Max Velmans

Max Velmans (born 27 May 1942) is Emeritus Professor tinct dierence between what we normally think of as the
of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London. He physical world, the phenomenal world and the world
co-founded the Consciousness and Experiential Psychol- as perceived.[6] He writes:
ogy Section of the British Psychological Society in 1994,
and served as its chair from 2003 to 2006. He was apThis sketch of how consciousness ts into
pointed National Visiting Professor for 20102011 by the
the wider universe supports a form of nonIndian Council of Philosophical Research, and in 2011
reductive, Reexive Monism. Human minds,
was elected to the British Academy of Social Sciences.[1]
bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater
Velmans has around 100 publications in the area of
universe. Individual conscious representations
consciousness studies, including Understanding Conare perspectival. That is, the precise manner in
sciousness (2000). In his map of prominent theowhich entities, events and processes are transries of consciousness Francisco Varela categorises Vellated into experiences depends on the location
mans work as non-reductionist, stressing the imporin space and time of a given observer, and the
tance of rst-person accounts of the phenomenology of
exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, aective,
consciousness,[2] as well as third-person accounts of brain
social, cultural and historical inuences which
states and functions, which in Velmans work are thought
enter into the 'construction' of a given experiof as complementary.[3]
ence. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique. Taken
Velmans is principally known for the theory of contogether, the contents of consciousness provide
sciousness called "reexive monism, in which the
a view of the wider universe, giving it the apmaterialist/dualist gap is bridged by placing aspects of
pearance of a 3D phenomenal world. ... Howhuman consciousness in the experienced world, rather
ever, such conscious representations are not the
than within the brain; the theory also combines facets of
thing-itself. In this vision, there is one universe
realism with facets of idealism, though it falls short of
(the thing-itself), with relatively dierentiated
avowing the necessity of perception to the existence of
parts in the form of conscious beings like our[4]
reality per se (the principle of "esse est percipi").
selves, each with a unique, conscious view of
the larger universe of which it is a part. In so
far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn,
experience the larger universe, we participate
1 Understanding Consciousness
in a reexive process whereby the universe experiences itself.[6]
Velmans Understanding Consciousness (2000) is a comprehensive summary of his theoretical work, and introduces the idea of reexive monism.[5]

2 Changing Places

Reexive monism presents itself as an alternative to both

dualism and reductionism. It states that it does not make
sense to speak of phenomenological experiences of reality as occurring within the brain, given that some of
them quite clearly occur within the experienced world itself (that is, asked to point to the light they experience,
almost all rational subjects would point to the light that is
experienced rather than to the brain, which is where, according to dualists and reductionists, the experience actually takes place). Thus, Velmans argues, the relationship between subjects and experienced reality is reexive:
some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite
clearly placed in the world by the perceiving mind. The
contents of consciousness are, thus, not exclusively in the
brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself; in
fact, in terms of phenomenology, there is no clear and dis-

The changing places thought experiment was conceived

by Velmans, and discussed in Understanding Consciousness. The experiment was designed to demonstrate the
diculties in distinguishing phenomenologically between
a rst-person experience of an event (a subjective experience of an object) and a third-person experience of the
same (that is, the observation of such an experience in a
subject).

2.1 The experiment

Velmans conceives of a situation in which an experimenter (E) is observing a subject (S) exposed to a
1

light stimulus. The dierences between the two viewpoints, Velmans argues, is primarily derived from a difference in interest, reected in a dierence in their required activities. To explain, during the experiment S is
required only to report on her experiences of the light,
which she needs to communicate to E in an appropriate
manner. E, on the other hand, is interested primarily in
Ss experience of the light, and thus Es focus is not just on
the light (which he now thinks of as a stimulus) but also
on the observable events in Ss brain, and on Ss reports
concerning what she experiences. Thus, E is interested
rst and foremost in the subjects experience, and how
these relate to the light stimulus and brain states of S that
he can observe. In such a case, Es experience of events
would be considered objective or public, while Ss experiences are subjective and private"; while Es focus
is on recording the neural causes and correlates of visual
experiences, S is interested only in reporting about such
experiences.
However, Velmans points out that all that would be required for S and E to exchange roles is for them to change
their respective foci (as he puts it S and E merely have
to turn their heads), so that E focuses exclusively on the
light and reports his experiences, while S focuses her attention not just on the light, but on the events in Es brain
and his reports of the experience. In such an event, S becomes the experimenter and E becomes the subject; thus,
following current conventions, S would now be entitled
to think of her observations (of the light and Es brain)
as 'public and objective' and to regard Es experiences of
light as 'private and subjective'.[7]
Velmans points out that this outcome is patently absurd,
as the phenomenology of the light (that is, the way it is
experienced) remains the same from the perspective of S
or E, whether it is thought of as being an observed stimulus or a subjective experience. Nothing has changed in
the nature of the light that either party can observe, save
in the contextualising focus of their interests. That is,
Velmans concludes, there is no phenomenological dierence between publicly observed phenomena and private,
subjective experiences.

Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (John Benjamins, 2000)

How Could Conscious Experiences Aect Brains?
(Imprint, 2003)

4 See also
Monism

5 References
[1]
[2] Varela, F. J. (1999) Present time consciousness. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 6(23), 111140.
[3] biem Graben, P. & Atmanspacher, H. (2009) Extending
the philosophical signicance of the idea of complementarity. In H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas (eds.) Recasting reality: Wolfgang Paulis Philosophical Ideas and
Contemporary Science. Springer, pp.99113.
Hoche, Hans-Ulrich (2007) Reexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of
the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmanss reexive model of consciousness Phenomenology and
the Cognitive Sciences, 6 (3) , pp. 389409.
[4] Blackmore, S. (2003) Consciousness: An introduction.
Hodder & Stoughton.
Blackmore, S. (2005) Conversations on Consciousness: Interviews with wenty minds. Oxford University Press.
Revonsuo, A. (2006) Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
[5] Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Understanding Consciousness.
Metapsychology, 13 (52)
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.
php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396
Faw, B. (2009) Book review of Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness (2nd ed.) Journal of
Consciousness Studies. Vol. 16, No.9, pp103-108
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/16-9_br.pdf

Selected publications

Velmans is the author and editor of numerous books and

papers on consciousness, including the following:[8]
Understanding
Consciousness
ledge/Psychology Press, London, 2000)

REFERENCES

(Rout-

Understanding Consciousness, edition 2 (Routledge/Psychology Press, London, 2009)

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (Blackwell, 2007)
The Science of Consciousness (Routledge, 1996)

Zeman, A. (2001) The paradox of consciousness:

a review of Understanding Consciousness (2000)
by Max Velmans. The Lancet Vol. 357, Issue
9249, p77. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/
lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(05)71582-8/fulltext
Batthyany, A (2002) Consciousness in the natural world (a review of M.Velmans, 2000, Understanding Consciousness). Theory & Psychology
12(3), pp. 415417. http://www.psych.ucalgary.
ca/thpsyc/Reviews12(3).pdf
[6] Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press, p. 298

3
Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans
Understanding Consciousness. Metapsychology,
13 (52) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/
view_doc.php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396
[7] Velmans 2000, p. 175
Harman, W. (1993) Towards an Adequate Epistemology for the Scientic Exploration of Consciousness Journal of Scientic Exploration, 7 (2),
pp. 133143. http://www.scientificexploration.
org/journal/jse_07_2_harman.pdf
[8] list of Velmans publications on consciousness

External links
Velmans website including list of selected publications with brief descriptions
Depository of online papers at Academia.edu with
added comments
Velmans lecture on The Unconscious Ground of
Being, Cortona, Italy, 2009.
Velmans lecture on Whos in Control?, National
Institute of Advanced Study, Bangalore, India, 2012
Consciousness Studies (on Wikibooks)
Indian Council of Philosophical Research (Indian
Government)

7 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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