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CASE

FACTS

ISSUE

PET

Ampatuan
v DILG Sec

-- On November 24, 2009, the day


after the gruesome massacre of 57
men and women, including some
news reporters, GMA issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the
Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the
AFP and the PNP to undertake
such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by
law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in
the named places. (note that for
Proc 1946, both emergency power
under Art VI and calling out
power under Art VII was used)
-- 3 days later or on November 27,
GMA also issued AO 273
transferring supervision of the
ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. But,
due to issues raised over the
terminology used in AO 273,
the President issued AO 273-A
amending the former, by dele
gating instead of transferring
supervision of the
ARMM to the DILG.

Whether or not
President Arroyo
invalidly exercised
emergency powers
when she called
out the AFP and
the PNP to
prevent and
suppress all
incidents of
lawless
violence in
Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat,
and
Cotabato City; and

After the Ampatuan Massacre, the


President issued Proclamation No.
1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Magindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato
City. Later on, she also issued
Proclamation No.1959, declaring
martial law and suspending the
writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao. After which, she
sent a report to the Congress,
complying with Article VII Section
18 of the Constitution. Senate
convened to review the validity of
Proclamation No. 1959, but before
they could act, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1963,
lifting the marital law.

WON Proclamation
1959
is
constitutional
MOOT
AND
ACADEMIC
ALREADY

Petitioner ARMM
officials claimed
that the President
had no factual
basis for declaring
a state of
emergency,
especially in Sultan
Kudarat and
Cotabato, where no
critical violent
incidents occurred.
The deployment of
troops and
the taking over of
the ARMM
constitutes an
invalid exercise of
the Presidents
emergency powers.
Petitioners asked
that Proclamation
1946 as well as
AOs 273 and
273-A be declared
unconstitutional
and that
respondents DILG
Secretary, the AFP,
and the PNP be
enjoined from
implementing them.
Petitioners are
questioning the
constitutionality
of President
Arroyos
Proclamation 1959
affecting
Maguindanao.
(But, given the
prompt lifting of
that proclamation
before Congress
could review it and
before any serious
question affecting
the rights and
liberties of
Maguindanaos
inhabitants could
arise, the Court

Fortun v
Arroyo
Medyo
sabaw tng
case na to
so get
ready.
Yung solid
digest
nandon sa
pinost ko
na digest
ng poli
class ni
dean

AND
Whether or not the
President had
factual bases for
her actions.

RESP

--President
Arroyo said
that she acted
based on her
finding that
lawless men
have taken up
arms in
Maguindanao
and risen
against the
government

RULING

RATIO

Petition
Dismissed

Unlawful Exercise of Emergency Powers under Art


VI Sec 23(2)
Deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powe
rs as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution.
The President did not proclaim a national
emergency,
only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
en
acted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such
places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in
the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.

the Court
DISMISSES
the
consolidated
petitions on
the ground
that
the same
have become
moot and
academic.

1.

Before the Courts can assail the acts of


the Executive and the Legislative, the
issue of constitutionality must be the
very issue of the case, that the resolution
of such issue is unavoidable.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments
of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the
constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the
Legislative department.
One. President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses
of Congress could fulfill their automatic
duty to review and validate or invalidate
the same.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew
her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ

deems any review of


its constitutionality
the equivalent of
beating a dead
horse.)

2.

of habeas corpus in just eight days, they


have
not
been
meaningfully
implemented.
The Court does not resolve purely
academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest,
however
intellectually
challenging these are. In this case, the
proclamation and the suspension never
took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having
become moot and academic.

Cristobal v
Labrador

Teofilo Santos was convicted of


estafa and was convicted. He
confined in the provincial jail and
served his sentence of 6 months in
1932. From 1934-1937, he
continued to be a registered
elector of Malabon and also seated
as the municipal president. In
1938, C.A. No. 357 was enacted
which disqualified Santos from
voting because of the final
judgment of guilt. But in 1939, the
President gave him absolute
pardon and restored his full civil
and political rights, except the
right to hold public office or
employment. Cristobal then filed
for the exclusion of Santos name
in the list of voters but the RTC
denied.

What is the nature


and extent of the
pardoning power of
the Chief Executive
of
the
Nation
granted
by
the
Consitution?
COVERS
ACCESSORY
PENALTIES
and
DISQUALIFICATIO
NS

Cristobals
contentions:
the
pardon did not
restore
the
full
enjoyment
of
political rights:
-- pardoning power
of
the
Chief
Executive does not
apply to legislative
prohibitions
-- pardoning power
here would amount
to
an
unlawful
exercise
by
the
Chief Executive of a
legislative function,
-- Santos served his
sentence and all the
accessory penalties
imposed by law,
there was nothing to
pardon.

The petition
for certiorar
i is denied,
with costs
against the
petitioner

- The disability is the result of conviction without


which there would no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its
command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When
granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction.
- Applied in the Case: While the pardon extended
to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that
"he will be eligible for appointment only to positions
which are clerical or manual in nature involving no
money or property responsibility," it is absolute
insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and
political rights."

Llamas v
Orbos

Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the


incumbent Vice-governor of
Tarlac, and on March 1,1991, he
assumed office by virtue of a
decision of the Office of the
President, the governorship.
Private Respondent Mariano
Ocampo III is the incumbent
governor and was suspended from
office due to having been found
guilty of having violated the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Public respondent Oscar Orbos
was the Executive Secretary at the
time of the petition, and is being

Whether or not the


President has the
power to grant
executive clemency
in administrative
cases

Petitioner contends
that executive
clemency could only
be granted to
criminal cases and
not administrative
case

the President
did not act
arbitrarily or
with abuse,
much
less
grave abuse
of discretion
in
issuing
the May 15,
1991
Resolution
granting on
the grounds
mentioned
therein,

-- Moreover, if the law does not distinguish, so We


must no distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token,
if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases
from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation,
cases
of
impeachment
are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
-- We do not clearly see any valid and convincing
reason why the President cannot grant executive

impleaded herein in that official


capacity for having issued, by
authority of the President, the
assailed Resolution granting
executive clemency to respondent
governor thus, putting him back
to his position as the governor of
Tarlac.
People v
Salle

People v
Bacang

executive
clemency to
Ocampo and
that,
accordingly,
the same is
not
unconstituti
onal

clemency in administrative cases. It is Our


considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.

pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final,


pardon has no effect until the
person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his
conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal.

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky


Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and
each is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay an indemnity. They were
granted a conditional pardon that
with their acceptance of the
conditional pardon, the appellants
will be released from confinement,
the appellants impliedly admitted
their guilt and accepted their
sentence, and hence, the appeal
should be dismissed. They were
discharged from the New Bilibid
Prison on 28 December1993.Atty.Lao
furtherin formed the Court that
appellant Ricky Mengote left for
his province without consulting
her. She then prays that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw
his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of
the conditional pardon. Mengote
has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal

W/N the pardon


granted to an
accused during
the pendency of his
appeal from a
judgment of
conviction by the
trial court is
enforceable

INVALID

RES Leopoldo Bacang, et al. were


found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of muder, each sentence to
reclusion perpetua and to pay for
actual damages and funeral
expenses. RES William Casido
and Franklin Bacang appealed to
the SC. SC accepted the appeal,
OSG filed the Brief for the
Appelee, but RES Casido and
Alcorin suddenly sent to the Court
an undated Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. SC made RES
to comment on the reason for the

W/N the grant of


conditional
pardons and the
RES subsequent
release from
detention during
the pendency of
RES appeal are
valid

NOT VALID

conviction by final judgment limitation under


Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky


Mengote y Cuntado
is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this
Court. The conditional pardon granted the said
appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon
the grant of such withdrawal. In case of noncompliance with thisResolution, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible
effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Bureau of Corrections and PNP are directed to rearrest the RES. Officers of the Presidential
Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardo
n are required to SHOW CAUSE, within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof, why they should not be hel
d in contempt of court for acting on and favorably
recommending approval of the applications for
the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the
pendency of their appeal.

Drilon v CA

Torres v
Gonzales

motion to withdraw.
Thereafter, Superintendent
Venancio Tesoro informed
the Court that the RES were
released on conditional pardon
1. The DOJ has brought suit to
annul the Decision of Court
of Appeals, prohibiting the
Government from pursuing
criminal actions against the
private respondents for the death
of Irene Longno and Lonely
Chavez during early
Martial Law.
2. In 1973 Raul Paredes and
Rodolfo Ganzon were charged
with double murder
before Military Commission No.
34.
3. July 27, 1973 the Military
acquitted Paredes and
sentenced Ganzon to life
imprisonment with hard labor.
4. March 25, 1978 Ganzon was
released and was placed under
house arrest.
5. In 1988 Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordonez directed State
Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to
conduct a Preliminary
investigation against the
private respondents for the
murders.
In 1978, Torres was convicted of
estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned
by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate
any penal laws again. He accepted
the conditional pardon and was
consequently
released
from
confinement. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of
estafa.
In
1986,
Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before
the SC averring that the Exec
Dept erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and

Whether or not the


Government can
pursue criminal
actions against
private respondents
despite Ganzon
having been
previously
convicted and
granted executive
pardon

WON conviction of
a crime by final
judgment of a court
is necessary before
Torres can be
validly rearrested
and recommitted
for violation of the
terms of his
conditional pardon
and accordingly to
serve the balance of
his original
sentence

Private
respondents
moved for
dismissal on
the grounds
that Ganzon
has been
extended
absolute
pardon by
President
Marcos and
having been
previously
convicted
cannot be
tried anew,
and Paredes
has been
acquitted.

TorresArgument
:
-impugns
the
validity of the Order
of
Arrest
and
Recommitment
-- claims that he did
not
violate
his
conditional pardon
since he has not
been convicted by
final judgment of
the 20 counts of
estafa nor of the
crime of sedition
-- also, he was not
given
an
opportunity to be
heard before he was

Petition
DENIED,
The Decision
of Court of
Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

1. Evidence (the testimonies of


Presidential Executive Asst. Juan Tuvera
and Deputy Presidential Executive Asst.
Joaquin Venus, Jr.) shows that Pres. Marcos
granted absolute pardon to Ganzon
2. If Pres. Marcos indeed ordered Ganzons
release after 6 years, Pres. Marcos
unavoidably commuted Ganzons
imprisonment to 6 years although Ganzon
shall remain under house arrest.
3. If Ganzons sentenced has been
commuted, then he has served his
sentence, it extinguishes criminal liability
partially and has the effect of changing
the penalty to a lesser one.
4. Commutation does not have to be in
specific form. It is sufficient that Ganzon
was voluntarily released in 1978 with
terms or conditions.
5. Arrest is not a penalty so the Court does
not consider the house arrest as a
continuation of Ganzons sentence.
6. aIrrespective of the pardon, Ganzon has
served his sentence and he can no longer
be reinvestigated for the same offense,
much more undergo further imprisonment
to complete his service.

NO

In proceeding against a convict who has been


conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Exec
Dept has 2 options:
(1) Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Admin, a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or
(2) Art. 159 of the RPC, a judicial act consisting of
trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon. In the case at bar, President has chosen to
proceed against Torres under the 1st option. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
***NOTE that when the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner

executory as they were still on


appeal.

People v
Casido

Petitioners William Casido and


Franklin Alcorin fil
ed for pardon and was
subsequently granted.
Thereafter, accused-appellants
were granted conditiona
l pardon. But the Court ruled in
resolution that the
conditional pardon granted to
accused-appellants is voi
d for having been extended during
the pendency of their appeal.
Prior to the resolution, the NAC
favorably acted on the
applications for amnesty of
accused-appellants. But the Court
ruled in resolution that the
conditional pardon granted to
accused-appellants is void for
having been extended during t
he pendency of their appeal. Prior
to the resolution, the NAC
favorably acted on the
applications for amnesty of
accused-appellants. However, the
petitioners were still released
from prison and thus the case.

arrested
and
recommitted
to
prison,
and
accordingly claims
he
has
been
deprived
of his
rights under the due
process clause of
the Constitution
W/N the release of
petitioners were
valid

carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the


Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated.

The release
was valid
because of
PARDON
not of
AMNESTY.

While the pardon in this case was void for having b


een extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of
amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily
applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid.
This Proclamation was concurred in by both
Houses of Congress.
***Pardon vs. Amnesty
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as suc
h is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by
the person pardoned because the courts take no notice
thereof. It is granted to one after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences
of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment and for
that reason it "does not work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office or the right of suffrage unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
Amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of concurrence of Congress, is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. It is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally after
conviction. Amnesty looks BACKWARD and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which heis
charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.

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