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013. De Borja v.

De Borja1
18 August 1972/EN BANC/Appeals
G.R. No. L-28040: Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Jose De Borja
administrator), Cayetano De Borja, Matilde De Borja, and Crisanto De Borja
(deceased) as children of Josefa appellees
Tasiana Vda. De Borja (Special administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco De Borja) appellant
G.R. No. L-28568: Testate Estate of the Late Francisco De Borja (Tasiana
special administratrix) appellee
Jose De Borja oppositor-appellant
G.R. No. L-28611: Tasiana plaintiff-appellee; Jose defendant-appellant
Decision by J. J.B.L. Reyes, Digest by Pip
Short Version: Franks wife Josefa died and he remarried, but his children
by Josefa apparently hated his second wife Tasiana. When Frank died, Tasiana
and the children filed about 18 cases against each other, mostly in relation of
Franks estate. To settle, they executed a compromise agreement where,
among others, Tasiana agreed to receive P800K in exchange for her share in
Franks estate. When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for court
approval, Tasiana opposed on the ground that when there is a will, any
agreements which distributes the estate before the probate of the will are
void.
The Court ruled that the compromise agreement was valid. The clear
object of the compromise agreement was the conveyance of Tasianas
individual share and interest in Franks estateactual and eventual. Since
the hereditary share is vested immediately from the moment of death
(Article 777 of the Civil Code), there is no legal bar to a successor with
requisite contracting capacity to dispose of his or her hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. In other words, the
agreement had to do with Tasiana selling her share onlythe estate itself
was not distributed or settled.
Facts: Franciscos wife Josefa died in 1940 and after her will was probated
Francisco and his son Jose were appointed as co-administrators (Frank in
1946, Jose in 1952). Meanwhile, Francisco married Tasiana Ongsingco. After
Francisco died in 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate
estate of his mother. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the CFI of
Nueva Ecija where she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of
her marriage to Frank was questioned in that proceeding.

Lots of issues had to be cut out of this case; please see original if curious, brief discussion
at the end of Ratio.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana
Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits;
including the three cases at bar, some 18 cases remain pending
determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has
been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end
to all that, a compromise agreement was entered into in October 1963
between Jose and Tasiana.
In the lengthy agreement, the parties agreed (1) to sell the poblacion
portion of the properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal; (2) that Jose would pay
Tasiana P800K as full and complete settlement of her hereditary share in
Franks estate (as well as Josefas) and any properties bequeathed to her by
Frank; (3) that Tasiana would assume payment of the obligation incurred by
Frank in favor of the DBP, as well as her 1/5 share of the estate taxes on
Franks estate; (4) that both parties mutually renounced and waived all
actions and causes of action which they may or might have against each
other; (5) that Tasiana would deliver to Jose all Franks papers and titles that
were in her possession; and (6) that the agreement would only take effect
upon the sale and receipt of full payment of the properties in Jalajala.
Jose submitted the compromise agreement for court approval in May 1966
(both to the CFI of Rizal and CFI of Nueva Ecija). For some reason Tasiana
opposed in both instances. The Rizal Court approved the compromise
agreement but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable.
Tasiana and Joses appeals were what the Supreme Court dealt with in this
case.
Tasiana admitted the genuineness and due execution of the compromise
agreement but attacked its validity on several grounds: (1) the heirs
cannot enter into such agreements without first probating Franks
will (SC ruling in Guevara v. Guevara, Section 1 of Rule 74, Revised Rules);
(2) the same involved a compromise on the validity of her marriage to Frank;
and (3) even if the will were valid, it ceased to have force and effect
(basically because Tasiana wanted to back out of the compromise).
Jose argued that when the compromise agreement was entered into, the
governing provision was Section 1 of Rule 74 of the original 1940 Rules of
Court, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased
person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also cited Guevara v.
Guevara, but relied instead on the dissent of J. Moran.
Issue: Was the compromise agreement settling Tasianas share in Franks
estate valid? YES.
Ruling: CFI of Rizal affirmed, CFI of Nueva Ecijas decision reversed and set
aside.

Ratio: The prohibition on agreements settling or distributing the estate


before the probate of the will applies to the settlement or distribution of the
entire estate. In this case, there was no attempt to settle or distribute
Franks estate. The clear object of the compromise agreement was
the conveyance of Tasianas individual share and interestactual
and eventual. Since the hereditary share is vested immediately from
the moment of death (Article 777 of the Civil Code), there is no legal
bar to a successor with requisite contracting capacity to dispose of
his or her hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate. (See Article 1088 of the Civil Code: if sale of
such share to a stranger is permitted, more so should the sale to a co-heir be
allowed.) While the effect of such alienation is to be limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor-heir, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction.
Another distinction between Guevara and this case: in Guevara a previous
probate of the will was required because it involved persons whose
successional interest depended on such will (i.e. not compulsory heirs). In
this case, as Franks wife Tasiana was a compulsory heir under Article 995 et
seq. of the Civil Code.
Other possibly relevant matters:
(1) Tasiana argued that by the time this case was raised to the Court, the
purchasing power of the P800K was greatly diminished and the value of the
Jalajala properties greatly increased. The Court pointed out that the delay in
the receipt of her P800K was due to her waffling over the compromise
agreement and all the cases she filed to nullify it.
(2) The question in the third case before the Court was whether the Jalajala
properties acquired by Frank during his first marriage was his private
property (as argued by Tasiana) or the conjugal partnership. The Court ruled
that this question was moot and academic in view of the Courts decision to
uphold as valid the cession of Tasianas eventual share in Franks estate for
the sum of P800K. But for fun, the Court jumped through the hoops anyway
and ruled that they were conjugal because Frank admitted that the
properties were conjugal in at least two separate occasions: (a) the inventory
he wrote up and filed with the court as executor of Josefas estate; and (b) in
the accounting of the estate which he also filed with the court. Even Tasiana
admitted the properties were conjugal when she filed an inventory in the
proceedings for Franks estate.
Voting: C.J. Concepcion, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

J. Fernando, no part.

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