RULE 102

HABEAS CORPUS
CASE #2
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS
CORPUS OF ATTY. FERNANDO ARGUELLES, JR., ATTY.
REYNALDO GERONIMO, ET.AL., Petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., In his capacity as
Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167211 March 14, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS: On March 15, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for habeas
corpus because they were detained in a room at the Senate
pursuant to an Order dated March 15, 2005 issued to respondent
by the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies (Senate Committee).
The Senate Committee scheduled a hearing on March 15, 2005 at
10:30 a.m. to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
regarding the alleged illegal sale of unregistered and high risk
securities by the Standard Chartered Bank. At the hearing, Atty.
Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo were present
as their counsel of the Standard Chartered Bank.
The minutes of the hearing show that Standard Chartered Banks
counsel provided the Senate Committee with a copy of the petition
for prohibition. The banks counsel also filed an urgent motion to
suspend or defer the proceedings of the Senate Committee
apparently to await the action of the Court on the petition for
prohibition.
During the hearing, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile declared that
"there is one portion of the petition for prohibition that casts a slur
on this Committee and the proceedings of the Committee."
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile moved to cite the officers of Standard
Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr.
and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for contempt for making the
allegation.
Senator Edgardo Angara, chairperson of the Senate Committee,
issued an Order directing respondent Major General Jose
Balajadia, Jr., sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, to detain for direct

contempt of the Committee the officers of Standard Chartered

Bank and their counsel, Atty. Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty.
Reynaldo Geronimo, for a period of not more than six hours.
The persons who were detained in a room at the Senate then filed
this petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the Committee acted
in violation of the Constitution and without jurisdiction, for the
following reason: that petitioners are being illegally deprived of
their liberty at the Senate building.
Petitioners prayed that respondent be directed to appear before
this Court to produce their bodies and to explain why they should
not be set at liberty without delay.
On March 18, 2005, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion
stating that they were released from the custody of the Senate by
the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms on March 15, 2005 at 5:56 p.m.
Notwithstanding their release, petitioners submitted that it is
imperative that the issues involved in this case be resolved,
because they are of unprecedented and transcendental importance
and they involve the impact of the exercise of the powers of
Congress upon human rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus has
become moot.
HELD: YES
The petition has become moot.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person
from it if such restraint is illegal.
The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect
and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. Petitioners have
been released. While the issues raised by petitioners are
important, it is not appropriate to resolve them now in these
proceedings. This is all the more so considering that the only
respondent here is Maj. Gen. Jose Balajadia, Jr., the Senate
sergeant-at-arms, impleaded in that capacity for holding
petitioners in custody. The Senate Committee itself has not been
made a respondent and, therefore, has not been given the
opportunity to be heard on the issues sought to be resolved.

----------------------------------------------------------------- Alexis Enriquez

RULE 103
CHANGE OF NAME
CASE #1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007

CORONA, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote, Giovannis guardian ad
litem, filed a petition for change of name of her ward from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998.

Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in

the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive
weeks was likewise ordered. The trial court also directed that the
local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved
for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a courtappointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the
Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
RTC: After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N.
Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through
the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the
court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.
CA: the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of
name.

She averred in her petition that Giovanni N. Gallamaso is a Filipino

Citizen, 16 years old, minor. As guardian ad litem, authorizing her
to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in
accordance with the desire of his mother, who is residing and
working abroad

ISSUE: Whether or not the apellee Capote guardian ad litem

availed of the proper remedy on the change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child

of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born on
July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite
the absence of marriage between them; and Giovanni has been
known by that name since birth as per his birth certificate
registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition.

Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all
the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court
found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code:

The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born
and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him]
on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.
That Giovannis mother might eventually petition him to join her in
the United States and his continued use of the surname
Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his
status as natural child.

HELD: YES

According to the Family Code which repealed, among others,

Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis ours)

Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never

recognized by his father while his mother has always
recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to
his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition
to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand
in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding.
HELD: YES
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the
action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the
proceedings there. The point is whether the proceedings were
sufficiently adversarial.
While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for
change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the
proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to
participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of
name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike
petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors
in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
cannot be decided through a summary proceeding.
There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule
108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry
suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief
sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in
the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the
result is the same in that a corresponding change in the
entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the
requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the
petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose
the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its

jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the

proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still
expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the
petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the
arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed
the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it
had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
(emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of
the petition through publication as required by the rules. With
this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole
world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the
trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the
petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including
petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition.
----------------------------------------------------------------- Alexis Enriquez
RULE 106
CONSTITUTION OF FAMILY HOME
CASE #1
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: As a result of a judgment in a civil case (for recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners'
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of
about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land and the other was the
family home.

The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12,

1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder.
Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final
deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely
selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private
respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on
November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of conveyance void and to
quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of
Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject
property
including
their
family
home
which
was
extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law.
Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as
family home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save
their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the
family home under the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the family home of the petitioners as
constituted by their father is exempt from execution.
HELD: NO
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is
said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over
the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home
may be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the former by
the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court,
and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the
proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the
family home. The operative act then which created the family
home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of
Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of
the Civil Code.
Under the Family Code, however. registration was no longer
necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the

family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from

the time it is occupied in the family. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
In the case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals 11 on the retroactive
effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the
family home, to wit:
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not
mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner's included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Neither does Article
162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The applicable law, therefore in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution,
forced sale or attachment.
Art. 243 of the Civil Code states that: The family home
extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment, except:
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded
in the Registry of Property;

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo

constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, as the family home.
The instrument constituting the family home was registered only
on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the
"debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or
even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243 (2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo
Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution
did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial
court found that the house was erected not on the land which the
Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the
very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which
it is situated," 13 it is understood that the house should be
constructed on a land not belonging to another.
----------------------------------------------------------------- Alexis Enriquez