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Times Law Reports/2002/March/(2002) Times, 29 March/Campbell v MGN Ltd - (2002) Times, 29 March

Campbell v MGN Ltd

(2002) Times, 29 March
Confidence -- publication of personal details having badge of confidentiality --court should protect public
figure against publication unless justifiable
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Published 29 March 2002
Before Mr Justice Morland
Judgment March 27, 2002
The court should protect from publication and give remedies for wrongful publication, in breach of
confidence, of details which had the mark and badge of confidentiality of the private life which a celebrity or
public figure had chosen not to put in the public domain, unless publication was justifiable despite the breach
of confidentiality and the private nature of the information.
The three requirements laid down in the first data protection principle under section 4 of the Data Protection
Act 1998 were cumulative, so a defendant that did not fulfil those requirements had contravened that Act.
Mr Justice Morland so held in the Queen's Bench Division, in a reserved judgment, when allowing Naomi
Campbell's claim for damages for breach of confidentiality and compensation under section 13 of the 1998
Act in respect of articles with accompanying photographs published by the defendant, MGN Ltd, the owner of
The Mirror, on Thursday February 1, 2001 and Monday February 5, 2001.
A claim for damages for infringement of privacy was not pursued.
Mr Andrew Caldecott, QC and Mr Antony White, QC, for Ms Campbell; Mr Desmond Browne, QC, Mr Mark
Warby and Miss Anna Coppola for Mirror Group Newspapers.

MR JUSTICE MORLAND
said that Naomi Campbell was an internationally renowned fashion model and celebrity.
The articles had revealed that contrary to her previous false assertions she was a drug addict and that she
was attending meetings of Narcotics Anonymous to beat her addiction.
Some details of those meetings were published in The Mirror together with photographs of her leaving a
meeting in Chelsea.

The claimant accepted that The Mirror was entitled to publish that she was a drug addict and the fact that
she was having therapy, but contended that the information that the therapy was being obtained through
Narcotics Anonymous and the details of her attendance at meetings were private and confidential matters
and that there was no overriding public interest justifying their publication.
The defendant denied that it had acted in breach of confidence, that the information published was sensitive
personal data and that the defendant was in breach of any duty under the 1998 Act.
It pleaded that if and to the extent that the information published was confidential, its publication was
legitimate in that the public interest in favour of publication outweighed any public interest in the protection of
Naomi Campbell's rights of confidentiality.
It also contended that she had not only been for many years the subject of extensive media attention and
coverage relating to her private and personal life, activities and conduct but also she had courted such
attention and coverage including voluntarily disclosing otherwise inaccessible details about her private and
personal life and feelings.
Although she had discussed with the media that she had undergone therapy for behavioural problems and
anger management, she had falsely and publicly asserted that she had not fallen prey to drug abuse thereby
misleading the public.
Breach of confidence
His Lordship said that to succeed in her claim for breach of confidentiality, the claimant had to establish three
things:

1 That the details given by the publications complained of about her attendance at Narcotics
Anonymous meetings had the necessary quality of confidence about them.

His Lordship said the details of the claimant's attendance at Narcotics Anonymous did have the necessary
quality of confidence about them.
Information relating to her therapy for drug addiction giving details that it was by regular attendance at
Narcotics Anonymous meetings was easily identifiable as private and disclosure of that information would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.

2 That those details must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of
confidence.

It was for the court viewing the circumstances objectively to determine whether the defendant was clothed in
conscience with the duty of confidentiality. In this case it was when it received the information.

That the publication of the details must have been to the claimant's detriment.

His Lordship said that publication of information about details of her therapy in regularly attending meetings
of Narcotics Anonymous was to her detriment. It was, viewed objectively, likely to affect adversely her
attendance and participation in therapy meetings.

Although many aspects of the private lives of celebrities and public figures would inevitably enter the public
domain, it did not follow that even with self-publicists every aspect and detail of their private lives was
legitimate quarry for the journalist. They were entitled to some space or privacy.
The media to conform with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights should respect
information about aspects or details of the private lives of celebrities and public figures which they
legitimately chose to keep private, and certainly sensitive personal data, unless there was an overriding
public interest duty to publish consistent with article 10.2.
The public had a need to know that Naomi Campbell had been misleading the public by her denials of drug
addiction and balanced and positive journalism demanded that the public be told that she was receiving
therapy for her drug addiction.
Clearly The Mirror was fully entitled to put the record straight and publish that her denials of drug addiction
were deliberately misleading.
She might have been thought of and indeed she herself seemed to be a self-appointed role model to young
black women.
However, consistent with article 8 the court should protect from publication and give remedies for the
wrongful publication in breach of confidence of details, which had the mark and badge of confidentiality, of
the private life which a celebrity or public figure had chosen not to put in the public domain unless despite the
breach of confidentiality and the private nature of the information publication is justifiable.
Article 10 was not an unqualified right as article 10.2 required that respect for the right of privacy had to be
shown.
Striking the balance between articles 8 and 10 and having full regard to section 12(4) of the Human Rights
Act 1998, the claimant was entitled to damages and/or compensation.
Data Protection Act 1998
In considering the Data Protection Act 1998, his Lordship said that the information as to the nature of and
details of the therapy that the claimant was receiving at Narcotics Anonymous including the photographs with
captions was sensitive personal data within Schedule 3 to that Act as it was clearly information as to her
physical or mental health or condition.
The defendant was not exempted from liability under section 32 of the 1998 Act because that section dealt
only with pre-publication processing.
It was aimed at limiting a proportionate restraint on freedom of expression by publication such as the granting
of injunctions to stop publication.
The three requirements laid down in the first data protection principle under section 4 of the 1998 Act were
cumulative.

The processing must have been fair, lawful, and must not have been processed unless at least one of the
conditions in Schedule 2 was met, and in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in
Schedule 3 was also met.
The defendant did not fulfil any of those requirements, and so had contravened the Act.
Further, the defendant utterly failed to establish a section 13(3) defence which provided that it was a defence
to prove that it had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the
requirement concerned.
Compensation was governed by section 13 of the 1998 Act. The word "damage" as referred to in sections
13(1) and 13(2)(a) meant special or financial damages in contra-distinction to distress in the shape of injury
to feelings.
His Lordship was satisfied that the claimant genuinely suffered distress and injury to feelings caused by the
unjustified publication and disclosure of details of her therapy in the two articles complained of, and assessed
damages or compensation in the sum of 2,500.
In addition, the claimant was entitled to aggravated damages in the sum of 1,000.
Solicitors: Schilling & Lom & Partners; Davenport Lyons.
Copyright Times Newspapers Ltd and Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd 2002