a.
NPV for each of the two projects, at various discount rates, is tabulated below.
NPVA = $20,000 + [$8,000 annuity factor (r%, 3 years)]
= $20,000 +
NPVB =
Discount Rate
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
$20,000
NPVA
$4,000
3,071
2,201
1,384
617
105
785
1,427
2,033
2,606
3,148
3
r r (1 r )
$8,000
$25,000
(1 r )3
NPVB
$5,000
3,558
2,225
990
154
1,217
2,205
3,126
3,984
4,784
5,532
From the NPV profile, it can be seen that Project A is preferred over Project B if
the discount rate is above 4%. At 4% and below, Project B has the higher NPV.
b.
IRRA = discount rate (r), which is the solution to the following equation:
$20,000
3
r r (1 r )
r = IRRA = 9.70%
$8,000
IRRB = discount rate (r), which is the solution to the following equation:
$20,000
$25,000
(1 r )3 = 0 IRRB = 7.72%
34.
a.
$100,000
Discount
rate
growth
rate
0
.
10
0
.
05
Present value =
NPV = $80,000 + $100,000 = $20,000
b.
Recall that the IRR is the discount rate that makes NPV equal to zero:
( Investment) + (PV of cash flows discounted at IRR) = 0
$80,000
$5,000
0
IRR 0.05
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
b.
c.
Stock
Market
Return
15.77
5.61
37.23
28.30
17.16
Total
Average
T-Bill
Return
4.80
4.66
1.60
0.10
0.12
Risk
Premium
Deviation
from Mean
10.97
0.95
38.83
28.20
17.04
18.33
3.67
7.30
2.72
42.50
24.53
13.37
Squared
Deviation
53.35
7.38
1,805.91
601.92
178.86
2,647.42
529.48
16.
Escapist Films:
$0 ($18 $25)
28%
$
25
Boom:
$1 ($ 26 $25)
8%
$25
Normal:
$3 ($34 $25)
48%
$
25
Recession:
r
( 28) 8 48
9.33%
3
1
1
1
(28 9.33) 2 (8 9.33) 2 (48 9.33) 2 963.56
3
3
Variance = 3
Cha 12
6.
a.
The expected cash flows from the firm are in the form of a perpetuity. The
discount rate is:
rf + (rm rf) = 4% + 0.4 (11% 4%) = 6.8%
Therefore, the value of the firm would be:
cash flow $10,000
P0
$147,058.82
r
0.068
b.
If the true beta is actually 0.6, the discount rate should be:
rf + (rm rf) = 4% + [0.6 (11% 4%)] = 8.2%
Therefore, the value of the firm is:
P0
$121,951.22
r
0.082
7.
11%
7% = market risk
premium
4%
beta
0
Beta
1.0
0.0
2.0
0.4
1.6
13.
Cost of
Capital
11.0%
4.0%
18.0%
6.8%
15.2%
1.0
IRR
NPV
14%
6%
18%
7%
20%
+
+
0
+
+
= $100 + $15
1
1
$25.29
10
0.152 0.152 (1.152)
21. We can use the CAPM to derive the cost of capital for these firms:
r = rf + (rm rf) = 5% + ( 7%)
Beta
1.22
1.44
.39
.59
Cisco
Apple
Hershey
Coca-Cola
29.
Cost of Capital
13.54%
15.08%
7.73%
9.13%
a.
b.
Cha6
11.
a.
With a par value of $1,000 and a coupon rate of 8%, the bondholder
receives $80 per year.
b.
c.
1
1
$1,000
$1,065.15
9
9
0.07 0.07 (1.07) (1.07)
PV $80
$1,000
1
1
$1,136.03
9
9
0.06 0.06 (1.06) (1.06)
PV $80
18.
a.
The coupon rate must be 7% because the bonds were issued at face value
with a yield to maturity of 7%. Now the price is:
$1,000
1
1
$641.01
8
1.15 8
0.15 0.15(1.15)
PV $70
b.
The investors pay $641.01 for the bond. They expect to receive the promised
coupons plus $800 at maturity. We calculate the yield to maturity based on these
expectations by solving the following equation for r:
1
1
$800
8
8
r r (1 r ) (1 r ) r = 12.87%
$641.01 $70
Cha7
42.
DIV1=$1
DIV2=$2
DIV3=$3
g=0.06P3=($31.06)/(0.140.06)=$39.75
P0
$1
$2
$3 $39.75
$31.27
2
1.14 (1.14)
(1.14)3
Cha13
8.
The rate on Buildwells debt is 5%. The cost of equity capital is the required rate
of return on equity, which can be calculated from the CAPM as follows:
4% + (0.90 8%) = 11.2%
The weighted-average cost of capital, with a tax rate of 40%, is:
D
E
WACC
rdebt (1 TC ) requity
V
V
a.
The 9% coupon bond has a yield to maturity of 10% and sells for 93.86% of
face value, as shown below:
$1,000
1
1
$938.55
10
10
0.10 0.10(1.10) 1.10
PV $90
1
$1,000
15
15
r r (1 r ) (1 r ) r = 10.83%
$940 $100
18.77
23.50
b.
Cha16
21.
Home Depots interest expense is given in Table 3-3 as $676 million. Its annual
interest tax shield is 0.35 $676 = $236.6 million.
If the company plans to maintain its current debt level indefinitely, then we can find
the present value of the stream of tax savings using the no-growth valuation model.
(See Chapter 6.) The discount rate for the tax shield is 8%. Therefore, the present
value of the perpetuity of tax savings is:
PV
23.
$2,957.5 million
r
0.08
a.
b.
40
120
WACC
8% (1 0.35)
15% 12.55%
160
160
c.
Annual tax shield = 0.35 interest expense = 0.35 (0.08 $40) = $1.12
PV tax shield = $1.12 annuity factor (8%, 5 years)
1
1
$4.47
5
0.08 0.08 (1.08)
$1.12
28.
a.
b.
$162,500
r
0.10
The value of the firm increases by the present value of the interest tax shield:
0.35 $50,000 = $17,500
c.
37.
AlphaCorpismoreprofitableandisthereforeabletorelytoagreaterextenton
internalfinance(retainedearnings)asasourceofcapital.Itwillthereforehave
lessdependenceondebtandhavethelowerdebtratio.
a. In the absence of taxes, WACC and rdebt do not change. The requity increases with
increased leverage.
Debt-Equity
Ratio
D/(D + E)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
0.000
0.091
0.167
0.231
0.286
0.333
0.375
0.412
0.444
0.474
0.500
0.524
0.545
0.565
0.583
0.600
0.615
0.630
0.643
0.655
0.667
0.677
0.688
0.697
0.706
0.714
requity
0.125
0.128
0.130
0.133
0.135
0.138
0.140
0.143
0.145
0.148
0.150
0.153
0.155
0.158
0.160
0.163
0.165
0.168
0.170
0.173
0.175
0.178
0.180
0.183
0.185
0.188
WACC
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
rdebt
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
b. When the corporate tax rate is 35%, the WACC cost declines with increases in
leverage. The optimal capital structure seems to be 100% debt financing.
Debt-Equity
Ratio
D/(D + E)
0.000
0.125
0.125
0.100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
0.091
0.167
0.231
0.286
0.333
0.375
0.412
0.444
0.474
0.500
0.524
0.545
0.565
0.583
0.600
0.615
0.630
0.643
0.655
0.667
0.677
0.688
0.697
0.706
0.714
0.128
0.130
0.133
0.135
0.138
0.140
0.143
0.145
0.148
0.150
0.153
0.155
0.158
0.160
0.163
0.165
0.168
0.170
0.173
0.175
0.178
0.180
0.183
0.185
0.188
0.122
0.119
0.117
0.115
0.113
0.112
0.111
0.109
0.108
0.108
0.107
0.106
0.105
0.105
0.104
0.103
0.103
0.103
0.102
0.102
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
requity
WACC
rdebt
c. What is not considered in the optimal capital structure seemingly implied by part (c) is
the increased risk associated with higher debt levelsrdebt will increase with the debtequity ratio.
Cha17
13.
19.
a.
The pension fund pays no taxes. The corporation pays taxes equal to 35% of
capital gains income and 35% (1 0.70) = 10.5% of dividend income.
The individual pays 15% taxes on dividends and 10% taxes on capital gains.
Therefore, the after-tax rate of return for each investor equals:
dividend (1 dividend tax) capital gains (1 capital gains rate)
price
We can use this formula to construct the following table of after-tax returns:
Stock
Pension
Investor
Corporation
A
B
C
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
6.500%
7.725%
8.950%
b.
Individual
9.00%
8.75%
8.50%
P0
P0
($ 5 0.5) ($ 5 0.8)
$81.25
0.08
P0
The increase in stock prices reflects the positive information contained in the
dividend increase. The stock-price increase can be interpreted as a reflection of a
new assessment of the firms prospects, not as a reflection of investors
preferences for high dividend payout ratios.
21. a. The risk in the firm is determined by the variability in cash flows, not payout
policy. Managers can stabilize dividends and cannot control stock prices, so
dividends are stable and capital gains less predictable. However, the risks of the
firm are unchanged by its payout policy. As long as investment policy and
borrowing are held constant, a firms overall cash flows are the same regardless of
payouts as dividends or repurchases.
b. The causation in this statement is reversed: Safer companies pay more generous
dividends because their forecast cash flows are more predictable. Again, the risks
of the firm are unchanged by its payout policy. A firm cannot change the
outcomes of its investment policy by changing its payout policy.
Cha21
6.
Premerger data:
Acquiring: Value = 10,000,000 $40 = $400,000,000
Takeover Target: Value = 5,000,000 $20 = $100,000,000
Gain from merger = $25,000,000
The merger gain per share of Takeover Target is $25 million/5 million shares = $5.
Thus, Acquiring can pay up to $25 per share for Target, $5 above the current
price. If Acquiring pays this amount, the NPV of the merger to Acquiring will be
zero.
8.
9.
a.
b.
c.
a.
10.
b.
The cost of the stock alternative is $8.125 million. This is the increase in the
value of the stock held by Pogo shareholders.
c.
NPV = $1.875 million. This equals the decrease in the value of the
stock held by Velcros original shareholders. It also equals gains from
the merger, $6.25 million, minus the cost of the stock purchase, $8.125
million.
a.
At a price of $25 per share, Immense will have to pay $25 million to
Sleepy. The current value of Sleepy is $20 million, and Immense believes
it can increase the value by $5 million. So Immense would have to pay the
full value of the target firm under the improved management; therefore,
the deal would be a zero-NPV proposition for Immense. The deal is just
barely acceptable for shareholders of Immense and clearly attractive for
Sleepy's shareholders. Therefore, it can be accomplished on a friendly
basis.
b.
12.
If Sleepy tries to get $28 a share, the deal will have negative NPV to
Immense shareholders. There could not be a friendly takeover on this basis.
b.
SCC will sell for its original price plus the per-share NPV of the merger:
$50 + ($10,000/3,000) = $53.33, which represents a 6.66% gain
The price of SDP will increase from $17.50 to the tender price of $20, a
percentage gain of $2.50/$17.50 = 0.1429 = 14.29%.
c.
d.