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I. INTRODUCTION
In the ordinary days of our lives we encounter different people and we
engage in different activities. As human as we are, we may not be able to
control everything that will happen around us. No matter how we try to be
careful, there is the law of nature that calls for our fault. To do fault is easy
but to do better is difficult. This goes without saying that indeed we, as
human being, were not born perfect. Thus, regardless of the effort to keep
away ourselves from doing harm to others, we still injure someone without or
not even realizing it. Conversely, even if we manage to secure ourselves
from harm or injury, still there is that force that causes us injury.
Hence, in order to balance these conflicting interests, the law provides
for a remedy in order for a person injured by another to recover from his
losses due to such injury. Citing Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, it provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done. This very provision of law affords an aggrieved person to seek redress
for his right that has been violated by another. But before an aggrieved
person may recover, the law also provides that he must first prove that such
person who caused damage to him is indeed the one liable for the same. The
law seeks not only to help a person injured by another by compensating him
his losses but also to protect a person alleged to be liable for the damage by
affording the latter his rights to due process in order to be able to defend
himself from possible prosecution. In so doing, it is but necessary for the
aggrieved party to first convince the court that the three elements of quasidelict are present before an alleged tortfeasor may be held answerable for
his action. These elements are; 1)there must be an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, 2) damage caused by the said act or
omission, and 3) causal relation between the damage and the act or

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omission. Hence, proving negligence and damage alone will not suffice to
consider the defendant liable.
Corrective justice presupposes that the defendant has
caused harm to the plaintiff. It is this doing of harm that needs to
be corrected. So there must be a causal link between the
defendants conduct and the plaintiffs loss. Hence, without
proof of causation, the action for damages based on tort fails.

Proof of causation is essential to established that someones act

or omission is indeed the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
Based on the foregoing, our main consideration is how do we determine
proximate cause in negligence cases? What are the things to be considered
in order to obtain affirmative relief when we come across a situation where
we will be proving negligence of someone? Are there factors which we could
weigh against to fix or limit the liability of the tortfeasor after establishing
that his action is the cause-in-fact of the injury?
These queries are what this paper aims to answer. This paper will
discuss two tests which are common law in origin used in determining
proximate cause of the injury. In addition, the paper aims to consider the
applicability of these two tests in the Philippine jurisdiction. These tests are
the cause-in-fact test and the policy test. In determining the proximate cause
of the injury, it is necessary to determine if defendants negligence was the
cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If defendants negligence was
not the cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it is a cause-in-fact, the inquiry
shifts to the question of limit of liability of the defendant. The latter
determination of the extent of liability involves a question of policy.
Consideration of public policy may be given due weight in fixing the limit or
scope of legal liability and practical considerations must at times determine

1 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and damages, 2013 Edition, p. 317

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the bounds of correlative rights and duties as well as the point beyond which
the courts will decline causal connection.2
In other words, the question of proximate cause does not only involve cause
and effect analysis. It also involves policy considerations that limit the
liability of the defendants in negligence cases.
II. THIRD ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE: CAUSATION
As earlier pointed out, proof only of negligence and injury in negligence
cases will not suffice to render the defendant liable. The plaintiff must prove
that there is a causal relation or link between the defendants negligence
and the plaintiffs loss or injury suffered.
Courts in the United States, Canada, and Britain have long struggled
with the slippery concept of causation. Legal doctrine has been shaped over
the years to assist fact finders in determining the answer to the crucial
question in a negligence action: What made this incident happen?

An

automobile accident could be caused by icy road conditions, faulty brakes on

the automobile, or the driver speeding through a stoplight without stopping.
If the defendants negligence is found to be a cause of the plaintiffs injury,
then the defendant is held liable and must compensate the plaintiff.3
A. Proximate Cause
The most widely quoted, and what is said to be the best definition of
proximate cause is that it is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred.

In the case of

2 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and damages, 2013 Edition, p. 328( Comstock v. Wilson, 76
A.L.R. 676, 257 NY 231.)

3 Knutsen, Erik S., Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A MultiJurisdictional Approach: p. 251. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Volume
38:249)
4 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 317

Page | 4

Bataclan vs. Medina5, the Supreme Court provides for a more comprehensive
definition of proximate cause which provides that, the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain affecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
This definition of proximate cause includes the element of foreseeability.
Foreseeability involves the question of probability. The Supreme Court
explain that there is negligence if a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that the effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his conduct or guarding against its
consequence.6 (cite specific event in this case)
Philippine Bank vs. Court of Appeals 7 also defines proximate cause which
included the element of foreseeability which goes this way:
The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our
corpus of jurisprudence as any cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the result complained of and without which
would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case
that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result
therefrom as a natural and probable consequence.
5 Bataclan vs. Medina, G.R. No. L- 10126
6 Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918, 37 Phil. 809
7 234 SCRA 435 (1994)

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It is believed that these definitions, which include the element of

foreseeability, are misleading and inconsistent with the provisions of the New
Civil Code. The actor is liable for the damages which resulted from his acts,
whether the same is foreseen or unforeseen.8
B. Proximate cause distinguished from other terms
i. Distinguished from Remote Cause.
The proximate cause is distinguished from remote cause which is
defined as that cause which some independent force merely took
advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof. A
remote cause cannot be considered the legal cause of the damage. 9
Indeed, not all causes that occur prior to the damages can be
considered proximate. For example, in the lobby of the second floor of
a building, there are several flower pots placed therein which if it will
fall may cause injury to someone walking in the first floor underneath.
Juan, a janitor of the building while cleaning that lobby accidentally
shoves one of the flower pots and causes it to fall harming a woman
standing in the first floor just below the lobby where the flower pots
exactly are. If we follow the theory that causes prior to the damage be
considered proximate then it would lead to an absurd conclusion that
the owner of the building who placed the flower pots in that lobby
would be held liable. Thus, a remote cause cannot be considered the
legal cause of the damage.
ii.

Distinguish from Nearest Cause

The word proximate is defined as being in immediate relation
with something else; next and near.10 Hence, the impression that is
being given by the word is that it is the nearest cause. Contrary to the

8 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition,p. 318

9 Aquino, Timoteo B.,Ibid.

10 Websters Dictionary, 1992 Ed.

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impression being given by the term, however, proximate cause is not

necessarily the nearest cause. Proximate cause is not necessarily the
last link in the chain of events but that which is the procuring efficient
and predominant cause.11 As the Supreme Court in one case, the
requirement is that the act was the proximate cause, not implying,
however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point
of time or relation, but rather the efficient cause, which maybe the
most remote of an operative chain. It must be that sets the other in
motion and is to be distinguished from a mere pre-existing condition
upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been
adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of
an independent cause.12
This rule is illustrated in Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Company. 13 In
the said case, embers were negligently emitted from one of the trains
of the defendant resulting in the fire in one of the houses near the
tracks (house 1). Because of the wind, fire was communicated to
another house (house 2) and then to another (house 3). One of the
arguments of the railroad company in trying to escape liability to the
owners of houses 2 and 3 is that the fire did not come directly from
its train but from house 1. The Supreme Court rejected the argument
ruling that what was important was the admitted fact that the fire
originated

in

the

negligent

acts

of

the

defendants

and

the

circumstance that fire may have been communicated to the two other
houses through the first house instead of having been directly

11 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. V. Sikes, 166 ALR 375, 196 Okla. 137, 168 P2d 1016.
12 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 321
13 G.R. No. L-15688, November 19, 1921

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communicated from the locomotive through the action of the wind, is

immaterial.
iii.

Effects of Concurrent Causes

The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the accident.
The defendant is still liable in case there are concurrent causes brought
about by acts or omission of third persons. The actor is not protected
from liability even if the active and substantially simultaneous
operation of the effects of a third persons innocent, tortuous or
criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm so
long as the actors negligent conduct actively and continuously operate
to bring about harm to another.14
In the same vein, the primary cause remains the proximate cause even
if there is an intervening cause which merely cooperated with the
primary cause and which did not break the chain of causation. These
rules were summarized in the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v.
Court of Appeals15, where the Supreme Court held that:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to
render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured.

14 Africa v. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966

15 G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 199 and G.R. No. 130150, October, 1998
(consolidated case)

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To find out further about proximate cause, two tests will be discussed
in the succeeding sections. The cause-in-fact test and policy test are
introduced by common law to assist our courts and as well as our lawyers
with their clients in determining proximate cause of an injury and matters
which should be considered in each and every case.
III. TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
A. Cause-in Fact Doctrine
Under traditional tort analysis, "cause in fact" has long been an
essential element in finding a defendant liable for a plaintiff's injury. Tort
theory generally has required that a plaintiff identify that the defendant's
act, omission, product, or dangerous animal was sufficiently connected to the
plaintiff's injury. By requiring that the plaintiff prove identification and
causation before a defendant is required to pay for a plaintiff's injuries, tort
law satisfies society's notion of justice.16
Cause-in-fact is traditionally considered to be less contentious and more
predictable than proximate cause.

Indeed, many torts scholars and fact

finders argue that cause-in-fact is a straightforward question of common

sense.17 Around the turn of the twentieth century, however, courts divided
the causation issue into two distinct inquiries: a determination of proximate
or legal cause, and cause in fact. This dual analysis was viewed as
demonstrating the courts' increased proficiency in analyzing the separate
causes that produced injuries to the plaintiff." The cause in fact analysis
focused on possible causes of the injury before an inquiry into legal or
proximate cause proceeded. This analytical separation did little, however, to
16 Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.769: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2326&context=law-review

17 Knutsen, Erik S., Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A MultiJurisdictional Approach: p. 252. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Volume 38:249):
http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/38/num2/Knutsen249.pdf

Page | 9

clearly define the distinctive characteristics of the cause in fact element."

Although a number of causes for an injury could exist, the courts reserved
inquiry into these causes until after a determination of whether a defendant
was sufficiently connected to the injury."18
Unfortunately, the two causation inquiries often commingled, and failure to
clearly define proximate cause yielded further confusion. The most common
method for distinguishing the two inquiries treated cause in fact as a
question for the trier of fact, and proximate cause as a question of law."
Cause- in - fact analysis, however, necessitated more than a simple
factual inquiry established through production of testimony." From his
understanding of, and experience with, the world, the trier of fact was
required to make a judgment that certain effects follow certain antecedents.
To ascertain whether a cause in fact existed, the trier of fact's "judging
capacity" needed to be furnished with enough evidentiary facts to enable
him, based on his experience, to rationally connect the defendant's act with
the plaintiff's injury, in order that the trier of fact could label the defendant's
act as the cause."19
The problem with cause in fact is related intimately to the philosophical
search for ultimate cause. In determination of causality, a greatest
philosopher,

David

Hume

observed

in

Inquiry

Concerning

Human

Understanding that our knowledge of cause and effect is not, in any

instance, attained by reasoning a priori, but arises entirely from experience,
when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each
other. Thus, our notion of causality according to Hume is not some
mysterious quality in the objects themselves. Rather, we consider that there
18 Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.774, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER, (Vol. 31:769):
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review
19 Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER, (Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review

P a g e | 10

is such causality because we have hitherto observed that objects of those

two types are regularly conjoined, we expect them to go together on this
occasion too. John Stuart Mill refined Humes account of causality. He
observed in A System of Logic that the invariable antecedent is termed the
cause and the invariable consequent, the effect. Hence, universality of the
law of causation consists in this, the every consequent is connected in this
manner with some particular antecedent or set of antecedents. Legal
theorists Hart and Honore elaborated on the theories of David Hume and
John Stuart Mill. Hart and Honore explained that when we look for the cause
of an occurrence, we are looking for something, usually earlier in time,
which is abnormal or an interference in the sense that it is not present when
things are as usual.20
Although the analytical element of cause in fact has not always been
specifically identified in common law torts," courts continually insisted on
some measure of causation. Thus courts have developed but-for test and
substantial factor test to determine cause in fact.
B. Different Cause-in-fact Tests
i. But-for Test or Sine Qua Non Test
The majority of common law cause-in-fact inquiries involve a courts
application of one of two well-established torts principles: the but for
test or the substantial factor test of causation. The but for test is
the simpler of the two and is used for the majority of factual
circumstances. A plaintiff in a negligence action must prove on a balance
of probabilities that, but for the defendants negligent conduct, the plaintiff
would not have suffered injury. Fact patterns which fit the but for test
of causation are those where it can be established on a balance of
probabilities that the defendants negligence was a necessary component
of the cause that gave rise to the plaintiffs injury.

In most negligence

actions where one plaintiff sues one negligent defendant, that defendants
20 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 edition, p.331

P a g e | 11

negligence is usually one of two or more equally competing and mutually

exclusive possible causes.

A court weighs the evidence of causation to

determine whether or not, on a balance of probabilities, it can be proven

that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury.21
The but for test is also known as the sine qua non test. Sine qua non is
a Latin term meaning a necessary requirement. The defendants action
(inaction) was a necessary requirement for the plaintiff to be injured. If the
defendants action is not a necessary requirement for an injury to occur,
then the defendant was not the cause in fact of the injury.
For example, Timothy stopped at the four-way stop. Lee did
not see the stop sign at the same intersection. Timothy proceeds
into the intersection. Lee did not stop and plows into Timothy.
But for Lee running the stop sign, Timothy would not have
injured.22
A further example, if the plaintiff was injured because a portion
of a negligently constructed wall that collapsed hit him, the
negligence in the construction of the wall is the cause in fact of
the injury because the injury to the plaintiff would not have
resulted had there been no negligence on the part of the
defendant. On the other hand, if the object that fell from the
window of the same building hit the plaintiff, the negligent
construction of the wall is not the cause in fact of the injury the
injury could not have been avoided in the absence thereof.23
Another example would be, Ernie is sitting in the law library,
looking at a rare legal manuscript. He pulls out a can of cola he
concealed in his backpack and brought into the library. He sips
21 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p.
22 Morissette, Emily Lyn, Personal Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals; Chapter 4:
Third Element of Negligence: Causation of Injury; p. 44

23 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages;2013 Edition, p.

P a g e | 12

the cola while reviewing the document. When he goes to grab

the open can of cola, he accidentally knocks it over, destroying
the rare document. But for Ernie knocking over the can of soda,
the document would not have been destroyed.
More than one defendants action might be the reason why the plaintiff
is harmed. Two actions might be necessary for an accident to occur. The but
for test does not require there be only one action that brings about an
injury. However, if there is more than one action, then each action must be a
but for cause (necessary cause) of the injury. The more contributors to an
injury and the more events necessary to cause an injury, the less helpful the
but-for test is. The but-for test should not be used when there are two or
more causes to an injury, either one of which, by itself, would have been
enough to cause the injury.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Minneapolis, Saint Paul
& Sault Sainte Marie Railway, adopted a test which was designed to better
handle the determination of cause in fact in cases involving multiple causes.
This test considers whether the defendant's action was a "material element"
or a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.24
ii.
Substantial Factor Test
Similar to the "but for" test, this substantial factor or material element test
included the notion that the defendant's act or object needed to be
possessed by the defendant and produced the plaintiff's injury. According to
the Minnesota Supreme Court and a majority of courts that adopted
Minnesota's approach, the substantial factor test was the minimum
requirement for assessing liability. 25
The substantial factor test asks the following: was the defendant a
substantial factor, or big contributor, in causing the injury to the plaintiff?
24 Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER, (Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review,
p. 779-780

P a g e | 13

The defendant will be liable for the injuries to the plaintiff where the
defendant was the substantial factor in causing the injury. The substantial
factor test, unlike the but-for test, addresses the issue of concurrent causes.
Concurrent causes are causes acting together to cause the injury, although
each cause by itself would not have caused the injury. If two causes combine
into one harm, one which cannot be cleanly divided, then each cause will be
considered as a substantial factor of the harm. For example if two fires
merge to cause an injury, the test to apply would be the substantial factor
test rather than the but-for test.
In Summer vs. Tice,

there were two hunters, who

separately fired their guns at the same time in the direction of

the plaintiff. The plaintiff was struck in the eye. Which defendant
should be held liable for the injury? How can liability be
determined? Is it not a fifty-fifty chance where one defendant or
the other shot the plaintiff? The court determined the plaintiff
was not in the best position to determine which defendant was at
fault. Therefore, the court ruled the burden of proof shifted to the
defendant to show each of them was not liable. The burden of
proof requires a party, in this case, the defendant to prove a fact
in dispute between the parties. The defendants could not prove
which defendant was more liable, so both were found liable. The
ruling prevented the defendants, who were both negligent, from
avoiding responsibility from their negligence.

26

25 Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER, (Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review,
p. 780
26 Morissette, Emily Lyn, Personal Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals;
Chapter 4: Third Element of Negligence: Causation of Injury; p. 45

P a g e | 14

As earlier stated, the substantial factor test is important in cases where there
are concurrent causes. Here the issues are not factual but conceptual: When
are harms attributable to the defendant whose own actions are combined
with those of other persons and natural events? The application of the butfor test will lead to an absurd conclusion if concurrent causes are involved.
For example, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a horse, which was
frightened by two approaching vehicles. If the drivers of both vehicles, A and
B, were negligent and either vehicle was sufficient to frighten the horse, the
resort to the but-for test will result to an absurd conclusion that the
negligence of either driver cannot be considered the cause in fact of the
injury because the damage have likewise resulted if only one driver was
negligent. It cannot be said that the damage would not have resulted had
there been no negligence on the part of A. It cannot likewise be said that
damage would not have resulted had there been no negligence on the part
of B. However, under the substantial factor test, the concurrent causes will
still be considered as the cause-in-fact of the injury because the negligence
of both A and B are substantial factors in bringing about the injury. 27
Another case in point, the but for test is unworkable in
sorting out the cause-in-fact of damage to a plaintiffs property
resulting from two separately burning fires that converge
together to cause indivisible damage. If one fire is caused by the
defendants

negligence

and

one

is

caused

by

natural

circumstances, a court is not aided by asking whether, but for

the one fire, the plaintiff would not have suffered damage. The
second fire exists and makes dividing the source of causation
impossible. Therefore, a court uses the substantial factor test of
causation to determine if a defendants negligent conduct was a
material element, or substantial factor, in bringing about the
27 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition,p.

P a g e | 15

injury of the plaintiff. The role of the defendants negligence in

bringing about this injury must be beyond the de minimus range
in order to be considered the cause of the injury.
iii.

Necessary Element of Sufficient Set (NESS) Test

Another alternative test is the so called NESS Test. The NESS test is

especially effective in solving problems regarding concurrent causes. Under

this test, the negligent act or omission, is a cause-in- fact of the damage if it
is a necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS). The test is based on the
concept of causation by David Hume and Stuart Mill, and systematically
elaborated for legal purposes by professors Hart and Honore in Causation in
Law and Professor Wright in Causation in Tort Law. 28
Professor Fleming restated the test as follows : Whether a particular
condition qualifies as casually relevant factor will depend on whether it was
necessary to complete a set of conditions jointly sufficient to account for the
given occurrence. A necessary condition for the occurrence of a specified
event is a circumstance in whose absence the event cannot occur while a
sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in
whose presence the event must occur.29
However, what is considered as a necessary cause is not one that occurs in
vacuum. Under the NESS Test, it is acknowledged that the candidate cause is
just part of the sufficient set. Professor Richard W. Wright explained the NESS
Test in this wise:30
The basic concept of causation is formalized in the NESS (necessary
element of a sufficient set) test of causal contribution, which in its full form
states that a condition contributed to some consequence if and only if it was
necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that
was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence. The relevant notion of
28 John G. Fleming, The Law of torts, 7th Edition,p. 173
29 Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 10 th Edition,pp. 496-497
30 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 337

P a g e | 16

sufficiency is not merely logical or empirical, but rather requires each

element of the applicable causal generalization, in both the antecedent (if
part) and the consequent (then part) must have been in actual existence
on the particular occasion.
The NESS test subsumes and integrates the Restatements necessary
condition test and its independently-sufficient condition test, which are
merely corollaries of the NESS test that apply in certain types of situations.
The NESS test reduces down to the necessary condition (but for) test if there
was only one set of conditions that was or would have been sufficient for the
occurrence of the consequence on the particular occasion, or, if there was
more than one such set, if the condition was necessary for the sufficiency of
each of the sets. Yet the NESS test is more inclusive than the but-for test. A
condition was a cause under the NESS test if it was necessary for the
sufficiency of any actually sufficient set, even if, due to other duplicative or
pre-empted set of conditions, it was not, as acquired by the but-for test,
necessary in the circumstances for the consequence.
B. Policy Test or Cut-off Test
A finding that the defendants negligence was the cause in fact of the
damage to the plaintiff will not necessarily result in a finding that the same
negligence is the proximate cause of the damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The law, as a matter of policy, may limit the liability of the defendant to
certain consequences of his action. If the damage or injury to the plaintiff is
beyond the scope or limit of the liability fixed bylaw, the defendants conduct
cannot be considered the proximate cause of the damage. Such scope or
limit of liability is determined by applying what are known as policy tests.
Thus, in deciding negligence cases, it is likewise necessary to
determine the policy tests adopted in a particular jurisdiction. The different
policy tests that are being used to determine the extent of the defendants
liability for negligence include: a) foreseeability test; b) natural and probable

P a g e | 17

consequence test; c) natural and ordinary or direct consequences test; d)

hindsight test; e) orbit of risk test; and f) the substantial factor test.31
The above-specified policy tests may be divided into two (2) groups. The first
group involves the element of foreseeability while the other does not require
that the injury is within the foreseeable risk created by the defendant. The
first may be referred to as the foresight perspective while the other as the
directness perspective.

32

The two perspectives were briefly explained in

this wise:
Analytically, the problem of proximate cause in turn can be
addressed in two distinct ways. One possibility is to ask whether
the chain of events that in fact occurred was sufficiently
foreseeable, natural, or probable at the outset for the
defendant to be held liable for the ultimate harm that ensued,
assuming the causation in fact can be established. That
judgment is made from the standpoint of the defendant at the
time the tortuous conduct was committed. The second approach
starts with the injury and works back towards the wrongful action
of the defendant, seeking to determine whether any act of a
third party or the plaintiff, or any event, severed the causal
connection between the harm and the defendants wrongful
conduct. Here the question is only whether, when all the
evidence is in, it is permissible to that the defendant did it, that
is, brought about the plaintiffs harm.33
Under the foreseeability test and other similar tests like the natural and
probable consequence test, the defendant is not liable for unforeseeable
consequences of his acts. The liability is limited within the risk created by the
31 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 340
32 Epstein, p. 468

33 Epstein, Ibid.

P a g e | 18

defendants negligent act. Direct consequence test, on the other hand,

makes the defendant liable for damages that are beyond the risk. Direct
consequences are those which follow in the sequence from the effects of the
defendants act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at
the time, without the intervention of any external forces, which come into
active operation later.34
I.

Foreseeability Test
In most personal injury cases, the answer to the question "Who
was at fault?" comes down to figuring out who was negligent.
Negligence is the failure, on the part of the person causing
the injury, to use the reasonable amount of care that is required
in a particular situation. In order to prove negligence, you have
to establish that the person causing the injury was not only the
actual cause of the injury, but also the proximate cause (or legal
cause), of the injury.
In order to be liable for negligence, the type of harm that
occurred must have been foreseeable. However, the extent of
the harm is not limited by what was or was not foreseeable. In
this article, well discuss some of the issues that may arise with
respect to proximate cause and foreseeability, when you're
trying to prove fault in a personal injury case.
What is Foreseeability?
Foreseeability is the leading test that is used to determine
proximate cause. The foreseeability test basically asks whether
the person causing the injury should have reasonably foreseen
the general consequences that would result because of his or her
conduct.
Foreseeability and Proximate Cause
The law limits the scope of liability based upon the
foreseeability of the type of the harm and the manner of the

34 Prosser and Keeton, p. 294

P a g e | 19

harm, but not the extent of the harm. In this section, we'll
explain the distinctions.
A. Unforeseeable Type of Harm. A person who causes injury
to another is not liable if the type of harm does not foreseeably
flow from the negligent act.
For example, if Damon drops a glass bottle on the floor and
does not clean it up, Damon would be liable for the injuries
caused to anyone who cut themselves on the glass. However, if a
freak fire is somehow caused by sunlight that is magnified
through the broken glass, it is arguable that Damon would not be
liable for injuries caused by the fire because they are not a
foreseeable type of harm that would flow from the negligent act.
In other words, a fire is not a foreseeable result that might stem
from leaving shards of glass on the ground.
B. Unforeseeable Manner of Harm. A person who causes
injury to another person is not liable for a superseding cause
when the superseding cause itself was not foreseeable. In such a
situation, it is said that the superseding act breaks the causal
chain between the initial negligent act and the injury. That
means the person who committed the initial negligent act will be
relieved of liability.
For example, if David left a candle burning in his apartment
while he was at work, and, subsequently, a burglar broke into his
apartment and knocked the candle over, burning down the entire
building, David would likely not be liable for injuries sustained
because the burglar was an unforeseeable, superseding cause. In
reality, the issue would be argued by both sides of the case -- the
people who suffered losses from the fire arguing that the

P a g e | 20

burglar's presence was foreseeable, and David arguing that it

was not.
Other examples of superseding causes that are usually deemed
unforeseeable:
1. acts of God (i.e., earthquakes)
2. criminal acts of third persons (i.e., burglary), and
3. intentional torts of third persons (i.e., assault, battery, false
imprisonment).
Examples of superseding causes that are typically deemed
foreseeable (so that the defendant does not escape liability):
1. harm caused by rescuers (i.e., firefighters or other people that
come to the injured persons aid)
2. ordinary negligence of health care providers (i.e., doctors and
nurses), and
3. disease or subsequent injury that is sustained as a result of
the injured person being in a weakened condition.
C. Unforeseeable Extent of Harm. A person who causes injury
to another person is liable for the full extent of the harm,
whether or not the extent of the harm is foreseeable. For
example, if Dallas is negligently driving through a small,
suburban town and collides with Pariss Ferrari, Dallas is liable for
the full amount of damage caused to the car, despite the fact
that it would not be foreseeable to see such a car driving through
a small, suburban town.35
The foreseeability test is sometimes used in conjunction with the
natural and probable consequence test, which, although expressed in
different terminology, is closely related, if not an essentially a similar
test.36
ii. Natural and Probable Consequence Test
35 Tikriti, Amir; Foreseeability and Proximate Cause in an Injury Case;
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/foreseeability-proximatecause.html;

P a g e | 21

The test of proximate cause which has been stated and applied
more often than any other is that which determines an injury to
be the proximate result of negligence only where the injury is the
natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act or
omission. The natural consequence of an act is the consequence
which ordinarily follows it. A probable consequence is one which
is more likely to follow than fail to follow its supposed cause but
it need not be one which necessarily follow such cause. Where
this test is used, ii is not enough to prove that an accident is the
natural consequence of the negligence. It must also have been
the probable consequence. Thus there was lack of causal
relationship between the plaintiffs injury and the alleged
negligence of the defendant, the operator of the market, in
grabbing the robber and attempting to disarm him, where after
the struggle had ended, the robber had commenced his flight,
and shot the plaintiff, since the robbers act was neither a natural
and

probable

consequence

of

the

defendants

resistance,

although if the gun has been discharged during the struggle

there would have been a causal relationship. In order to warrant
a finding of negligence or an act not amounting to wanton wrong,
was the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the
injury was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence. Where there is danger of a particular injury which
actually occurs, it must be said that the injury is the usual,
36 Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,
+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoY
CoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable
%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false,

P a g e | 22

natural and probable result of the act exposing the person or

thing injured to the danger.37
iii. Ordinary and Natural or Direct consequence Test
The extent of the actors liability is for all consequent damage
naturally flowing from such conduct, whether such damage were
reasonably to be anticipated or not. This test states, as a matter
of legal policy, that if a negligence is a cause in fact of an injury
under the criteria previously discussed, the liability of the
wrongdoer extends to all injurious consequences. Such based is
based on the principle that in tort the wrongdoer is liable for all
the consequences that naturally flow from his wrongful act,
provided only that they are not too remote, and that as far as
proximate cause is concerned the question is not whether the
damage was foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where in fact it
resulted as a direct consequence of the defendants act.
According to this view, reasonable anticipation has no logical
connection with causation. It is not the consequence that the
defendant as a reasonably prudent person should have foreseen
as within the risk of his conduct which controls the limitation of
his liability, but the risk that the court, after the conduct has
taken place and the injury has been suffered, considers shall fall
within the scope- or orbit of the defendants duty under the
law.38
37 Sangco, Caesar J, Ibid.
38Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,
+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoY
CoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable
%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false; p 111

P a g e | 23

iv. Hindsight Test

Another test which seems to eliminate foreseeability as an
element of proximate cause and which has been referred to as
the hindsight test, has been stated as follows: A party guilty of
negligence or omission of duty is responsible for all the
consequences which a prudent and experienced party fully
acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact exist,
whether they could have ascertained by reasonable diligence, or
not, would have thought at the time of the negligent act as
reasonably possible to follow, if they have been suggested to his
mind. Seemingly, these words mean that a wrongdoer is
responsible for all the consequences which a prudent man
charged with knowledge of all the facts would have thought
possible to follow from his negligent act and they appear to
obviate foreseeability as an element of proximate cause.

39

v. Orbit of the Risk Test

The orbit of the risk doctrine as formulated in the prevailing
opinion in the celebrated Plasgraf case was intended to be a test
of duty and not a test of proximate cause, an issue which was
not reached by the court since it disposed of the case by
determining that the defendant under the circumstances had
breached no duty that was owed to the plaintiff.

39 Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;

https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,
+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoY
CoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable
%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false

P a g e | 24

The Supreme Court in Palsgraph v. Long Island R.R. Co.40

held that that the conduct of Long Island Railroads guard was
wrongful in relation to the man carrying the parcel, but not in
relation to Palsgraf standing far away. No one was on notice that
the package contained fireworks which when dropped could
harm a person as far from the zone of danger as Palsgraf. To find
negligence there must first be a finding that a duty was owed
and breached, and that the injury could have been avoided if the
defendant had been following that duty. The orbit of the danger
or risk associated with a danger or risk is that which a reasonable
person would foresee. Even if the guard had intentionally taken
the package and thrown it he would not have threatened
Palsgrafs safety from the appearances of the circumstances to a
reasonable

person.

Long

Island

Railroads

liability

for

an

inadvertent or unintentional act cannot be greater than it would

be if the act had been intentional.
If foreseeable risk to the plaintiff created a duty which the
defendant breached, liability is imposed for any resulting injury
within the scope or orbit of such injury, it is not the unusual
nature of the act resulting in injury to plaintiff that is the test of
foreseeability, but whether the result of the act is within the
ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the
defendant.41
IV. APPLICABILITY OF CAUSE-IN-FACT AND
POLICY TEST IN THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION
The determination of the applicable test is likewise a problem in Philippine
jurisdiction. The problem is being compounded by the fact that there is little
40 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,Ct. of App. of N.Y., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928)

P a g e | 25

literature on proximate cause. Examinations of decisions of the Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals do not immediately reveal the applicable rule
because more often than not, the discussion of proximate cause contains
mere salutary citations of definitions and previous decisions.42
Nevertheless, it had also been acknowledge that the determination of
proximate cause depends on whether public policy requires that the plaintiff
or defendant should bear the loss. 43 The difference between this jurisdiction,
however, with that of other jurisdictions is that the New Civil Code contains a
chapter on Damages which specifies the type of damage for which the
defendant may be held liable as well as the limit to such liability. In other
words, the policy on the kind of damage to be awarded to the plaintiff is
already expressed in statutory provisions.44
A. Applicable Cause-in-Fact Test in the Philippines
There is no statutory provision in this jurisdiction that mandates the use of a
particular cause-in fact test. However, there is no question that the but-for
test is being applied in this jurisdiction. The definition of proximate cause
includes a statement that indicates the applicability of the but-for test. The
definition of Bataclan v. Medina45 includes a statement that the cause should
be that without which the damages would not have resulted.

41 Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;

https://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,
+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoY
CoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable
%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false ; page
114
42 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 343
43 Reyes and Puno, p. 167
44 Aquino, Timoteo B, Ibid.
45 G.R. No. L- 10126

P a g e | 26

The substantial factor test is likewise being applied in this jurisdiction. The
substantial factor test as it is contemplated in the Restatement, Second,
Torts of the American Law Institute had been cited in cases decided in this
jurisdiction.46 The very the same definition adopted in Bataclan reflects the
observation of one legal writer that the issue of proximate causation asks
whether the defendants conduct could be regarded as a substantial factor in
bringing about plaintiffs harm, and the inquiry is often translated into one
that asks whether any of the human actions or natural events that occur
after defendants but before the plaintiffs harm severs the causal connection
between them.47
It is believed that the NESS test can also be applied in multiple causation
cases. Since there is no statutory provision that fixes the applicable test,
there is room for the application of NESS test. The NESS test is gaining wider
acceptance because it is even reflected in the latest version of the
Restatement of torts. In Restatement (Third) of Torts, if a tortuous conduct of
a tortfeasor fails the but-for test because there is another set of conduct also
sufficient to cause the harm, the tortfeasors conduct is still a cause in fact or
factual cause.48

B. Applicable Policy Test in the Philippines

There is a conflict of opinion regarding the applicability of the foresight
perspective in determining proximate cause. The ruling in the early case of
Algarra v. Sandejas49 indicates the applicability of the foreseeability test:

46 See Philippine Rabbit v. Court of Appeals, G.r. No. 66102, August 30, 1990
47 Epstein, p.468
48 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition,p.344
49 G.R. No. L-8385 ,March 24, 1914

P a g e | 27

The liability of the present defendant includes only those

damages which were foreseen or may have been foreseen at
the time of the accident, and which are necessary and
immediate consequence of his fault. In discussing the question of
damages under the civil law, Gutierrez (vol. 4, pp.64,65) says:
In the impossibility of laying down a surer rule, the Code
understands known damages to be those which in the prudent
discernment of the judge merit such a qualification, although
their consequences may not be direct, immediate, inevitable.
If it is a question of losses occasioned through other
causes, except fraud, and the contracting parties have not
covenanted any indemnity for the case of non fulfilment, then
the reparation of losses or damages shall only comprise those
that are the necessary and immediate consequence of that fault.
This rule may not be very clear, but is the only possible in a
matter more of the domain of prudence than of law.
These authorities are sufficient to show that liability for acts ex delicto
under the Civil Code is precisely that embraced within the proximate cause
of the Anglo-Saxon Law of Torts.
The general rule as frequently stated, is that in order that an act or
omission may be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the
natural and probable consequence of the act or omission and such as might
have been foreseen by an ordinary responsible and prudent man, in the light
of the attendant circumstances, as likely to result therefrom.
According to the later authorities foreseeableness, as an element
of proximate cause does not depend upon whether an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent man would or ought in advance to have
anticipated the result which happened, but whether, if such result and
the chain of events connecting it with the act complained of had
occurred to his mind, the same would have seemed natural and

P a g e | 28

probable and according to the ordinary course of nature. Thus as said

in one case, A person guilty of negligence, or an unlawful act, should
be held responsible for all the consequences which a prudent and
experienced man, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in
fact existed, would at the time of the negligent or unlawful act have
thought reasonable to follow, if they had occurred to his mind.
(Wabash R. Etc. Co. V. Coker, 81 Ill. App. 60, 664; Cooley on Torts, sec.
15).
The view which I shall endeavour to justify is that, for the
purpose of civil liability, those consequences, and those only, are
deemed immediate, proximate, or, to anticipate a little, natural and
probable, which a person of average competent and knowledge, being
in the like case with the person whose conduct is complained of, and
having the like opportunities of observation, might be expected to
foresee as likely to follow upon such conduct. This is only where the
particular consequence is not known to have been intended or
foreseen by the actor. If proof of that be forthcoming, whether the
consequence was immediate or not does not matter. That which a
man actually foresee is to him, at all events, natural and probable
(Webbs Pollock on Torts, p. 31).
Almost half a century thereafter, Justice J.B.L. Reyes clarified that
the rule under the Old Civil code is the same as the rule in contracts.
He explained in Silva vs. Peralta50 that:
As to the award of damages, against Saturnino Silva, it is to be
noted that while the latters liability was exta-contractual in origin, still,
under the Civil Code in 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are
measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor
in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had
foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum
50 2 SCRA 1025 (1961)

P a g e | 29

emergens but also for lucrum cessans, as required by Article 1106.

Article 1002 of the 1889 Civil Code of Spain formulated no standard for
measuring quasi-delictual damages, the article merely prescribing that
the guilty party shall be liable for the damages so done. This
indefiniteness led modern civil law writers to hold that the standart set
in Article 1106 and 1107, placed in the general rules on obligations
rigen por igual para las contractuales y las extras contractuales, las
preestablicidas y las que borten ex-lege de actos ilictos.(Roces Notes
to Fisher) Los Daos Civiles y su Reparacin. (1927). Since liability
for damages arises in either case from a breach of a pre-existing
obligation (to behave without fault or negligence in case of quasidelicts, and, in the case of contracts, to observe the conduct required
by the stipulation), it is logical to conclude with Planiol that La
reponsibilidad contractual y la extra contractual tienen el mismo
fundamento, pou to que se hallan sujetas en principio a identicas
reglas. (6 Planiol-Ripert, Derecho Civil, pp. 133, 207-208).

51

V. ANALYSIS/RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the foregoing, causation of an injury as an element in
negligence cases has been a matter which different scholars and
diverse jurisdictions have been studied for a long time. Such studies
continue to create different aspects of causation of an injury which
have been or would be a basis in determining negligence in each and
every case in different jurisdictions. Many tests have been used to
determine causation of an injury which tests may be based on
experiences, natural law, or varieties of laws in each country.
Determination of proximate cause has been decided in different cases
and different jurisdictions dependent upon the findings of each Courts
or juries upon examining the particular facts and evidences adduced
51 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, pp. 347-349.

P a g e | 30

upon it. While other courts may use one type of tests in its jurisdiction
to derive at a solution in a case the same may not be applicable in
other jurisdictions. However, since natural law dictates, that each
action or omission may have the same effects in two or more countries
or jurisdictions, the Court in another country may refer or used the
same test as applied by another Court in one State as it may deem
applicable in a particular case within its jurisdiction.
Thus, the tests discussed above, cause-in-fact and policy tests
and their different types, were used for so long in different jurisdictions
in resolving negligence cases. Cause-in- fact test usually had been
used to determine the cause of an injury created or as a result of a
defendants action or omission towards the plaintiff. It determines
whether

or

not

indeed

committed

the

act

complained

of

by

ascertaining whether the injury and the negligence of the defendant

has a causal relationship. On the other hand, by determining cause-infacts, does not necessarily mean that the defendants negligence is the
proximate cause of such injury. The policy tests explains that, a
defendant may be a cause-in fact of an injury but the law may limit or
fix its liability and the court by practical considerations must at times
determine the bounds of correlative rights and duties as well as the
point beyond which the courts will decline causal connection. In other
words, attendant facts and circumstances in a particular or given case
must be measured in order to determine the degree of defendants
negligence. There is no hard and fast rule in these cases. This gives us
an idea that justice may not be at all times dispense by finding an
alleged tortfeasor liable when his acts or omission is found to be a
cause in fact but rather we must consider policy as a matter of law if
not to negate liability of the defendant but to mitigate the same if
called by circumstances of the case.

P a g e | 31

The Philippine jurisdiction had been using some of these tests to

decide negligence cases despite the absence of a particular statutory
provision to that effect. High accord should be given to our Courts in
applying these tests in determining liability in negligence cases. It is
also recommended that may be our Courts would try to study some of
these test as they would certainly be helpful and applicable in our
jurisdiction. Even though our New Civil Code already included chapter
on damages which provides for specific type of damage which the
defendant may be held liable, nevertheless, the foregoing tests as
discussed may strengthen the disposition of negligence case if our
Courts would endeavour to study them for a successful dispensation of
justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
What are the things to be considered in order to obtain affirmative
relief when we come across a situation where we will be proving negligence
of someone? Are there factors which we could weigh against to fix or limit
the liability of the tortfeasor after establishing that his action is the cause-infact of the injury?
These questions as posed in the introductory statement may now
attain their satisfying answers.
Based on the above discussions, we come into conclusion that an
injured person must always determine the cause of his injury, who causes his
injury, and what are the factors which one way or another severs his injury.
Action for damages may be futile if these instances cannot be proven or
identified before an aggrieved person rests his case. Thus,

it

is

but

necessary that the plaintiff should know the defendant in the first place. The
Courts cannot settle a case when in the first place there is no accused
therein. In our jurisdiction of course, it is but the duty of the Lawyer to help
his client to come up with answers to this questions and gather evidence to

P a g e | 32

establish his case. On the other hand, a defendant may not be held liable for
an act he has not committed or an allegation that he did an act which caused
an injury to another will not be successful in the absence of proof thereto.
More so, a defendants liability may be mitigated if warranted by facts of the
case.
Therefore, in deciding negligence cases, our Courts always look at the
factual circumstances in each case, the applicable laws and jurisprudence
which will help them achieve a just and reasonable decisions. The Tort law,
as applicable law in our jurisdiction will indeed achieve its major purposes: 1)
to provide a special means for adjusting the rights of the parties who might
otherwise take the law into their own hands, 2) deter wrongful conduct, 3) to
encourage social responsible behaviour; 4) to restore injured parties to their
original conditions, in so far as the law can do this by compensating them for
their injury.52

VII. REFERENCES
1. Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition

2. Knutsen, Erik S., Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A

Multi-Jurisdictional Approach: p. 251. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
(Volume 38:249)
3. Morissette, Emily Lyn, Personal Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals;
Chapter 4: Third Element of Negligence: Causation of Injury; p. 45
4.Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,Ct. of App. of N.Y., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928)
5. Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?
52 Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p.11

P a g e | 33
id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,
+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8
gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and
%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and
%20damages&f=false ; page 114
6. Tikriti, Amir; Foreseeability and Proximate Cause in an Injury Case;
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/foreseeability-proximatecause.html;

7. Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.769: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2326&context=law-review

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