Manila International Airport Authority vs CA

GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006

495 SCRA 591
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International
Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices
to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount.
When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city
threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA,
which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed
to do so withinthe 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA
then sought for the TRO with theSupreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA
was granted with the TRO but unfortunately theTRO was received by the Paranaque
City officers 3 hours after the public auction.MIAA claims that although the charter
provides that the title of the land and building are withMIAA still the ownership is
with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is
aninstrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That
the land and buildingsof MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque
City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporationtherefore not
exempted to real estate tax.
Issues:
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus
cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale?

Ruling:
Yes, under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for
public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. The ports
included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When properties
under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the
patrimonial property of the state
The court held that the land and buildings of
MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public
use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even
if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not
change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion.

As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce
of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy.
Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land
and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are
inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines.

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia G.R. No. 92013 july 25, 1990
Dionisio S. Ojeda vs. Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr., et. Al G.R. No. 92047 July
25, 1990

FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the
Philippines from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where
the Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai
property. It was decided that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction
was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.
HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through
reparation agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that
the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house
the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but
the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object
of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA
as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain.

DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-40411

August 7, 1935

MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land,
which it doesnt own. Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after
the lease agreement, all buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership
of the lessor, which would not include machineries and accessories. In
connection to this, petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other
equipment wherein some were bolted in foundations of cement.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial judge erred in finding that the subject properties are
personal in nature.
HELD:
The machinery must be classified as personal property.

The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to
another, with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the
improvements which would pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease
agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal
property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The
machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of
execution obtained without any protest being registered.

Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the

owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary,
or any person having temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.