his book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas tries to explain how
the concept of modernity has been based up the philosophy of the subject, in error, Habermas
believes, since Hegel, and he traces how this paradigm has led to post Hegelian philosophers
down the wrong path of modernity. By following this wrong path, ,based upon subjectivity, we
have fallen into the tail of modern thinking which has led to such things as the strength of the
National Socialist movement of WWII. He believes that it is no modernity itself that led to such
a bizarre twist since the beginning of the modernist project, but the logical consequences of the
paradigm of consciousness that was most successfully started with Hegel. Habermas proposes
that if we can change the paradigm of consciousness and the importance of subjectivity that is
now the definitive aspect of modernity to his idea of intersubjective communicative action, we
can save the project of modernity. Habermas believes that we must abandon the philosophy of
the subject if we are going to make a successful attempt at a truly modern, and grounded
critique. He tries to show this by examining various post-modern thinkers, and exposing how
their philosophy is inevitably linked to the modernist tradition. Let me begin by trying to define
modernity a little more clearly and how Hegels conception of modernity is central to the
modernist project and to Habermas critique, as well.
Modernity can briefly, but not sufficiently, be described as the replacing of faith with
reason. Before the Enlightenment, we had God, the written word and our faith in both of these
things as being absolute to ground our decisions and moral judgments, to give some meaning to
existence. As science and its methods began to grow and take hold, was in the process of
becoming the new absolute, as it were, we began to doubt the factual possibility of such things
as the written word and God as being truly absolute. Our previous foundation could not stand up
to the rigor of the scientific method. We began to think about religion and tradition logically and
rationally. Why do we go to church on Sundays or condemn one man for murder and another for
stealing? Before the Enlightenment, we could turn to Gods laws, or laws of man given to us by
God, or better yet, tradition as a reason, a grounding for such actions. With the Enlightenment
movement growing stronger, we began to scrutinize such things from a scientific, logical
perspective. To our surprise, and possibly dismay, we found that we had not good explanation
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for doing such actions. That is, no good reason, logically. So, our faith in such things began to
falter. Things that could not hold up under the pressure of a logical analysis could no longer be
considered true, on an absolute scale. That is, essentially, what modernity is, the application of
reason against faith and the break from the past that such application ushers forth. As we all
know, faith is something that is illogical. So, faith was soon overtaken by reason, which left us
with a legitimation crisis. The crisis boils down to this: if we no longer have tradition, the
written word and God to ground our decision, how are we supposed to justify anything we do?
How do we call any of our actions legitimate actions if we can no longer look to the past and its
traditions?
It is this crisis that leads to the paradigm of consciousness and modernitys focus on the
subject. The first steps on this road to crisis began in the 15ht century and gathered strength
through Descartes, and others until it seemed to culminate in Hegels writings. Hegel realizes
this crisis and tries to ground the modern age within subjectivity. This conception is historically
influenced by three main events. Hegel sees the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution as being something totally new, and therefore modern, and it is their focus upon the
individual, the subject, that gives modernity its emphasis upon subjectivity. Subjectivity in a
modern context has four connotations individualism, the right to criticism, autonomy of action
and idealistic philosophy. Hegel sees this subjectivity being developed through the three
historical evens stated above. (Pg. 16-17) The importance of the subject is also expressed in
Descartes cogito and Kants transcendental philosophy. Descartes wants to doubt all
knowledge with external references, while Kant tries to establish the possibility of knowing in
general in other words, Kant tries to reveal the structure of the knower (the subject); the object
in-itself is unknowable altogether. (Lecture III notes, Pg. 14) This is the paradigm of
consciousness that leads to the philosophy of the subject.
The subject, individual consciousness, becomes the grounding for modernity.
Subjectivity grounds itself in a reflexive way. As if in a mirror, the self sees a reflection of itself
to itself. This is the topos of modernity; something essentially speculative. It locates ontology
within the mind and epistemology within the selfs own knowledge. The self becomes the
subject of reality and modernity becomes grounded on this reality. This new grounding can
undermine religion, but it cannot take the place of religion. (Pg. 20) Because of its failure to take

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the place of such a unifying principle as religion, we are going to need something stronger than
just subjectivity. We are going to need an entire philosophy of the subject, a new religion of
reason to take the place of the fallen religion of faith. Hegel tries to answer this call.
Hegel takes the topos of modernity, individual self-consciousness, and absolutizes it as
universal self-consciousness. The knowledge of the subject, and the subject itself become
absolute knowing and pure spirit (Geist) through Hegels dialectic of theses, antitheses and
synthesis. Though, it was Fichte who actually used those terms, not Hegel. The individual, finite
self will become absolute, infinite spirit when the knowledge contained in the Christian religion,
in a story-like fashion expressed through images (Vorstellungen), is translated into philosophical
concepts (Begriffen).
Habermas feels that this move of Hegels is his fatal undoing and robs the project of
modernity of any recourse of self-critique and progress. Hegels absolutizing of the topos of
modernity, subjectivity and rational critique, undermines modernity itself. It can no longer Selfexamine itself because it has become absolute. Hegels absolute Geist, i.e.; the absolutizing of
reason by way of Hegels dialectic, solves the crisis of modernity but in so doing, de-values
modern day reality and literally takes the point out of any rational critique. As Habermas states
it, Hence, the rationality of the understanding, which modernity knows as its possession and
recognizes as its only source of obligation, has to be expanded into reason, following in the
tracks of the dialectic of enlightenment. But as absolute knowledge, reason assumes a force so
overwhelming that it not only solves the initial problem of self-reassurance of modernity, but
solves it too well. For reason has not taken over the places of fateThus, Hegels philosophy
satisfies the need of modernity for self-grounding only at the cost of devaluing present-day
reality and blunting critique. (Pg. 42) Hegel does not get out of the philosophy of the subject,
he simply makes the subject absolute.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, is at the completely other end of the post-modern
spectrum. While Hegel absolutizes the subject and tries to go forward with the whole project of
the enlightenment and modernism, Nietzsche decides to give up the entire project, instead of
trying at another critique of subject-centered reason, as the Young Hegelians attempted to do.
(Pg. 83-86) With critique being the hallmark of modernity, rational self-critique is basic to the
enlightenment. The problem is that, from a subjectivist standpoint, such self-critique is

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ultimately self-undermining. It is the philosophy of the subject, not self-critique that

Habermas resists. Nietzsches move to abandon subject-centered reason altogether is what
Habermas would consider to be the entry point for post-modernism. Nietzsche tries not
legitimize subject-centered reason with more proof and argumentation, but instead tries to put a
new mythology in its place. Nietzsche thinks that the mythology of antiquity, namely Dionysus,
can be the other of reason. Habermas says this takes the form of a new, mythologicallyinformed time consciousness that is no longer simply chronological. (Lecture V notes, Pg. 27)
Nietzsche is able to use history apart from its modern time consciousness, i.e.: chronologically,
as a tool of power. We can use history to teach us what we want to learn and/or to teach us
individual centers of consciousness.
This historical myth-building, aided by the un-modern concept of a chronological history,
decentralized the uncertainty of the subject and allows a unifying whole that is centered on
something other than self. Its centered on archaic, social ritualistic events (such as Dionysian
rituals) that modern art can bring forth and express. This new myth helps to decentralize the
subject precisely because of its non-chronological historical outlook. It can look back through
history and take what it needs in order to teach what it wants, according to our desire or will to
power. This use of history turning past religious festivals into works of art, as Nietzsche would
like to see them as, is supposed to overcome the inwardness of privately appropriated historical
culture This art of the future denies that it is the product of an individual artist and establishes
the people itself as the artist of the future. (Pg. 87-88)
Habermas criticizes Nietzsche by saying that his move was already anticipated by
previous framers of the oldest System-Program of German Idealism, namely Schelling,
Holderin and Hegel. He also states that Nietzsches new myth of Dionysus is unoriginal and
content-less. Habermas thinks that Nietzsche uses Dionysus as a form of messianism, a
yearning for the god who never appears. But, Nietzsche does not want to equate Dionysus with
such a figure as Christ. His Dionysus is antithetical to such a mythology; it should be Dionysus
versus Christ, not equated with it. Because of this messianism, and the God that never arrives,
Habermas feels that Nietzsches myth gives no content to the people of modernity, only a hope
of what is to come. The new mythology offered by Nietzsche confronts subject-centered
reason with its absolute other. And as a counter-authority to reason, Nietzsche appeals to

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experiences that are displaced back into the archaic realm experiences of self-disclosure of a
de-centered subjectivity, liberated from all constraints of cognition and purposive activity, all
imperatives of utility and morality. (Pg. 94)
Habermas objects to Nietzsches content-less myth by saying a myth based upon
aesthetic criteria, based upon taste, the Yes and the No of the palate (Pg. 96), cannot be
legitimized because of Nietzsches transposition of aesthetic experience into the archaic,
because he does not recognize as a moment of reason the critical capacity for assessing value that
was sharpened through dealing with modern art. (Ibid.) But that is precisely Nietzsches point,
I believe. The legitimization itself is called into question if one begins to question the
legitimization process, namely reason. If you are going to question reason, you cant use reason
to legitimize your claims. Habermas says that because Nietzsche cannot legitimize, ground, his
new myth because of its archaic realm of experiences in opposition to modern reason, he is
trapped in a self-defeating self-enclosed critique of reason that has become total. (Ibid.) With
Nietzsche trapped in this dilemma, Habermas jumps up and over Nietzsche as a major player in
the discussion, accusing him of never being able to get out of the philosophy of the subject.
So, what do we have left if Hegel, Nietzsche and, as it turns out in Habermas book, the
other post-modern philosophers are one by one eliminated from being able to provide a
reasonable critique of modernity? We have Habermas, of course! Habermas saves the day
with his theory of intersubjective communicative action. Habermas even says that the previous
philosophers could have taken the path he envisions and would not have fallen victim to the
dilemmas he points out in each of their philosophies. For example, Habermas explains how in
Hegels early work he began to go towards communicative action with his ideas of love and
life, but opted for the absolute Geist instead. Hegel summons the unifying power of an
intersubjectivity that appears under the titles of love and life. (Pg. 30-31) Habermas says
that any self-critique of reason is doomed to paradoxes or mysticism (as in Heidegger) if still
undertaken within the paradigm of subjectivity. That is not to say the discourse of modernity
must be given up altogether. Habermas believes that reason turning upon itself, which is not
quite post-modernity, only a counter-discourse implicit within modernity, must still be
undertaken. (Pg. 295) The obstacles preventing previous attempts at a critique could be avoided
if one were to switch to a paradigm of mutual understanding.

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In Habermas intersubjective paradigm, the subject-object distinction that led to the

emphasis of the subject by previous philosophers is now transformed into a subject-subject
relationship of related subjects capable of speech acts; between subjects capable of speech
and action. (Pg. 295) Now this attitude of participants in linguistically mediated interaction
makes possible a different relationship of the subject to itself from the sort of objectifying
attitude that an observer assumes toward entities in the external world. (Pg. 297) The change
will occur within the subject itself. He will no longer see himself as something other to the
world. He will be able to understand himself as a participant similar to other participants. He
will be able to understand the interaction taking place in a communicative action because he will
be able to see through the perspective of the other, alter, since he is similar to the other. This
is Hegels conception of subjects trying to overcome objects, objects that are manifestly foreign
to themselves, through the lordship and bondage struggle. (Hegel goes beyond objects and talks
about the master-slave relationship of two similar objects, egos, subjects, and selvesmaybe
Habermas didnt go to class that day!) It wont have to be a self-reflective relationship because
the other, alter, is a participant in communicative action just as the ego is. He can self-reflect
from the perspective of the alter without having to surmise back upon himself, what that
perspective is. (Ibid.)
Once this paradigm is accepted, epistemology changes from a self-reflective knowledge
to a recapitulating reconstruction of knowledge already employed. (Ibid.) Ontology will also
change from within the self (mind as reality) to the external social rules and language games
that accompany the participants within a given language context. The grounding of modernity is
no longer the subject, but the social context of language users and of the egos recapitulation of
the alters perspective for the actions the ego just carried out. Habermas believes that if we can
switch to this paradigm, it will give modernity a solid ground with which to work; solid because
it is based on something real, i.e.: communication. Because of the solid ground of an
intersubjectivity based on communicative action, there will be no reason to try and flee into a
mystical or a self-referential grounding, which will allow the counter-discourse inherent within
modernity to proceed in a constructive manner.

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