Well-Integrity Issues Offshore Norway

Birgit Vignes, Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, and Bernt S. Aadny, the University of Stavanger

Summary
A number of serious well failures in recent years led to investigations of well-integrity issues. The Petroleum Safety Authority
Norway (PSA) performed a pilot well-integrity survey based on
supervisory audits and requested input from seven operating companies, 12 preselected offshore facilities, and 406 wells. The wells
were a representative selection of production and injection wells
with variation in both age and development categories.
The pilot project indicates that 18% of the wells in the survey
have integrity failure, issues, or uncertainties, and 7% of these are
shut in because of well-integrity issues. The selection of wells and
the companies indicate that the statistics are representative.
The well incidents in the past and the results of the pilot wellintegrity survey revealed that the industry needs to increase focus
on barrier philosophy. Control of barrier status is an important
health, safety, and environment (HSE) factor to avoid major incidents caused by unintentional leaks and well-control situations.
Knowledge of well-integrity status at all times enables the companies to take the right actions in a proactive manner to prevent
incidents.
The paper presents the results and the conclusions from the
pilot survey. In addition, a number of technical well failures will
be presented, identifying critical elements such as corrosion,
leaks, and operational factors. In particular, the understanding of
barrier regulations, standards, and implementation was found to
be inadequate.
Introduction
A number of well incidents had been reported to the PSA with
significant impact and potential for serious accidents (several companies and various well categories). These were typically aging
or design effects, unclear understanding of barriers, weaknesses
in well design and planning processes, insufficient validation of
premisses, and other reasons.
PSA experienced shortcomings in the industrys handling of
well-related management of change and well conversion and lack
of recognition of the entire well-barrier envelope. In addition,
safety critical equipment and elements were not included in the
companies maintenance system.
Information from the employees and union representatives
indicated varied comprehension of well barriers, lack of overview,
or variable approaches for corrective actions. An example is the
difficulty for key personnel to get access to essential well data
when well-control situations occurred. There were differences in
the way the well-barrier concept was implemented.
There were examples of insufficient systematic control of
the technical capability of entire barrier envelopes and limited
standardization according to the NORSOK D-010 (2004) recommendations for well barriers. Examples include design capabilities
exceeded in operation, excessive exposure time with aims for
increased oil recovery, and missing continuity from design through
operation and maintenance.
Furthermore, there were examples of insufficient transfer of
critical information during license acquisitions and change of
operatorship, and there was a general need for improved handover
documents for operations.

Copyright 2010 Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper (SPE 112535) was accepted for presentation at the IADC/SPE Drilling
Conference, Orlando, Florida, USA, 46 March 2008, and revised for publication. Original
manuscript received for review 23 November 2007. Revised manuscript received for review
02 April 2009. Paper peer approved 11 April 2009.

May 2010 SPE Production & Operations

In order to obtain a better picture of the well-integrity status

on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS), PSA initiated a pilot
project based on spot checks of selected production and injection
wells from some of the operating companies. All of the companies
involved were positive to the pilot well-integrity survey.
The objective of the well-integrity project is to make wells safe
on the NCS. An important contributor to reach this objective is that
the industry establishes total overview and condition monitoring
for all wells on the NCS.
NORSOK D-010
NORSOK D-010 (2004) Well Integrity in Drilling and Well Operations is a standard developed with broad petroleum-industry participation by interested parties in the Norwegian petroleum industry
and is owned by the Norwegian petroleum industry represented by
the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) and Federation of
Norwegian Industries (TBL).
Well integrity is defined as an application of technical operational and organizational solutions to reduce the risk of uncontrolled
release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well.
Primary well barrier is the first object that prevents flow from
a source, and the secondary well barrier is the second object that
prevents flow from a source. Well barriers are an envelope of one
or several dependent well-barrier elements (WBEs) preventing
fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation
into another formation or to the surface. WBEs can prevent flow
from one side to the other side alone.
The well barriers are defined before commencement of an activity or operation by description of the required WBEs to be in place
and specific acceptance criteria. Well-barrier acceptance criteria
are technical and operational requirements that need to be fulfilled
in order to qualify the well barrier or WBE for its intended use.
The Pilot Study
Method Used. The survey included the operators on the NCS. PSA
selected new and old facilities, platform and subsea wells, injection
wells and production wells from north to south on the NCS. Plug
and abandonment (P&A) wells were excluded from this survey.
Seven selected operating companies received an audit notification from PSA and were requested to provide status of well-integrity issues for 12 preselected offshore facilities and 406 wells as
of 1 March 2006.
From a total number of 2,682 development wells on the NCS,
12 installations with 406 associated wells were identified as candidates for the pilot project.
The scope of the audit was to analyze how comprehensive the
well-integrity problems on the NCS are, and what the main issues
and challenges are (Fig. 1).
A spread-sheet template (Fig. 2) was sent to the companies that
delivered data from preselected wells to PSA.
Further, the notification included a questionnaire about issues
such as well data, well documentation, handover documentation,
regular condition monitoring, application of NORSOK D-010,
consistent practice within the company, management of change,
competence and training, openness and exchange of experience,
reliability analyses, performance indicators, and other challenges
(see Appendix A).
Analyzing the Received Documentation (Vignes et al. 2006).
PSA received Excel sheets and questionnaires from the companies
(seven companies, 12 offshore facilities, 406 development wells).
The selected companies and facilities were then requested to
provide more documentation of the well-integrity status. Included
145

Scope: How comprehensive is the

well-integrity problem on the NCS,
and what are the main issues/challenges?
Selection of wells for pilot examination
What kind of barrier/
barrier element
failure/issue/uncertainty?

Yes

Well-integrity
failure/issue?

Well barrier
intact

No

(or uncertainty)

Yes

No

Impact?

Yes

No

Shut in well?

Well
OK
active

Cat. A:

Cat. B:

Well is
shut In,

Working
under
conditions/
exemptions

e.g.: Leaks,
over criteria,
well contr.,

E.g.: No gas lift

Cat. C:
Insignificant
deviation
for current
operation

Cat. D:
External
Conditions

Determine injury/damage/
production impact/
financial loss

Cat. E:

Cat. F:

Cat.G:

Shut in
on the
basis of
reservoir
related
Issues

Shut in
because of
topsides
bottlenecks,
planned
testing and
maintenance

Shut in
while
awaiting
P&A

Fig. 1Flow diagram.

was documentation such as well-barrier sketches, handover documentations, and other relevant material describing well-integrity
status for 85 preselected wells (see Appendix A).
The received documentation was analyzed by the PSA Drilling
and Well Technology engineers in cooperation with consultants
for selected areas.
A form with barrier drawing and template based on NORSOK
D-010 was used for assessment of selected well-barrier documentation. The operating companies replies and documentation

were used in this form. This form was used to evaluate gaps, to
identify need for clarifications, and to provide detailed comments
to the companies.
PSA had clarification meetings with the companies. The purpose was
To get a correct and consistent understanding of received
documentation about well integrity
If relevant, to calibrate and verify received documentation
Communicate PSAs opinion of received documentation

Well barrier failure/ uncertainty

Well
details:
e.g. WAG,
Impact?
water
A: Well is
injection, Well
shut in
gas Integrity
B: Working
injection, oil problems
under
Risk
producer, [Y/N], If
water [N] go to Type of barrier conditions/ex reducing
Well bore
Well bore producer, Column element failure/ emptions measures/
uncertainty? C: Well ok conditions
name Type of well status disposal, N.

RED Wellhead Plugged

WAG

Yes

Oil producer
ORANGE Sub sea Producing with gas lift Yes

A: Well is
Casing leak shut in
B: Working
under
Annulus conditions/
communication exemptions

Other reasons

Well barrier
schematic
with barrier
element
assessment
available,
Estimated
loss of
similar to
Norsok D-010 When was
production
(NB To be the well Main reason pr. day/
attached) shut in? to well barrier impact of
[Y/N] [MM,YYYY] failure
failure

Enhanced
monitoring

Yes

Barrier failures
in planning
and
implementatio
n. Casing
wear
jan. 04
XXX

Production
without gas
lift

Yes

jan. 06

Other impact
of failure
(measures to
secure/ SD&P
action /
restoration
demand)

Intervention
demand.

Thread
failure?

Corrective
action needed

XXX

GREEN Platform Producing Oil producer No

Wells
closed by
other
reasons
than
integrity
problems

Yes

Category reference to
flow diagram:
D. External conditions
E. Reservoir technical
When was
F. Topsides bottlenecks,
the well
planned testing &
maintenance, SD&P.
shut in/
G. Abandonment,
Securing secured
awaiting P&A
method [MM,YYYY]

G. Abandonment,
awaiting P&A

Installed
deep set
plug mar. 06

Fig. 2Excel sheet with examples.

146

May 2010 SPE Production & Operations

Number of Wells With Well Integrity Problem

35

Number of Wells

29

75

48
27

30
25
20
15

9
2

10
5

Design

Formation

Fluid barrier

TRSV

Chemical inj. line

Fig. 3Production wells, injection wells, and total wells reported with integrity failure, issues, or uncertainty in this survey.

Packoff

Packer

Cement

GLV

Casing

Tubing

Production, Injection, and Total

ASV

Total

Conductor

Injection

DHSV

Production

Wellhead

Number of Wells

Wells With Integrity Failure, Issue, or Uncertainty

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Category Barrier Element Failure

Identify possible outstanding points with the company and

conclude the pilot well-integrity survey
PSA issued an audit report after each meeting. The companies
received one report each from this survey. A summary report from
the seven companies was presented at the PSA website.
Results of the Well-Integrity Survey
The pilot well-integrity survey was based on input from 21% of the
active wells (production and injection wells) on the NCS, which
formed the basis for the evaluations of well-integrity status on the
NCS (see Appendix B).
A total of 406 production and injection wells was included in
the survey. The 323 production wells include gas and oil producers, while the 83 injection wells include water-alternating-gas
injectors (WAG), gas injectors and water injectors. P&A wells are
not included.
Fig. 3 illustrates the number of production and injection wells
with well-integrity problems. Forty-eight production wells and 27
injection wells, for a total of 75 wells, were reported with integrity
problems.
Eighteen percent (75 of 406 wells) reported well-integrity
problems as of 1 March 2006.
Well-Integrity Impact
Table 1 shows that 7% of the wells were shut in because of
well-integrity problems, and 9% of the wells were working under
conditions/exemptions as of 1 March 2006.
The table illustrates that 12% of the injection wells are shut in,
and 19% are working under conditions because of well-integrity
problems.
Well Failures
Fig. 4 illustrates the number of wells with well-integrity problems
and the category of barrier-element failure. Most of the integrity
problems are within barrier elements such as tubing, annulus safety
valves (ASVs), casing, cement, and wellhead.
Reported tubing problems were leakage in production tubing
above the downhole safety valve (DHSV), tubing-to-annulus leakage, or internal leak in tubing-hanger neck seal.
Problems with ASVs are ASV leakage or ASV failure.

Fig. 4Number of wells with integrity failure, issues, or uncertainty and category of barrier-element failure.

Casing problems such as casing leakage (connections that are not

gas-tight) or collapsed casing were reported in the pilot survey.
Cement problems such as no cement behind the casing and
above the production packer, leaks likely along cement bonds, or
leak through cement microannulus.
Reported wellhead problems are leakage in wellhead from
Annulus A to Annulus B because of wrong seal type in the wellhead.
Well-Integrity Problems/Issues or
Uncertainty and Age
Fig. 5 illustrates that tubing leakage is a dominant factor in failure
(39%) in wells from 0 to 19 years old. Wells from 0 to 14 years
old have barrier-element issues such as tubing, ASV, and cement.
Wells from 15 to 29 years old have barrier-element issues such as
tubing, casing, and packoffs.
Fig. 5 illustrates that recently optimized well designs have
caused challenges.
A relatively low number of subsea wells have reported wellintegrity failure, issues, or uncertainty. This can be explained by
limited possibility to monitor these wells.
Examples of Well Failures
The PSA has also conducted technical audits in the period from
2003 to 2006 to gain an understanding of the technical aspects of
well failures. In addition to the technical and operational investigations, PSA also evaluated the design manuals, methodology for
data collection, and the actual well design. These were compared
to the actual well construction and later problems.
A number of interesting observations came from this work. In
the following, we will discuss five of these well incidents to gain
further insight.
Well Failure: Example 1. During workover of a well on a production platform, the load-bearing surface casing collapsed, resulting
in a wellhead that dropped onto the platform structure. The root

TABLE 1WELL-INTEGRITY IMPACT (A, B, C) FOR PRODUCTION AND INJECTION WELLS

PER 1.3.2006
Well-Integrity Impact (A,B,C)
Total Number
of Wells

A: Shut In

B: Working
Under Conditions

C: Insignificant Deviation
for Current Operations

Production

323

18

22

Injection

83

10

16

Total

406

28 (7 %)

38 (9 %)

9 (2 %)

May 2010 SPE Production & Operations

147

Age and Category of Barrier Element Failure

Issues For Improvement and the

Number of Companies

15 to 19

20 to 24

25 to 29

Age (years)

Wellhead
ASV
Casing
Packoff
Fluid barrier

DHSV
Tubing
Cement
Chemical inj.line
Design

Issue For Improvement

Conductor
GLV
Packer
TRSV
Formation

Fig. 5Age and category of barrier-element failure as of 1

January 2006.

cause was severe corrosion near the top of the surface-casing

annulus. Corrosive seawater gained access through a cement port
that was left open during the drilling phase. Temperature and tidal
variations through platform shaft leaks were accompanying factors.
This particular well was shut in for approximately 1 year before
production commenced.
Well Failure: Example 2. The operator had installed a specially
designed slim wellhead in a field. The casing hanger had only
8 taper as opposed to the usual 40. During pressure testing, the
casing hanger was pulled through the wellhead. Later, the operating company experienced a similar incident with a tubing hanger.
The root cause of the failures was axial overload because the slim
wellhead tapers had limited capacity. The wellhead capacity had
been uprated from 350 tons to 600 tons. The investigation report,
however, showed that the manufacturer test had failed, leaving
it incorrect to allow such an uprating. After these incidents, the
operating company limited the load to the initial design value.
Another finding in this case was that the operator did not have
in place an updated well-design manual. This was corrected after
the audit.
Well Failure: Example 3. During drilling of a depleted reservoir,
severe circulation losses arose, followed by a well-control problem. During pumping of a gunk plug, the drill string became
plugged. This complicated the well-control situation. The problem
was resolved.
However, during the well-control phase, the well was left open,
contrary to regulations. The operating company revised their wellkilling procedures, including field procedures for lost-circulation
pills after the incident.
Another issue during the well-control incident was annulus
pressure buildup exceeding maximum allowable surface pressure
(MAASP). This downgrading was introduced after some years of
production because of depletion. After several years with injection
and subsidence, the pressure measured during the well-control
situation exceeded the new established/downgraded pressure limit.
This caused serious actions and a need to determine absolute
maximum pressure. The well-killing operation was at the end successfully executed just below the new pressure limit. The operating
company rechecked their MAASP-limits in adjacent wells.
This is an example of the importance of lifecycle evaluations,
continuous monitoring, and evaluation of well integrity rather than
consideration just at the well-design stage.
148

Kpreformance
indicators

10 to 14

Jreliability analyses

5 to 9

Lother challenges

Iopenness and
exchange of

0 to 4

Awell data

Hcompetence
and training

4
2

Gmanagement
of change

Fconsistent
practise within the

ENORSOK D-010

10

Dregular condition

Number of Wells

12

Chandover
documentation

14

B well documentation

Number of Companies

16

Fig. 6The issues for improvement and the number of companies.

Well Failure: Example 4. Tubing leaks were found in 14 production wells on an offshore platform. Because the leak rates exceed
the acceptance criteria for NORSOK D-010, an investigation was
initiated. It was difficult to establish a root cause. However, the
conclusion was that it was likely leaks through the polished-bore
receptacle (PBR) (telescopic expansion joints in the tubing). These
were considered weak points in the production tubing. A possible
explanation was wear damage when the production tubing was
tripped into the well. The operating company decided that the PBR
will be shielded during installation in future wells.
Well Failure: Example 5. An offshore production well had tubular
collapse in both the production casing and the production tubing
at the same depth. These had to be removed in one operation, a
task that was complicated and time consuming. During this operation, a well-control incident happened during perforation of the
production casing. The investigation revealed that the well-control
procedures were not applied. The root causes were leaks from the
reservoir to the outside of the production casing and installation
of one single casing joint (grade 47 lbm/ft) in a 53.5-lbm/ft casing
string. The incorrect casing joint collapsed.
Summary Well Failure 15. There is a common denominator
between these five examples:
Operational decisions during abnormal situations often lead
to the well failures.
Design issues such as long-term effects are not sufficiently
considered.
The challenge is to account for rare events that may lead to
major incidents. The normal approach is to focus on frequent and
low-consequence incidents.
Improvement Potential
Results From the Questionnaire. Fig. 6 illustrates the issues for
improvement from A to L and the number of companies. The figure
shows that Issues B (well documentation), C (handover documentation), D (regular condition monitoring), E (comments related to
NORSOK D-010 compliance), and H (competence and training)
are issues for improvement for almost all of the companies in the
pilot well-integrity survey.
B: Well Documentation. Different approaches for transfer of
well-barrier responsibilities and insufficient transfer of critical
information during operations and license acquisitions may result
in reduced barrier control.
Improved and user-friendly access and visualization of key well
information are needed.
C: Handover Documentation. Several companies include pressure-test-verification charts in their handover documentation without interpretation. These data could be several years old and do
May 2010 SPE Production & Operations

not necessarily represent the present status. Well-integrity or wellbarrier schematic illustrations, verifications, and how-to-monitor
status were not easily accessible.
While completion schematics are included in the handover
documents and kept updated at all times, the barrier schematic
illustrations with descriptions were often inadequate.
D: Condition Monitoring. Consideration to and evaluations
of initial casing design for the lifetime of the well and possible
changes to the well usage (example, from production to injection)
are also difficult to obtain.
E: Comments Related to NORSOK D-010 Compliance. The
NORSOK D-010 defines requirements and guidelines, including
the established well-barrier philosophy. It appears to be less known
and adhered to than PSA expected at the time when the audits
were conducted.
The lack of information on well names, dates, and revision
numbers complicates easy overview of the status on well barriers.
Color coding and descriptions of the barrier envelopes vary from
company to company, but also within the same company.
In several cases, the barrier illustrations do not contain details
of perforations, the X-mas tree, and cement presence, and in some
cases they lack barrier elements. Such well details with possible
inclusion of dimensions and depth data should be included for
updated versions.
Verification details of the casing cement barriers are often lacking.
Hence, proper planned top of cement (TOC), packer-setting depth, and
later proper zonal isolation for later P&A could imply uncertainties.
H: Competence and Training. The questionnaire revealed a
need for strengthening knowledge, communication, and requirements to well barriers and status. The companies generally
expressed high interest in sharing and exchanging training material for practical use.
Conclusions
The results of the well-integrity survey revealed that the industry
needs to have an increased focus on barrier issues. Control of barrier
status is considered an important HSE factor that could limit unintentional leaks, well-control situations, and accidents. A well-known
status enables companies to take the right actions in a proactive
manner and thereby prevent potential losses and expenses.
7% of the wells were shut in because of integrity failures/
issues or uncertainty
9% of the wells were working under conditions/exemptions
2% of the wells had insignificant deviations for current operation
The integrity problems exist within barrier elements such as
tubing, ASV, casing, and cement.
The improvement potential for the industry includes the following:
Improve systems of reliability and condition-based surveillance for well barriers and well-integrity aspects to improve well
safety.
Provide better visualization of barriers for both onshore and
offshore users to improve the safety level and user friendliness.
Agree on standard ways of visualization, technical qualification, documentation, and abbreviations.
Consider developing a standard handover package containing
basic well-engineering data required to give a full overview of the
well-barrier situation from spud to abandonment.
The industry needs to further develop and acquire suitable
technology for condition monitoring of wells to improve on systematic and preventive maintenance and to keep better control on
degradation mechanisms.
Improved attention on verification and condition monitoring
of well barriers and well integrity is needed.
Improve competence and training of involved personnel both
from operators and contractors.
Start the process of updating the NORSOK drilling standards
to include recent experiences related to well barriers. This should
include the qualification process for barrier elements.
There is a common denominator between the examples of well
failures (Examples 15).
Operational decisions during abnormal situations often lead
to the well failures.
May 2010 SPE Production & Operations

Design issues such as long-term effects are not sufficiently

considered.
The challenge is to account for rare events that may lead to
major incidents. The normal approach is to focus on frequent and
low-consequence incidents.
References
NORSOK D-010: Well integrity in drilling and well operations, third
edition. 2004. Stavanger: Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF)/
Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries (TBL).
Vignes, B., Andreassen, J., and Tonning, S.A. 2006. Well Integrity Challenges on the Norwegian Shelf. Presented at the PSAs Well Safety
Seminar, 4 May 2006. Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA).

Appendix A: Survey Method

The pilot survey is based on a limited selection of active wells on
the NCS. When selecting wells, facilities, and companies for the
pilot well-integrity survey, PSA wanted to have platform/subsea
wells, old/new wells, wells from north to south of the NCS, and
wells with different wellbore status. This initial selection included
406 wells on the NCS.
Seven selected operating companies received an audit notification from PSA and were requested to provide the status of
well-integrity issues for 12 offshore facilities and 406 wells as of
1 March 2006. This included submission from the operating companies describing well-integrity status (Vignes et al. 2006).
The scope of the audit was to analyze how comprehensive the
well-integrity problem is on the NCS, and the main issues and
challenges (Fig. 1).
The data from the selected wells were requested in a premade
spreadsheet template (Fig. 2).
The notification included a questionnaire. The questions from
A to K are listed below.
A: Do the well picture and outcome of the Excel form represent a typical distribution for todays situation on the facility (yes
or no, briefly explain differences, if any)?
B: Are key design premisses/input, design tools/procedures,
well history and current technical condition validated and made
easily accessible for key personnel (yes or no, briefly describe
shortfalls, if any)?
C: Do handover documents include sufficient well information,
with inclusion of premisses/potential anomalies/technical conditions, and operating limits? (e.g., updated schematics, exposures,
test records/demands, safety factors/criteria, references to key governing documents and changes/deviations/precautions with regard
to well-integrity and well-control issues.) (Yes or no, briefly
describe shortfalls, if any).
D: Are there established technical requirements to well-barrier
envelopes/elements and regular condition monitoring, and are
procedures implemented for managing well-integrity issues (yes
or no, briefly describe shortfalls, if any)?
E: Are the company requirements relating to well barriers/barrier practices consistent with NORSOK D-010 (for all wells) (yes,
no, or similar. Describe gaps or other standards, if applicable)?
F: Is there a consistent practice within the company for managing well-integrity issues (yes or no. Specify for each facility,
describe variations, if any)?
G: Are management of change and nonconformance handling
consistently practiced (Yes or no. Describe variations or shortfalls,
if any)?
H: Are requirements to competence and training defined and
implemented for satisfactory/common understanding of the wellbarrier concept, barrier-performance requirements, records assurance, and actions required upon indications of impairment (Yes or
no. Describe gaps, if any)?
I: How do you promote openness and reporting of undesirable
well incidents, similarly as you report other undesirable incidents, and the exchange of experience toward other units within
the company, contractors/service companies, authorities, or other
stakeholders (satisfied with the reporting and the use of exchange
of well incidents/needs to improve the reporting routines and the
exchange of experience. Describe challenge, if any)?
149

TABLE B1ACTIVE DEVELOPMENT WELLS IN THE PILOT SURVEY AND AT NCS

Active Development Wells in the

Active Development Wells

Pilot Survey per 1.3.2006

at NCS per 1.1.2006

Production

323 wells

1539 wells

Injection

83 wells

369 wells

Total

406 wells

1908 wells

TABLE B2ACTIVE PLATFORM WELLS IN THE PILOT SURVEY AND AT NCS

Active Platform Wells in the
Pilot Survey per 1.3.2006

Active Platform Wells

at NCS per 1.1.2006

Injection

51 wells

244 wells

Production

249 wells

1011 wells

Total

300 wells

1255 wells

TABLE B3ACTIVE SUBSEA WELLS IN THE PILOT SURVEY AND AT NCS

Active Subsea Wells in the
Pilot Survey per 1.3.2006
Injection

32 wells

125 wells

Production

74 wells

528 wells

Total

106 wells

653 wells

J: Are the causes of the loss of barrier integrity systematically

mapped and used in order to reduce the probability of similar
incidents in other wells operated by the company (yes, no, or in
process. Describe shortfalls, if any)?
K: Is the company observing specific performance indicators
pertaining to well integrity (Yes or no. Describe performance
indicators, if any)?
The questionnaire, Excel sheet, and the flow diagram were
sent to the seven preselected operating companies. PSA had also
preselected the offshore installations concerned and their wells to
be included in the audit/pilot project study. The well numbers and
types were provided from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(NPD) wells database (Vignes et al. 2006).
Barrier Sketches, Handover Documentation, and Relevant
Material Describing Well-Integrity Status. The selected companies and facilities were requested to provide more documentation
of the well-integrity status, including documentation such as barrier sketches, handover documentations, and other relevant material describing well-integrity status for some preselected wells.
When selecting wells, PSA started to select every fifth well on
an installation. In order to avoid too many wells and wells with
similar wellbore status, PSA selected a maximum of three of each
wellbore status and a maximum seven to 10 wells on an installation. In all, 85 wells were requested to provide more information
about well-integrity status.
Analyzing the Received Documentation. The received documentation, handover documentation, Excel sheet, questionnaire,
well-barrier schematic, and other relevant material describing
well-integrity status from the selected wells were analyzed by the
PSA Drilling and Well Technology engineers in cooperation with
consultants for selected areas.
For the assessment of selected well-barrier drawings and handover documents, a particular comments form was developed. This
form employed a barrier drawing/template based on the NORSOK
standard D-010 (2004) recommendations for well-barrier-schematic illustration, with the provisions for WBE description, table
references, and comments.
The operating companies answers and documentation were put
into this template and used as a tool for the PSA to evaluate gaps,
identify needs for clarification, and to provide detailed comments
to the companies (Vignes et al. 2006).
150

Active Subsea Wells

at NCS per 1.1.2006

Clarification Meetings. PSA had clarification meetings with the

companies with discussion or calibration of received documentation. The purpose was
To obtain a correct and consistent understanding of received
documentation about well integrity
If relevant, to calibrate and verify received documentation
To communicate PSAs view of received documentation
To identify possible outstanding points with the company and
conclude the pilot well-integrity survey
PSA issued an audit report after each meeting. The companies
received one report each from this survey. A summary report from
the seven companies was presented at the PSA website.
Appendix B: Status of Wells on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf
Active Development Wells. Active development wells are production and injection wells. The production wells include water
production, gas production, and oil production. The injector wells
include gas injection, water injection, and WAG injection. P&A
wells are not included in this survey.
Table B1 shows that the total number of active wells on the
NCS as of 1 January 2006 is 1,908 wells and the number of active
wells in the pilot well-integrity survey is 406 wells.
The pilot well-integrity survey includes 21% of active development wells at the NCS.
Active Platform and Subsea Wells. Tables B2 and B3 show that
the total number of production and injection wells on platforms
and subsea, respectively, on the NCS as of 1 January 2006 is 1,255
platform wells and 653 subsea wells.
The pilot well-integrity survey includes 300 platform wells and
106 subsea wells with production and injection.
The pilot well-integrity survey includes 24% of the platform
wells and 16% of the subsea wells with production and injection
on the NCS.

Birgit Vignes is a PhD student in well integrity. He has performed

well-integrity surveys in Norway and the Netherlands. Hes
published several papers on well integrity. Bernt S. Aadny is a
professor at the University Stavanger. He has a PhD degree in
geomechanics. He has published more than 100 publications
and several books.
May 2010 SPE Production & Operations