ARNAULT v.

NAZARENO
G.R. No. L-3820
July 18, 1950

Note: This is the first time the Court was called upon to define the
power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a
member for contempt.

Facts:
The Senate was investigating the purchase of two tracts of land: The Buenavista and
Tambobong estates.
o The Buenavista estate was originally owned by the San Juan de Dios Hostpital. It
sold the estate to Ernest H. Burt, a non-resident American, but the latter failed to pay
what was due and the sale was rescinded.
o The Tambobong estate was originally owned by the Philippine Trust Company. It
sold the estate to Burt, but the latter again failed to pay what was due.
o In both cases, Burt had already paid P10,000 as down payment.
o On October 1949, The Phil. Government bought them for P4,500,00 and P500,000
respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Burt thru his attorney-in-fact in
the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for
alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate.
o The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his
other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by
Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8.
o The resolution created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and the
Tambobong Estates deal.
o The duty of the committee was to determine whether the purchases were honest,
valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just.
o It was alleged that the Government could have bought the Buenavista estate for
P3,000,000 by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios
Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939; and that the Government did not have
to purchase the estate because the Occupation government had already paid for the
amount.
o It was also alleged that the Government did not have to pay for the Tambobong
estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 1947, for P750,000, and by virtue of
the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the
estate.
In the subsequent investigation, the Senate had as a witness Jean L. Arnault. He was
asked about the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to
Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to
him on October 29, 1949. On the same date, he opened a new account in the name of
Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the sum. On the same
occasion, he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to
the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another
for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee

to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the
present case.
The petitioner refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount.
The Senate, in a resolution dated May 15, 1950, confined the petitioner in prison for
the reason of contempt, which led to this petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:
1. Whether the Senate has the power to punish petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the personto whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether the Senate has the authority to commit the petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.
3. Whether the petitioner can rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner.
The Constitution (1935) did not contain an express provision empowering either of the two
Houses of Congress to punish non-members for contempt. But the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Court
found that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate was pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. Yes, the Senate has the authority to commit the petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, the Court
thought that it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second
Congress in 1953.
They found no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to
the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that
body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power

to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the
present case.
3. No, the petitioner may not exercise his right against self-incrimination in this case.
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty
as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford
him safety. Due to his inconsistent and evasive answers, the Courts believed that his answers
were false, and that his insistent claim that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate
himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name.
Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is
punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
Decision: Petition denied.