Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Metaphysics of the Stoics

Author(s): N. Lossky and Natalie Duddington
Source: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Oct., 1929), pp. 481-489
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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THE

METAPHYSICS
Professor

OF

THE

STOICS

N. LOSSKY

The

doctrine of the Stoics is a remarkable instance of

metaphysical
a theory that appears to be materialism, but is in truth a form of
It is worth while to give an exposition of
unconscious
ideal-realism.
it in order to show that this is really the case, and, incidentally, to
explain why a materialistic philosophy seems so attractive to many
minds. I will refer chiefly to the teaching of the ancient Stoics, i.e. of
Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, and also to the later doctrine of
Posidonius.
The founder of Stoicism, Zeno, maintained
that "two principles,
an active and a passive one, lie at the root of all things. The passive
substance
or matter, and the active
principle is the unqualified
in
it
is
the
or
God.
Logos (Reason)
Being eternal, the Logos
principle

forms all individual

things out of matter"
(I, 851). According to
the
Reason
which
all
Zeno,
penetrates
things is ei/xap/xeV^(I, 87),
i.e. is the necessary connection of things, the law of nature. This
can be gathered, for instance, from the words of Chrysippus, who
says that elfiapixivrj is Reason, in accordance with which the existing
have come into being, those that are about to exist are
coming into being, and those that are going to exist will come into

things

as merely
being" (II, 913). This Reason must not be understood
ideal and spiritual, as law and Providence;
the Stoics insist through?
out that Cosmic Reason is corporeal. It is the Fire (irvp) that pene?
trates the universe. To distinguish it from ordinary earthly fire they
often call it rrvp reyw/coV, i.e. a creative fire, or ether, or irvevfia,
and 7Ti>evfjLaevheppiov?the breath of fire. They definitely say that
this principle is a body, the purest and finest conceivable.
This body
is God (I, 153), and all other bodies and the world as a whole proceed
from it.
The ancient Stoics definitely affirmed that all being is corporeal.

According to Chrysippus, "that only exists which may be grasped

and touched"
(II, 359), "the cause is something that exists, namely,
Stoics said, "are corporeal because
abody"
(11,336). "Allcauses,"the
are
With
they
pneumatic"
(II, 340).
regard to the soul, Zeno main?
tained that it is "breath," but breath is a body, therefore the soulis
a body (I, 137). Chrysippus proved the corporeal nature of the soul
1 The references are to Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Vols. I and II; the
Roman figures indicate the volume and the Arabic the number of the frag?
ment.
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is the separation of the soul from the body. But

nothing incorporeal can be separated from the body; nor can any?
thing incorporeal be in contact with the body; the soul, however,
both is in contact with the body and separates itself from it, hence
as follows:

"death

the soul is a body" (creola) (II, 790; see also 790-800).

Similarly the ancient Stoics definitely said of God

that

He

is

"purest body" (I, 153).

Their insistence on the corporeality of all that exists was often
carried to the point of absurdity. Thus, for instance, they maintained
that the qualities of things, "light, whiteness, warmth, are bodies"
(II, 386). "Voice is a body, since everything capable of action and
influence is a body" (II, 387). Even virtues and vices, wisdom, etc,
were in their opinion bodies. Posidonius
taught that (1) thought

in words, (2) emptiness,

(3) space,
existing merely as expressed
(4) time, were incorporeal; but according to Basilides these also were
bodies.1
Such assertions suggest that the metaphysical
teaching of the
Stoics

was the crudest

form of materialism.

If one takes

them to

wisdom, etc, are substances, the

goodness, wickedness,
implication is that, e.g., a fool can be made intelligent by introduc?
(some
ing into his body a certain quantity of the wisdom-substance
product of internal secretion, a hormone of some sort, as a modern
biologist might say). It is possible, however, to put a more reasonable
interpretation upon their teaching, taking it to mean no more than
mean

that

the kind of thing constantly met with in the materialistic literature

man has certain bodily
of our day, namely, that a good-natured
a bad-tempered
one has definite physical peculiaricharacteristics,
ties, a genius has a special kind of brain, etc It will be shown later
at
of qualities;
what the Stoics really meant by the corporeality
said
are
sufficient
has
been
said
to
show
generally
why they
present
I will now pass
to be thoroughly materialistic in their metaphysics.
to consider another aspect of their doctrine, namely, its pantheistic
character.
Zeno and Chrysippus maintained that the earth and the sky were
the substance of God (II, 1022). "Just as the different parts of the
body unite to form the seed, but when a new body grows out of the
seed they divide once more, so everything arises out of the One and

says Cleanthes. "All the world is divine; "

that 'God is the soul of the world'
designating by the word God the rational and

is reunited with the One,"

but it may also be said

I, 532),
(Cleanthes,
active principle in the world.
As already said, this active and rational principle is a "fiery
and embraces all things" (II, 1051).
pneuma which interpenetrates
The interpenetrating
action of the pneuma is tovos, i.e. tension,
See Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa, v. I, p. 18.
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which spreads out from within each thing and returns into it again.
This tension. in so far as it is directed outwards, determines all the
qualities of things, and in so far as it is directed inwards constitutes
the unity and essence of things.1 It is something like a force of

repulsion and attraction. Simplicius, indeed, expressly says that "the

Stoics recognize force, or rather a rarefying and condensing motion.2
The qualities of things, arising out of this tension, are said by Chry?
or aerial tensions which enter particles of
sippus to be "pneumatic
matter and give shape to them" (II, 445).
less fine than fire?air, water, and earth?are
Elements
formed
out of the divine fire through a slackening of its tension; but an
increase of tension leads up once more from earth through water and
directions of the process of
air back to fire. These two opposed
tension correspond to what Heraclitus had called the downward and
of the Firethe upward path, in speaking of the transformation
Logos into air, water, earth, and then back again into fire.
Not the whole of pneuma passes into the lower elements; a part of
it remains at the end of the world and rules the world; the Stoics

rov Kovpiov (the ruling principle of the world).

called it rjyefjLovLKov
Not all of them, however, agreed that it was situated at the end of
identified this principle with the sun, the
the world. Posidonius
of the world. It was the source of light and warmth, of the
vital breath.
But wherever the Stoics might locate the cosmic Reason, they
in asserting that it was the source of all things in
were unanimous

heart

earth's

both their form or structure and their corconditioning

All
the
multiplicity of the world sprang from the Cosmic
poreality.
a number of "seed-logoi"
Reason
contained
because
that
Reason,
which
and
animals and all other
out
of
plants
(Xoyot oTTtpixaTiKoL),
Matter
devoid of qualities
things developed (Marcus Aurelius, IV, 36).
the
a seed-logos or a
matter
action
of
became qualified
through

the world

group of them.
L. Stein in his Die Psychologie der Stoa explains that by a seedlogos the Stoics meant an activity of the pure pneuma which by
rational and purposive
means of tension invited and encouraged
As usual with the Stoics, we have
origination and development.3
of an indissoluble
unity between the ideal and
poreal being; the seed-logos is an organic bodily whole, a
with such a tension that taking possession of lifeless matter
it shape and forms an individual entity. Such an individual
it goes on
may perish, but its seed-logos is indestructible:

here a case

the cor?
pneuma
it gives
entity
forming

1 See Reinhardt, Posidonius, p. 142.

2 See L. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa, v. I, pp. 32, 90;
Simpl. Sch.in
Arist. Categ., ed. Brandis, p. 74.
3 L. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa, I, p. 49.
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new individuals
of the same species, being, as it were, the spirit of
The world, united and interpenetrated
by the Divine
be
of
which?the
to
found in each
seed-logoi?are
Logos, aspects

the genus.1

thing, is one living whole. "If the olive-tree," says Zeno,

"produced melodiously playing flutes, you would have no doubt that
If plane-trees
about flute-playing.
it knew something
produced
rhythmically sounding lyres, you would also admit that plane-trees
were musical. Why not admit, then, that the world is a living and
individual

animate and rational entities?"

rational being, since it produces
also
Chrysippus and Posidonius
(I, 112 and the whole of 110-114).
and thinking
recognize that "the world is a rational, animated,
All parts of the world are therefore united
entity" (II, 633-645).

with one another through sympathy and correlation. Plotinus, whose

system in this respect is similar to that of the Stoics, says about the
world: "This One-all is a sympathetic total and stands as one living
the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate
talon,horn,
finger, and any other member are not continuous,
parts:
and yet are effectively near; intermediate parts feel nothing but at
a distant point the local experience is known" (Enneads, IV, 4, ? 32,
translated by S. Mackenna).
The world as a whole, the heavenly bodies and the earth are
being;

living beings. Their parts are subservient to one another, and the
whole, and, vice versa, the whole is subservient to the parts. Thus,
according to Posidonius, the earth "feeds" the plants: "in the coun?
tries where there is no rain she secures for them the due amount of
moisture by means of floods, such, for instance, as we find in the
the Ind; in flood-time the Ind not
case of the Nile, the Euphrates,
the
but
sows
it with seeds of plants."2 Causality
moistens
soil
merely

and teleology are not mutually exclusive; the Stoics conceive of the
divine cosmic Reason on the one hand as a universal law, a strictly
necessary causal bond, and on the other as purposive, rational, and
beneficial Providence. In the words of Zeno, "necessity is the moving
power of matter; it always remains equal to itself, and may also be
or Nature"
called Providence
(I, 176). "The universal law which is
all things, is identical
Reason
(6 6p6os \6yos), penetrating
right
directs
the
with Zeus, who
world-order (I, 162).
also identified the law of nature?"the
eternal,
Chrysippus
coherent,

and

ordered

motion"

with cosmic

Reason

or Providence

(II, 913, 916).

And so, according to the Stoics, the necessary is at the same time
the logical and the purposive;
the causal process is teleological
and
the world as a whole is the most perfect
rational. Consequently,
being (I, 111), "it is arranged as excellently as the best-governed
1 Proclus, Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, v. V,
p. 135,
3 Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 110, 170, 176,
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State."

To obey the laws and to carry out the purposes of this State
highest good and supreme duty. "Lead me, Zeus and Fate,
wherever it is destined by you that I should go, and I will follow
is man's

but if I tried to lag behind like a coward, I should be

to
compelled
go against my will," says Cleanthes (I, 527). fiDucunt
volentem fata, nolentem trahunt,iy writes Seneca (Epistles 107, 10).
of the Stoic philosophy,
Having considered the main conceptions
let us ask whether the usual interpretation
of it as materialism
is
correct. E. Zeller asserts that their doctrine is materialism, but, in
unfailingly;

to that of Democritus,
contradistinction
it is dynamic materialism.
For Democritus,
bodies consist of impenetrably
hard atoms which
for ever remain what they are; the world process consists in the blind,
soulless

movement of these atoms in space and of their accidental

and purposeless impacts. For the Stoics, on the contrary, corporeality
consists in activity, space is filled through tension, i.e. through the
processes of attraction and repulsion. These processes are not soulless

or irrational: they are based upon the sympathy between the different
parts of the world and are rational and purposive. We find thus an
indissoluble
connection
between
extended
existence,
corporeal
states
ideal
or spiritual essence expressed
and
psychical
("sympathy"),

by the notion of vovs (Reason),

Logos, and \6yoi aTrtpiiariKoi.
In order to say whether this doctrine is materialism we must see
and the
how it accounts for the relation between the psycho-spiritual
bodily reality. It must be observed that a theory should be only
called materialistic if it implies that the psychic and the spiritual is
a passive derivative from the physical. But for the Stoics the psychic
state of sympathy is that which directs the bodily processes; similarly,
the ideal aspect of the Divine pneuma designated by the word Logos
conditions

from the first the necessary and purposive order of physi?

cal processes, and is not produced by the latter. This clearly shows
that Stoicism is not materialism;
it is a dynamic view according to
which everywhere in the world there is activity, tension, striving
towards a definite rational purpose?namely,
towards the realization

of physical being embodying rational principles.

The doctrine of the Stoics seems materialistic because they overthe contention that all ideal and psychical being has a
emphasize
bodily aspect. But this assertion does not, as such, commit us to
materialism:
the fact that spiritual and psychic entities have a

physical embodiment
actually enhances their value and significance
for the world, and in no way affects their essential nature. Thus, for
instance, when our awareness of a humorous situation finds expres?
a
sion in a smile, it acquires,
through that bodily manifestation,
fulness
and
of
while
its
greater
spiritual
reality,
preserving
psychic
content.
The fundamental

principle

of Stoic

metaphysic

is not substance
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but force, Svvafjus. This is clearly the case with Posidonius, as Reinhardt has shown. He discovers special forces in all departments
of
the world; thus he speaks of the force of thought, the force of life,
etc. Reinhardt

shows that the basis of the world for Posidonius

is a
the
which
of
rise
manifestations
to
living Primoforce,
give
physical
and psychical being. In the terminology of W. Stern, author of the
remarkable book Person und Sache, force is for Posidonius
a metai.e.
it
transcends
the
distinction between
principle,
psycho-physical
the psychical and the physical.
The ancient

Stoics

this supremacy of the active prin?

emphasized
or corporeality.
It has already been said that
ciple over substance
for Zeno the ultimate reality was to be found not in elements but in
"principles"
(ap^cu) which were in no sense material. "Two principles
lie at the root of all things, an active and a passive one. The passive
isthe unqualified substance or matter (vXrj), and the active principle
in it is Logos, or God. Being eternal, the Logos forms all individual
things out of matter" (I, 85). "Principles
(apxa0 are to be distin?

guished from elements,"

says Chrysippus;
"principles do not come
into being or perish, whereas elements perish in a cosmic conflagration. Principles are incorporeal and have no shape, whereas elements
have shape"
then (i.e. the elements?fire,
air,
(II, 299). Substance,
as to "firstmatter"
water, and earth) is, for the Stoics, derivative;
nor what
(vXrj), they meant by it neither the atoms of Democritus
we now mean by matter; it was not the visible and tangible matter
given in experience, but an indefinite passive principle, the subject
for the activities of the Logos. This alone is sufficient to show that

the Stoic metaphysic is not materialism.

They insist on everything
not
because
is for them an ultimate
being corporeal,
corporeality
but
because
it
as
the actualization
principle,
they interpret
of the
As
Aall
it
in
his
Geschichte
der
in
der
spirit.
puts
Logosidee
griechischen
the active principle, the living force is for them the
Philosophie,
Logos, but it is through physical activity that Logos acquires onto?
logical actuality.
The metaphysic of the Stoics may then be called pansomatism, not
in the sense of asserting that bodies alone exist, but in the sense
that everything actual has a bodily as well as a psycho-spiritual
and cannot exist
aspect, and these two aspects are inseparable
apart.
Such a view may appear as materialism to a superficial observer,
and the misapprehension
can only be avoided if the ideal (spiritual),
the psychical, and the bodily aspects of a real entity be carefully

from one another, designated

distinguished
by exact terms and
shown to be separable in thought, though not in reality. The Stoics
failed to do this, or, rather, in trying to do it they perpetually spoiled
the results by committing the mistake of "duplication in abstraction,"
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as Luppe

has well called it. The mistake may be explained

Suppose that AB is an actually indivisible whole; the task
abstraction
is mentally to separate A from B; if AB is
whole of perception, the abstracted
elements A and B

as follows:
of correct
a concrete
cannot be

imagined pictorially, but may only be objects of conceptual thought.

Minds that are not good at abstraction will find the task too difficult,
and in trying to think of A will still picture it as Ab, and instead of
thinking of B, will have a presentation of aB. Thus abstraction will

of it. Thus, for

yield not the elements of AB, but a reduplication
instance, if we perceive a red cube and want to think of its colour
in abstraction
and extendedness
from each other, we generally set
about it incorrectly, imagining the colour as, say, a red patch and
the extendedness
as a cube or some other visual shape filled with
or with some other sensible quality. A correctly performed
however, ought to yield two elements of
process of abstraction,
at all, but
and
cannot be visualized
extension?that
reality?colour
the
can only be thought of conceptually.
A
of
addition
by
Distorting
colour

B, and B by the addition of A, we learn nothing about the specific

nature of either.
It is precisely this mistake of duplicating through abstraction that
the Stoics are always making. Their intellectual
intuition enables
them

differentiate

from the world-whole

the rational
supertemporal and superspatial
principle, Logos, but they immediately
proceed to sink it in the material element of fire; they no sooner
think of the ideal aspect of force than they convert it into centrifugal
and centripetal currents, and so on. Let us consider, for instance, in
greater detail their doctrine of the seed-logoi. The Stoics certainly
to

of them as supertemporal
and superspatial
elements?
present in the extended material being, after the manner of Aris?
are indestotle's "forms." Thus, in the first place, the seed-logoi
tructible; material being, on the other hand, is destructible because
it is infinitely divisible, and can always be destroyed through division;
besides, it is continually undergoing profound qualitative
changes:
conceived

fire is turning into air, water, earth, and back again. In the second
place, definite seed-logoi condition the rational purposive structure
of every species of animals and plants, and, indeed, of every indi?
vidual entity. When a creature such as, e.g., an eagle dies, the seed

to it does not die, but conditions the birth of a

logos corresponding
new eagle with the same rational and purposive
structure of the
This
can
the
if
case
the
not merely
be
does
only
seed-logos
body.
fill the material bulk of the eagle's body, but is an ideal super?
spatial
space
space.

unity which governs a number of material

particles
dynamically, i.e. by manifesting its force in many points

According

to a dynamistic

theory

of matter,

spatial

II

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tions of the seed-logos confer upon it an aspect of materiality, but it

is not the fact of the seed-logos being extended in space that enables
it to play the leading part in the process of building up and governing
the body of an eagle; it can only do so in virtue of its superspatial
character, which enables it to dominate many points in space. The
aware of the ideal character of the seedapparently
wholeness, but they identified it with its corporeal aspect and
of the seed-logos penetrating
bodily the whole bulk of an
individual thing and holding it together as a unity. Criticizing this
view, Proclus pointedly remarks that if seed-logoi are corporeal, they
cannot combine the parts of a thing, for in that case they cannot
Stoics

were

logos's
talked

together. Proclus, afollower of Plotinus, and a

man highly endowed with the faculty of intellectual intuition, clearly
perceived that spatial unity is only possible if it springs from a
source.
superspatial
Both the seed-logoi and the World Logos are materialized
by the
Stoics. They know the spiritual aspect of the Logos, but in speaking
hold even themselves

of it they immediately translate it into terms of space and material

the world. The crudeness of their
fire which bodily interpenetrates
to a divine
mistake consists not in their ascribing corporeality
the
in
not
but
spiritual and the
clearly distinguishing
principle,
and
their
of
it,
They
significance.
specific qualities
bodily aspects
of the world by a
reason as though the actual interpenetration

homogeneous
pneuma could make the world into a single whole. But
as against this one can only repeat once more the argument of
Proclus: such a pneuma, occupying a number of points in space, can
itself be a single whole only if its wholeness springs from an ideal
all its
source which
and
combines
superspatial
supertemporal
"tensions"
into an inseverable unity.
The ideal source of the wholeness of an individual thing or event
in
is complex, and two kinds of ideal entities must be distinguished
it: the concretely ideal element or the substantival
agent, and the
abstract ideas, that is, the laws and forms of that agent's manifesta?
tions.
The

of any concrete fact will show that many

consideration
elements, both real and ideal, form part of its structure. Suppose a
his
musical melody:
rendering an exquisite
singer is beautifully
movements, the sounds of his voice, and his mental states constitute
the real aspects of this process; they are events in space and time.
and superspatial
But the supertemporal
reality is present here as

well, first, as the singer's self which dominates all this multitude of
events in space and time; secondly, as the abstract form of the
events, their regular structure, and so on; finally, the melody itself
exists not merely as an event in time, but also as an ideal super?
temporal whole, and in order to render it intelligently the singer
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must have in mind the pattern of it as a unity of elements mutually

determining one another.
The Stoics did not carefully distinguish these various aspects of
reality; their analysis was not sufficiently thorough, and they com?
mitted endless mistakes of reduplication.
This lack of subtlety?a
have had some connection
characteristic defect of their system?may
with the fact that many of the leading Stoics were not Greek by
birth. The fundamental

mistake of their metaphysic may be expressed

as follows: in preaching dynamic pansomatism
they failed to see
the difference between asserting that "every entity is a body" and
that "every entity produces physical reactions, though it transcends
them and is not exhaust ed by them."
I have dwelt at such length upon these peculiarities
of Stoicism
because they are highly instructive. We find that most materialists
are guilty of the same mistake. They unconsciously
ascribe ideal
characteristics to matter, and, unable mentally to differentiate them,
are perfectly content with their inchoate or at any rate unanalysed

conception of matter, finding in it all they need for the interpretation

of the world. This, for instance, is the case with Robinet, a French
thinker of the eighteenth century, or with Priestley (1733-1804),
and,
indeed, with all thinkers who conceive of the world as a mechanism
in which psychical processes are subordinated
to the physical, and
The elements of
created
God.
yet admit that the world has been
by

the world mechanism are in their view so wisely co-ordinated

that
natural mechanical
processes lead to highly purposive and rational
results. Such thinkers do not really deny the ideal foundations of the

world of existence, but interpret them as God's ideas in accordance

with which the world has been created. They forget that every ideal
principle exemplified in a real existent is indissolubly connected with

that existent, so that if one takes into account all the elements that
go to the make up of any concrete existing entity, such an entity will
always prove to be both real and ideal.
I will point out in conclusion that the overwhelming majority of

even when they do not reduce the world to mechanical

fall into the same error as soon as they come to deal with
problems of philosophy. In their own sphere they easily differentiate
the various aspects of an object with the greatest exactitude, express?
ing them in notions admirably fitted for the purpose. But as soon as
naturalists,

processes,

they go beyond their own special field and turn to philosophical

their
that require the utmost refinement of analysis,
problems
mental subtlety seems to forsake them; the ideal and the real aspects
of existence blend for them into one undifferentiated mass, and can
no longer be distinguished.
(Translated from the Russian by Natalie

Duddington.)
489

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