The spectre haunting politics is power in an era where the state has become predatory
and the populace disillusioned, we must analyze politics without party and powers
beyond the state
Newman 10 (Saul Newman, Professor of Political Theory at the University of London at Goldsmiths,
2010, The Politics of Postanarchism, pub. Edinburgh University Press, pp. 104-107)
in much contemporary continental
theory we find a series of themes, preoccupations and debates which bear a strong resemblance to those of anarchism.
Amid the ruins of Marxism or at least of a certain institutionalised and statist form of it there is a desire among many thinkers today
to develop new categories and directions for radical politics. There is the attempt , first, to find new forms
of radical political subjectivity no longer based on the Marxist notion of the proletariat. There is a recognition that such a category
is too narrow to express the different forms of oppression, modes of politicisation and ways of relating
to one's own work and existence that make up the contemporary world. However, there is also the recognition of the inadequacy of the
ultimately liberal notion of 'identity politics' that characterised much new social movement theory. What is called for is new way of thinking about how, and
by what processes, a subject becomes politicised how does the subject become an egalitarian and
collective subject? Secondly, there is, among many thinkers today, a rejection of authoritarian modes
of political organisation for instance, the centrally organised Marxist-Leninist vanguard party which would lead the proletariat to
revolution, or the Communist and socialist parties in capitalist countries which sought to play the
parliamentary game, thus abandoning any hope of emancipation from the state. There is a need, then, as Badiou would put it,
for a politics without a party new forms of political organisation that are no longer structured
around the model of the party, as the party always has as its aim the reproduction of state power.
Related to this, therefore, is the question of the state itself: the immovability of state power, despite
the revolutionary programmes which promised its 'withering away', and, moreover, the increasingly
authoritarian character of the so-called liberal democratic state, show us that the state remains
perhaps the central problem in radical politics. Radical thought, therefore, sees politics increasingly as being
situated beyond the state there is a desire to find a space for politics outside the framework
of state power, a space from which the hegemony of the state would be challenged. It seems to me that these
themes and questions political subjectivity beyond class, political organisation beyond the party and
political action beyond the state relate directly to anarchism. If these are the new directions that
radical politics is moving in, then this would seem to suggest an increasingly anarchistic orientation.
Indeed, this is a tendency that is being borne out in many radical movements and forms of
resistance today. The emergence of the global anti-capitalist movement in recent times suggests a
new form of politics, one that is much closer to anarchism in its aspirations and tactics, and in its decentralised,
democratic modes of organisation. Also, the insurrections in Greece in December 2008 which had an explicitly anarchist identification are indicative of this libertarian moment in
radical politics. It would seem that the prevailing form taken by radical politics today is anti-statist, anti-authoritarian
and decentralised, and emphasises direct action rather than representative party politics and lobbying.
Furthermore, is it not evident that there is a massive disengagement of ordinary people from normal
political processes, an overwhelming scepticism especially in the wake of the current economic
crisis about the political elites who supposedly govern in their interests? Is there not, at the same
time, an obvious consternation on the part of these elites at this growing distance, signifying a crisis
in their symbolic legitimacy? As a defensive or pre-emptive measure, the state becomes more
draconian and predatory, increasingly obsessed with surveillance and control, defining itself through
war and security, seeking to authorise itself through a politics of fear and exception . How should
radical political thought respond to this situation, lagging behind as it so often does reality 'on the
ground'? My contention is that anarchism or more precisely postanarchism can provide some
answers here. Indeed, anarchism might be seen as the hidden referent for radical political
thought today: while its importance is scarcely acknowledged amongst the thinkers referred to above, anarchism can nevertheless offer critical
resources for radical political theory, allowing it to transcend many of its current limitations and,
indeed, providing it with a more consistent ethical and political framework.
We observe a similar silence about anarchism in more recent radical political thought, that which comes in the wake of poststructuralism. Indeed,
The resolution asks us to bring a set of practices into the law, sustaining the
omnivorous nature of state power while simultaneously obscuring it. Legalization of
weed or organ sales are particular questions that are only legible once we have
interrogated the foundational question: who has the power to legalize?
We reject the juridico-sovereign dialectic of prohibition and legalization. The 1AC is an
immanent, agonistic contestation of the law; an unruly space of resistance carved from
its very heart that withers away any first principle governing existence.
Newman 12 (Saul Newman, Professor of Political Theory, Goldsmiths, University of London,
Anarchism and Law: Towards a Post-Anarchist Ethics of Disobedience, Griffith Law Review (2012)
Vol. 21 No. 2)
I do not want by any means to rule out the possibility of a stateless society without law, nor suggest
that people are incapable of organising their lives on a voluntary and cooperative basis. Indeed, there
can be no conception of anarchism without taking this possibility seriously. What may be questioned, however, is the idea that this
order is somehow immanent within social relations and based on natural foundations. Instead, I would propose a shift of ground or, better
yet, a shifting ground or groundless ground on which to base the possibilities of
disobedience, resistance and insurrection. One way to think about this is through a reconfiguring of
the idea of anarchy. I have thus far discussed two contrasting figures of anarchy: one is that which forms the background to the law, the Hobbesian anarchy of lawless violence which provides, in legal
theory, the justification for the law (here we could also include the anomic condition of the state of exception, which is a kind of anarchy of the law); the second is the anarchist reading of anarchy, which refers to societys
capacities for independent, peaceful and autonomous self-organisation beyond the state and the law. The problem with these two conceptions as different as they are is that they are both essentialist and assume a certain
another kind of authority in its place: the epistemological authority of science and the moral authority of society. Thus, in place of the state, there emerges a more rational form of social organisation. By contrast, according to
Schurmann: The anarchy that will be at issue here is the name of a history affecting the ground or foundation of action, a history where the bedrock yields and where it becomes obvious that the principle of cohesion, be it
taking place within and against the order of power, on a field of multiple struggles , strategies and
localised tactics an ongoing antagonism without the promise of a final victory or universal
emancipation. As Foucault puts it: Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case:
resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary,
concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial; by
definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations .31 But what implications does this have for thinking about law and about
practices of resistance and disobedience? I would highlight, briefly, two key points that emerge with a post-anarchist approach. The first concerns the relationship between law and power relations . One of the
limitations of classical anarchism was to see power largely in terms of sovereign legal and political
authority namely, the state and therefore to not be able to take sufficient account of the complexity of power relations. As is well known, Foucault argued that what he called the juridicosovereign image of power, where power was understood in terms of law, prohibition
and repression the power to say no obscured the pervasive, multiple and
productive nature of power in the modern age, particularly in its disciplinary and biopolitical forms. Law is by no means displaced or
replaced by power, according to Foucault; rather, under the regime of disciplinary and biopower, law increasingly
functions to produce the norm. Yet this realisation at the same time suggests a more nuanced
approach to the law on the part of those who rebel: the absolute rejection of the law and authority does not necessarily
solve the problem of power or provide us with any language to contest the limitations and constraints,
the new forms of normalisation that may emerge in a post-legal society, limitations that may perhaps
in their own way be just as coercive as law, precisely insofar as they are not explicitly stated or codified. What is required, then, is an
ongoing, agonistic contestation of both power and law, in which their limits are continually tested and
interrogated. In other words, anarchists can never rest assured that just because they have
transcended legal authority in a new form of community life, they have forever removed the potential for domination; the
radical horizon of the transcendence of the law opened up by Benjamins divine violence at the same time demands a continual reflection on the ethical limits of the power and the invention, as Foucault would put it, of new
practices of freedom as a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty.33 Moreover, if liberty is more productively seen as an ongoing practice or agonistic labour, rather than an eternal state, then we should
consider the possibility of strategic mobilisations of particular laws for instance, human rights laws, as inadequate as they are against particular relations of power and practices of domination.34 If an anarchist ends up in
the laws self-authorisation, then we can say that anarchism is the political philosophy most closely
aligned with justice.
Voting aff is an endorsement of the creation of a space beyond the law, a simultaneous
process of DISOBEDIENCE and EXIT. Faced with the injunction to be technicians
refining the machinery of power, we instead desert our roles, an exodus that asserts our
power to legalize whatever practices we desire.
Noterman and Pusey 12 (Elsa, Program Associate at the Community Strategies Group of the Aspen
Insitute, Andre, PhD candidate in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds, UK, Inside,
Outside, and on the Edge of the Academy: Experiments in Radical Pedagogies in Anarchist
Pedagogies: Collective Action, Theories, and Critical Reflections on Education, pp. 192-194)
how do we build this new kind of open and ephemeral institution? We think it is important to open up
spaces in which we can both experiment with, and critically reflect upon, radical
pedagogical practices. The crisis of the university is a crisis that throws up new openings and
possibilities for what a university could be. These spaces can work toward pushing the boundaries of
the academy by concretely asking, what can a university do? in praxis. We need to engage in a discussion about how we can go forward as
critical-radical researchers inside, outside and on the periphery of the academy. Is there any place for us within the institution as it is? Or as Stefano Harney and Fred Moten (2004) suggest, is the only
possible with the relationship to the university today... a criminal one? This opens up the
question/possibility of what Virno terms exodus, but which might also be described as desertion.
This is not a territorial exodus, or a fleeing from, but rather a desertion of ones assigned role, in this case of the critical yet
docile body (Foucault, 2004) of the academic. As Harney and Moten (2004) put it, to be in but not of is the path of the subversive intellectual in
the modern university. In part, the Really Open University is an experiment in just this. The creation of spaces in which we can begin to
interrogate the role of the university and of the academic, not just as theoretical exercise, but
within an implicitly antagonistic, yet not wholly reactive, space of political engagement. This
is a messy space that avoids any pure politics, or identitarian overcoding , neither overtly anarchist,
nor Marxist, nor simply an anticuts group, yet neither a purely utopian reimagining. This is
necessarily a cramped space, of (im)possibility, as Deleuze (2005) states, creation takes place in bottlenecks.
Many elements of the edu-struggle will ultimately want to close down the categories again, in order to
give more weight to their ideological underpinnings, trying to make the moment fit their politics,
rather than seizing the moment in all its wealth of potentiality . The ROU views crisis as possibility arguing that it is up to us to decide [the
universities] future. But through what concrete actions might we actually develop a really open university? One
way to begin may be through the occupation of the spaces where we work, play and consume, and the
reappropriation of this time and space for our own (common) ends. This may help to promote new lines of
questioning and open up new connectivities. One way to discuss this occupation and reappropriation,
might be the literal forced reclamation of space, though direct action. This has, of course, been a tried and tested method across history, and we have seen the tactic of
So,
occupation has begun to some extent become popular again, with the recent occupations at universities across the UK, but to a much larger extent across Europe and the United States. We think there is an interesting dynamic,
however, between defensive and offensive uses of occupation. We do not wish to set up a binary, but rather are interested in the qualitative shifts and activities that can occur within the occupied space itself, rather than simply
the obstructive element of occupation. This problematic has been explored in the U.S. occupations movement through the often heated debate about the utility of political demands, versus occupation without demands. For
example, Occupation mandates the inversion of the standard dimensions of space. Space in an occupation is not merely the container of our bodies, it is a plane of potentiality that has been frozen by the logic of the
Another way to discuss the occupation and reappropriation of time and space
might be through the creation of new spaces that prefigure the new forms we may wish a
reimagined university to take. A concrete example of this is the model of the autonomous social center, or infoshop, found within anarchist and autonomous activist practices
commodity (Inoperative Committee, 2009).
(Atton, 1999). Social centers are place-based, self-managed spaces. They can be squatted, rented or cooperatively owned (Pusey, 2010). A particularly rich history of social centers can be found in Italy, but they exist all across
Europe. In the United States the closest approximation to the autonomous social centers seems to be the network of radical bookstores and infoshops such as Red Emmas in Baltimore and Bluestockings in New York City
(Kanuga, 2010). Some academics at the University of Lincoln are attempting to develop a cooperatively run social science center that utilizes a social center type autonomous space, where they can practice radical pedagogical
methods (Winn, 2010). The idea is that students will be able to enroll for free and staff will still be paid. We can imagine, based on our experiences and research within social centers in the UK, that this would be controversial
within anarchist circles, both for its relationship with the institution of the university, and also because of its payment of academic staff. Payment for some roles performed within some spaces has been a source of much debate
and contention within social centers within the UK (Chatterton, 2008). "These spaces generally rely on the good will and free time of volunteers. However, many spaces cite burnout and lack of participation as major issues
within social centers (UK Social Centres Network, 2008). The dole autonomy (Aufoeben, 1999), which helped facilitate earlier cycles of struggle, has been very much weakened with successive government attacks on the
It is, perhaps,
through the establishment of self-organized alternative educational practices, and open and
ephemeral institutions that we can start to value ideas for their own merit, rather than capitalist valueto create
spaces and places where we can discard the price tags of commodified knowledge and
instrumental learning, and instead appreciate the value of ideas and concepts
themselves, while rediscovering the subversiveness of teaching.
welfare state, and students increasingly forced to take employment while studying means that there are far fewer people around with the free time to help enable projects such as these.
Liberalism tries to seize control of the state and direct the flow of history; a suturing of
the subject infected by the possibility for fascism. Against this we affirm an anarchy of
Nietzsche famously regarded the free will which is central to most conventional notions of subjectivity as an egregious error. For example, he notes in Human, All Too Human that we do not accuse nature of immorality when
it sends thunderstorms and makes us wet: why do we call the harmful man immoral? Because in the latter case we assume a voluntary commanding free will, in the former necessity. But this distinction is an error.54 Here
Nietzsche seems to be advocating a kind of radical determinism: he views individual actions not as the product of some chimerical free will, but rather as the indirect product of the social and cultural forces which have
constituted the individual who performs those actions. Of course, this has radical implications for political theory. If we understand individual actions as the product of the society and culture which produced the individual,
Indeed, on this reading it would make more sense to execute the system itself, since it is the system that is guilty of manufacturing criminals. Revolutionaries who follow this kind of interpretation would also, perhaps, be less
likely to allow their uprisings to descend into the kind of mindless terror which was, unfortunately, to be found in abundance in France during the 1790s, in Russia during the 1920s and 1930s, or in China during the 1950s. I
say this because the radical denial of free will applies to the rulers as well as the ruled. This point was made, remarkably enough, by Bakunin, who observed in 1869 that the kings, the oppressors, exploiters of all kinds, are as
and Evil, questioning whether there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ego, and, finally, that it is already
determined what is to be designated by thinkingthat I know what thinking is.57 An obvious assault on the old Cartesian concept of subjectivity (I think, therefore I am), Nietzsches critique of consciousness also has
dramatic political meaning. These thinking egosthe rational, autonomous subjects who have dominated political discourse since the Enlightenmentare supposedly the beings who vote in liberal elections, who serve on the
liberal juries which decide the fate of the supposedly autonomous criminals who stand before them, who use the media to inform themselves about issues so that they may form rational opinions, and so on. In short, a whole
host of liberal theories and institutions depend upon a certain idea of subjectivity which is, after Nietzsche, extremely difficult to sustain. This anarchy of the subject makes possible another, possibly even more radical form of
If Nietzsche is right about the status of the subject in the late modern period and an entire
then we must radically rethink
what it means to be human. Previous concepts of subjectivity (and thus previous political theories) focused on being: I am
this autonomous person, I am this rational citizen of a liberal democracy. Nietzsche shifts our
attention to becoming. If, as he argues, the subject has no firm metaphysical ground and no center, if
indeed our subjectivity is in a constant state of flux, then the meaning of our lives must be constantly
changing. It is, of course, somewhat alarming to think that we might have no fixed being, that our essence (if we have one) must reside in a constant stream of transformations. However, the thought of
becoming can also be a very liberating thought. All radical thinking demands change, and Nietzsches demands
more than most. To the conventional radicals demand for social and political change, Nietzsche adds
the demand for a change in our very consciousness, in the way we view our relationship to time and
history. In this sense Nietzsches thought stands as one of the most radical ever conceived, for it
asserts nothing less than this: change is the very heart of who and what we are. And this is true, says Nietzsche,
anarchy, an anarchy of becoming.
tradition of twentieth-century Continental philosophy suggests that his analysis is at least presciently persuasive with regards to the postmodern period
not only of ourselves but of our world. If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were for it some unintended final state, this also must have been reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and
becoming fixed, of being, if in the whole course of its becoming it possessed even for a moment this capability of being, then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all spirit. The fact of
spirit as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being.58 For Nietzsche the world has no teleology, no destination. The forces of history do not direct us toward a Zeitgeist
assures us that nothing is permanent. Oppressive institutions and reactionary ideas will not endure;
these institutions and these ideas are, like the people who created them, nothing more than streams of
becoming. The philosophy of becoming thus suggests that we are in a state of permanent and total revolution, a
revolution against being.59 Becoming also implies the kind of radical personal responsibility which
is so crucial to anarchist theory. We, however, want to become those we arehuman beings who are new, unique,
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.60 Nietzsche views humans not as
finished beings but as works of art, and specifically works in progress. The philosophy of becoming
implies a single ethical imperative: become who you are, create yourself as a
masterpiece. And as Nietzsche argues, this involves creating ones own law. Needless to say, this kind of
radical individual legislation is hardly compatible with the legislative system of any statist order . It is thus
misleading to suggest, as Bruce Detweiler does, that the philosophy of becoming means that the Lefts cry for social justice is based upon an error.61 Detweiler should say that the orthodox Left suffers from this error. The
postmodern Left embraces becoming, and refuses to formulate its emancipatory policies in terms of epistemologically suspect categories of subjectivity. This may seem strangewhom are we liberating?but it is the only way
becoming is bordered by a law after alla visceral, pretheoretical law which says simply, I will not give myself over to the fascist inside me? Perhaps. But I do not believe that this constitutes a fatal flaw of anarcho-becoming.
The possibility of fascism does not strip becoming of its anarchistic implications. Rather, microfascism should be understood as the limit which defines becoming, grants it a definite (albeit fluid and flexible) shape, and
prevents it from dissipating into a politically meaningless gasp of chaos. Foucault reminds us that the limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were
a permanent duel with microfascism, but ironically this duel is actually crucial to the anarchy of
becoming, for it is what channels and focuses that anarchy into a coherent program of political selfcreation. By granting the anarchy of becoming something to define itself against, microfascism takes a
strange forcewhich might otherwise exhaust itself in futile, formless rageand transforms that force
into a powerful postmodern political agenda. Kill your inner fascistthis single, minimal limit
opens up incomprehensibly vast vistas of becoming , for there are surely a billion ways to
fulfill this prescription. And it is a prescription which comes not from the mind but from the viscera as
Nietzsche would surely be delighted to observe. Anarchy of the subject, anarchy of becomingNietzsche lays the foundations for some of the most unique and innovative varieties of anarchist thinking which are to be found in
modem political theory. And yet the usual suspects would be quick to point out that there are powerful elements of Nietzsches thinking which seem to undermine those foundations. Is not der Ubermensch some kind of acting
agent who hopes to impress his will upon human history? And (even more troubling for the postmodern anarchist) doesnt Nietzsches thought, despite all the rhetorical force of its drive towards becoming, return eternally to a
deep concern for being? Nowhere are these twin problems made more manifest than in the works of Martin Heidegger. We must grasp Nietzsches philosophy as the metaphysics of subjectivity Heidegger provocatively
declares.70 Nietzsches thought has to plunge into metaphysics because Being radiates its own essence as will to power; that is, as the sort of thing that in the history of truth of beings must be grasped through the projection
as will to power. The fundamental occurrence of that history is ultimately the transformation of beingness into subjectivity.71 Heideggers deeply disturbing political commitment to the Nazi party makes it tempting, of course,
to dismiss his reading of Nietzsche as reactionary. A subject-centered Nietzscheanism which dams up the river of becoming in a futile attempt to isolate the elusive essence of Beingsurely, says the postmodern anarchist, this
is nothing more than a limit case which shows the extreme ethical and epistemological dangers inherent in the totalitarian liberal consensus of the usual suspects. Yet such a dismissal is too easy. Jean-Francois Lyotard, one
of the foremost French postmodern radicals, has persuasively insisted that one must maintain both assertionsthat of the greatness of [Heideggers] thought and that of the objectionable nature of [his] politicswithout
concluding that if one is true then the other is false.72 For Heideggers thought is great: it provides useful answers to many interpretive questions regarding Nietzsches philosophy, and it helps to tease out some very
interesting answers to some of the most stubborn riddles in Nietzsches writing.73 Controversial and problematic though it is in some ways, there is much to recommend Heideggers interpretation of Nietzsche as the last
metaphysician in the West. For the postmodern anarchist, what is most valuable in Heideggers reading of Nietzsche is precisely this point: Nietzsche stands at a crucial transition point in the intellectual history of the
Western world. He is simultaneously the last metaphysician and the entry into postmodemity. This limits the radical potential of Nietzsches thinking in one sense, for it means that Nietzsches philosophy must contain
elements of a very traditional metaphysics. Yet the unique dual identity of Nietzsches thought also provides that thinking with a multifaceted theoretical versatility which makes it more radical, in another sense, than any
previous philosophy. Yes, the metaphysics of subjectivity lingers in Nietzsches writings, and yes, those writings are haunted by the specter of Being. No one knew this better than Nietzsche. Perhaps this is why he chose to title
his second book Die Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen. Typically translated as Untimely Meditations, this title has also been rendered somewhat less accurately (but perhaps more interestingly, for our present purposes) as
Thoughts Out of Season. This is the essence of Nietzsches thought, to the extent that it can be said to have one. He simultaneously concludes the project of Western metaphysics, and begins to think thoughts whose time has
not yet come. I know my fate, Nietzsche declares in a section of Ecce Homo which the humorless commentator might overlook simply because it is entitled Why I Am a Destiny. One day my name will be associated with the
memory of something tremendousa crisis without equal on earth.74 And Nietzsche is quite careful to emphasize that this is a specifically political crisis: it is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.75
We should not let Nietzsches playful bombast obscure the fact that he is, to a certain extent, right about this. Nietzsches thought does indeed mark the beginning of great politics. Particularly in France, some of the best and
brightest minds of the twentieth century have dedicated substantial portions of their intellectual careers to the project of articulating this new radical politics. Deleuze and Derrida, Baudrillard and Bataille, Lyotard and
Foucault have gone to great lengths to turn the sketch for a postmodern anarchism which is to be found in Nietzsches writings into a full-fledged political philosophy. For Nietzsche himself, however, postmodern anarchism
must remain an agenda for the future. His thought continues to be captive to the metaphysical tradition which it completes. He must leave it to others to articulate the full meaning of the political and philosophical position
political traps faced by all merely modem revolutions. Marxism and nineteenth-century anarchism criticized capital, bourgeois values, and the liberal statebut they did so using the language, the terms, and the theoretical
tools of the very bourgeois order they sought to undermine. Lenin and Mao sought to reshape the state into something which could sanction genuine political and economic freedom, but they retained so many of the old forms
that they ended up reproducing the old varieties of repression and exploitation. The problem for revolutionaries today, as Deleuze argues, is to unite within the purpose of a particular struggle without falling into the despotic
We seek a kind of war machine that will not re-create a state apparatus, a
nomadic unit related to the outside that will not revive an internal despotic unity . Perhaps this is what is most profound in
Nietzsches thought and marks the extent of his break with philosophy, at least so far as it is manifested in the aphorism: he made thought into a machine of
wara battering raminto a nomadic force.76 As always, it is the performative effect of Nietzsches thought, rather than its explicit content, which concerns
and bureaucratic organization of the party or state apparatus.
us. And one crucial effect of his thinking is that it removes philosophy from the horizons of the state. This is an event which is unprecedented in the history of Western thought. And it is an event whose ramifications will
Just as news of the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does
news of the death of the state. But word of these deaths draws inexorably nearer. For no God
and no state can hope to survive a full engagement with that thinking which detonates
all fixed human identities and reveals as mere phantasms of consciousness all fixed
politics, economics, and culture.
continue to be felt for some time.
Politics that does not begin with the creation of the self is doomed to reactivity and
ressentiment. This inscribes hatred into the place of power, reaffirming existing
structures of domination.
Newman 2k (Saul, Professor of Political Theory at the University of London at Goldsmiths, 2000,
Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, Theory and Event, 4:3)
Ressentiment is diagnosed by Nietzsche as our modern condition. In order to understand ressentiment, however, it is necessary to understand the relationship between master morality and slave morality in which
revaluation of values: It was the Jews who, rejecting the aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed) ventured with awe-inspiring consistency, to bring about a reversal and held it in the
'Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the
lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble, the powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel,
lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!'....[5] In this way the slave revolt in morality inverted the noble system of values and began to equate good with
the lowly, the powerless -the slave. This inversion introduced the pernicious spirit of revenge and hatred into the creation of
values. Therefore morality, as we understand it, had its roots in this vengeful will to power of the powerless over
the powerful -the revolt of the slave against the master. It was from this imperceptible, subterranean hatred that grew the values subsequently associated with the good -pity, altruism, meekness, etc.
Political values also grew from this poisonous root. For Nietzsche, values of equality and democracy, which form the cornerstone of
radical political theory, arose out of the slave revolt in morality. They are generated by the same spirit of revenge and hatred of the powerful. Nietzsche
teeth of their unfathomable hatred (the hatred of the powerless), saying,
therefore condemns political movements like liberal democracy, socialism, and indeed anarchism. He sees the democratic movement as an expression of the herd-animal morality derived from the Judeo-Christian revaluation
of values.[6] Anarchism is for Nietzsche the most extreme heir to democratic values -the most rabid expression of the herd instinct. It seeks to level the differences between individuals, to abolish class distinctions, to raze
finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.
[Newman continues . . .]
Has anarchism as a political and social theory of revolution been invalidated because of the contradictions in its conception of human subjectivity? I do not think so. I have exposed a hidden strain of ressentiment in the
essentialist categories and oppositional structures that inhabit anarchist discourse -in notions of a harmonious society governed by natural law and man's essential communality, and its opposition to the artificial law of the
anarchism, if it can free itself from these essentialist and Manichean categories, can
overcome the ressentiment that poisons and limits it. Classical anarchism is a politics of ressentiment
because it seeks to overcome power. It sees power as evil, destructive , something that stultifies the full realization of the individual. Human
State. However I would argue that
essence is a point of departure uncontaminated by power, from which power is resisted. There is, as I have argued, a strict Manichean separation and opposition between the subject and power. However I have shown that this
"...the real is that which always comes back to the same place -to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it."[45] Anarchism attempts to complete the identity of the subject by
separating him, in an absolute Manichean sense, from the world of power. The anarchist subject, as we have seen, is constituted in a 'natural' system that is dialectically opposed to the artificial world of power. Moreover
because the subject is constituted in a 'natural' system governed by ethical laws of mutual cooperation, anarchists are able to posit a society free from relations of power, which will replace the State once it is overthrown.
least are conditioned by relations of power. These essentialist identities and categories cannot be imposed without the radical exclusion of other identities. This exclusion is an act of power. If one attempts to radically exclude
State and political authority. On the contrary, anarchism can more effectively counter political domination by
engaging with, rather than denying, power. Perhaps it is appropriate here to distinguish between relations of
power and relations of domination. To use Michel Foucault's definition, power is a "mode of action upon the action of others."[46] Power is merely the effect of one's actions upon the actions of
another. Nietzsche too sees power in terms of an effect without a subject: "... there is no being behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 'the doer' is invented as an afterthought."[47] Power is not a commodity that can
be possessed, and it cannot be centered in either the institution or the subject. It is merely a relationship of forces, forces that flow between different actors and throughout our everyday actions. Power is everywhere, according
Power does not emanate from institutions like the State -rather it is immanent throughout the
entire social network, through various discourses and knowledges. For instance, rational and moral discourses, which anarchists saw as innocent
to Foucault.[48]
of power and as weapons in the struggle against power, are themselves constituted by power relations and are embroiled in practices of power: "power and knowledge directly imply one another."[49] Power in this sense is
It is therefore senseless and indeed impossible to try to construct, as anarchists do, a world outside power. We will
never be entirely free from relations of power. According to Foucault: "It seems to me that...one is never outside (power), that there are no margins for those who break
with the system to gambol in."[50] However, just because one can never be free from power does not mean that one can never
be free from domination. Domination must be distinguished from power in the following sense. For Foucault, relations of power become relations of
domination when the free and unstable flow of power relations becomes blocked and congealed -when it forms unequal
productive rather than repressive.
hierarchies and no longer allows reciprocal relationships.[51] These relations of domination form the basis of institutions such as the State. The State, according to Foucault, is merely an assemblage of different power relations
that have become congealed in this way. This is a radically different way of looking at institutions such as the State. While anarchists see power as emanating from the State, Foucault sees the State as emanating from power.
The State, in other words, is merely an effect of power relations that have crystallized into relations of
domination. What is the point of this distinction between power and domination? Does this not bring us back to original anarchist position that society and our everyday actions, although oppressed by power,
are ontologically separated from it? In other words, why not merely call domination 'power' once again, and revert back to the original, Manichean distinction between social life and power? However the point of this
distinction is to show that this essential separation is now impossible. Domination -oppressive political institutions like the State -now comes from the same world as power. In other words it disrupts the strict Manichean
separation of society and power. Anarchism and indeed radical politics generally, cannot remain in this comfortable illusion that we as political subjects, are somehow not complicit in the very regime that oppresses us.
According to the Foucauldian definition of power that I have employed, we are all potentially complicit, through our everyday actions, in relations of domination. Our everyday actions, which inevitably involve power, are
easily give rise to further domination. There is always the possibility, then, of contesting domination, and of minimizing its possibilities and effects. According to Foucault, domination itself is unstable and can give rise to
overcoming is itself the imposition of another regime of power. The best that can be hoped for is a reorganization of power relations -through struggle and resistance -in ways that are less oppressive and dominating.
ressentiment notion of power. It undermines the oppositional, Manichean politics of ressentiment because power cannot be externalized in the form of the State or a political institution. There can be no external enemy for us
to define ourselves in opposition to and vent our anger on. It disrupts the Apollonian distinction between the subject and power central to classical anarchism and Manichean radical political philosophy. Apollonian Man, the
essential human subject, is always haunted by Dionysian power. Apollo is the god of light, but also the god of illusion: he "grants repose to individual beings...by drawing boundaries around them." Dionysius, on the other hand
is the force that occasionally destroys these "little circles," disrupting the Apollonian tendency to "congeal the form to Egyptian rigidity and coldness."[54] Behind the Apollonian illusion of a life-world without power, is the
Rather than having an external enemy -like the State -in opposition to
which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must
overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power . One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To
Dionysian 'reality' of power that tears away the "veil of the maya."[55]
affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps
We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will
always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a
will to power -in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.
[57] To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential
political subjects in ways that that dominate us -this is what he calls subjectification.[58] We hide behind essentialist
identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute
opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose . This we have seen in the case of
anarchism. In order to avoid this Manichean logic, anarchism must no longer rely on essentialist identities and concepts, and instead positively affirm the eternal return of power. This is not a grim
realization but rather a 'happy positivism'. It is characterized by political strategies aimed at
minimizing the possibilities of domination, and increasing the possibilities for freedom. If one rejects essentialist
identities, what is one left with? Can one have a notion of radical politics and resistance without an essential subject? One might, however, ask
in the same way, eternal return refers to power.
the opposite question: how can radical politics continue without 'overcoming' essentialist identities, without, in Nietzsche's terms, 'overcoming' man? Nietzsche says: "The most cautious people ask today: 'How may man still be
a philosophy of the strong, rather than the weak . Nietzsche exhorts us to 'live dangerously', to
do away with certainties, to break with essences and structures, and to embrace
uncertainty. "Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into
unchartered seas!" he says.[60] The politics of resistance against domination must take place in a world without guarantees. To remain open to difference and contingency, to affirm the eternal
return of power, would be to become what Nietzsche calls the superman or Overman. The overman is man 'overcome' -the overcoming of man: "God has died: now we desire -that the Superman shall live."[61] For Nietzsche
the Superman replaces God and Man -it comes to redeem a humanity crippled by nihilism, joyously affirming power and eternal return. However I would like to propose a somewhat gentler, more ironic version of the
Superman for radical politics. Ernesto Laclau speaks of "a hero of a new type who still has not been created by our culture, but one whose creation is absolutely necessary if our time is going to live up to its most radical and
Perhaps anarchism could become a new 'heroic' philosophy, which is no longer reactive
but, rather, creates values. For instance, the ethic of mutual care and assistance propounded by Kropotkin could perhaps be utilized in the construction of new forms of collective action and
exhilarating possibilities."[62]
identities. Kropotkin looked at the development of collective groups based on cooperation -trade unions, associations of all kinds, friendly societies and clubs, etc.[63] As we have seen, he believed this to be the unfolding of an
essential natural principle. However, perhaps one could develop this collectivist impulse without circumscribing it in essentialist ideas about human nature. Collective action does not need a principle of human essence to
relationship between equality and freedom. To anarchism's great credit it rejected the liberal conviction that equality and freedom act as limits upon each other and are ultimately irreconcilable concepts. For anarchists,
equality and freedom are inextricably related impulses, and one cannot conceive of one without the other. For Bakunin: I am free only when all human beings surrounding me -men and women alike -are equally free. The
freedom of others, far from limiting or negating my liberty, is on the contrary its necessary condition and confirmation. I become free in the true sense only by virtue of the liberty of others, so much so that the greater the
number of free people surrounding me the deeper and greater and more extensive their liberty, the deeper and larger becomes my liberty.[64] The inter-relatedness of equality and liberty may form the basis of a new collective
ethos, which refuses to see individual freedom and collective equality as limits on each other -which refuses to sacrifice difference in the name of universality, and universality in the name of difference. Foucault's anti-strategic
ethics may be seen as an example of this idea. In his defence of collective movements like the Iranian revolution, Foucault said that the anti-strategic ethics he adopts is "to be respectful when something singular arises, to be
intransigent when power offends against the universal."[65] This anti-strategic approach condemns universalism when it is disdainful of the particular, and condemns particularism when it is at the expense of the universal.
a new ethics of collective action would condemn collectivity when it is at the expense of difference
and singularity, and condemn difference when it is at the expense of collectivity. It is an approach that
allows one to combine individual difference and collective equality in a way which is not dialectical but
which retains a certain positive and life-affirming antagonism between them. It would imply a notion
of respect for difference, without encroaching on the freedom of others to be different -an equality of
freedom of difference. Post-anarchist collective action would, in other words, be based on a
commitment to respect and recognize autonomy, difference and openness within collectivity.
Furthermore, perhaps one could envisage a form of political community or collective identity that did
not restrict difference. The question of community is central to radical politics, including anarchism. One cannot
talk about collective action without at least posing the question of community . For Nietzsche, most modern radical
aspirations towards community were a manifestation of the 'herd' mentality. However it may be
possible to construct a ressentiment-free notion of community from Nietzsche's own concept of power. For Nietzsche, active power is
the individual's instinctive discharge of his [or her] forces and capacities which produces in him [or her] an
enhanced sensation of power, while reactive power, as we have seen, needs an external object to act on and
define itself in opposition to.[66] Perhaps one could imagine a form of community based on active power.
Similarly,
For Nietzsche this enhanced feeling of power may be derived from assistance and benevolence towards others, from enhancing the feeling of power of others.[67] Like the ethics of mutual aid, a community based on will to
Our act of playful self-creation ruptures the processes of political subjectivization that
make liberal violence thinkable
Clifford 1 (Michael, associate professor of philosophy @ Mississippi State Univ, 2k1 [Political
Genealogy after Foucault: Savage Identities, p. 144-146)
the self is not given to us there is no essential identity around which discourse,
power relations, and modes of subjectivation revolve, but rather the subject is an effect of their
interplay. This recognition of the subject as historically contingent effect, rather than essential, metaphysical entity, leads Foucault
to a Nietzschean conclusion, that we have to create ourselves as a work of art. 60 We have to become
involved in an ongoing process of creative self-transformation, of self-overcoming, in a genuinely
Nietzschean sense. Yet when Foucault says that we have to create ourselves, he is not expressing this as a moral demand; it is, rather, a description of our
situation. Constituting ourselves as subjects is a creative endeavor that involves giving meaning style
to our existence, whether we recognize it as such or not. And Foucault is also extending an invitation: he is inviting
us to open a space of freedom for ourselves, a freedom that consists in affirming ourselves as a
creative force. 61 In abandoning any notion of metaphysical essentiality or anthropological necessity regarding who and what
Foucault's genealogical analyses reveal that
we are, we are able to recognize the creative contribution of the subject in the process of his or her own
self-formation. This recognition itself is a kind of liberation , a distancing from the processes of subjection and subjectivization, through
which the power of a particular identity is suspended. In the affirmation, not of a discourse of truth about ourselves as creative beings,
but of creative activity in and for itself, recognition is no longer a determination. Through this affirmation, identity becomes a game , in which
the relationships we have to ourselves are not of unity and coherence, but of difference and creation.
In this way subjectivity becomes, not a limitation, but an art. Perhaps all this sounds too playful for
the serious business of politics. In fact, this is just the sort of play required to break through,
to fracture, the most oppressive forms of political subjection . A whole range of social
problems, from limitations on social opportunities to declarations of war, are in part attributable to
processes of subjectivization. The constitution of a political identity for ourselves involves the
appropriation of values and beliefs that commit us to certain practices-practices that have real
political consequences. We alternately lament or praise such consequences with little or no sense that
their source lies in part in the arbitrary appropriation or imposition of an identity . We condemn the
persecution of minorities, for instance, but how often do we ever really question the endemic processes of
differentiation and identification that divides human beings along line-limits-of race and gender? War
is the most tragic of human dramas, we say, even when it is necessary to secure our liberty, but to what extent is this necessity
tied to an arbitrary drawing of lines-limits-on a map, to the contingency of a national identity that
marshals troops for its perpetuation? The bigot and the dictator are micro- and macrosymbols of our political subjection. We raise our opposition against them willingly,
enthusiastically, thinking that freedom consists simply of overcoming their petty, or global, tyrannies.
We never think to overcome a much finer, more pervasive, less violent but more
pernicious, quotidian form of subjection; that is, we never think to overcome ourselves.
Political subjectivity is played out every day in struggles of domination and submission. Real freedom,
concrete freedom, consists in fracturing the political identities-our liberalism, our conservatism, our patriotism, our individualism-through
which we are bound to, limited by, rationalities that make these struggles necessary. If we can come to
recognize the optionality and lack of necessity of given forms of political subjectivity, we might have a
point of departure for changing (overcoming) certain kinds of real political relations. If this sounds
utopian or idealistic, we have only to consider that most if not all political conflict in this half-century
can be understood as clashes of identity. Most political movements in the last forty years in the United States can be understood in these terms. 62 Such movements have been
(to some degree) successful in upsetting certain entrenched political identifications that had been the basis of their subjection and domination. The resistance that such movements
have raised against their subjection is predicated on a refusal of a subjectival conceptualization and its
limitations. Moreover, we have seen evidence that such refusals have gained wider social acceptance; they increasingly infiltrate the social structure through institutionalization and demarginalization. Of course,
there are backslidings and retrenchments on a fairly regular basis (consider recent legislation to ban gay marriages, or the platform statement of Southern Baptists that wives submit graciously to the servant leadership of
their husbands). Still, in many instances the political battles over identity-women in the military as a policy (though, of course, in practice sexual harassment and discrimination are still very prevalent), for example-have at
least lifted such movements from the shadows and given them an air of legitimacy.
of the state system which must accompany such an expansion) thus stands in precise opposition to Nietzsches model for a healthy culture. Nietzsche also emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the states penal schemes.
Against a liberal orthodoxy which would have us believe that the states punishments refer in some
clear, distinct, and rational way to actual crimes, Nietzsche characterizes punishment as a continuous
sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to
one another.34 Like morality, then, punishment is exposed via genealogical critique as a purely contingent and historical
operation. Also like morality, punishment does not lead to the improvement of culture : punishment
tames men, but it does not make them betterone might with more justice assert the opposite.35 As always,
Nietzsche is the master of reversal, taking the dominant interpretation of the legal-judicial-penal complex and subjecting it to relentless critique until it implodes. Few people have recognized the full implications of Nietzsches
comparison with which the ancient system of cruelty , the forms of primitive regimentation and punishment,
are nothing.36 Contra Rorty, Deleuze suggests that the liberal cure of punishment is in fact far more
terrifying than the disease of cruelty. Deleuze also builds upon another crucial theme from the Genealogy's second essay, the theme of indebtedness. Nietzsche
suggests that we feel an enormous debt toward our ancestors, our tribe, our gods; for Nietzsche, the advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of
guilty indebtedness on earth.37 It is not difficult for Deleuze to transform this critical analysis of cultural debt into a political and economic critique. Deleuze describes the development of feelings of indebtedness as the
growth of reactive forces: the association of reactive forces is thus accompanied by a transformation of the debt; this becomes a debt toward divinity, toward society, toward the State, toward reactive instances.38
Deleuze radicalizes the discussion of the debt by adding a discussion of money: moneythe circulation of moneyis the means for rendering the debt infinite. ... the abolition of debts or their accountable transformation
initiates the duty of an interminable service to the State that subordinates all the primitive alliances to itself.39 In Deleuzes capable hands, the category of the debt becomes the instrument of an extremely radical, and indeed
anarchistic, critique of the state system and the economies associated with that system. Postmodern bourgeois liberals would presumably like to dismiss Deleuzes reading of Nietzsche as an outrageous left-wing polemic
which has no textual basis in Nietzsches writings. But they can do so only by ignoring the extensive critique of bourgeois culture and capitalist values which is present in Nietzsches work, particularly in his earlier books.40 We
find the young Nietzsche making remarks which would have fit quite easily into the nineteenth-century radical tradition. In Daybreak Nietzsche criticizes the privileging of exchange value over use value: the man engaged in
commerce understands how to appraise everything without having made it, and to appraise it according to the needs of the consumer, not according to his own needs.41 This remarkable work even contains a critique of
alienated labor which would find itself quite at home on the pages of the Communist Manifesto. To the devil with setting a price on oneself in exchange for which one ceases to be a person and becomes part of a machine!42
Of course, Nietzsches primary objection to capitalism is not social or economic, but cultural. There exists a species of misemployed and appropriated culturehe tells us in Schopenhauer as Educator. You have only to look
around you! And precisely those forces at present most actively engaged in promoting culture do so for reasons they reserve to themselves and not out of pure disinterestedness. Among these forces is, first of all, the greed of
the moneymakers, which requires the assistance of culture and by way of thanks assists culture in return, but at the same time, of course, would like to dictate its standards and objectives.43 Marx and Bakunin have already
warned of the social injustices which capitalism engenders. Nietzsche adds a cultural dimension to this critique, pointing out that the unrelenting emphasis on profit tends to eclipse more authentic cultural concerns. (Today we
measure the quality of films in terms of their box office receipts and the quality of political candidates in terms of their campaign war chests; Nietzsches critique is probably more relevant than ever.) The young Nietzsche also
denounces the state as the accomplice of these culturally decadent money-makers. Nowadays the crudest and most evil forces, the egoism of the money-makers and the military despots, hold sway over almost everything on
earth. In the hands of these despots and moneymakers, the state certainly makes an attempt to organize everything anew out of itself and to bind and constrain all those mutually hostile forces: that is to say, it wants men to
render it the same idolatry they formerly rendered the church.44 Here the state sounds a bit like Marxs executive committee of the bourgeoisie, but in Nietzsches view the state is actually even more dangerous than that. By
describing the state as an idol, Nietzsche makes it hard to imagine that any state, even a utopian workers state, could possibly provide any meaningful human liberation. And if the state is an idol, then the Nietzschean
philosophers job is to approach it as she approaches all idols: with a hammer. Nietzsche returns to this theme in a famous section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra entitled On the New Idol. Here Zarathustra characterizes the state
as an instrument of the herd. All-too-many are born: for the superfluous the state was invented.45 The state is described as life-denying; as always, this is one of Nietzsches most powerful critiques. State I call it where all
drink poison, the good and the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; state, where the slow suicide of all is called life.46 Nietzsches critique of the state in general certainly includes a critique of the
always advocates independent thought: perhaps there will one day be laughter at that which nowadays counts as moral among the younger generation brought up under parliamentary institutions: namely, to set the policy of
Free, creative thought is for Nietzsche the only possible source of authentic
culture. But such thinking stands in stark opposition to the restrictive cultural and
political consensuses enforced by modern liberal states.
the party above ones own wisdom.50